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There is a confusing diversity of conceptions of ‘the self’ in philosophical, 
psychological, psychiatric, and neuroscientific discourse. To remedy this, I 
propose and defend a naturalistic view of the self: the system view. The self 
is here conceived of as the complex and dynamic system of our higher-level 
self-monitoring functions,  including our capacities for self-representation 
over time. These are grounded in more basic self-representational capacities 
that are widespread among different species. On the system view, the self is 
not to be confounded with the attributes of personhood, as it often has been 
in philosophical discourse. Nor is the self over time a product of memory, 
as philosophers in Locke’s tradition, and some popular intuitions, seem to 
take it to be. I discuss the complex nature of autobiographical memory and 
argue  that,  given  that  much  of  our  autobiographical  remembering  is 
already a reconstructive process, the self is not produced by our memories, 
but is the system that produces them. The system view is also opposed to 
currently fashionable views of the self as ‘narrative’.  Narrative construc-
tionism about the self has an authorship problem: it does not account for 
the processes that enable and subserve narration about oneself in the first 
place. I argue that it is in these processes, rather than in their productions, 
that we should conceptually locate the self. Neither should we take narrat-
ive capacities to be essential for a self. To illustrate the advantages of the 
system view, I discuss autism spectrum conditions and other defects and 
disorders such as dementia, dissociative disorders, and schizophrenia. In 
these conditions,  particular self-representational capacities are differently 
configured, impaired, or absent, but this does not entail a wholesale loss or 
lack of self. Instead, such conditions are better characterized as specific sys-
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‘The self’ can be conceptualized in various ways—as a subject of experi-
ence, as the locus of ‘personal identity’, as a fictional construct, as a moral 
and social agent, etc. (Gallagher, 2011a). So diverse are these conceptions 
that Eric Olson (1998) has argued that, given the absence of an ‘agreed use 
of the term ‘self”’, we should abandon talk of selves altogether. 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  however,  publications  on  the  self—by 
philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists—have pro-
liferated; some aimed at academic, some at lay audiences. Ignoring for the 
moment the countless articles on the self published in academic journals 
catering to various disciplines, already a brief (and, no doubt, incomplete) 
survey of books with ‘self’ (or ‘ego’) in the title or subtitle published in the 
last twenty years reveals the diversity of their concerns. The philosopher 
Marya Schechtman, in The Constitution of Selves (1996), defends a narrative 
constructionist view of the self,  as does Valerie Hardcastle in Constructing 1
the Self (2008). The neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger, in his monument-
al Being No One: The self-model theory of subjectivity  (2003) and in The Ego 
Tunnel (2009), takes the view that the self as traditionally conceived is an 
illusion; and so does the psychologist Bruce Hood in The Self Illusion (2012). 
Richard Sorabji’s  Self  (2006)  covers  the  philosophy of  self,  identity,  self-
awareness,  and  mortality  from the  ancients  to  the  present.  Dan  Zahavi 
(2005)  and J.   J.  Valberg (2007)  take phenomenological  approaches to the 
self. Galen Strawson offers a ‘revisionary metaphysics’ of the self in Selves 
(2009). Meanwhile, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio revisits and revises 
his earlier (1999) writings on the neurological basis of the self in Self Comes 
 See my chs. 5–6.1
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to  Mind  (2010).  A companion piece  to  Damasio  is  Patricia  Churchland’s 
Touching a Nerve (2013), whose ontologically bold subtitle The Self as Brain 
changes  to  a  more  non-committal  Our  Brains,  Our  Selves  in  the  second 
edition. Then, John Doris’s Talking to Our Selves (2015) takes a psychologic-
ally informed social constructionist approach, not only to the self, but to 
agency. At the other end of the ontological spectrum between simple and 
constructionist conceptions of the self, Geoffrey Madell endorses a ‘simple’ 
view of personal identity in The Essence of the Self (2015). Towering over all 
these is The Oxford Handbook of the Self edited by Shaun Gallagher (2011b), 
whose thirty-seven contributors are philosophers, psychologists, psychiat-
rists, and neuroscientists, covering the self in the history of Western philo-
sophy, bodily selves, the phenomenology and metaphysics of self, personal 
identity, narrative identity, self-knowledge, actions and morality, self patho-
logies, and the self in pragmatist thought and social constructionism.
This diversity of titles and topics seems to support Olson’s complaint 
that there is little accord on what the self is—indeed, a compendium like 
the Oxford Handbook  seems almost to celebrate the variety of conceptions 
and definitions of ‘the self’  in current academic discourse.  On the other 
hand, the sheer volume of recent treatments of ‘the self’ under that label 
makes it apparent that his suggestion that we abandon the term has not, so 
far, met (and looks, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to meet) with much 
agreement—quite the reverse. Yet, not only philosophers, but also psycho-
logists frequently fail to explain what they mean by ‘the self’ (Klein, 2012a). 
The challenge, then, is to bring some order to the current conceptual disar-
ray about the self. That is the object of this thesis. 
I here offer a view of the self that is both empirically informed and (I 
hope) empirically fruitful, and that seeks to avoid the confusions and mis-
conceptions in the recent (and not so recent) philosophical and psycholo-
gical literature on the self. My view of the self is that it is a functional sys-
tem, both complex and dynamic. In this chapter, I will motivate and explain 
this  view, highlight some of  its  advantages,  and preview the arguments 
against rival views that I develop in subsequent chapters.
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1.2  Main claims
In brief,  my main claims are these.  First,  there is  a  self  in a meaningful 
sense, grounded in empirical considerations—but not as a simple, indivis-
ible and invariable entity (§ 1.3). Rather, the self is a complex and dynamic 
functional system (§ 1.4). Secondly, this complex and dynamic self is not a 
construct  from memory and/or narratives but,  instead,  engages in their 
construction (§ 1.5). The bulk of my thesis (especially chs. 4–6) is a protrac-
ted argument in support of this second claim.
My system view of the self (§ 1.4) entails three subsidiary claims, two 
of which I’ll revisit in later chapters. First, persistence conditions of the self 
depend on those of the material entity in which it is realized, i.e. the brain 
(§  1.6.1).  Secondly,  and relatedly,  questions  about  the  self  are  separable 
from, and prior to, questions about ‘personal identity’ (§ 1.6.2 and § 2.4). 
Thirdly, there is one self per brain, synchronically and diachronically (§ 1.7 
and § 8.3).
1.3  No self?
Despite the plethora of recent works on some notion or other of ‘the self’ 
cited in the introduction, it remains a recurring challenge for an apprentice 
philosopher writing a thesis on the self—both in conversations with other 
philosophers and in studying the relevant literature—to defend the view 
that we should entertain any such notion at all.  For, alongside those ex-
pounding  different  conceptions  of  the  self,  there  are  not  a  few sceptics 
about, and outright deniers of, the self in the history of Western philosophy, 
most famously David Hume (of whom more shortly). Among the promin-
ent self deniers in 20th-century analytic philosophy, Richard Sorabji (2006) 
names  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  his  disciples  Elizabeth  Anscombe—whose 
(1975) startling conclusion that ‘I’ does not refer to anything is perhaps one of 
the  absurdest  outcrops  of  ‘analytic’  philosophy—and Norman Malcolm; 
further, Anthony Kenny and Daniel Dennett. 
With the exception of Dennett (who is not actually a self denier, but a 
fictionalist—see §  5.3.3),  I  will  not discuss their views here.  Rather,  I  at-
tempt to show in this and the next section, by discussing Hume’s scepti-
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cism and some more recent contributions to the literature, that there is  a 
case for talking about ‘the self’—but under a conceptualization that takes 
seriously some of the difficulties that made Hume forbear to discuss the 
self in all but his earliest work. It is worth recalling Hume’s difficulties, in 
§ I.iv.6 of his Treatise (1739/1978), at some length:
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must con-
tinue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is 
suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant 
and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations 
succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, there-
fore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of 
self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea.  
. . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at 
any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. . . . If any one upon serious and unprejudic’d reflection, thinks 
he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer 
with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, 
and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, 
perceive something simple and continu’d, which he calls himself; tho’ I am 
certain there is no such principle in me.  
But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to 
affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collec-
tion of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceiv-
able rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . (pp. 251–2)
Hume here makes two connected assumptions that, on but the slightest 
consideration, seem dubious. While these two assumptions explain Hume’s 
denial of the self in this passage, questioning them shows that such denial 
is rather precipitate. Hume’s first assumption is that the self should be in-
trospectible as such—or, more precisely, that the idea of self can only result 
from a corresponding impression, which in this case would have to be the 
result of introspection. Leaving aside a lengthy consideration of the Empir-
icist doctrine of ideas being always derived from impressions, it will suffice 
to  note  that  even Hume’s  system allows that  ideas  can  be  complex  and 
thereby not necessarily a reflection of a single impression.  If, then, the idea 2
 ‘I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corres2 -
ponded to them’ (Hume, 1739/1978, I.i.1, p. 3).
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of self were a complex one, it would be unsurprising for it not to be un-
derwritten by a single impression and therefore not made directly apparent 
in introspection. 
But the self Hume fails to locate amid his impressions is conceived as 
something simple  and invariable,  ‘since self  is suppos’d to exist after that 
manner’.  Hume here takes this supposed conception of the self  as read, 
without telling us why, or by whom, it is so supposed.  Whatever its ante3 -
cedents, this conception of self as simple and invariable is Hume’s second 
dubious assumption, and the one that leads him to deny that there is such a 
thing: the ‘perpetual flux and movement’ of perceptions rules out such a 
self. Yet, as Hume goes on,
we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as 
a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link’d 
together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, des-
troy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their 
correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impres-
sions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it 
is expell’d in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more prop-
erly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several 
members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordina-
tion, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in 
the incessant changes of its  parts.  And as the same individual republic 
may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in 
like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as 
well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. (p. 261)
Hume here speaks of the ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ and attributes to them qualities 
of compositionality and changeability. And he points out that such mental 
mutability is no bar to the preservation of an individual’s identity. Might 
not therefore an individual’s self, appropriately construed, have these same 
qualities of compositionality and changeability? William James (1890) takes 
such a view,  as  do those philosophers  and psychologists  after  him (e.g. 
Mead, Gergen, Bruner, Schechtman) who espouse some form of construc-
tionist theory of the self (of which more anon).
 Writing within a century of Descartes’s (1641) Meditations—and while in France—3
Hume may have had something like a Cartesian ego in mind: a simple, indivisible, 
and immaterial substance.
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Notwithstanding these 20th-century accounts of the self, Thomas Met-
zinger begins his provocatively titled Being No One  (2003) by contending 
that ‘Nobody ever was or had a self’ (p. 1). But he then, on the basis of both 
our neurobiology and our phenomenology, posits a phenomenal self-model 
(PSM) whose contents are an integration of ‘your current bodily sensations, 
your present emotional situation, plus all the contents of your phenomen-
ally experienced cognitive processing’ (p. 299). And it is the activity of the 
PSM that gives us a sense of self.  So, on the one hand, Metzinger presents 4
an intricate and elaborate theory of a neurophenomenomal system that one 
might  conceptualize  as  ‘the  self’—on the  other  hand,  he  maintains  that 
there is no such thing as a self. This may well apply to ‘the self’ understood 
a priori as an ontologically simple—indivisible, unchanging—entity. But we 
could still allow that a self could be conceived of as something more com-
plex and dynamic.
Why does Metzinger, like Hume, seem to take the view of the self as a 
simple  and  invariable  entity  as  the  default  conceptualization?  Whereas 
Hume may have had the excuse that,  in  his  time,  the self  was perhaps 
widely—if not universally—‘suppos’d to exist after that manner’, the same 
cannot be said for Metzinger, before whom quite a number of philosophers 
and psychologists have ventured to give accounts of the self under more 
complex descriptions.
Is, perhaps, the conception of self as a simple invariable entity more 
attuned  to  our  ordinary  use  of  the  term?  No.  As  Patricia  Churchland 
(2002a) observes, popular discourse concerning the self is highly unsystem-
atic and often metaphorical, sometimes equating ‘self’ with ‘body’, some-
times distinguishing ‘self’ from ‘body’; sometimes conceiving of ‘self’ as an 
object and sometimes a subject; sometimes taking ‘self’ to mean ‘person’, 
sometimes just some of a person’s attributes and dispositions.
What the nonsystematic character of metaphorical language suggests is that 
the  self  is  not  a  thoroughly  coherent,  single,  unified  representational 
scheme about which we have thoroughly coherent, unified beliefs. Rather, 




In other words, far from committing to a Cartesian-ego-like view of the self, 
ordinary discourse supports conceiving of the self as a composite, rather 
than a single and invariable entity.
As it happens, Hume himself had second thoughts about what the self 
might be, as attested in the Appendix to his Treatise (1739/1978):
When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without 
some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the 
perceptions. ’Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.  
(p. 634, third emphasis added)
Here, while repeating his earlier insistence that his self is not introspectible 
on its own, Hume now admits the notion of the self as a composite. (This 
still leaves him with the puzzle as to how we are able to perceive the con-
nection between our distinct perceptions and thus how they form the self, 
but here perhaps Hume is too empiricist for his own good. For one thing, it 
is not necessary for a composite self that we should by mere introspection 
be  able  to  perceive  all  the  connections  between  its  parts.  For  another, 
Hume’s own account of the compositional nature of the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ 
quoted above can readily be transposed to the self.)
In sum, I agree with Hume (and Metzinger) that there is no self con-
ceived as something both simple and invariable. This, however, does not rule 
out a conception of the self as both complex and dynamic, and it is such a 
conception of the self that I now propose we should adopt.
1.4  A complex dynamic system
There should be nothing particularly startling about the suggestion that the 
self is something complex. It often happens that, in the light of empirical 
observations, ideas that initially seemed to denote something simple turn 
out to be about complex phenomena. Take the example of air.  The Ancients 5
thought air to be one of only four elements, the four simplest substances in 
nature. We now know air to be a complex gaseous compound made up of 
(mostly) molecular nitrogen, molecular oxygen, argon, and small amounts 
of other atomic or molecular gases in varying quantities. Air does not cease 
 I thank Dominic Gregory for suggesting this analogy.5
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to be air when the quantities of its components, or its pressure, vary some-
what, or when other components are added to it: polluted air is still air. 
And although our concept of air has evolved with scientific progress, its 
basic referent has not changed: what we call ‘air’ is the same thing that the 
ancient Greeks called ἀήρ—it is what they breathed, and what we breathe. 
But since scientific exploration has greatly added to our understanding of 
what air is, we would not want to return to the ancient folk concept.
Now, something analogous seems to apply to the self. Here, too, is an 
idea that seemed, to some at least (Descartes, for one), to refer to something 
simple. As discussed in the previous section, that particular conception of 
the self has run into difficulties. But then, why not follow Hume in dismiss-
ing the idea of a self altogether? Because there are rather important—but 
complex—processes at work in the natural world that match at least some 
of our uses of ‘the self’. For the ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘non-self’ is 
one of the most useful evolutionary adaptations around. This is the capa-
city of an organism to represent itself as itself to itself, so as to distinguish 
itself from its environment (and thus to avoid harming, or indeed eating, 
itself) and to be able to take care of itself (to avoid being eaten by others). In 
more sophisticated organisms like ourselves, there is also the ability to rep-
resent oneself over time.
In characterizing the self through these abilities, I take my lead from 
Pat Churchland (2002a), who suggests ‘recasting Hume’s problem in terms 
of self-representational capacities’  (p. 63):6
Self-representational  capacities  include  representing  the  internal  milieu 
and viscera via chemical and neural pathways aimed largely at the brain-
stem and hypothalamus; representing musculoskeletal structures via the 
somatic sensory system; representing autobiographical events via medial 
temporal lobe structures; deferring gratification and controlling impulses 
via prefrontal lobe and limbic structures; and representing the sequence of 
actions to take next, as well as representing where one is in space-time and 
the social order. (Churchland, 2002b, p. 309)
 Here, and throughout this thesis, the hyphenated prefix ‘self-’ has its ordinary 6
reflexive meaning. Thus, ‘self-representation’ is an instance of something repres-
enting itself, ‘self-awareness’ of something being aware of itself, ‘self-monitoring’ of 
something monitoring itself, etc. The prefix should not be understood as referring 
to the self—this obviously would make explaining the self in terms of self-repres-
entations and/or self-monitoring viciously circular.
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This is still quite a large bag of tricks, ranging from homeostasis through 
sensorimotor integration and proprioception to higher-level self-represent-
ations such as autobiographical memory, impulse control, and representing 
and evaluating one’s situation in the social context. It will be useful, there-
fore, to distinguish among them. Homeostatic functions and basic sensori-
motor co-ordination are, of course, vitally important, but they occur below 
the threshold of conscious awareness. They amount to what Antonio Dam-
asio (1999; 2010) calls the ‘proto-self’  because, even at that level, different 
processes are already integrated,  allowing an organism to regulate its  in-
ternal milieu and to interact with its environment. Moreover, as Church-
land (2002b) puts it, ‘[t]his level of integration, shared across many species, 
is the nonconscious neurobiological platform for higher levels of self-rep-
resentation’ (p. 310).
It is these higher-level self-representational processes that generally con-
cern us when we speak of ‘the self’ in human beings: memory of oneself, 
planning for oneself, impulse control, assessing one’s social situation, and 
so on. Developing Churchland’s suggestion, I propose, therefore, that we 
should understand the self as those self-representational processes that are 
potentially  conscious  (potentially  conscious  because  they  are  not  always 
consciously accessible—indeed, the larger part of e.g. our memories is not, 
fortunately,  permanently  conscious—but,  by  their  potential  of  becoming 
consciously  accessible,  they are  distinguishable  from the  lower-level,  al-
ways unconscious  self-representational  processes involved in homeostasis 
and sensorimotor integration). These higher-level self-representational ca-
pacities result in both awareness of oneself as a  distinct individual  within 
one’s natural and social environment, and awareness of oneself as the same 
individual over time.  In accomplishing this, I suggest, our higher-level self-7
representational capacities form a more-or-less coherent self-monitoring sys-
tem—in short, ‘the self’. Call this view of the self the system view.
In  speaking  of  a  ‘system’,  I  mean  nothing  more  grandiose  than  a 
bundle or cluster of different processes serving a common function (cf. the 
visual  system,  the  sensorimotor  system,  the  immune system…)—in this 
case, the function of self-monitoring. The self conceived of in this way is 
 Thus, they satisfy what Richard Sorabji (2006), in his characterization of the self, 7
rather nicely calls one’s ‘need to see [oneself] as me and me again’ (p. 31). But we 
can recast this as one’s capacity to see oneself as ‘me and me again’.
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defined by what it does, rather than by how or where precisely it is instan-
tiated. Thus, I am not suggesting that the self is a localized neurological 
system. Rather, the self qua functional system recruits many different neural 
networks and subsystems (Gillihan & Farah,  2005;  Vogeley & Gallagher, 
2011). This also means that localized neural damage or deterioration affect-
ing some self-representational capacity may leave others intact (see my dis-
cussion of defects and disorders of the self in ch. 8). But it should also be 
clear that the self as a system depends upon the brain, which provides the 
neural architecture in which it is realized.8
This system is clearly complex, as it involves a number of different self-
representational capacities. This complexity will be a recurring theme in the 
rest of my thesis. The self as a system is also dynamic: as its self-representa-
tional inputs change over time, so the system changes. It  adapts to new 
goals and takes account of new experiences. And at any one time, different 
self-monitoring  processes  take  precedence  over  others.  For  example,  in 
writing up a thesis, monitoring goal-directed behaviour is a more useful 
self-representational  capacity  to  deploy  than,  say,  revelling  in  autobio-
graphical recollections. But all these self-monitoring activities and self-rep-
resenting capacities form part of the system.
The system view is not, at this stage, a fully-fledged theory of the self.  9
For the purposes of this thesis, it is a view with which to contrast the other 
views of the self that I will discuss in subsequent chapters. But beyond that, 
it is something of a conceptual recommendation for philosophers, psycho-
logists and neuroscientists alike, which—without being an exercise in con-
ceptual analysis—captures many of the usages of ‘the self’ in both ordinary 
discourse and the recent scientific literature, while avoiding the shortcom-
ings of other conceptions of the self. If (pace Olson), we are going to contin-
 Conceivably, such a system could be instantiated in inorganic machines. Mobile 8
robots, for instance, require something of a proto-self and sometimes more sophist-
icated unconscious self-models, in order to co-ordinate their movements and adapt 
to their environment (Metzinger, 2007). I’ll revisit this topic briefly in my conclu-
sions (§ 9.3), but otherwise, such putative artificial selves are not my concern in this 
thesis  (excepting a thought-experimental  robot in §  6.2.1).  For the avoidance of 
doubt, unless otherwise specified, where I speak of ‘the self’, I here refer to the hu-
man self.
 I will return to the question of quite how to characterize the self system in my 9
concluding chapter (§ 9.2).
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ue speaking of ‘the self’, I contend—and the rest of this thesis will show—
that the system view is a more useful conceptualization of the self than oth-
ers.
Among our higher-level self-representational processes that make up 
our self-monitoring system, my focus in this thesis will be on those that are 
engaged in self-monitoring over time. These are the processes by which we 
construct autobiographical memories and self narratives, which on other 
views of the self are often mistaken for what the self is. In the following sec-
tion, I will sketch my disagreements with these views, which I develop in 
Chapters 4–8.
1.5  Memory and narrative
In his neurological theory of the self, Antonio Damasio (1999; 2010) notes 
that in forming, processing, and retrieving memories, our brains extend our 
consciousness—our self-consciousness—beyond the present.  Self-monitor-
ing does not stop at representing an organism in its current activities and 
interactions with the world (the ‘core self’,  in Damasio’s  terms),  but  in-
volves learning from current interactions, recalling past interactions, and 
planning future interactions (and in so doing the self becomes an ‘autobio-
graphical self’). There are obvious adaptive advantages to self-monitoring 
over time. An organism that is able to remember itself encountering danger 
in a particular location will in future try to avoid that spot, or if unavoid-
able proceed to it only with great caution. Remembering oneself successfully 
overcoming some obstacle by a particular method will enable one to deploy 
similar strategies in overcoming similar obstacles.  It  might be suggested 
that the mere learning of what situations are dangerous or what strategies 
are successful, without implicating oneself in them, would be just as effi-
cient. But there is an added advantage of having a memory representing 
oneself in these interactions. When faced with the need to cross running wa-
ter, an instinct to look for a ford or stepping stones is useful, but having a 
recollection of one’s own previous successful (or unsuccessful) brook-cross-
ings is more useful: it allows one to replicate the very motor actions that 
previously got one to the other side (and avoid repeating the ones that did 
not).
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In humans, of course, self-monitoring over time goes far beyond such 
matters of bare survival. Most of our interactions with the world are inter-
actions with other human beings. Consequently, it is in social contexts that 
we form most of  our personal  memories,  from parent–child interactions 
through  the  experiences  of  schooling  to  our  various  friendships,  sports 
teams, amorous liaisons, professional interactions, etc. And here the recall of 
one’s memories, though important in guiding us to avoid faux-pas and to 
pursue successful strategies in navigating our complex social world, is only 
part of the story. Much of one’s (mostly unconscious) self-monitoring over 
time consists in organizing one’s memories. Such organization is somewhat 
chronological but mostly thematic. Particular memories are tagged accord-
ing to what period of one’s life they belong to, whether they concern one’s 
educational experiences, one’s leisured social interactions, or one’s profes-
sional life, what pursuit or goal or achievement, embarrassment or failure 
they relate to, what other people and what places they involve, and so on. 
In this way, the self builds up an ‘autobiographical knowledge base’ (Con-
way & Rubin, 1993—see my § 4.3.1).
This  autobiographical  knowledge  is  not,  generally,  a  completely 
private matter. While there may be elements to it that one likes to keep to 
oneself, the social context frequently demands that one recount particular 
selections of one’s experiences to others in greater or lesser detail. Making 
new acquaintances, reunions with old acquaintances, job interviews, small 
talk at parties or academic conferences, meeting friends in the pub after 
work (and, returning home, responding to such queries as ‘Good day at the 
office?’ and/or ‘Why are you so late?’), phone calls and visits from and to 
parents  and other relatives,  judicial  enquiries,  the Catholic  sacrament of 
confession, being a ‘castaway’ on Radio 4’s Desert Island Discs…—all these 
are situations where we are called upon to produce shorter or longer, more 
or less detailed self narratives,  selective (and not always entirely truthful) 
accounts of ourselves and our experiences. Moreover, the rehearsal of our 
experiences in such narrative practices shapes and consolidates our autobi-
ographical memories (see ch. 5).
Self-monitoring over time, then, is accomplished by one’s remember-
ing and narrating one’s experiences—these activities of the self are import-
ant for one’s self-awareness of ‘me again’.
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It is perhaps understandable, then, that our autobiographical memories 
and self narratives could plausibly be mistaken for being the self. But this is 
the view—or rather, a whole family of views, which I will call historical-
constructionist views of the self—that I wish to oppose in this thesis. They 
include both the view that the self is constructed from our autobiographical 
memories, as many readings of Locke (see ch. 2) have it, and the currently 
widespread view that  the  self  is  a  narrative  construct  of  some sort  (see 
ch.  5).  The  feature  that  they have in  common,  and which distinguishes 
them from my system view, is that the self is taken to be a construct or con-
struction, whose raw materials, as it were, are our autobiographical memor-
ies, our self narratives, or both—that is, the personal histories we do indeed 
construct of ourselves. But who or what is doing this construction? My claim 
is that historical-constructionist theories of the self, in taking the self to be a 
construct from our memories and stories, put the cart before the horses: 
they confuse the agent—the self qua self-monitoring system—with some of 
its characteristic activities—the construction of autobiographical memories 
and narratives as a means of self-monitoring over time. For the self here is 
the constructor, not the construction. Our memories and narratives are not 
the self, but its productions; they are, as it were, the ‘print-outs’ of our self-
monitoring processes. Let me explain.
Memory, to begin with, is not fixed. We may have what are sometimes 
called memory traces or ‘engrams’ of our experiences, but these are con-
stantly  updated,  recombined,  sorted,  and organized in  the  light  of  sub-
sequent experiences and the circumstantial demands of each particular act 
of recollection. As Conway and Rubin (1993) note, there is ‘no specific type 
of knowledge which can be easily singled out as being a memory. Rather, 
memories  are  compilations,  constructions,  or  compositions  of 
knowledge’ (p. 104).
Remembering is  not  the re-excitation of  innumerable fixed,  lifeless  and 
fragmentary traces.  It  is  an imaginative reconstruction,  or  construction, 
built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of or-
ganised past reactions and experience . . . (Bartlett, 1932, p. 213)
This is particularly so for so-called episodic  memories,  the recollection of 
particular scenes and events from one’s life: 
Episodic remembering bears a close family resemblance to other higher-
order mental achievements (e.g., introspecting, daydreaming, anticipating) 
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that are not typically considered to be acts of memory.  
 (Wheeler, 2000, p. 606)
Thus, our memories—and particularly our episodic recollections—are con-
structions or reconstructions. And where our memories are autobiographical, 
they are an instance of constructive self-representation, at the time of recollec-
tion, of a previous state of oneself. Their reconstruction is an activity of the 
self-monitoring system which I have identified as the self (see § 4.5).
Therefore, if we, as we must, take a constructionist view of autobio-
graphical memory, we cannot at the same time subscribe to a construction-
ist  view of  the  self  as  assembled from memories,  since  we cannot  take 
memories  to  be  a  fixed  ‘raw  material’.  Worse,  taking  both  these  views 
would lead to a circularity of the self and its memories constructing each 
other. And it would leave us without an agent or engine to accomplish the 
construction of either. One could say that the constructor of both memory 
and self is the brain—but it is precisely those activities of the brain that are 
concerned with self-representation and self-monitoring that I take to be the 
self.  And those are the brain activities  that  are behind,  and prior  to,  our 
autobiographical memories.
The activity of constructing self narratives  is continuous with that of 
constructing autobiographical memories. For one thing, narrative practices 
serve  to  rehearse  and structure  autobiographical  memory.  And the  nor-
mally unconscious organizational and editing processes that compile our 
autobiographical knowledge base are here made more explicit; for the pur-
pose  of  telling  others  about  ourselves,  we  again  select  and  recombine 
memories and, additionally, subsume them under a narrative arc. Usually, 
our narrative practices are instances of self-presentation as much as self-rep-
resentation.
Self narratives, therefore, are the public face of the self, or better: its 
public faces—for our self narratives are generally tailored and adapted to 
the relevant audience: different self narratives are deployed with friends in 
the pub, at job interviews, and in a court of law. (Where self narratives fail 
to take account of our interlocutors’ expectations—by being too detailed, 
too long, too forthright, or in some cases perhaps too cagey—they amount 
to social solecisms. But even then, they are exercises in self-presentation, 
however  misjudged.)  Our  self  narratives  reveal  how  we  want  to  come 
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across in different social situations, how we see ourselves, whom we take 
ourselves to be. 
There is some plausibility, therefore, to the notion that our self narrat-
ives are the self. But this can only be a metaphor. Our self narratives are 
partial,  selective, context-dependent. Sometimes they are untruthful. But, 
most important, if the self were a narrative construct, who or what would 
then be the author of those narratives? I will discuss this authorship prob-
lem in detail in Chapter 6. Its solution is the system view: it is the self qua 
self-representational brain activity that, inter alia, produces our self narrat-
ives—and not our self narratives that produce the self. To confuse the self 
with its narrative productions is somewhat analogous to mistaking a re-
cording of the Berlin Philharmonic for the orchestra itself. For, while it is a 
perfectly appropriate shorthand usage to say ‘That is  the Berlin Philhar-
monic’ when listening to one of its recordings, it is understood that what is 
meant here is that the sound waves emanating from the loudspeakers, the 
information encoded on the CD, are a recording of the Berlin Philharmonic. 
The reason why the shorthand is appropriate is that it is, of course, an or-
chestra’s function  to produce music. And it is a function of the self—but 
only one of its functions—to produce self-representations in narrative form. 
The analogy, then, does not carry over fully to the self. Even speaking 
metaphorically, someone’s autobiography, however detailed and truthful it 
might be, isn’t all there is to its author in the way that the Berlin Philhar-
monic’s performances and recordings (and choices of conductors) may sat-
isfactorily characterize that orchestra. Our self narratives—or for that mat-
ter our autobiographical memories—do not exhaust the functions of our 
self-monitoring system like making music exhausts the function of an or-
chestra. Our self-representations also include implicit memories, character 
traits, attitudes, affective and behavioural dispositions. This becomes espe-
cially clear when explicit self-representational activities—like narrating and 
remembering—are impaired by neural damage or degeneration (see ch. 8), 
or in individuals who may have no narrative capacities to begin with, as 
may be the case in autism (ch. 7). In such cases, other, implicit self-repres-
entational functions remain, suggesting the presence and persistence of the 
self in the absence of its usual overt indicators. This brings me to the issue 
of  the persistence of  self  more generally,  which I’ll  now address—along 
with the relations between self and questions of identity.
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1.6  Persistence, identity, and personhood
1.6.1  Persistence
Complexity in response to certain philosophical questions can entail sim-
plicity in response to others. In taking the view that the self is a complex 
system realized in the brain, I find that the answers to some of the ques-
tions that  have befogged the philosophical  literature on the self  become 
pleasingly straightforward. The foremost of these is the question as to the 
persistence conditions  of the self,  and the answer to it  is indeed relatively 
simple. Since the self is a system of brain activity, it persists for as long as 
the brain is active, i.e. living. When the brain is dead, so is the self. But we 
can be a little more precise about what brain activity is necessary for the 
self to persist. We’ve taken the self to be those higher-level self-representa-
tional activities that are potentially conscious (§ 1.4). These require activity 
in the forebrain, especially the cerebral cortex. Therefore, in a brain that had 
completely  ceased  its  cortical  and  most  subcortical  activity  but  whose 
brainstem was still  active,  maintaining homeostasis  and thus technically 
keeping its organism alive, we should say that the self no longer persists. 
The organism may still have a ‘proto-self’ in its brainstem’s self-representa-
tional activity, but no higher-level self-monitoring, no self.
Notice, however, that localized damage to or even progressive global 
deterioration of cortical self-monitoring activities (as in amnesias and de-
mentia) does not yet entail the death of the self. In these conditions, as we 
shall see further on (§ 8.2), some self-representational capacities remain act-
ive.  Nor does  a  self-monitoring system that  produces  odd or  erroneous 
readings (as in schizophrenia, see § 8.3.4) amount to a loss of self. A dam-
aged or malfunctioning system is still that system; thus, the self as a system 
is still the self, even when damaged or malfunctioning.
Could a self qua functional self-monitoring system be transferred from 
one brain to another or to some other, perhaps inorganic, platform? Very 
likely not. Such scenarios assume the brain to work like a serial computer 
with distinguishable hardware and software. But brains are not like that. 
Information processing in the brain is not just the exchange of electrical po-
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tentials  between neurons,  but  involves  the  very  configuration  of  neural 
pathways and synaptic connections, which is itself dynamic and subject to 
change over time in response to new inputs, across the whole life-span of 
the organism (the phenomenon known as neuroplasticity).  So,  since our 
cerebral processing architecture is  not separable into hardware and soft-
ware, it is not at all clear how we could conceive of one brain’s processing 
systems being transferred to another or to a different medium, for it is not 
clear quite what, in neurophysiological terms, is supposed to be transferred 
here. For we cannot separate the function of self-monitoring from its ‘realiz-
ation’ in the brain—the realization is the very neural architecture that fulfils 
the function.
What  about  transplanting the whole  brain?  If  live  brain transplants 
were possible, surely such a transplant would entail the transplant of the 
brain’s self as well? Again, while a logical possibility, that scenario seems 
empirically highly unlikely, once we consider the details of what would be 
involved in such a transplant.  The brain as the operations centre of  the 
central nervous system is not easily isolable from the multitude of efferent 
and afferent neural pathways which connect it to all parts of the organism. 
But, supposing that a transplanted brain could be successfully attached to 
all the neural pathways of the recipient organism (all this while keeping it 
supplied with blood and thereby with oxygen, without which widespread 
tissue death would occur very rapidly),  the result would be a very con-
fused brain, whose brainstem and hypothalamus would now be faced with 
regulating a strange organism and whose sensorimotor systems would be 
confronted with receiving sensory input from, and generating motor out-
put to,  new and unaccustomed limbs and sense organs.  Most likely,  the 
transplanted brain would be unable to adjust to such a sudden and over-
powering demand on its plasticity. (Our brains do of course adjust to so-
matic changes, particularly in childhood and adolescence. Such changes, 
however, are gradual, rather than involving the wholesale replacement of 
an organism with another.) But, supposing a transplanted brain could adapt 
to all that, it would then be generating self-representations of a different 
organism. Even if some traces of higher-level self-representations from its 
original organism remained, the self-monitoring system would have been 
reconfigured  from  the  bottom  up.  In  such  circumstances,  the  question 
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whether the transplanted brain’s self-monitoring system would be the same 
persistent self is rather moot.
Leaving aside the neuroscience fiction, there is another, connected is-
sue to which the system view yields a simple answer. This concerns a dis-
tinction  that  is  sometimes  made  between  questions  about  the  self  con-
sidered at a given time (synchronic) and questions about the self over time 
(diachronic) (Zahavi, 2011). It is often supposed that the diachronic unity of 
the self poses problems and requires conditions in addition to those for its 
synchronic unity. What is it,  the question goes, that unifies the self over 
time? The historical-constructionist answer is that memory, psychological 
continuity, or narrative structure provide the diachronic unity of self (Grice, 
1941; Shoemaker, 1984; 2011; Schechtman, 1996). But this strategy is again 
the result of confusing the self with its productions, or of mistaking evidence 
of a self with criteria for a self. As discussed in the previous section, some of 
the key functions of a self-monitoring system are to produce autobiograph-
ical memories and self narratives. Their contents, by and large, may indeed 
be temporally continuous. But it is not their continuity that ensures the con-
tinuity of self. Rather, it is the other way around: the continuously operat-
ing self-monitoring system is what allows for the production of such tem-
porally  coherent  autobiographical  memories  and  narratives.  And  even 
when  the  self  produces  temporally  discontinuous  self-representations 
(which it does far more frequently than the historical-constructionist views 
allow—see §§ 4.5.1; 6.3.2), it is the same system, the same self persisting. 
Thus, on the system view, there is no problem of diachronic unity. The con-
tinuous activity of the system, rather than the continuity of its productions, 
is what makes the self persist over time.
1.6.2  Identity and personhood
Since Locke (1690/1706—see my ch. 2), the question of the persistence of 
self over time has often been conflated with what the philosophical literat-
ure calls the question(s) of ‘personal identity’ over time. At least, discus-
sions of personal identity still often use ‘the self’ as a convenient label for 
their topic (e.g. Williams, 1970; Madell, 2015). Colloquially speaking, this 
may seem plausible:  are  not  questions  about  the  identity  of  my person 
questions about my self? But in defining these questions, it soon becomes 
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necessary to clarify what we mean by ‘identity’, ‘person’, and ‘self’,  and 
this  is  where  unwarranted  confusions  and  conflations  abound.  I  have 
already sketched what I take the self to be. What about the other two terms, 
‘identity’ and ‘person’?
To begin with,  identity—in the philosophical sense of the term—is a 
straightforward logical relation, the relation a thing bears to itself (not to its 
self—the ambiguities of language tend to add to the confusions here ) and 10
nothing else.  The question of  something’s identity over time is  thus the 
question whether it is the same thing, or a different thing, at different times. 
This is, or ought to be, a straightforward yes-or-no question. But with com-
plex entities,  questions of identity may be anything but straightforward. 
For it now matters just what sort of an entity it is whose identity over time 
we’re interested in, and what its criteria for sameness are:
[T]he question of personal identity is a difficult one, especially when some 
theorists tend to look for identity in only the biological or embodied exist-
ence of persons, and others tend to look for it exclusively in psychological 
existence. (Gallagher, 2011a, p. 13)
Thus, the difficulties with and disagreements over questions of personal 
identity are not difficulties and disagreements about ‘identity’, but about 
what  a  person  is.  Is  it  a  biological  organism—a ‘human animal’  (Olson, 
1997)—which happens to have certain qualities of personhood? Or is it a 
bundle of psychological traits independent of their physiological substrate? 
These are the two classic and apparently irreconcilable positions in the per-
sonal identity literature.
Psychological-continuity theories of personal identity resort to a vari-
ety  of  otherworldly  thought  experiments—disembodiment,  fusions,  fis-
sions—to tease out the identity conditions of persons (see ch. 3). One ap-
proach resulting from this is a view of persons as four-dimensional objects 
whose various ‘time-slices’ are causally connected and thus held together 
in  their  temporal  dimension  (Perry,  1972;  Lewis,  1976).  This  approach 
 One way of teasing apart ‘identity’ and ‘self’ is to make use of the difference 10
between Latin  idem  ‘the  same’  and ipse  ‘oneself’,  as  suggested by Paul  Ricœur 
(1990), leading to a distinction between ‘sameness’ (mêmeté) and ‘selfhood’ (ipséité). 
While the distinction is useful, Ricœur’s own notion of selfhood is not, for it (as far 
as I understand it) takes the historical-constructionist approach that I critique in 
this thesis.
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avoids transitivity objections (see § 2.3.1) but faces the unsatisfactory con-
sequence that multiple persons can occupy the same biological organism.
The opposite position is  the biological-continuity theory of  personal 
identity,  defended notably by Eric  Olson (1997).  According to this  view, 
whether one is the same  at different times boils down to one’s being the 
same biological organism, the same animal. Psychological continuity plays 
no part in settling the question of personal identity over time. As an ac-
count of one’s diachronic identity, this seems right. But one might wonder 
whether  it  accounts  for  all  the  characteristics  we associate  with  persons, 
such as, in Schechtman’s (1996) terms, ‘moral responsibility, self-interested 
concern, and compensation’, and probably others besides. Such character-
istics may indeed require some kind of psychological continuity, in addition 
to  (not  instead of)  the biological  continuity of  the organism. But then it 
seems that persons are insufficiently basic sortals to be the subject of ques-
tions of diachronic identity.
As we’ll see in the next chapter (§ 2.4.1), the question of what makes a 
person is an important and controversial philosophical issue—but it is not a 
question we need to answer when discussing the self. I’ll argue that, while 
personhood requires  higher-level  self-monitoring functions,  our  self-rep-
resentational  capacities  can  operate  with  or  without  the  trappings  and 
trimmings of personhood. Having a self is thus a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for being a person.
The concern of this thesis, then, is not ‘personal identity’—it is neither 
identity nor personhood. As far as questions of identity are about persist-
ence through time, these have already been answered in the preceding sub-
section: the persistence conditions of the self qua self-monitoring system are 
the persistence conditions of the relevant brain activity. As to personhood, a 
self may or may not have the attributes of a person—but what these are is a 
separate and rather vexed question. I will sometimes have to engage with 
the personal identity literature (especially in chs. 2–3). But, insofar as my 
thesis is a contribution to that literature, it is a foundational one: we need 
an account of the self before we can go on to questions of personhood.
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1.7  One self per brain
Another consequence of the system view is numerical: with the self as a 
system of brain activity, it makes little sense to impute more than one self to 
any one brain, either consecutively or simultaneously.
First, could there be distinct successive selves instantiated in the same 
persistent brain at different times? This seems to have been the contention 
of historical-constructionist theories of the self since Locke (1690/1706):
But if it  be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable 
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at 
different times make different persons . . . (II.xxvii.20)
—and  thereby  (according  to  Locke’s  person–self  equation )  at  different 11
times have different selves. Now, if the self were merely a construct, such a 
view might (just) be plausible. But if we take the system view, we must ask 
what conditions would have to obtain, empirically, for one organism at dif-
ferent times to have different selves. (I shall here leave aside the scenario of 
the organism’s receiving a transplanted brain, such wildly fictional cases 
having already been discussed in § 1.6.1.) The brain’s self-monitoring activ-
ities would have to be entirely reset. At the very least, its remembering and 
self-narrating capacities (as the outwardly most important aspects of self-
monitoring) would have to be put in a position of restarting from, as it 
were,  a  blank  slate.  This  would  require  complete  amnesia—a  condition 
which, in discussions of the self, has been a favourite philosophers’ trope 
since Locke. But it is not a condition that has ever been reported as actually 
having occurred:  as I  note in my discussion of amnesias and dementias 
(§  8.2), conditions of memory loss always seem to leave some aspects of 
memory (basic language skills, procedural memory, implicit memory of e.g. 
character traits, musical memory…) intact. As already observed, brains are 
not like computers in which one may simply wipe all  the software and 
leave the hardware intact.  A brain that had ceased to maintain even the 
most basic self-representational processes would be so devastatingly dam-
aged that it  would be unlikely to be able to start  those processes anew. 
Thus, it is, empirically speaking, no more sensible to assume that there can 
be distinct self-monitoring systems in one brain at different times than it 
 See § 2.4.2.11
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would be to speak of one’s having distinct successive visual systems or mo-
tor systems at different times in one’s life.
Secondly, what about the possibility of one’s having distinct self-mon-
itoring systems simultaneously, operating in parallel? It might be suggested 
that since our higher-level self-monitoring functions are a matter of cortical 
activity, and since the cortex is arranged in two anatomically symmetrical 
hemispheres, there could be a possibility of two self-monitoring systems 
operating  independently  in  each  cerebral  hemisphere.  That  suggestion 
might at first seem to be supported by commissurotomy or ‘split-brain’ pa-
tients, whose corpus callosum—the central commissure of nerve fibres link-
ing the two cerebral hemispheres—has been resected (as a treatment for 
severe  epilepsy).  I  will  discuss  this  condition and its  implications  more 
fully later (§§ 6.3.1, 8.3.1), but here is a brief preview. 
Split-brain cases have indeed shown that the sensorimotor systems of 
each hemisphere, along with higher-level cognitive functions (e.g. language 
in the left hemisphere, perceptual distinctions in the right hemisphere), can 
operate independently of the other hemisphere (Gazzaniga,  2000).  How-
ever,  split-brain  patients  retain  a  good deal  of  bilateral  co-ordination of 
movement, so it is not the case that their brains have been entirely bisected. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be an overall bisection of ‘their general 
cognitive awareness, affect and sense of self’ (p. 1309). 
Of course, the general cognitive awareness and sense of self of split-
brain patients is faulty to the extent that their self-monitoring system is in-
terrupted by the severed corpus callosum: these patients cannot verbally 
report on, and seem to have no conscious awareness of, stimuli received 
only by the right cerebral hemisphere (as happens mostly in tightly con-
trolled experimental conditions). But this does not suggest that each hemi-
sphere operates a segregated self-monitoring system. Rather, it means that 
the self-monitoring system serving the whole organism is deficient in that it 
does not  receive input from the right  hemisphere for  verbal  processing. 
Thus, rather than producing two selves, the split-brain condition results in 
a somewhat deficient self.
If an acquired neural bisection like commissurotomy does not, on the 
system view, produce more than one self, it is even less likely that condi-
tions without a discernible neural disconnection should produce multiple 
selves. This concerns particularly the condition known variously as mul-
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tiple personality disorder (MPD) and dissociative identity disorder (DID). 
This disorder too will be the subject of a lengthier discussion later (§ 8.3.3). 
For now, the supposition presents itself that, in so far as those afflicted with 
MPD/DID can be said to have various distinct ‘personalities’ or ‘identities’, 
these might well be different interpretative artefacts by the self-monitoring 
system, which for whatever reason produces multiple partial histories of 
the self. But those different personal histories are still outputs of the same 
self-monitoring system serving the same single organism—i.e. of a single 
self. A complex system like the self can develop faults and fractures. This 
does not entail that in so doing it duplicates or multiplies.
1.8  Synopsis of following chapters
To defend the system view of the self that I have sketched here, it will be 
useful  to  consider  its  main  rival:  historical-constructionist  accounts.  In 
Chapter 2, I discuss Locke’s (1690/1706) account of the self and of personal 
identity and its neo-Lockean variations. I also note that there is an import-
ant distinction to be drawn between person and self, a distinction that is in-
choate but not developed in Locke, and has been much overlooked since. 
Chapter 3  considers how different thought experiments trigger diverging 
intuitions about the self, but how recent experimental philosophy studies 
seem to suggest that quasi-Lockean intuitions are particularly robust. 
Thought experiments and experimental philosophy vignettes trigger-
ing  Lockean  intuitions  usually  appeal  to  the  loss  or  preservation  of 
memory. Thus, Chapter 4 is devoted to autobiographical memory, which I 
show to be complex and subject to various constraints upon its availability 
and accessibility, and its reliability. Given the reconstructive nature of epis-
odic recollection in particular, I argue that the self is the constructor of, not 
a construct from, autobiographical memories. In Chapter 5, I consider how 
narrative practices contribute to autobiographical memory. I then review a 
number of narrative accounts of the self, which divide into four positions: 
strong and weak narrative constructionism, and essential and simple nar-
rative-capacity views. In Chapter 6, I argue first against strong narrative con-
structionism. Identifying the authorship problem of even weak narrative 
constructionism, I then present an empirical and a metaphysical argument 
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against all narrative constructionist views. Finally, I argue against essential 
narrative-capacity  views  (leaving  us  with  a  simple  narrative-capacity 
view).
The topic of Chapter 7 is autism spectrum conditions: why they are rel-
evant to discussions of the self, and how the self in autism is affected (or 
unaffected) by the specific deficits that have been identified with autism 
spectrum conditions. In Chapter 8 I look at other defects and disorders, of 
memory  (lack  of  episodic  memory,  amnesias,  dementia)  and of  the  self 
(split brains, bipolar disorder, multiple personality, and schizophrenia), and 
suggest that we should regards these defects and disorders as specific mal-
functions of the self-representational system.
Chapter 9 contains a brief review of the thesis, a further discussion of 





Self and person in Locke
2.1  Introduction
In treating of the self, one cannot avoid John Locke. He is one of the first to 
use ‘self’ as a noun, with a specific metaphysical meaning, in the English 
language.  And  his  account  of  ‘personal  identity’  in  the  Essay 1
(1690/1706/1997, II.xxvii) is the classic example of an historical-construc-
tionist view of the self: it locates the criterion for selfhood in the continuity 
of consciousness over time, regardless of how or where such consciousness 
is  instantiated.  There  is  something  both  right  and  wrong  with  this  ap-
proach. Locke is right in taking the self to be a functional entity, defined by 
what it does, rather than following his precursors, like Descartes (1641), in 
assuming it to be something ontologically basic, like a substance in its own 
right.  Where Locke goes wrong is in the specific criteria of what makes 
something the same self over time, for he takes evidential  criteria for the 
continuity of the self (‘same consciousness’) to be constitutive of what a self 
is (‘consciousness . . . constitutes . . . self’, II.xxvii.17). It is from this unfor-
tunate confusion that historical-constructionist accounts of the self origin-
ate, which take the self to be constituted by, or constructed from, one’s con-
sciousness of one’s own past: one’s autobiographical memories. In §§ 2.2 
and 2.3, I will discuss Locke’s account of the self, along with some common 
objections to, and developments of, his view, and note how the problems 
faced by Locke’s account affect historical-constructionist views more gen-
erally.
 The OED (Oxford University Press, 2015) cites two earlier uses of ‘the self’ in the 1
philosophical sense, but their authors are obscure, and the philosophical nature of 
the first attestation is doubtful.
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A connected and somewhat overlooked issue with Locke’s account—
but of interest beyond it—is the relation between self and person. In much 
of II.xxvii, Locke seems to be using ‘self’ and ‘person’ interchangeably. And 
while the term ‘Lockean person’, designating a person in Locke’s sense, is a 
staple of philosophical discussions of personal identity and ontology (e.g. 
Parfit, 2012), talk of a ‘Lockean self’ is much less common. If a Lockean self 
simply is the same as a Lockean person, this matters little. But, although 
Locke himself seems to encourage a conflation of person with self, there are 
hints in his treatment that the terms are not wholly coextensive even in 
their Lockean senses. And nor, in a general sense, should they be. For a per-
son has characteristics, rooted in the social context in which it is expedient 
to talk of persons, that are not required of a self. This distinction between 
person and self will be the topic of my discussion in § 2.4: I will explain in 
general terms why it is an important distinction and why ignoring it is at 
the root of much that is wrong with historical-constructionist accounts of 
the self. But I will also point out that Locke himself vacillates somewhat 
between the synonymous and the distinctive use of ‘person’ and ‘self’. This 
is not surprising, since the self–person distinction is ultimately informed by 
Locke’s own conceptualization of persons: it is the ‘forensic’ aspect of the 
Lockean person that  does not necessarily apply to the self.  Here,  again, 
there is an element in Locke’s account that is worth preserving—his view of 
the nature of persons—though Locke himself does not follow it through to 
its conclusion—that self and person do need to be distinguished.
But let me begin with a summary of Locke’s account.
2.2  Locke on personal identity and the self
Locke begins his  disquisitions on identity  uncontroversially  by giving a 
standard definition of what philosophers now usually call diachronic iden-
tity, i.e. identity over time, as something’s being one and the same thing at 
different times. But he notes that the principle of individuation, and thus 
the conditions of identity, of things depend on what sort of thing is being 
talked  about:  simple  or  compound,  ‘mass  of  matter’  or  ‘living 
body’ (1690/1706, II.xxvii.3). In the case of compounds, particularly living 
organisms, diachronic identity is not a question of a thing’s retaining pre-
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cisely the same particles of matter over time. Plants and animals, as well as 
machines, remain the same by preserving a ‘fit organization of parts’ that 
make  them  a  particular  plant,  animal,  or  machine,  rather  than  by  pre-
serving each of the parts. He thus allows, in keeping with common sense, 
that a complex thing can be the same thing over time even while its con-
stituent parts change.
In discussing the identity of a man (or, we ought to add, a woman), 
Locke does not yet depart from the principles that apply to the identity of 
plants, animals, and machines. Here too identity consists ‘in nothing but a 
participation of the same continued life . . . like that of other animals in one 
fitly organized body’ (II.xxvii.6).  Though men (and, we should add, wo-
men) are generally endowed with reason, that in itself is not the quality 
that decides their identity over time, which is rather a question of ‘shape 
and make’: 
‘tis not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea 
of a man in most people’s sense; but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to 
it.  (II.xxvii.8) 
Locke supports this point with the first of many thought experiments  in 2
this chapter of the Essay: a rational parrot would still be thought a parrot, a 
dull man still a man. Thus, a man could lose all his reason and still, satisfy-
ing the conditions of having ‘the same continued life’ in the same body ‘so 
and so shaped’, remain the same man, that is, the same human organism.
One might leave it there, and say that the same conditions apply to the 
identity of a person. Locke, however, does not, and here provides us with an 
important distinction that has bedevilled the philosophy of personal iden-
tity  ever  since:  that  between a  human being and a  person.  A person is 
something other than a man, and consequently the identity conditions for a 
person are different from those that apply to a human being generally. For 
here is where the qualities of rationality and thought come to matter. A per-
son, according to Locke, is
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can con-
sider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; 
which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from think-
ing . . . and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
 I discuss Locke’s—and others’—use of thought experiments in ch. 3.2
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past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the 
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one 
that now reflects on it, that that action was done.  
(II.xxvii.9; original emphasis)
This passage is crucial in two ways. First, it stipulates the identity condi-
tions  for  Lockean  persons:  I  will  discuss  the  consequences  of  these 
presently. Secondly, Locke here employs the terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ in the 
same breath. But what is the self?
Self  is  that  conscious  thinking  thing,  (whatever  substance  made  up  of 
whether  spiritual,  or  material,  simple,  or  compounded,  it  matters  not) 
which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness 
or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness ex-
tends. (II.xxvii.17)
We here have a functional definition of ‘self’ which—taken, for the moment, 
without the ensuing identification of the self with the person—is not incon-
sistent with my system view of the self. The Lockean self is something con-
scious of itself  and concerned for itself:  these are important higher-level 
self-representational processes among those I have named in the previous 
chapter as defining the self as a complex system. Locke’s agnosticism about 
the precise ontology of the self probably owes less to 17th-century limita-
tions in scientific knowledge than to Locke’s desire to eschew contempor-
ary metaphysical debates between materialists and immaterialists (Boeker, 
forthcoming).  Having defined the self  in functional terms, Locke has no 
need to commit himself to a particular ontological position.
He  does,  however,  in  the  remainder  of  the  paragraph  just  quoted, 
equate ‘self’ with ‘person’. Let us return, then, to the identity conditions of 
Lockean persons (and thus of Lockean selves). 
Why do persons have identity conditions different from those of a hu-
man being? It is because, in Locke’s view, ‘person’ is a ‘forensic term’; it 
‘belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law’ (II.xxvii.26). When we 
refer to someone as a person, we ascribe to him or her qualities that go 
beyond the continued life of a body that would be sufficient for someone to 
remain (just) the same human being; qualities which allow a person to be 
held responsible for his or her actions. Thus, the ‘forensic’ nature of the term 
‘person’ refers to the practice of holding someone to account for what she 
does or has done. Thus, a Lockean person, too, is a functional kind.
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The conditions for personhood, then, must include whatever is neces-
sary for someone to be ascribed responsibility for her actions: in Locke’s 
view,  rational  intelligence  and  consciousness.  Rational  intelligence  is 
needed, presumably, because responsibility for one’s actions implies that 
one acts according to reason and can give a rational account or explanation 
of  how an  action  connects  with  a  goal  or  motivation,  so  satisfying  the 
‘forensic’  nature  of  responsibility-taking.  And  consciousness  is  required 
because it seems inequitable to reward or punish someone for an act per-
formed unconsciously (II.xxvii.19).3
It now becomes clear why the diachronic identity of persons must, on 
Locke's  account,  involve  the  ‘same  consciousness’  being  present  at  any 
point in time at which some person is the same person.  For if one had lost 4
all consciousness of a previous action, even if that action had at the time 
been carried out consciously (and intelligently and rationally) it would not, 
Locke maintains, be appropriate to apportion praise or blame for that ac-
tion to that man now:
But if it  be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable 
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at 
different times make different persons; . . . human laws not punishing the 
mad man for the sober man’s actions, nor the sober man for what the mad 
man did, thereby making them two persons . . . (II.xxvii.20) 
Same consciousness is thus an absolutely necessary condition for diachronic 
personal identity—but is it also a sufficient condition? Locke thinks so: the 
substance (be it a material body or an immaterial soul) that may at any time 
be associated with a particular person is irrelevant to that person’s identity 
over time, which is wholly determined by consciousness (II.xxvii.10–16).
If, then, consciousness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
personal identity, the identity conditions of persons and those of human 
beings no longer overlap, and their identities can therefore come apart. One 
Lockean man, having completely lost all consciousness of his former ac-
tions before a certain point in time, and from then on developed a new con-
 But Locke’s account also seems to imply, more controversially, that one cannot be 3
held responsible for actions of which one has lost all recollection.
 Quite what Locke means by ‘consciousness’—and therefore quite what it is that is 4
‘the same’ when the personal-identity condition obtains—is somewhat debatable 
(see § 2.3.3 below).
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sciousness of all that he had experienced and done since, would be two 
(consecutive) Lockean persons (or selves) (II.xxvii.21). Conversely, it is con-
ceivable (and a much used trope in certain genres of science-fiction literat-
ure) for someone’s consciousness to be transferred from one man to anoth-
er, or even from one kind of substance to another.
The potential coming apart of the identities of a man and a person do 
not,  of  course,  accord with our ordinary experience (though it  might in 
situations when someone is ‘besides himself’ (II.xxvii.20)), but they do follow 
from Locke’s commitments on what constitutes the conditions for person-
hood. One can lose the characteristics of personhood—one’s consciousness 
of past actions, one’s reason—and stay the same human being. It is in the 
context  of  this  distinction  that  the  most  commonly  cited  objections  to 
Locke’s account arise.
2.3  Objections and interpretations
2.3.1  Loss of transitivity
A first criticism of Locke’s account that has repeatedly been made is that his 
notion of personal identity does not preserve transitivity. As a formal rela-
tion, identity is transitive: if A = B and B = C, then A = C. For Lockean per-
sonal identity, this is not the case, as Thomas Reid (1785, § 3.6) points out in 
his now canonical counterexample of the ‘brave officer’, who as a young 
officer remembers being flogged for stealing apples when a schoolboy, and 
who when later made a general recalls his exploits as a young officer, but 
no  longer  remembers  the  schoolboy  flogging.  According  to  Locke’s  ac-
count, this makes the old general the same person as the young officer, and 
the young officer the same person as the delinquent schoolboy, but not the 
old general the same person as the schoolboy—thereby violating the trans-
itivity requirement.
Several kinds of reply are possible here. The first is to modify Locke’s 
account so that transitivity is preserved. John Mackie (1976) attempts this 
‘by taking the unit of consciousness to be determined not by the relation 
could remember, but by its ancestral—that is, by the relation which is to could 
remember as ancestor is to parent.’ (p. 180). That is to say, there is a continuity 
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relation—the  ‘ancestral’  of  the  memory  relation—between  between  the 
young officer  and the  old  general,  and between  the  schoolboy  and the 
young officer, but also transitively between the schoolboy and the old gen-
eral. This, however, as Mackie admits, is ‘a revision, not an interpretation, 
of  Locke’s  account’  (p.   181),  and  directly  contradicts  Locke’s  view  in 
II.xxvii.20 that irretrievable memory loss indeed severs the link of personal 
identity.
The other possible reply to the loss of transitivity is to bite the bullet. 
One way of doing this is to eschew the formal identity relation altogether, 
as Derek Parfit (1984) does when he insists that ‘identity is not what mat-
ters’ (passim).  What matters is the continuity  of persons, their survival.  In 
Parfit’s account this is assured by psychological continuity having ‘any cause’ 
(p. 208). Parfit’s notion of psychological continuity here bears some resemb-
lance to the ancestral relation of Mackie’s revision. Both go beyond what 
Locke means by ‘consciousness’ (more on this in §  2.3.3, below). But the 
Parfitian continuity/survival relation does not rule out the fission or fusion 
of persons. The same applies to Lewis’s (1976) neo-Lockean account that 
takes persons to be four-dimensional entities.
Arguably, Locke’s own view does not rule out that persons could fis-
sure  or  be  fused,  so  long  as  the  ‘same consciousness’  relation  obtained 
between their pre- and post-fissure or -fusion stages. But it would be se-
mantically difficult to defend the consequence, given that a Lockean person 
is a Lockean self, that a (post-fusion) self at one time would be the same self 
as  two  selves  at  a  previous time,  or  that  a  (pre-fission)  self  at  one time 
would be the same self as two selves at a later time. It is worth reminding 
ourselves  that  such  counterintuitive—because  empirically  highly  un-
likely—scenarios arise only if we consider the continuity of a person or self 
as ontologically separable from his or her biological organism—that is, if 
the identity conditions of a person are wholly independent of those of the 
entity that happens to have the characteristics of being a particular person. 
But all historical-constructionist accounts in which the person or self is not 
anchored to a particular organism must admit of such scenarios—whereas 
the system view, as explained in the opening chapter, avoids such bizarre 
consequences, since a self subsists only in virtue of the continuing existence 
of an active brain—and it is extremely unlikely for living brains to become 
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fissured or fused.  And anchoring the self in the continuing brain, rather 5
than its productions, avoids problems of transitivity altogether.
Meanwhile, a more moderate way of accepting the loss of transitivity is 
to take it to be the very point Locke is trying to make. In Galen Strawson’s 
(2011) view, contradicting the transitivity principle 
isn’t an objection to Locke’s view of personal identity. It is, rather, an illus-
tration of its fundamental and forensic point, the commonsense point . . . 
that human beings won’t on the Day of Judgment be responsible for all the 
things they have done in their lives, but only for those that they’re still 
Conscious of and so still Concerned in. (p. 54)6
This echoes Mackie’s (1976) verdict that Locke’s theory is ‘hardly a theory 
of personal identity at all, but . . . a theory of action appropriation’ (p. 183). 
Person, as a ‘forensic term’, is not about formal identity, but about respons-
ibility. But, if so, we must ask whether this applies to the Lockean self, too. I 
address this point in § 2.4.
2.3.2  Circularity?
Perhaps the most notorious objection to Locke’s account, most often associ-
ated with Bishop Butler (1736),  is that it is circular:7
And one should really think it Self-evident, that Consciousness of personal 
Identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute,  personal Identity, 
any more than Knowledge in any other Case, can constitute Truth, which 
it presupposes. (p. 302)
The way Butler frames this makes it seem a sound, even devastating, objec-
tion. If Locke’s view were indeed that personal identity is constituted by 
consciousness of personal identity, it would be obviously circular. But that 
is not Locke’s account. Personal identity is not constituted by consciousness 
 The so-called ‘split-brain’ condition does not amount to a complete fissure of the 5
brain (see § 8.3.1).
 Strawson uses initial capitals in ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Concern’ to indicate that 6
they are to be understood in Locke’s particular sense of these words.
 A similar objection is also found in Berkeley (1732) and Reid (1785). As for Butler, 7
‘the objection to Locke for which he is well known is not his, having been put by 
John Sergeant in 1697 and Henry Lee in 1702, among others’ (Strawson, 2011, p. 2). 
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of itself, as Butler’s lazy reading of Locke would have it, but by conscious-
ness of past actions and thoughts. There is thus no obvious circularity here.
At the same time, if we were to ask whose consciousness it is that con-
stitutes  personal  identity  over  time,  we  cannot  answer  ‘the  person’s’ 
without avoiding circularity. As Mackie (1976) puts it:
Yet behind [Butler’s] unsound criticism, there is an element of truth. We 
are reluctant to believe that our identity through time is constituted by this 
sort of memory, and are more inclined to regard the memory as evidence 
for an identity which is already there, constituted by something else and 
somehow making that memory possible. (p. 187)
Mackie here echoes Hume’s (1739) thought that ‘memory does not so much 
produce as discover personal identity’ (I.iv.6). In other words, memory is an 
evidential rather than a constitutive criterion of identity. So, while Locke does 
not make the formal mistake he stands accused of, his account does seem to 
presuppose that some continuant entity underpins (enables, subserves) the 
possibility of consciousness of past actions being preserved and repeatable.
Another way of making Mackie’s point is to say that ‘it seems to be-
long to the very idea of remembering that you can remember only your 
own experiences’ (Olson, 2015). This being so, even taking memories as just 
evidence (rather than constitutive) of personal identity is ‘trivial and unin-
formative’ (ibid.): what I can genuinely remember are necessarily my own 
experiences. Therefore, to say that my remembering something of my past 
makes me myself has no explanatory purchase.
Neo-Lockeans have countered this objection by introducing the notion 
of ‘quasi-memory’. Sydney Shoemaker (1970) defines quasi-memory as
knowledge of past events such that someone’s having this sort of know-
ledge of an event does involve there being a correspondence between his 
present cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of 
the event, but such that this correspondence . . . does not necessarily in-
volve that past state’s having been a state of the very same person who 
subsequently has the knowledge. (p. 271)
The idea of quasi-remembering does not, therefore, necessarily require the 
identity of the rememberer with the person having the experience being 
remembered. How does this help? It helps insofar as it removes the circu-
larity objection. But, in exchange for that, it leaves us with a purely theoret-
ical notion of ‘quasi-remembering’ whose only actual instances that feature 
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in ordinary experience are the ‘special case’ (ibid.) of actual remembering. 
Shoemaker concludes:
In the actual world it is true both that (1) [quasi-remembering] is always 
[actual] remembering . . . and that (2) the primary focus of a person’s ‘self-
interested’ attitudes and emotions is his own past and future history. It is 
surely no accident that (1) and (2) go together. (p. 285)
Thus, while memory, in Shoemaker’s account, is no longer a criterion  for 
personal identity, it clearly matters to one’s self-interested concerns. And, of 
course, remembering is an important high-level self-representational activ-
ity. (I will discuss personal memory in detail in ch. 4.)
Before moving on, it is worth noting that variations of the circularity 
objection apply to historical-constructionist accounts of the self more gen-
erally. For any account that takes the self to be constructed from elements of 
one’s autobiography (memories, self narratives) faces the question who or 
what is doing the construction (the remembering, the narrating). I will re-
turn to this point in Chapters 4 and 6. For now, let us return to Locke.
2.3.3  Consciousness, memory, psychological continuity
Commentators on Locke, at least since Reid (1785), have summed up his 
account of personal identity by ascribing to Locke the view that one’s per-
son or self is constituted by one’s memory of past actions. I have in the fore-
going discussion followed this practice. But this is something of an over-
simplification. In his II.xxviii, Locke repeatedly names consciousness as what 
assures (‘makes’) personal identity—not memory. H.  P. Grice (1941) sug-
gests  that  we may interpret  ‘“consciousness”  as  meaning “memory”,  or 
“memory  or  introspection”’  (p.  341).  More  recently,  Marya  Schechtman 
(1996) and Galen Strawson (2011) have taken a different view, claiming that 
Locke’s ‘consciousness’ precisely does not mean ‘memory’. It may be use-
ful, therefore, to try and shed some light on the relation between Lockean 
‘consciousness’ and memory.
Of  course,  consciousness  of  one’s  past  actions  requires  memory.  As 
Locke  himself  says  explicitly  in  II.xxvii.20,  the  complete  loss  of  one’s 
memory of a past action wipes that action out of one’s conscious personal 
history. So we are right in taking memory to be a necessary condition for 
the consciousness that makes a Lockean person. But memory being neces-
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sary does not mean that it is also a sufficient condition for the ‘same con-
sciousness’ that for Locke assures the same self:
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with 
the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness 
it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self.  
(Locke, 1690, II.xxxvii.10; first emphasis added)
Locke here effectively requires us to relive our past actions ‘with the same 
consciousness’ which we had of them at the time. A mere factual memory of 
a past action is not enough; it would be wrong to assume that ‘repeating’ 
past actions is merely a demand on the accuracy of our memory. It is also, 
perhaps primarily, a requirement that one be affectively concerned in the ac-
tion in question in the same way as when one first performed it (Schecht-
man, 1996; Strawson, 2011).  8
Unfortunately, Locke himself does not elaborate on what he means by 
‘consciousness’. As Mackie (1976, p. 178) observes, Locke sometimes uses 
‘consciousness’ as a mass noun, and at other times as a countable noun, as 
when he speaks of ‘distinct incommunicable consciousness’ (Locke, 1690, 
II.xxvii.23). Some tidying-up is required here.
Mackie suggests that Locke’s use of ‘consciousness’ as a concrete noun 
stands  for  the  fairly  commonsensical  notion  of  ‘an  entity  consisting  of 
someone’s being conscious of a number of actions and experiences togeth-
er’ (1976, p. 178). Thus, someone’s consciousness amounts to this someone 
‘having a  series  of  co-conscious  experiences’  (ibid.).  One might  then be 
tempted to suppose that there are ‘well-defined units of consciousness, dis-
tinct consciousnesses, that is, separate mental histories, such that there was 
perfect co-consciousness within any unit and no co-consciousness between 
units’ (ibid.). But, as Reid’s brave-officer case illustrates, there are no such 
well-defined and unchanging mental histories. Mackie’s reply to Reid was 
that we should take the ‘unit of consciousness to be determined . . . by [the] 
 It might be said that the ‘same consciousness’ requirement could be met by what 8
has become known as ‘episodic memory’, since such recollections are said to in-
volve ‘autonoetic’ awareness, i.e. awareness of oneself in the event being recalled 
as though one were experiencing it in the present (Tulving, 1972; 1985). But then, 
Butler’s circularity objection does apply, for we would have thus redefined con-
sciousness as consciousness of the same self. (For a discussion of episodic memory 
and autonoetic awareness, see § 4.2.2 below.)
!36
ancestral [of] the relation could remember’ (p. 180). He then explicates this 
point by developing it into a full-blown revision of Locke’s account.
Mackie proposes that we should think of one’s personal history as a 
series of ‘I-occurrences’. Each moment of consciousness is such an I-occur-
rence, which ‘fills some short stretch of time’, so that successive I-occur-
rences during any continuous period of consciousness ‘overlap and fade 
into one another’. And it is these overlapping I-occurrences which ‘consti-
tute’ one’s identity ‘throughout any one waking day’ (ibid.).
But of course we are not continuously conscious throughout our lives, 
having nightly periods of unconsciousness that amount to as much as a 
third of our ‘continued life’, and perhaps not even throughout all of any 
waking day, during which the merest ‘drowsy nod’ (Locke, 1690, II.i.13) 
may disrupt  the  flow of  overlapping I-occurrences.  These  interruptions, 
Mackie suggests, are bridged by memory. There then emerges an elegant, 
but not quite Lockean, account of what a person is:
A network  of  overlapping  specious  presents  and  day-to-day  memory 
bridges builds up what we can now take to be a single consciousness: we 
can thus generate a relation is the same person as and another belongs to the 
same person as which are both transitive and symmetrical . . .  
(Mackie, 1976, p. 181)
Mackie thus not only restores transitivity; he also accounts for both con-
sciousness and memory—although he does so at the cost of revising, rather 
than  interpreting  Locke.  Mackie  gives  an  account  of  personal  identity 
proper, rather than personal ‘identity’ in the ‘forensic’ sense in which Locke 
was interested (see § 2.4).
Mackie’s interpretation is similar to Shoemaker’s (1984) account of per-
sonal identity as ‘psychological continuity’. Such continuity requires neither 
‘same  consciousness’  nor  an  uninterrupted  memory  link  from any  past 
moment to the present; rather, it is sufficient for there to be an ‘appropriate’ 
causal chain from past psychological states to one’s present psychological 
states. Relevant states include memories, but also traits, preferences, beliefs, 
and other cognitive states. Two such states can be directly psychologically 
connected (as in Reid’s brave officer recalling his boyhood), and any two 
states related by a chain of such psychological connections, even if not dir-
ectly connected, are then psychologically continuous (as in the officer’s boy-
hood and his dotage). Shoemaker thus avoids problems of both transitivity 
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and circularity.  Further,  his  account  is  designed to  fit  with a  materialist 
metaphysics. 
This too is a common factor with Mackie’s revision of Locke, which in 
this respect is another departure from Locke’s own account: Mackie sug-
gests that when we come to try and give a factual account of how co-con-
sciousness and memory bridges work, we need not stipulate any immateri-
al  and/or  unknowable  substrate:  ‘what  makes  co-consciousness  [and 
memory] possible is the structure of the central nervous system and the 
persistence of that structure through time’ (1976, p.  200). This, of course, 
comes close to my system view: but here, the question of identity is already 
answered by the persistence of the neurocognitive self-monitoring system. 
And psychological continuity is a product of the operations of that system. 
It provides the appropriate causal mechanism for my psychological states 
at one time to be continuous with those at another time.
2.4  The person and the self
I come now to a crucial (and, I think, hitherto overlooked) point in this dis-
cussion of Locke’s (1690/1706) II.xxvii, the question of the relation between 
‘person’ and ‘self’. But before I analyse Locke’s own use of the terms, some 
more general remarks on the concept of a person and its relation to the self 
are in order.
2.4.1  Personhood (and why it is not the same as the self)
Questions  about  personhood  are  a  wide-ranging  philosophical  topic  in 
their own right. It is not the topic of my thesis, but, given the unfortunate 
conflation of ‘person’ and ‘self’ since Locke, I must at least explain why it is 
not my topic—that is, why being a person is a quality, or set of qualities, 
over and above those of having a self. To that end, I will not attempt to 
settle what the best definition of a person is. For present purposes, a brief 
survey of some common approaches to the question of personhood will be 
sufficient.
Daniel Dennett (1976) lists ‘six familiar themes, each a claim to identify 
a necessary condition for personhood’ (p. 177): being a rational being; ascrip-
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tion of  psychological  states;  having ‘in some way an attitude taken  toward 
it’ (ibid.); a capacity to reciprocate; a capacity for verbal communication; and 
‘self-consciousness of one sort or another’ (p. 178). Note that all these criter-
ia seem to require some kind of self-monitoring. Additionally, attitude-tak-
ing and reciprocity—the essential criteria for personhood in P. F. Strawson’s 
(1962) account—and communication are social capacities.
An oft-cited account stipulating some psychological capacity as requis-
ite  for  personhood is  Harry  Frankfurt’s  (1971).  A person,  in  Frankfurt’s 
view, must have second-order volitions, that is, desires about  her desires. 
She is able to structure and control her volitions in ways that satisfy some 
overarching goals, rather than acting impulsively on every desire. She may 
want to enjoy the sunshine by taking a stroll in the park, but, deploying a 
second-order desire to do well at her job, she modifies her first-order voli-
tion, forgoes the walk, and gets on with some time-critical paperwork. Her 
second-order volition is that she wants herself to want to stay at her desk. 
Meanwhile, an agent who simply acts on his first-order volitions is not a 
person on this account, but a ‘wanton’. Clearly, a Frankfurtian person re-
quires the higher-level self-monitoring necessary for impulse control and 
deferred gratification.  But  even a Frankfurtian ‘wanton’  engages in self-
monitoring to the extent that he knows what his desires are, and how to 
satisfy  them.  A self-monitoring  system  is  thus  absolutely  necessary  for 
Frankfurt’s account of a person, but more than that: it must be exercised in 
a particular way. Just having a self-monitoring system is not sufficient for 
Frankfurtian personhood. 
Frankfurt’s personhood criterion is perhaps too stringent. At any rate, 
Tom Beauchamp (1999) notes that any definition of  ‘person’ in terms of 
cognitive capacities is bound to fail in borderline cases. But if we look else-
where for the criteria of personhood, we similarly find that characteristics 
over and above having a self are necessary. John Doris (2009) points out 
that ‘[t]alk of persons involves both descriptive and normative elements’; 
the latter ‘mark a network of ethical expectations’ (p. 58). Satisfying such 
expectations may well  involve Strawsonian reciprocal  attitude-taking;  in 
any case they require a capacity for representing others as well as oneself. 
While there is  some evidence from cognitive neuroscience that self-  and 
other-representations engage the same neural networks (see § 7.3.1), their 
object is obviously not the same. It is entirely conceivable that a being could 
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have a functioning, even highly developed, self-representational system yet 
fail  to respond to and understand others in ways that satisfy the social-
normative expectations involved in person-talk. This may be the case for 
people with autism (see ch. 7).
To sum up: a functioning self-monitoring system—a self—is one of the 
necessary conditions for personhood,  but on no account is it a sufficient 9
one. One may have a self and be a Frankfurtian wanton. One may be com-
petent  at  self-monitoring but  incapable  of  communication and therefore 
unable to fulfil the normative expectations surrounding persons.  Or one 
may be capable of communication and still lack a sensibility for the norm-
ative framework of personhood, as may be the case with psychopaths. Fur-
thermore, personhood, whatever its precise criteria, is a property or set of 
properties one can acquire, have, and lose—notwithstanding the continuity 
of one’s organism (Olson, 1997) and its self-monitoring system. The griev-
ous error of much of the personal-identity literature has been to focus en-
tirely on what assures the continuity of this property of personhood, how-
ever defined, without first establishing what ensures the continuity of the 
self. In deciding what makes someone the same person  over time—given 
the social-normative considerations inherent in the concept of personhood, 
such as responsibility for one’s actions—the historical-constructionist ap-
proach makes some sense. The mistake is then to equate the social-normat-
ive history of the person with the continuity of the self.
Much  of  the  blame  for  this  person–self  conflation  must  be  laid  at 
Locke’s door. But, at the same time, the roots of the self–person distinction I 
have just outlined are, I shall now argue, to be found in Locke’s account as 
well.
2.4.2  ‘Person’ and ‘self’ in Locke
Locke seems to use the terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ synonymously and inter-
changeably. Thus, his definition of ‘self’ in II.xxvii.17 closely mirrors that of 
‘person’ in II.xxvii.9,  and in both passages, the terms appear as comple-
 Legal persons (companies etc.) are an exception to this, although arguably a col9 -
lective entity that qualifies for legal personhood will have management and audit-
ing procedures that are functionally equivalent to self-monitoring in an organic 
being.
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mentary: ‘so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it 
was then’ (II.xxvii.9; original emphasis); ‘consciousness . . . makes the same 
person, and constitutes this inseparable self’ (II.xxvii.17; original emphasis). 
In these passages, Locke may seem to be saying that what he is talking 
about goes by two common nouns, ‘person’ and ‘self’. They may to some 
extent explicate each other, hence his juxtaposing both terms in this way; 
but overall they refer to the same thing and can be used interchangeably 
(cf. Strawson 2011, ch. 8).
But there are other passages that do not quite tally with this reading. 
Thus, Locke also uses ‘personal’ as a qualifier for ‘self’ (II.xxvii.10). Are we 
to understand ‘personal self’ as a particular kind of self, or is the qualifier 
redundant? If the latter, why should Locke use the epithet ‘personal’ at all? 
If a self is the same as a person, a ‘personal self’ is a ‘personal person’. It 
seems unlikely that Locke would deliberately construct such a meaningless 
expression.
Further, if Locke’s use of ‘self’ and ‘person’ is indeed intended to be 
synonymous, it is remarkable, given the centrality of both terms to his ar-
gument, that he doesn’t explicitly tell us this. The closest he comes to ex-
plicating the relation between the terms ‘self’ and ‘person’ directly, in what 
may well be the most important section in the chapter, is in saying precisely 
not that the person is  the self, but: ‘Person,  I take it, is the name  for this 
self.’ (II.xxvii.26; original italics; bold emphasis added)
Locke would not put it this way without good reason, and the reason 
for putting it this way is given soon after: person ‘is a forensic term appro-
priating actions and their merit’ (ibid.). It is thus in the ‘forensic’ context of 
action-appropriation that the self is labelled ‘person’. There are, I think, two 
related but subtly different readings of this available. The first reading is 
that while ‘self’ and ‘person’ refer to the same thing, the use of each label is 
determined by different perspectives:  ‘self’  is  an inward-looking,  reflexive 
term, which picks out the self ‘from the inside’,  while ‘person’ is a name 10
for the self given the forensic context of a person being judged, as it were, 
from the outside.  Thus,  ‘person’  and ‘self’  are  co-extensive,  but  not  syn-
onymous. This reading seems directly supported by the sentence that in-
tervenes between Locke’s definitions of ‘person’ as ‘a name’ for the self and 
 This term of Shoemaker’s (1970) is used by both Mackie (1976) and Strawson 10
(2011) to explicate the Lockean notion of ‘consciousness’.
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as a ‘forensic term’, where he says: ‘Wherever a man finds what he calls 
himself, there I think another may say is the same person’ (ibid.; original ital-
ics; bold emphasis added). Thus the difference in use between ‘self’ and 
‘person’ is explained by whether one is looking at oneself (one’s own per-
son) or at another person. 
But there is a second possible reading of the difference, which while 
less explicit is nevertheless suggested by what Locke says about the charac-
teristics of persons here and elsewhere in the chapter. It is that there may be 
Lockean selves that do not qualify as Lockean persons. The giving of the 
‘name’ person to a self, on this reading, is itself a kind of forensic act, an atti-
tude-taking, one which recognizes the self so named as one that is capable 
of appropriating its own actions so as to satisfy the moral and legal re-
sponsibility that is contained in Locke’s notion of a person.
Locke’s singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something 
to be a person  are that it be ‘thinking’, ‘intelligent’, that it have ‘reason and 11
reflection’, ‘can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different 
times and places’  (II.xxvii.9).  Explicitly defining the self,  Locke says it  is 
‘that conscious thinking thing, . . . which is sensible, or conscious of pleas-
ure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, 
as far as that consciousness extends.’ (II.xxvii.17) Finally, in defining ‘per-
son’ as a ‘forensic term’, Locke goes on to say that this term ‘belongs only 
to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery’ (II.xxvi.
26; bold emphasis added). We notice that being ‘capable of happiness and 
misery’, previously said of the self, recurs here in Locke’s second definition 
of ‘person’, thus underpinning the close relation between the two terms. 
But ‘capable of a law’ is an addition that only occurs here. It explicates the 
forensic nature of Locke’s notion of ‘person’.
Self, on the other hand, is clearly not a forensic term. It is quite conceiv-
able that there are selves in the Lockean sense that are ‘thinking’ and ‘sens-
ible,  or conscious of pleasure and pain,  capable of happiness or misery’ 
while  lacking  the  action-appropriation  condition  of  a  Lockean  person. 
Children before the age of accepting responsibility for their doings seem an 
obvious example.
 As noted in §  2.4.1, conditions for personhood are notoriously hard to define. 11
Locke, at least, has a pretty good stab at it.
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And this is where Mackie’s (1976) revision makes sense. By his own 
admission, his account is not one of a person in the Lockean forensic sense, 
but of something ‘corresponding to all the personal pronouns’ (p. 183). But 
in this it also corresponds to Locke’s definition of a ‘self’, and most of his 
definition of a ‘person’—with the crucial exception of the forensic condi-
tion. If we follow Locke in reserving ‘person’ for its forensic use, we can 
still adopt Mackie’s revision as an account of the Lockean self—the transit-
ivity of whose identity over time, as has been mentioned, is preserved.
Locke himself, despite the hints I have exposed here, does not expli-
citly draw a distinction between self and person, and most readings of Locke 
also fail to do so. But since his account of personal identity emphasizes the 
question of legal and moral responsibility of persons, the conflation of per-
son and self is unfortunate. Had Locke been a little clearer on this point, we 
might not now be confronted with a vast philosophical literature that takes 
the continuity of the characteristics of personhood, however defined, as the 
main issue in determining the continuity of the sort of thinking beings that 
we are.
2.5  Conclusions
The point of this chapter has been to highlight two rights and two wrongs 
with Locke’s account of personal identity and the self. He is right in giving 
a functional account of the self as something ‘concerned for itself’. This re-
quires the higher-level self-monitoring involved in awareness of one’s own 
past and making projects for one’s future. But such temporally extended 
self-consciousness is a product of the self: Locke is wrong in holding that 
this consciousness ‘makes’  the self.  This historical-constructionist strategy 
faces the difficulties with transitivity and circularity discussed earlier, but, 
more important, it leaves open the possibility of branching selves and suc-
cessive discontinuous selves in the same organism. The system view, taking 
the self to be the neurocognitive system that enables our self-consciousness 
over time, rather than that consciousness itself, avoids these problems.
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There is more than a hint towards the end of his chapter on personal 
identity that Locke (1690/1706), though studiedly agnostic on the question 
of materialism, realized that knowledge of the substrate of our cognitive 
capacities might well render some of his discussion superfluous:
Did we know what it [the nature of that thinking thing that is in us] was, 
or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether 
it could, or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out 
of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no 
one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body, upon the 
right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend, we might 
see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. (II.xxvii.27)
Locke’s own account does not guarantee that there should be a single self 
per human being. But if we take the continuing brain to be ‘the right consti-
tution of  organs’  on which the self  depends,  we can put aside quibbles 
about successive and fissured selves.
Locke’s ontological agnosticism has a purpose, however. For his main 
concern, as Mackie (1976), Schechtman (1996), and Strawson (2011) point 
out, is the accountability of persons for their actions. Here the historical-con-
structionist strategy makes sense: in the social-normative arena, our doings 
are evaluated by what reasons we proffer, that is, by the continuity we con-
struct from our motives to the results of our actions. The second right ele-
ment of Locke’s account is  his characterization of persons as ‘intelligent 
agents capable of a law’, the recognition that what it is to be a person is 
conditional on the social-normative framework in which we speak of per-
sons and take the relevant attitudes of commendation and blame towards 
one another.
What is wrong with this part of Locke’s account is the conflation he 
encourages of ‘person’ in his sense with ‘self’. For, as I have shown, there 
can be selves without the attributes of personhood. It is the lack of a clear 
distinction between person and self in Locke that seems to have led many 
of his followers to emphasize the continuity of personal attributes above all 
else, without first considering the continuity of the self. And so the criteria 
for the continuity of persons, wrongly, become criteria for the continuity of 
selves.
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Yet, even stripped of the attributes of personhood, it may seem that the 
continuity of the self is determined by the ‘same consciousness’ that Locke 
marks as its criterion. In the next chapter, I will examine whether and how 
the notion that the self depends on memory and psychological continuity 




Thought experiments and  
experimental philosophy
3.1  Introduction
One explanation for the pertinacity of the Lockean view of the self and its 
historical-constructionist descendants is that there may be something intu-
itively plausible about the idea that one is oneself only so long as one is in 
some way psychologically continuous with one’s personal history. Collo-
quial  expressions  suggest  that  some  such  intuition  may  be  widespread 
among ordinary people. One may say of a relative suffering from dementia 
that ‘she is no longer herself’. An exculpatory ‘I forgot myself!’ may be said 
to appeal to a quasi-Lockean ‘folk’ conception of personal responsibility.
But if we are intuitive Lockeans about the self, how deep and robust 
are those intuitions? In this chapter, I will examine and question the use of 
thought  experiments  in  eliciting  intuitions  about  philosophical  puzzles 
(§   3.2).  Then,  after  introducing  the  method  of  ‘experimental 
philosophy’ (§ 3.3), I will discuss recent experimental studies of intuitions 
about the persistence of self (§§ 3.4, 3.5) and note that while there is some 
evidence suggesting a popular quasi-Lockean conception of the self,  this 
evidence is not conclusive.
3.2  Intuitions and thought experiments
Intuitions  are thought of as spontaneous and pre-theoretical responses to 
situations,  questions,  and  problems—including  philosophical  puzzles. 
They are thus distinguished from reflected philosophical theories, although 
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they may well be informed by implicit metaphysical commitments. It is of-
ten the way of philosophical enquiries either to vindicate or to modify our 
initial intuitions about a question, particularly when a question seems to 
throw up conflicting intuitions.  Thought  experiments  take  the  form of  an 
imagined scenario designed specifically in order to elicit intuitions about 
some philosophical problem or puzzle (or to illustrate the consequences of 
a philosophical view), and so to help develop (or dismiss) a reflected philo-
sophical position.
The literature on self and personal identity in particular abounds with 
thought experiments. Here too Locke is a precursor: his chapter on person-
al identity (1690/1706, II.xxvii) contains a number of thought experiments 
to support his position. To illustrate that the identity conditions of human 
beings per se (as opposed to persons) do not rest in rationality alone, Locke 
reproduces William Temple’s tale of Prince Maurice’s parrot as an example 
of an allegedly rational (and talking) being that is very obviously not a hu-
man being (II.xxvii.8). Having established his notion of self, Locke emphas-
izes its distinctness from that of an immortal soul with another thought ex-
periment: although someone alive now might somehow have inherited the 
soul of either of the Trojan War heroes Nestor and Thersites, that would not 
make him of the same self unless he also retained the consciousness of Nestor 
or Thersites (II.xxvii.14). Next, to illustrate the distinction between self and 
body, Locke presents the first of many body-swap thought experiments in 
the personal-identity literature, involving a prince and a cobbler (II.xxvii.
15): were the prince’s soul to ‘enter and inform’ the cobbler’s body and, 
crucially, carry the prince’s consciousness with it, we would then take the 
cobbler to be ‘the same person with the prince’—but not the same man. 
Further emphasizing the role of consciousness for the continuity of the self, 
Locke repeatedly invokes different versions of Socrates: awake and asleep 
(II.xxvii.19), and as an infant and after resurrection (II.xxvii.21). Improbable 
though most  of  these scenarios  are,  their  point  is  to  elicit  what  matters 
about the concept of a person, as opposed to that of a man or his soul.
Subsequent treatments of personal identity in the philosophical literat-
ure have largely followed Locke in appealing to thought experiments. We 
find fission cases in Lewis (1976) and Parfit (1984), here alongside merger 
cases and teletransportation, and more body-swapping in Williams (1970), 
of which more shortly. All of these are designed to illuminate some prob-
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lem or puzzle arising from what we seem intuitively to believe about the 
nature and persistence conditions of persons. And almost all of them de-
scribe situations which are not only fictitious, but quite unlike any situation 
which any of us is likely to encounter in the course of a human life. Kath-
leen Wilkes (1988), a notable dissenter from the use of thought experiments 
in the personal-identity literature, argues that thought experiments lead to 
inconclusive results and are irrelevant to actual conditions in people’s lives 
that pose questions about the boundary conditions of personhood, such as 
infancy, mental deficiency, dementia, insanity, and dissociation.1
Here then are two major problems with the use of thought experiments 
and associated intuitions.  First,  if  thought  experiments  typically  involve 
puzzle cases, can we be sure that there is but one ‘intuitive’ solution to the 
puzzle? Or that there is any solution at all? And if there are several, how 
are we to adjudicate between them? Secondly, if thought experiments are 
far-fetched scenarios removed from ordinary experience, how are we war-
ranted in extrapolating from these cases to more general and familiar ones?
The first problem is most apparent in the observation that intuitions 
about puzzle cases vary between individuals. For instance, in a tutorial group of 
first-year philosophy students, Plutarch’s Ship of Theseus puzzle will elicit 
different intuitions from different students, with some opining that the ship 
made of  parts  that  have gradually  replaced all  the  original  parts  is  the 
proper Ship of Theseus, others that it is the ship reconstituted from the ori-
ginal discarded parts; some few will even claim that both are.  It may be 2
tempting here to suggest that such differences will disappear once the stu-
dents have been thoroughly tutored in philosophical analysis. But it is by 
no means to be taken for granted that even philosophers agree among each 
other in their intuitions about a given puzzle. After all, puzzle cases are in-
teresting precisely because they tend to elicit conflicting intuitions. But then 
the use of thought experiments only confirms that there is a puzzle and by 
itself offers no conclusive answer to it. 
The  second  problem  with  philosophical  thought  experiments  arises 
from the fact that they deal with highly specific scenarios. Thus, the intu-
 I discuss some of these cases in chs. 7 and 8, but with respect to the self, not per1 -
sonhood.
 One might also hold that neither is Theseus’s ship, though I have not come across 2
this intuitive response among my undergraduates.
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itions thought experiments elicit may be of limited general applicability. We 
may have one intuition about one thought experiment and a conflicting one 
about another (or another version of the first thought experiment), where 
both are designed to elicit intuitions about the same concept. Indeed, the 
two thought experiments may be explicitly designed with the purpose of 
eliciting  conflicting  intuitions.  Thus,  Bernard  Williams  (1970)  presents  a 
case of two individuals’ swapping bodies from two different perspectives. 
One presentation elicits the intuition that psychological continuity is neces-
sary and sufficient to ensure continuity of the self. The other presents the 
case from a first-person perspective involving fear of future pain despite 
the loss of all psychological continuity; here the intuition Williams seeks to 
elicit is that since we can fear future bodily harm, it is bodily continuity 
that matters for the continuity of the self. Such cases suggest that, rather 
than  eliciting  dependable  intuitions  about  a  philosophical  problem, 
thought experiments can serve to produce a state of cognitive dissonance 
by triggering conflicting intuitions. That may be Williams’s point in this 
particular  case:  but  it  illustrates  the  general  danger  of  ‘thought  experi-
menter bias’ (Nichols & Bruno, 2010, p. 304), where a thought experiment is 
(deliberately or inadvertently) framed in a way that leads to the desired 
intuition about a problem. I discuss Williams’s two presentations in more 
detail below (§ 3.4.2).
Further, there is Wilkes’s (1988) point that the kinds of scenarios ima-
gined in thought experiments, especially those concerning personal iden-
tity, are often highly improbable or empirically impossible. We do not or-
dinarily come across a prince’s consciousness entering a cobbler, or the sim-
ilar  body-swapping  scenario  imagined  by  Williams.  Nor  are  we  accus-
tomed,  outside  of  science  fiction,  to  teletransportation—Derek  Parfit’s 
(1984, ch.  10; 2011; 2012) favourite thought experiment. Now it might be 
argued that such scenarios nonetheless help us elucidate, in the abstract, 
just what it is that is important about the continuity of a person or self. 
Thus Locke’s and Parfit’s thought experiments draw us towards attaching 
the greatest importance to psychological continuity. But of course they are 
designed to do so, deliberately removing the bodily continuity of the charac-
ters in their scenarios, blithely assuming that this is indeed separable from 
their psychological continuity. In so doing, they do not establish that psy-
chological continuity is all that matters generally—only that, in constructed 
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cases where psychological continuity is all that is available, we’re inclined to 
assume that the person or self continues through it. They also do not tell us 
anything at all about how anyone’s psychological continuity is ensured in 
the actual world.
In short,  the second problem with thought experiments is their spe-
cificity,  which  may at  best  elicit  local  intuitions  about  a  particular  case, 
rather than about the general underlying question; and further, that it may 
be impossible to generalize from the local case because it  is one not en-
countered in ordinary life. 
How can these problems be addressed? Over the last decade or so, a 
new method has been adopted by a number of philosophers that seeks to 
address the first problem identified here—that of diverging intuitions: ex-
perimental philosophy.  Used in the right way, it can also help mitigate the 
second problem I’ve discussed—that our intuitive responses are specific to 
the scenarios presented.
3.3  Experimental and empirical philosophy
Experimental philosophy has been described as a ‘new movement’ (Knobe 
&  Nichols,  2008)  and,  with  some  hyperbole,  a  ‘methodological 
revolution’  (Prinz,  2008).  Its  motivation  is  to  make  use  of  experimental 
methods in tackling philosophical  problems.  In probing intuitions about 
puzzle cases, this means sampling the intuitions of ordinary, philosophic-
ally untrained people about these cases, rather than relying solely on indi-
vidual philosophers’ intuitions about them, which may or may not be rep-
resentative of those held by a wider population.
The two principal aims of experimental philosophy in this kind of en-
quiry are to find out (i) what people’s intuitions about philosophical prob-
lems actually are (as opposed to what a particular philosopher thinks they 
are), but also (ii) whether these intuitions are warranted (Sosa, 2008). The 
commonest method for achieving the first aim is borrowed from social psy-
chology  and  involves  questionnaire-based  surveys.  Participants  in  such 
surveys are typically presented with a philosophical thought experiment 
and  probed  for  their  intuitive  response  to  the  case  presented.  For  the 
second aim,  one  may test  the  intuitive  responses  obtained against  data 
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either from existing studies in e.g. the psychological sciences or from spe-
cially designed experiments.  Though unlike the traditional  image of  the 
philosopher as a solitary being given to reasoning from an armchair, the 
method of gathering data on people’s intuitions and, where appropriate, 
using empirical and experimental studies to test whether such intuitions 
are warranted by the facts, is an extension of—rather than a discontinuity 
with—more  traditional  philosophical  methods  (Nichols,  2004;  Knobe  & 
Nichols, 2008). This continuity is evident from the fact that experimental 
philosophy studies begin just like traditional philosophical analysis: a prob-
lem or puzzle is identified and intuitions as to its solution are sought. (As 
Jesse Prinz (2008) observes, the traditional philosophical method of intro-
spection is itself an observational study, albeit with a sample of just one 
participant.) The novelty of experimental philosophy lies in the methods 
used thereafter, i.e. the gathering and analysis of ordinary people’s intuitive 
responses to philosophical puzzles.
The usefulness of such an enterprise should appeal to any philosopher 
who has ever witnessed or been party to a disagreement among colleagues 
about what intuitions we ‘commonly’ have about some conceptual puzzle 
or problem, and whether these prior intuitions hold when the puzzle is 
modified or refined, and if not, what new intuitions are elicited. It should 
thus be useful to know whether what some philosophers suppose our intu-
itions to be about a certain problem is in fact matched by the population at 
large.  Experimental  evidence  can  illuminate  who holds  what  intuitions, 
and how common or uncommon certain ‘commonly held’ intuitions actu-
ally are.
The experimental  method thus tackles the first  of  the two problems 
identified in the previous section: the variability of intuitions between indi-
viduals.  Obtaining  responses  to  particular  philosophical  puzzles  from a 
larger sample of individuals minimizes the risk of individual bias in intu-
itions.  Of  course,  there  is  still  likely  to  be  disagreement  within  a  given 
sample. However, the experimental method allows such disagreement to be 
quantified. With results from an experimental  study, we can show what 
proportion of a sample respond in what way to a given philosophical prob-
lem. Supposing there are two typical intuitive responses A and B to a philo-
sophical puzzle, the survey method combined with statistical analysis will 
produce one of three outcomes: that the majority of a sample hold intuition 
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A rather than B, that the majority hold intuition B rather than A, or that 
there is no significant difference in numbers between adherents of A and B.
But it will be observed that even though we may gain a more or less 
representative insight into ‘folk’ intuitions about a particular problem in 
this way, we still only obtain responses to a particular scenario. Indeed, the 
second  problem  identified  in  the  previous  section,  concerning  the  spe-
cificity of thought experiments, appears at first sight not to be avoided by 
experimental  philosophy.  For  a  typical  experimental  philosophy  survey 
presents participants with a vignette that is just as specific as a philosoph-
er’s armchair thought experiment. Nevertheless, the experimental method 
can mitigate the problem of overly specific thought experiments by submit-
ting different vignettes to the same experimental group and comparing par-
ticipants’ responses to different scenarios, or comparing responses to a con-
crete scenario with responses to an abstract question. (I’ll  discuss an ex-
ample of such a study in the next section.) Again, statistical analysis is used 
to  determine whether  differences  in  responses  to  different  scenarios  are 
significant.
As for the second aim of experimental philosophy—to scrutinize our 
intuitions about some puzzle case with respect to whatever facts we can 
gather about that matter: this is already an integral part of many philosoph-
ical enquiries. Empirical data, whether specially gathered or generated by 
relevant scientific research programmes, provide an obvious testing ground 
for both philosophers’  and common-sense intuitions about philosophical 
problems. Here one may usefully follow Prinz’s (2008) distinction between 
experimental  philosophy  and  empirical  philosophy,  where  the  former  en-
gages in ‘data collecting’ and the latter in ‘data mining’ (p.  196). Having 
collected data  on ordinary people’s  intuitions  about  philosophical  prob-
lems, the second aim of testing whether these intuitions are warranted may 
be served by the ‘mining’ of data already generated in the empirical sci-
ences, specifically psychology and neuroscience. 
This  may  at  first  seem  to  contrast  sharply  with  the  time-honoured 
method  of  armchair  theorizing  about  whether  common-sense  intuitions 
hold up in light of available facts. But again, there is continuity with tradi-
tional philosophical method: it is simply that by referring to empirical stud-
ies, our philosophical theorizing (which we may still carry out while seated 
in an agreeably cushioned item of furniture) benefits from additional data 
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that bear on the appropriateness or otherwise of our intuitions. Nor is the 
use  of  available  empirical  data  in  philosophical  enquiries  really  all  that 
novel  and  revolutionary,  having  been  practised,  to  varying  degrees,  by 
Descartes, Locke, Hume, James, and many others. What is perhaps novel is 
the sheer wealth of data the behavioural and brain sciences now provide 
that was not available to philosophers in earlier centuries. Scouring these 
data  for  those  that  are  relevant  to  a  given  philosophical  problem  may 
present its own difficulties. But where they do bear on philosophical prob-
lems, it cannot be in philosophy’s interest to ignore them.
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with experimental philo-
sophy studies on personal identity and the self. From these, it will be ap-
parent that the ‘Lockean’ intuition that the persistence of the self requires 
persistence of one’s memories indeed seems a fairly common one, though
—as Williams suspected—not applicable to all cases, and with a sizeable 
minority of test subjects taking a different view. The following chapters will 
then engage in what Prinz calls empirical  philosophy, garnering evidence 
from the cognitive sciences to expose the problems faced by Lockean, neo-
Lockean, or quasi-Lockean popular conceptions of the self which anchor 
the persistence of the self in psychological continuity.
3.4  Experimental philosophy and the self
3.4.1  Experimental studies on a ‘Lockean frame’ scenario
Do ordinary people share Locke’s and other philosophers’  intuition that 
memory is necessary for the persistence of the self?  An obvious way to test 3
this using the method of experimental philosophy is to present philosoph-
ically untrained participants with two versions of a thought-experiment-
style vignette that differ only in the condition of a protagonist’s memories, 
which are either preserved or lost. Participants should then judge in each 
case whether the protagonist is or is not the same person at the end of the 
vignette as at its beginning. The independent variable of such an experi-
 One reason to suppose the folk might be ‘Lockean’ in this way is that they might 3
have an implicit commitment to mind–body dualism, perhaps for religious reas-
ons.
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mental design is the preservation or loss of the protagonist’s memories; the 
dependent variable the participants’ judgement of the sameness or other-
wise of the protagonist. The experimental hypothesis is that memories are 
commonly and intuitively deemed necessary for the preservation of the self 
or person.  A result where participants judge the protagonist not to be the 4
same person in the lost-memories case,  but the same person in the pre-
served-memories case, would support the hypothesis. A result with no sig-
nificant difference between the conditions would support the null hypo-
thesis, i.e. that it is not the case that memories are commonly and intuit-
ively deemed necessary for the preservation of the self or person.
Intending to design such an experiment from scratch, I was fortunate 
to find this to be unnecessary, since an experimental study with an appro-
priate design had already been carried out; not once, but twice—by Sergey 
Blok and colleagues (2005) and by Shaun Nichols and Mike Bruno (2010). I 
was able to replicate the study once more. The vignette presented to parti-
cipants was this:
Jim is an accountant living in Chicago. One day, he is severely injured in a 
tragic car accident. His only chance for survival is participation in an ad-
vanced medical experiment called a “Type 2 transplant” procedure. Jim 
agrees.  
It  is  the  year  2020  and scientists  are  able  to  grow all  parts  of  the 
human body, except for the brain. A stock of bodies is kept cryogenically 
frozen to be used as spare parts in the event of an emergency. In a “Type 2 
transplant procedure,” a team of doctors removes Jim’s brain and carefully 
places it in a stock body. Jim’s original body is destroyed in the operation.  
After the operation, all the right neural connections between the brain 
and the body have been made. The doctors test all physiological responses 
and determine that the transplant recipient is alive and functioning. The 
doctors scan the brain of the transplant recipient and note that the memor-
ies in it are the same as those that were in the brain before the operation.
(Blok et al., 2005)
In the second condition, the conclusion of the vignette was altered thus:
 The design of the experiments presented here does not allow for the self–person 4
distinction I have drawn in the previous chapter. I address this point in my discus-
sion below (§ 3.5.3).
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The doctors scan the brain of  the transplant recipient and note that  no 
memories in it are the same as those that were in the brain before the op-
eration. Something must have happened during the transplant.
For each condition, participants were then asked to rate their agreement 
with the statement ‘After the operation, the Type 2 transfer recipient is Jim,’ 
using  a  ten-point  Likert  scale  ranging  from  0  (‘strongly  disagree’)  to  9 
(‘strongly agree’).
Nichols and Bruno (2010) introduced a further variable into the exper-
imental design: whether the vignette was presented as a third-person or a 
first-person scenario. The motivation for this addition is Williams’s (1970) 
suggestion that presenting a given thought experiment in the first-person 
perspective may change our intuition about the necessity of memories for 
the  persistence  of  the  self—perhaps  because,  as  Nichols  (2008)  suggests 
elsewhere, the indexical I is ‘descriptively exceedingly thin’ (p. 523) and so 
may mislead one into being able to imagine oneself under that thin descrip-
tion of ‘I’ in scenarios lacking one’s normal ‘thick’ descriptors (i.e., one’s 
psychological  states).  Nichols’  and Bruno’s  first-person versions omitted 
the first sentence of the vignette and substituted ‘you, your, etc.’ for ‘Jim, 
Jim’s, he, his, etc.’.5
My own study  replicated  the  four  conditions  used  by  Nichols  and 
Bruno (2010), but unlike their and Blok and colleagues’ (2005) studies used 
a between-participants design, so that each participant was given just one of 
the four scenarios (same memories or lost memories in either the third-per-
son  or  the  first-person  version).  Blok  and  colleagues  and  Nichols  and 6
Bruno used a within-participants design where each participant was presen-
ted with both the same-memories case and the lost-memories case. Though 
 Although these experimental conditions use the second-person pronoun, they are 5
(here and in Nichols & Bruno, 2010) referred to as first-person conditions, since 
they are designed to elicit a first-person perspective on the scenario in the parti-
cipant. One may wonder, however, whether this second-person prompt of a first-
person perspective quite mirrors what Nichols (2008) refers to as ‘the poverty of 
the I-concept’ (p. 523) when one engages in I-imaginations by oneself.
 I also substituted ‘Birmingham’ for ‘Chicago’ and ‘2030’ for ‘2020’. The first sub6 -
stitution was motivated by the desire to avoid giving my (UK-based) participants a 
scenario obviously set in a foreign country, the second was made in order to replic-
ate roughly how far in the future the original study had set the scenario, relative to 
the date of the study being conducted.
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both previous studies controlled for order effects by balancing the order of 
presentation  of the  vignettes  across  participants,  a  within-participants 
design will obviously mean that the participant is already familiar with the 
general scenario when presented with the second vignette. To avoid any 
potential confounds from this familiarity effect, and following up a sugges-
tion made by Nichols and Bruno (2010, note 16), I tested responses to the 
different  scenarios  entirely  between  participants,  each  participant  having 
been randomly assigned one of the four scenarios.
The participants in the three studies were: for the relevant part of Blok 
and colleagues’  study,  33  introductory  psychology students;  for  Nichols 
and Bruno, 70 students in an introductory philosophy class; in my study, 73 
first-year philosophy undergraduates who at the time of the survey had not 
been exposed to philosophical discussions of personal identity.
The results of the three studies are broadly congruent (fig. 3.1). Blok 
and colleagues obtained a mean agreement of 7.3 for the same-memories 
condition and 2.7 for the no-memories condition. The means in Nichols and 
Bruno’s study were closer to the midline, but not significantly, at 5.8 (same 
memories)  and  3.8  (no  memories);  they  report  no  significant  difference 
Figure 3.1  Mean values of responses to ‘Lockean frame’ surveys.
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between the third- and first-person conditions (the figures given here are 
therefore aggregate means for both conditions). In my study, the aggregate 
mean for the same-memories conditions was 6.1, for no memories, it was 
3.2.7
All three studies thus support the experimental hypothesis that per-
sistence of memories is,  in the context of the given thought experiment, 
deemed necessary for the persistence of self; Nichols and Bruno’s and my 
study additionally support the hypothesis that it makes no significant dif-
ference whether the relevant scenario is presented in the third or the first 
person. In addition, the between-participants design of my study also made 
no difference. I did, however, observe an interesting feature in the distribu-
tion  of responses to the lost-memories cases in my study, where about a 
quarter of respondents form a clearly separate group in taking the opposite 
view to the majority. I discuss this in § 3.5.1 below.
3.4.2  Williams’s ‘pain frame’: conflicting intuitions
The difference between third- and first-person presentations is not the only 
difference between the two ‘frames’ Williams (1970) gives of his thought 
experiment. The other difference is that in one scenario, the emphasis is on 
the continuity of a person’s memories, whereas in the second presentation, 
it is a subject’s affective responses that supposedly elicit a different (non-
Lockean)  intuition  about  the  continuity  of  the  self.  It  is  Nichols’  and 
Bruno’s merit to have deconflated these two variables in their study.
Williams’s second presentation involves the fear of future pain and the 
explicit loss of a subject’s memories:
Someone in whose power I am tells me that I am going to be tortured to-
morrow. I am frightened, and look forward to tomorrow in great appre-
hension. He adds that when the time comes, I shall not remember being 
told that this was going to happen to me, since shortly before the torture 
something else will  be done to me which will  make me forget  the an-
nouncement. This certainly will not cheer me up, since I know perfectly 
 There was a significant main effect of whether or not memories were preserved 7
(F(1, 69) = 32.26, p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.31). There was no significant main effect of third/
first-person difference (F(1, 69) = 0.00, p = 0.984, ω2 = 0) and no significant interac-
tion effect between whether or not memories were preserved and third/first-per-
son difference (F(1, 69) = 0.07, p = 0.793, ω2 = 0).
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well that I can forget things, and that there is such a thing as indeed being 
tortured unexpectedly because I had forgotten or been made to forget a 
prediction of the torture: that will still be a torture which, so long as I do 
know about the prediction, I look forward to in fear. He then adds that my 
forgetting the announcement will be only part of a larger process: when 
the moment of torture comes, I shall not remember any of the things I am 
now in a position to remember. This does not cheer me up, either, since I 
can readily conceive of being involved in an accident, for instance, as a 
result of which I wake up in a completely amnesiac state and also in great 
pain; that could certainly happen to me, I should not like it to happen to 
me, nor to know that it was going to happen to me.  
(Williams, 1970, pp. 167–8)
The intuition Williams seeks to elicit by this thought experiment (labelled 
the ‘pain frame’ by Nichols and Bruno, as opposed to the ‘Lockean frame’ of 
the first thought experiment) is that the self persists regardless of the loss of 
memories: ‘it seems quite sensible to fear the pain that will be experienced 
by the person with your original  body,  despite the amnesia’  (Nichols & 
Bruno, 2010, p. 295).
Nichols and Bruno (2010) proceeded to test this intuition by means of a 
second survey, which was again presented in first-person and third-person 
versions:
Imagine that some time in the future your brain has developed a lethal 
infection and will stop functioning within a few hours. In the emergency 
room, you are alert and listening as the doctors explain to you that the 
only thing they can do is the following:
Render you completely unconscious,  and then shave your head so 
that they can place electrodes on your scalp and shock your infected 
brain. Unfortunately, this procedure will permanently eliminate your 
distinctive  mental  states  (including  your  thoughts,  memories,  and 
personality traits).
You slip into unconsciousness before the doctors can discuss the matter 
further with you, and they elect to perform the procedure. It works exactly 
as expected. Several days after the procedure, the doctors perform some 
follow up brain scans and administer a series of painful shots. (p. 300)
The third-person version substituted ‘Jerry, he, him, his’ for ‘you, your’.
Along  with  a  number  of  questions  designed  to  probe  participants’ 
comprehension of the scenario, participants were then asked to agree or 
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disagree with the statement,  ‘When the doctors  administer  the series  of 
shots, you [Jerry] will feel the pain’ (p. 301 [302]). The responses obtained 
from  participants  having  demonstrated  comprehension  of  the  scenario 
were as follows: in the first-person condition, 75 % agreed with the state-
ment ‘you  will  feel the pain’;  in the third-person condition, 72 % agreed 
with the statement ‘Jerry will feel the pain’. Again, Nichols and Bruno re-
port  no significant  difference  between first-  and third-person conditions 
(fig. 3.2 (a)).
Their interpretation of these results is that Williams is right in asserting 
that the particular framing of a thought experiment makes a difference to 
what intuitions about the persistence of the self are elicited. The difference 
here does not, pace  Williams, seem to depend on whether the scenario is 
presented in the first or third person: none of the studies considered here 
that tested for this variable found that difference to have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on responses. However, the ‘pain frame’ may encourage re-
spondents to impute a persistent subject, because it is intuitively obvious 
that someone is going to feel the pain:
After all, if I am not going to feel it then who is? Similarly for the third-per-
son version, if Jerry isn’t going to feel the pain, then who? There is plaus-
ibly pressure here to give a persistence response. (p. 304)
This of course is the second problem with thought experiments identi-
fied in § 3.2—their tendency to elicit local intuitions about a specific scen-
ario, rather than about the general applicability conditions of a concept. But 
if  there is thought-experimenter bias in Williams’s two frames, which of 
them is the biased one? And how can experimental philosophy help over-
come the specificity problem?
Nichols  and Bruno conducted  a  further  survey  that  addresses  both 
these questions. If the problem is the concreteness of thought-experimental 
scenarios, the obvious solution is to remove concrete particulars from the 
questionnaire and pose the question in an abstract way. Nichols and Bruno 
did this by asking participants for a free response to the question, ‘What is 
required for some person in the future to be the same person as you?’ To 
avoid experimenter  bias  towards Lockean responses,  their  questionnaire 
made  no  mention  of  psychology.  The  result  was  this:  ‘In  their  free  re-
sponses,  over  70  %  of  participants  explicitly  mentioned  psychological 
factors  like  memory  or  personality  traits  as  necessary  for 
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persistence’ (p. 304). Participants were then asked ‘whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statement:
In order for some person in the future to be you, that person doesn’t 
need to have any of your memories. (ibid.)
Here, more than 80 % of participants disagreed—an almost exact reversal 
of the responses to the ‘pain frame’ scenario (fig. 3.2(b)).
It  seems,  then,  that  once  specific  thought  experiments  are  removed 
from  consideration,  folk  intuitions  about  personal  identity  take  on  a 
strongly Lockean flavour. But, as Nichols and Bruno caution, there may be 
cases where responses to abstract questions are less reliable than responses 
to concrete questions in that they offer an unconsidered view that could 
easily be shifted when presented with a counterexample. And though the 
specificity of thought experiments is a problem, the fact that philosophers 
have found it useful to have recourse to such specific scenarios is due pre-
cisely to the fact that abstract considerations do not always suffice in teas-
ing out our intuitions about philosophical problems. We do learn from ex-
amples. 
Nichols and Bruno (2010) therefore ran a final survey in which parti-
cipants were given both the ‘pain frame’ scenario and the ‘abstract frame’, 
followed by ‘an exercise of reflective equilibrium’:
Now that you have answered these questions, we want to call your 
attention to the fact that it wouldn’t really be consistent to say both 
that you would feel the pain of the shots and also that in order for a 
person to be you, that person must have some of your memories. In 
light of this, which one are you more inclined to agree with? (check 
one please)  
___ More inclined to say that you would feel the pain in case #1.  
___ More inclined to say that in order for some person in the future to 
be you, that person must have some of your memories.
The point was to see whether people would show a preference for one 
judgment  over  the  other.  And we did  find a  preference.  64% of  parti-
cipants sided with the psychological response under these reflective con-
ditions, greater than what one would predict by chance alone . . . See fig-
ure [3.2(c)].  
Once again,  people’s  judgments  favor  the  view that  persistence  of 
psychological features is required for persistence of self. (p. 306)
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To sum up, then, the results and implications of Nichols and Bruno’s 
study: In a ‘Lockean frame’ survey (borrowed from Blok and colleagues, 
and also replicated by me), there is a clear result that most participants in-
tuitively judge the persistence of memories to be necessary for the persist-
ence of the person or self. Conversely, given a ‘pain frame’ scenario mod-
elled on Williams’s (1970) second presentation of a thought experiment de-
signed to elicit the intuition that the self persists in the same body regard-
less of the loss of one’s psychological states, the majority of participants re-
spond accordingly, their intuitive response now at odds with the ‘Lockean 
frame’.  So  far,  then,  the  experimental  method seems to  confirm,  with  a 
wider sample than a single ‘armchair’ philosopher, that different framings 
of thought experiments elicit divergent intuitions.
Nichols and Bruno’s third and fourth surveys seek to redress this prob-
lem  of  ‘thought-experimenter  demand’.  The  point  of  both  the  ‘abstract 
frame’ and the ‘reflective equilibrium’ surveys in their study is to find out 
which intuitions about the persistence of the self hold when the specifics of 
particular imagined scenarios are removed and generalization is required 
(thus  addressing the  specificity  problem of  thought  experiments  I  high-
lighted  earlier).  And  here  their  results  suggest  that  in  both  an  abstract 
frame and a considered condition of reflective equilibrium, popular intu-
itions revert to a quasi-Lockean position.
Figure  3.2   Responses  obtained  by 
Nichols & Bruno (2010): (a) Williams’s 
‘pain frame’ (‘Will you/Jerry feel the 
pain?’); (b) aggregate results from (a) 
compared  with  ‘abstract  frame’  (‘In 
order for some person in the future to 
be  you,  that  person  doesn’t  need  to 







Do these survey results provide evidence that the ‘folk’ concept of self is 
broadly Lockean, such that memory is considered necessary for the persist-
ence of the self? That would be to overstate both the breadth and the depth 
of what these studies show. Concerning breadth, some remarks about the 
experimental populations, and variations within them, are in order. As re-
gards depth, it is worth asking just what conclusions about people’s intu-
itions we are warranted to draw from their survey responses. I’ll now dis-
cuss these points in turn.
3.5.1  Experimental populations and dissenting minorities
The participants in all three studies were psychology or philosophy under-
graduates  at  North American or  British  universities  and not  necessarily 
representative of the general population in their countries, let alone of non-
Western populations. As Nichols and Bruno (2010) admit,
This sample is homogenous on several important factors, including age, 
culture, and socioeconomic status. It’s quite possible that people in differ-
ent cultures or age or socioeconomic groups will respond differently from 
the population we studied. And even within the population we studied, 
there was far from uniform agreement about the questions. (pp. 307–8)
Disagreement within a culturally and socioeconomically homogeneous ex-
perimental population is also apparent in my replication of the ‘Lockean 
frame’ study, in the crucial ‘lost memories’ conditions. Recall that there was 
a statistically significant difference between the means of the responses to 
the two scenarios (6.1 for same memories, 3.1 for lost memories, on a 0–9 
scale where 0 signified strong disagreement and 9 strong agreement with 
the statement that the post-operative patient was Jim/you). But it is in the 
nature of averages to mask underlying differences. These become apparent 
when  one  looks  at  the  distribution  of  replies  to  the  different  scenarios 
(fig. 3.3). 
The left-hand column in the figure shows the frequency distributions 
for the two ‘same memories’ conditions and their aggregate, the right-hand 
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Figure 3.3  Frequency distributions of replies to own ‘Lockean frame’ survey 
with ‘twin peaks’ in lost-memories conditions indicated by arrows.
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column for  the two ‘lost  memories’ conditions and their  aggregate.  The 
black curve in each diagram shows the normal distribution of the responses 
with its  peak at  the mean;  the underlying histogram the number of  re-
sponses  for  each  point  on  the  Likert  scale,  where  in  all  conditions  the 
largest number of responses for any one scale point lies close to the overall 
mean.  Additionally,  for  the  ‘same memories’  conditions,  the  histograms 
approximately  follow  the  normal  distribution—where  the  distribution 
curves taper off towards the low end of the scale, so do the histograms. But 
a different picture emerges for ‘lost memories’: here we find a gap in the 
histogram at about the midpoint of the scale, with a second, smaller peak in 
the distribution on the other side of the midpoint from the overall mean. 
About a quarter of participants in these conditions dissented from the ma-
jority view and agreed more than disagreed with the statement that the 
post-operative patient was Jim/you despite the loss of his memories, par-
ticularly so in the first-person condition. 
This ‘twin peaks’ effect in the frequency distribution illustrates that the 
‘lost memories’ scenarios trigger clearly divergent responses among differ-
ent participants. Given the philosophically puzzling nature of the case, one 
might expect nothing less—after all, these studies were conducted precisely 
because  philosophers differ about our intuitions regarding the persistence 
conditions of persons and selves. One might therefore say that these results 
merely confirm that what we took to be a puzzle is indeed a puzzle. But it 
is striking that, unlike in the ‘same memories’ conditions, participants in 
the ‘lost memories’ cases divide so neatly into two (unequal) camps. Here, 
then,  the  experimental  method apparently  has  not  done  away with  the 
problem of diverging intuitions—indeed, stating just the means of the re-
sponses obtained completely masks the underlying disagreement. 
But what is the nature of this disagreement? It might be tempting to 
suppose that the dissenting minority of participants in my study are intuit-
ively anti-Lockean about personal identity.  But this risks overstating the 
depth of what can be gathered from survey responses. We now need to 
consider just what is being probed in these surveys and how this is done.
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3.5.2  Survey pragmatics
In a critical discussion of the survey method used in experimental psycho-
logy, Samuel Cullen (2010) warns that ‘the assumption that intuitions can 
be simply read off from survey responses’ (p. 275) is misguided. This, he 
argues, is because the pragmatics of surveys—the type and phrasing of the 
questions asked, the measurements used, the context of the survey—allow 
for responses to be influenced by factors other than participants’ intuitions. 
Let me first address the pragmatics of measuring survey responses. On 
this point, one might wonder whether the results of Nichols and Bruno’s 
(2010)  ‘pain frame’,  ‘abstract  frame’,  and ‘reflective equilibrium’ surveys 
would be as clear cut if they had again used a Likert scale for answers, 
rather than a forced-choice yes/no option. One might also query whether 
there were cues in the phrasing of the vignettes that may have influenced 
participants’ responses in one direction rather than another, perhaps result-
ing from experimenter bias (cf. Strickland & Suben, 2012).
But of course, the very point of Nichols and Bruno’s study was to ex-
amine the  thought-experimenter  bias  inherent  in  the  Lockean and ‘pain’ 
frames. It  cannot therefore be a criticism of the vignettes used that they 
were skewed to elicit one intuition rather than another about the persist-
ence  conditions  of  the  self:  that  was  the  purpose  of  comparing  them. 
Meanwhile,  for  their  free-response  ‘abstract  frame’  survey,  Nichols  and 
Bruno carefully avoided all references to psychological traits in the ques-
tion, yet obtained results leaning heavily towards psychological-continuity 
views of the self. It is also worth noting that they expected to find a signi-
ficant difference in responses between third- and first-person conditions, 
but found none: on this variable, there is no evidence of experimenter bias 
towards the expected result.
What  of  Cullen’s  (2010)  general  point  that  survey responses do not 
equate to participants’ intuitions, but rather are influenced by ‘pragmatic 
cues and conversational norms’ (p. 285)? Here we may admit that the sur-
vey methodology used in experimental philosophy is not perfect as a tool 
for gathering data on people’s intuitions. But it is difficult to imagine cir-
cumstances under which people could ever not be influenced by ‘pragmatic 
cues and conversational norms’ (debates among philosophers, in print and 
in  seminars,  not  excepted).  Further,  cues  and  conversational  norms  are 
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themselves open to empirical study. Experimental philosophy can offer a 
way of studying these by repeating trials with variations in cues and ques-
tions and so obtain a better understanding of how these factors influence 
results. Some of this has already been done with respect to the ‘Lockean 
frame’ surveys, as I’ll now discuss.
3.5.3  Survey questions: persons and individuals and their identities
It seems an obvious observation that the responses one gets depend on the 
question that is asked. But it is less obvious whether the questions asked in 
experimental surveys reflect the philosophical categories one is trying to 
illuminate. In the ‘Lockean frame’ studies, participants were asked to in-
dicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement ‘After 
the operation, the Type 2 transfer recipient is Jim’ (or ‘you’ in the first-per-
son conditions). The prompt made no mention of ‘identity’, ‘self’, or ‘the 
same’. Now, to assume that the responses indicate participants’ intuitions 
about  personal  identity  or  the  self  means  also  to  assume  that  identity 
judgements can be read off the use of proper names or personal pronouns. 
This may seem a reasonable assumption—but it is not clear whether the 
continued  use  of  a  proper  name  or  personal  pronoun  carries  with  it  a 
judgement of a continuing person, or merely a judgement of a continuing 
individual.
In  a  response  to  Nichols  and  Bruno,  Renatas  Berniūnas  and  Vilius 
Dranseika (2016)  report on a number of studies they conducted to elucid8 -
ate  this  question.  Among these,  they too replicated the ‘Lockean frame’ 
survey discussed here, but with two additional statements, asking parti-
cipants whether the transplant recipient ‘is still the same person’ and wheth-
er he ‘is still a person’ (p. 106).  The responses they obtained for the original 9
prompt  were  in  line  with  the  previous  ‘Lockean frame’  experiments  by 
 I thank my MA student Miranda Fisher-Levine for bringing this paper to my at8 -
tention.
 Blok and colleagues’ (2005) original study also tested this last statement, here in 9
order to differentiate between conditions with a human transplant recipient and a 
robot  transplant  recipient.  In  the  ‘human recipient’  conditions,  agreement  with 
‘still a person’ was high for both ‘same memories’ and ‘no memories’ conditions; in 
the ‘robot recipient’ cases, it was low.
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Blok et al., Nichols and Bruno, and myself. Responses to the ‘same person’ 
prompt  differed  insignificantly  from  these,  but  showed  slightly  lower 
agreement in both ‘memories retained’ and ‘memories lost’ conditions. This 
suggests that the assumption that the use of proper names carries an iden-
tity judgement of some kind is sound—but not necessarily a judgement of 
personal identity. For responses to the ‘still a person’ question showed an 
only marginally significant difference between the ‘memories retained’ and 
‘memories lost’ conditions. To Berniūnas and Dranseika, ‘the results sug-
gest that continuity of memory is important in tracking an individual, but not 
as important in categorizing the post-transformation individual as a per-
son’ (p. 106).
Following up this suggestion, they conducted further surveys, which 
used ‘scenarios that are more down-to-earth (not “science fiction”) and ex-
plicitly present a reverse case of  radical  psychological  discontinuity and 
bodily continuity’ (p. 107), such as a patient in a persistent vegetative state 
(PVS).  From their results, along with those of other studies reported in 10
Blok et al. (2005), Berniūnas and Dranseika (2016) conclude that ‘it would 
be helpful to distinguish between two types of identity judgments: those of 
personal identity and individual identity’ (p. 113). Such a distinction can ac-
count for someone’s remaining the same individual  while ceasing to be a 
person, as might reasonably be said of a PVS patient. This tallies perfectly 
with the observation made in the previous chapter (§ 2.4.1) that the quality 
of personhood is dissociable from the continuity of an organism (cf. Olson, 
1997).
Berniūnas and Dranseika put this distinction to the test by re-running 
the ‘Lockean frame’ and their PVS case surveys, this time probing parti-
cipants’  agreement  with  statements  that  distinguished  between  the  pa-
tients’ being ‘the same person numerically’ and ‘the same person qualitat-
ively’. They were able to do this without having to explicate the philosoph-
ical notions of numerical and qualitative identity in complex terms, since 
their and their participants’ native Lithuanian allows such a distinction in 
ordinary terms, with ‘the same’ translating as tas pats when used numeric-
 Although they make no reference to Wilkes (1988), this choice of scenarios would 10
seem to address her (and my own) complaint about the over-reliance of the per-
sonal-identity literature on otherworldly, science-fiction cases.
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ally,  and  toks  pats  when  used  qualitatively.  The  results  showed  that 11
judgements of someone’s being ‘the same person numerically’ (tas pats) in 
the ‘memories lost’ conditions were greatly increased and no longer statist-
ically significantly different from the ‘memories retained’ conditions.
The  implications  of  the  numerical–qualitative  or  individual–person 
distinction on Nichols and Bruno’s results are that their results in the ‘ab-
stract frame’ and ‘reflective equilibrium’ conditions must be read with cau-
tion, since participants may have responded to the survey questions with a 
qualitative rather than numerical reading of identity in mind. Further, in 
Berniūnas and Dranseika’s conclusion, 
it seems not to be the case that, in thinking about hypothetical cases of 
transformation, the folk rely on anything like the philosopher’s notion of 
personal identity. In other words, identity judgments in hypothetical cases 
do not track identity conditions supplied by the concept person, since there 
is a double disassociation between identity and personhood judgments.
(p. 119)
We should note that Berniūnas and Dranseika’s research is far from a criti-
cism of the method of using experimental surveys to probe popular intu-
itions. It is, on the contrary, an illustration of how refinements of the ques-
tions used in experimental methodology can yield more precise results. 
Their  conclusion  that  there  is  a  distinction  in  popular  judgement 
between the continuity of individuals and that of persons supports my point 
that personhood is a secondary characteristic that we apply to individuals, 
whose persistence conditions qua individuals are prior to the attributes of 
being a person. Unfortunately, none of the studies discussed here explores 
the  distinction  between  person  and  self,  or  for  that  matter  the  question 
whether a continuing individual, bereft of the qualities of personhood, re-
tains  the  same  self.  The  person–individual  dissociation  elaborated  by 
 The closest equivalent to this in English might be the somewhat awkward ‘self11 -
same’ for a numerically identical item. My native German, like Lithuanian, has two 
words for ‘same’—selbe for numerically identical items, and gleiche for qualitatively 
identical  ones,  but  their  correct  use is  the subject  of  much every-day pedantry, 
since colloquially and regionally selbe  may be used in both senses. Whether this 
applies to tas pats and toks pats in Lithuanian I do not know, but Berniūnas and 
Dranseika sought to forestall any confusion about the use of these expressions with 
an explanatory paragraph reminding participants of the difference by means of an 
easy-to-understand example involving billiard balls.
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Berniūnas and Dranseika could still allow for the persistence of the self to 
be judged by the same attributes as that of the person. Or the continuity of 
the self could instead ride on the persistence conditions of the individual—
though we can speculate that in the case of a patient in a persistent vegetat-
ive state, popular judgement might be hesitant to ascribe fully the same self 
to that patient as before. Finally—and consonant with my system view—
the persistence of the self could be judged to lie somewhere in between: not 
requiring the full attributes of personhood, but retaining more brain func-
tions than are available to a patient in a PVS.
3.6  Conclusions
I have in this chapter considered the relevance of thought experiments to 
philosophical problems in general, and in particular to the problems con-
cerning personal identity and the self. Many, but not all, thought experi-
ments in the literature support a psychological-continuity view of the self, 
but there is a worry that the framing of these thought experiments, particu-
larly  those involving empirically  highly improbable  scenarios,  skew our 
intuitions in a particular direction that may have little bearing on puzzling 
cases we may encounter in actual situations. The recently developed meth-
od of experimental philosophy can offer additional insights into what intu-
itions  ordinary  people  have  on  philosophical  puzzle  cases.  As  I  have 
demonstrated,  this  methodology  is  not  without  its  pitfalls.  Thus,  while 
Nichols and Bruno’s (2010) studies suggest that, on balance, there seems to 
be a popular intuition (at least among Western undergraduates) associating 
the persistence of  the  self  with that  of  psychological  states  (particularly 
memory), subsequent research by Berniūnas and Dranseika (2016) shows 
that variations in the survey questions posed paint a more complex picture 
of popular intuitions, particularly in that they appear to dissociate between 
persons and individuals.
In the experimental studies discussed here, much importance has been 
attached to memory—whether its preservation is or is not a signifier of iden-
tity (personal or individual). Yet little or no attention is paid in thought ex-
periments  and  experimental  philosophy  vignettes  to  what  memory 
amounts to. This lack of precision is in the nature of such experiments: we 
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are assumed to have an intuitive handle on what it means for someone to 
retain or lose his or her personal memories. But if we assume that the per-
sistence of memory does matter, in a quasi-Lockean fashion, to a popular 
conception of the persistence of the self, it is then reasonable to enquire into 
the nature of memory and what implications this has on the nature of the 
self.  This enquiry is the next stage of my experimental-empirical  project 






The Lockean self,  whether  on  Locke’s  own view or  in  neo-Lockean ac-
counts, cannot persist without memory. Arguably, the necessity of memory 
is given more prominence in more recent accounts (Grice, 1941; Shoemaker, 
1984) than in Locke’s own, but Locke’s remarks on total amnesia make it 
clear that the ‘same consciousness’ that marks a Lockean self, whatever else 
it  involves,  depends inter  alia  on  intact  memory.  Damasio's  (1999;  2010) 
neurologically grounded account of the self likewise includes remembering 
as  the  key  activity  of  an  ‘autobiographical’  self.  And  in  the  previous 
chapter, we have seen that it seems quite a common intuition that the loss 
of one’s memories forecloses or at least seriously threatens the continuity of 
the self.
Many philosophers have, until fairly recently, taken memory for gran-
ted—that is,  for the purposes of,  say,  devising a model of psychological 
continuity (see § 2.3.3), it seemed to suffice to appeal to conditions in which 
one did or did not have memories of past events, without enquiring too 
closely into what it means, conceptually and/or empirically, to remember. 
Thus, it was enough for Grice (1941) to redefine Locke’s ‘consciousness’—
as characteristic of the self—as ‘memory’. Mackie’s (1976) revision of Locke 
depends  on  periods  of  unconsciousness  being  bridged  by  memory—of 
whatever kind necessary. For these accounts, and many others,  what mat1 -
ters is whether, rather than how, one remembers.
But,  as so often happens when one studies the nature of  seemingly 
simple  phenomena  more  closely,  when  we  enquire  empirically  into  the 
 Notable exceptions are Vico (1744) (see § 4.4.1 below) and Wittgenstein (1974). 1
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nature of memory, things turn out to be far more complex than the simple 
binary ‘does/does not remember’. From such enquiries into memory, three 
main themes emerge that are relevant to this thesis. First, the kinds of re-
membering that concern the self are surprisingly difficult to accommodate 
in standard classifications of memory. The kind of memory relevant to the 
self is what is often called autobiographical  memory,  that is, memory of or 
about oneself (Robinson, 1992; Conway & Rubin, 1993; Nelson, 1993; Klein 
et al. 2004). This typically involves ‘episodic’ memories of one’s actions and 
experiences—which when remembered should produce the consciousness 
of past actions that is central to Locke’s account of the self.  But we also 
have ‘semantic’ (factual) memories that are autobiographical—one can re-
member facts about one’s upbringing, schooling, relationships, and profes-
sional career without their being embedded in specific episodes. Indeed, it 
seems that in organizing our autobiographical memories, these are, over 
time, transformed from recollections of particular episodes to recollections 
of more ‘general events’ and ‘lifetime periods’—which are no longer epis-
ode-specific (Conway & Rubin, 1993). Recent clinical studies also suggest 
that some of our semantic self-knowledge can remain intact when specific 
episodic memories are no longer retrievable (Klein, 2013c). Further, it ap-
pears  that  even episodic  remembering involves  the operation of  several 
dissociable psychological mechanisms (Klein & Nichols, 2012). Thus, auto-
biographical memory sits uneasily in standard classifications of memory. I 
begin this chapter, therefore, with an overview of how memory can be clas-
sified (introducing some standard terminology along the way) and what 
kinds  of  memory  may  usefully  be  termed  ‘autobiographical 
memory’ (§ 4.2).
Secondly, the availability  of autobiographical memory imposes severe 
constraints  on a  quasi-Lockean view of  the  self  as  something somehow 
fixed by the continuity of remembering. I  will  review the processes and 
conditions of memory encoding and retrieval, the different ways in which 
we can be aware of our memories, and how our autobiographical memories 
are typically distributed over a lifetime—all of which suggest that autobio-
graphical memory is uneven, patchy, and highly mutable (§ 4.3).
Thirdly—and most  important—the operations of  so-called ‘episodic’ 
remembering are largely reconstructive, and require the joint activity of sev-
eral dissociable self-representational capacities. These processes are guided 
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as much by current inputs as they are by recalled events in the past. I dis-
cuss the reconstructive nature of episodic recall and its implications on the 
reliability of autobiographical memory (§ 4.4). These observations seriously 
call into question the historical-constructionist notion of our memories’ be-
ing prior to the self. If we are—as this evidence suggests we must be—con-
structionist about autobiographical memory, we cannot at the same time be 
constructionist  about  the  self.  Thus,  in  the  final  section  of  this  chapter 
(§ 4.5), I conclude that the self, rather than being a construct from autobio-
graphical memory, is better conceived of as the system that actively con-
structs our autobiographical memories.
4.2  What is autobiographical memory?
4.2.1  Taxonomies of memory
Memory may be classified in a number of different ways to suit different 
purposes. Sven Bernecker (2009, ch. 1) lists four standard ways of memory 
classification: by the length of time a memory is retained; by the degree of 
awareness one has of a memory; by what kind of prompt triggers memory 
retrieval; and by content.2
The  first  classification  distinguishes  between  working  and  short-term 
memory, and long-term memory. The terminology concerning working and 
short-term memory is  somewhat inconsistent (Sutherland, 1995).  Among 
psychologists, working and short-term memory are generally taken to op-
erate over periods of only seconds. On this view, autobiographical memory 
in any useful sense is long-term. Neurobiologists, on the other hand, use 
the terms more distinctly and somewhat more in line with popular usage. 
One model has working memory, along with a ‘sense of the present’, oper-
ating  over  fractions  of  seconds  to  minutes,  short-term  memory  over 
 I  here ignore Bernecker’s own novel taxonomy—by grammatical object of the 2
verb ‘to remember’—partly because my concern here is psychology, not language 
use; partly because autobiographical memory does not fall neatly into one of Ber-
necker’s ‘grammatical’ classes any more than it maps on to the standard classifica-
tions by content which his classification is supposed to improve upon. (For a dis-
cussion  of  Bernecker’s  theory  of  memory  in  relation  to  personal  identity,  see 
Schechtman, 2011a.)
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minutes to hours, and long-term memory over days to years—short-term 
memory here is ‘effectively long-term memory that is too new to have be-
come well-established’  (Murphy & Naish,  2006,  p.  3).  According to  this 
model, autobiographical memory can be short-term—e.g. Mackie’s (1976) 
memory  bridges  between  (working-memory)  ‘I-occurrences’—as  well  as 
long-term. But most autobiographical memory—e.g. the memories whose 
loss  so  dramatically  features  in  the  thought-experimental  scenarios  dis-
cussed in the previous chapter—is long-term memory. It is then worthwhile 
to  ask  which short-term memories  are  committed to  long-term memory 
and why, and I return to this question below (§ 4.3.1). Where in what fol-
lows  I  refer  to  short-term  memory,  ‘short-term’  is  to  be  understood  in 
Murphy and Naish’s neurobiological sense of ‘minutes to hours’.
Bernecker’s second and third ways of classifying memory, by degree of 
awareness and by what prompts its retrieval, are relevant to autobiograph-
ical memory in that these factors impose certain constraints on its availabil-
ity. I will therefore postpone their discussion to the section on availability 
constraints (§ 4.3).
Finally, perhaps the most oft-used way of classifying memory is by its 
content. The standard psychological taxonomy here makes systematic dis-
tinctions on two levels. At the first level, there is a distinction between pro-
cedural and declarative memory. The terms are (nearly) self-explanatory. Pro-
cedural memory is memory for executing (usually motor) skills; its retrieval 
is automatic and non-conscious (Sutherland, 1995). Textbook examples of 
procedural memory include riding a bike or playing the piano. Declarative 
memory is memory for facts, which can be consciously accessed and articu-
lated (ibid.). Within declarative memory, a further standard distinction, first 
introduced  by  Endel  Tulving  (1972),  is  between  episodic  and  semantic 
memory.
Semantic memory may be defined as ‘memory for facts’ or ‘organized 
world knowledge’, which can be retrieved without the need to ‘remember 
any particular past event’. Episodic memory, in contrast, is memory of ‘the 
events of one’s life’ which includes ‘spatial and temporal landmarks that 
identify the particular time and place when an event occurred’ (Squire & 
Kandel, 2009, p. 118). Thus it might seem that episodic memory is straight-
forwardly  autobiographical,  while  semantic  memory,  comprising  factual 
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information about the world, seems ‘detached from autobiographical refer-
ence’ (Tulving, 1972, p. 389).
Drawing the episodic–semantic distinction by content or reference is 
not tenable, however. It should be obvious that there can be elements of 
semantic  memory that  have an autobiographical  reference:  knowledge of 
one’s name, of where and when one went to school, etc. Such memories are 
semantic in that their encoding and retrieval can indeed be (and often is) 
detached from any temporal or spatial setting or any other episodic fea-
tures. Yet, in so far as they are memories of the facts of one’s life, they are 
clearly autobiographical.
Tulving (1983) recognized that the original distinction by content or 
reference was ‘inchoate, . . . rudimentary, imperfect, incomplete, and rather 
disorganized’ (p. 27). To refine the distinction in light of new clinical obser-
vations, he therefore proposed that episodic and semantic (and non-declar-
ative)  memory are  different  memory systems  marked by the type  of  con-
sciousness with which their retrieval operates: episodic memory correlates 
with autonoetic (‘self-knowing’) consciousness, semantic memory with noet-
ic  (‘knowing’)  consciousness,  and  procedural  memory  with  anoetic  con-
sciousness (consciousness limited to present inputs) (Tulving, 1985). Both 
the episodic–semantic and the declarative–procedural distinctions are thus 
redefined in terms of the different phenomenologies of remembering, with 
each type of memory hypothesized to be using a distinct neurocognitive 
system.3
4.2.2  Where does autobiographical memory fit in?
Autonoetic consciousness, which is exercised in episodic recall, is ‘the ca-
pacity  that  allows  adult  humans  to  mentally  represent  and  to  become 
aware of their protracted existence across subjective time’ (Wheeler et al., 
1997,  p.  335).  Exercising this  capacity  is  often referred to  as  mental  time 
travel (Tulving, 1983; Suddendorf et al., 2009; Klein, 2013a). The idea behind 
this somewhat fanciful label is that the phenomenology of episodic remem-
 The redefinition of the episodic–semantic distinction in terms of phenomenology 3
rather than content has since been ‘widely adopted by memory researchers and has 
shown [itself] to be a particularly fruitful way of generating testable hypotheses 
and theoretical models of . . . long-term declarative memory’ (Klein, 2013b, pp.1–2).
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bering involves, as it were, transposing oneself into one’s own past, of con-
sciously ‘reliving’ past events—and in this resembles the phenomenology 
of consciously simulating future events, a capacity which indeed seems to 
share a neural substrate with episodic remembering (Schacter et al., 2012—
see § 4.4.1). 
There is a decidedly Lockean flavour to the notion of autonoetic con-
sciousness. Episodic memory understood as mental time travel approxim-
ates ‘repeat[ing] the idea of any past action with the same consciousness 
[one] had of it at first’ (Locke, 1690, II.xxvii.10). Autonoetic consciousness 
involves awareness not just of past events, but of oneself experiencing those 
events (see § 4.2.3). So, although episodic memory is no longer defined by 
its autobiographical reference, its redefinition in terms of autonoetic con-
sciousness still makes it the most obvious class of memory to be associated 
with the self.
And indeed there is a considerable overlap between autobiographical 
memory and episodic memory even under its new definition. It is probable 
that most of our autobiographical memories are episodic in nature, and that 
most episodic memories are autobiographical. But the overlap is not com-
plete. There may be episodic memories that are not strictly autobiographic-
al, such as vivid recollections of a scene in a film. Of course, there is an 
autobiographical context to such recollections (one’s having seen the film in 
such and such a cinema at such and such a time of one’s life), but it seems 
plausible that one may in recalling a film scene have the vivid phenomeno-
logy of ‘being there’ without any connection to the surrounding events of 
one’s own life. It may be said that such consciousness is not strictly autono-
etic either (it does not involve ‘self-knowing’)—but its vividness resembles 
autonoetic consciousness more than the comparatively austere phenomeno-
logy of semantic recall. But I need not insist upon this point.
The converse case—autobiographical memories that are not episodic—
is more important. As has already been mentioned, there are facts about 
one’s life whose retrieval from memory does not require autonoetic con-
sciousness and episodic memory. My name, my date of birth, my place of 
birth, certain facts about my career and places of residence, etc., are all the 
stuff  of  semantic  memory,  but  are  nonetheless  autobiographical.  Such 
memories are often reinforced by episodic recollections (e.g. recalling one’s 
former address may trigger a visual recollection of what the street looked 
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like), but they can also be recollected as mere facts, without necessarily be-
ing accompanied by autonoetic consciousness. Such semantic memories are 
relevant to the present discussion not just because they are about oneself: 
the presence of such memories is crucial to a continuous sense of self, as is 
obvious when we consider what their loss would mean. The news media 
periodically report on cases of ‘transient global amnesia’—some wandering 
individual having been found somewhere who has (or appears to have) 
forgotten his name, address, occupation, indeed every fact about himself. 
Whether these cases are all really cases of amnesia may be disputable, but 
the point is that it is easy to imagine that anyone afflicted with such a loss 
of semantic memory would have a seriously defective sense of self, in hav-
ing forgotten who he is.
I am not alone in holding that some important components of autobio-
graphical memory are semantic rather than episodic in nature. Along with 
factual self-knowledge of the kind just discussed, Klein and Nichols (2012) 
point out ‘a second kind of semantic self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s 
own traits’:
Research over the past twenty years has provided evidence that the se-
mantic memory system contains a specific subsystem that stores informa-
tion about one’s own personality in the form of trait generalizations (for 
example, Self: usually stubborn). (p. 681)
Similarly, John A. Robinson (1992) includes a semantic element of ‘self-de-
scription’ in his account of autobiographical memory. Such self-description 
or trait  generalizations may,  of  course,  be augmented and reinforced by 
episodic recollections that illustrate one’s particular traits. But the descript-
ive, semantic elements and the episodic recollections seem to be dissociable 
and accessible independently of each other. (This is often apparent in am-
nesia and dementia cases—see §§ 4.2.4 and 8.2.3).
For example, I may have a very vivid episodic recollection of a particu-
lar  event,  say,  a  triumphant  and unexpected  sprint  victory  on  a  school 
sports day. I may recall the phenomenology of the victorious sprint—the 
heat of a summer’s day, the smell of mown grass, the shot of the starting 
gun, the feel of the Tartan track under my running shoes, the navy blue 
colour of my opponent’s shirt as I overtook him just a few metres before the 
finish line. I could have this episodic recollection without recalling any facts 
about when or where the event remembered took place. More often, such 
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episodic recollection will be accompanied by knowledge of facts about the 
situation  and other  persons  present  which  allow me to  place  the  event 
more or less accurately in my biographical history: the name of the school, 
the name of the boy in the blue shirt, the fact that it was the same year in 
which  some  other  event  happened,  and  so  on.  But  these  are  semantic 
memories. And they could, in turn, be recalled without any accompanying 
episodic memory, as could the mere fact of winning the hundred metres at 
the school sports day at such-and-such a school in the summer of 198x. 
Autobiographical memory, then, includes semantic as well as episodic ele-
ments, even if, in normal circumstances, these are likely to be mutually re-
inforcing. 
One may perhaps go further. Arguably, there will be cases where pro-
cedural memory, too, can be ‘autobiographical’ or self-defining. Again this 
becomes obvious when one considers the loss of such memory. A concert 
pianist having, through some brain lesion, lost the ability to play the piano, 
or a Tour de France competitor having lost his capacity for cycling, or an ar-
tisan who apprenticed for years acquiring the fine motor skills necessary 
for her trade becoming similarly incapacitated—all these would experience 
not merely a loss of procedural memory but of part of their ‘self’. That said, 
the import of such a loss of procedural memory would become apparent to 
the patient only in the presence of intact semantic and/or episodic memory 
(of having previously had the now defunct procedural capacity). Thus, I 
will now mostly limit my discussion to declarative (semantic and episodic) 
autobiographical memory.
4.2.3  The phenomenology of autobiographical memory
While the episodic–semantic distinction is no longer usefully cashed out in 
terms of content or reference of the memories in question, those terms still 
seem to be useful in defining autobiographical memory. In the simplest ana-
lysis, we could say that any memory, whether episodic or semantic (or pro-
cedural), is autobiographical whenever its content refers to oneself as oneself 
(de  se)—one’s  biographical  data,  capacities,  personality  traits,  and  the 
events of one’s life. But this does not seem quite sufficient to capture the 
phenomenology of autobiographical recall. If I were to memorize another’s 
biographical details, catalogue his capacities and personality traits in detail, 
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and contrive—after his description and any other data I might assemble—
vividly to imagine a vast number of events of his life from his perspective, 
would I then be accessing (replicating, simulating) that person’s autobio-
graphical memory? Or would there be something lacking in the experience 
of that memory as autobiographical? Would I, in short, have the same sense 
of ‘mineness’ in accessing another’s autobiographical memory as with my 
own?
Perhaps, then, autobiographical memory is not defined merely by its 
content or referent, but also, again, by its phenomenology. An empirically 
useful way of characterizing that phenomenology is in considering what 
other  psychological  capacities  are  recruited  in  accessing  declarative 
memory so as to produce an experience of that memory being mine, of my 
life, and not of another’s. In their theory of autobiographical memory, Stan-
ley Klein and colleagues (2004) suggest that there are three such capacities 
that ‘transform declarative knowledge into an autobiographical experience’ 
(p. 463): the ability to reflect on oneself (‘self-reflection’), a sense of agency 
and ownership, and a ‘sense of personal temporality’ (p. 465). Drawing on 
clinical data, Klein and colleagues argue that these capacities are ‘individu-
ally  necessary  and  (perhaps)  jointly  sufficient  for  autobiographical  me-
morial experience’ (p. 468). They note that impairments of self-reflection in 
frontal-lobe pathologies and autism, disturbances of the sense of agency 
and ownership in schizophrenia and certain delusional states, and impair-
ments  of  ‘personal  temporality’  (the  sense  of  one’s  continued  existence 
through time) in certain amnesias all correlate with impairments of autobi-
ographical episodic recall.4
Correlations do not, of course, in themselves favour one direction of 
causality or  necessity over the other.  It  could be that  the capacities  dis-
cussed themselves depend on functioning autobiographical memory. But 
there  are  good reasons  for  the  hypothesis  that  these  capacities  are  pre-
requisites for autobiographical memory experience, rather than the other 
way around. The ability to self-reflect, which again taps into Tulving’s no-
tion of autonoetic consciousness —and by which is meant merely a higher-5
 Cf. chs. 7 and 8.4
 And shares its neural basis in the frontal lobes—self-reflection, autonoetic con5 -
sciousness,  and  episodic  memory  are  all  associated  with  frontal-lobe  activity 
(Wheeler et al., 1997; Klein et al., 2004).
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order cognitive capacity that allows one to be the object as well as the sub-
ject of one’s consciousness—is basic to all forms of self-knowledge, not just 
autobiographical memory. It is conceivable that one could have the capacity 
for  self-reflection  in  the  present  without  having  any  autobiographical 
memories. But the converse case is not conceivable: a memory would not 
qualify as autobiographical if one did not know or sense that it was about 
oneself.
The sense of agency and ownership is, perhaps surprisingly, dissoci-
able from self-reflection. A disturbed sense of agency is evident in delu-
sions of control, where ‘patients . . . experience their own thoughts and ac-
tions as having been caused by an external agent’ (Klein et al, 2004, p. 465). 
Loss of a sense of ownership of one’s thoughts occurs in the classic schizo-
phrenia symptoms of  thought insertion and auditory hallucinations (see 
§   8.3.4).  As  Klein  and  colleagues  point  out,  impairments  of  episodic 
memory are also ‘disproportionately pronounced’ in schizophrenia (ibid.), 
suggesting a link between loss of a sense of ownership and impairments of 
episodic memory. However, the relationship between a sense of ownership 
and episodic  memory  is  a  complex  one.  It  is  possible  to  have  episodic 
memories without a sense of ownership. Klein and Nichols (2012) report on 
such a case, the patient R.B., who after a brain injury lost the sense of own-
ership of his episodic memories. 
I can picture the scene perfectly clearly … studying with my friends in our 
study lounge. I can ‘relive’ it in the sense of re-running the experience of 
being there. But it . . . did not feel like it was something that really had 
been a part of my life. Intellectually I suppose I never doubted that it was 
a part of my life. 
Things that were in the present,  like my name, I  continue to own. 
Having been to MIT had two different issues.  My memories of  having 
been at MIT I did not own. Those scenes of being at MIT were vivid, but 
they were not mine. But I owned ‘the fact that I had a degree from MIT’.
(p. 686)
Though R.B. has semantic  autobiographical knowledge (such as having a 
degree  from  MIT),  and  he  therefore  knows  the  events  of  his  episodic 
memory to be his, he does not experience them as his own. Thus, it seems that 
episodic memory does not in itself require—or confer—a sense of owner-
ship, but that a sense of ownership is required for episodic recollections to 
be experienced as autobiographical.
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R.B.’s  case  is  relevant  to  the  neo-Lockean  notion  of  quasi-memory, 
memory-like states that have some proper causal connection to the events 
of which they seem to be memories, without however presupposing the 
rememberer to be the same person as the one who experienced the event 
(see  §  2.3.2).  Marya  Schechtman (1990)  argues  against  the  possibility  of 
quasi-memories by noting that individual memories aren’t isolated, but in-
volve many associations with, and references to, ‘other parts of [one’s] life 
and  [one’s]  personality’  (p.  81).  From  this,  she  concludes  that  a  quasi-
memory must either be stripped of these associations—in which case the 
quasi-memory will be qualitatively rather different from an actual memory, 
and so cannot serve as a substitute for actual memories in establishing psy-
chological connectedness—or it must somehow reproduce all the ‘personal 
elements’ (p. 83) of actual memories. In that case, Schechtman goes on, ‘the 
mineness  of  the  experience  seems  to  be  part  of  the  content  of  the 
memory’ (ibid.).  If  that is so,  the quasi-memory is either delusional (be-
cause the quasi-rememberer experiences it as ‘his’ when, in fact, it is not) or 
it presupposes personal identity (because it is indeed the quasi-remember-
er’s own memory), and so again fails to do the job of establishing psycho-
logical continuity without presupposing it.
R.B.’s case seems a clear counterexample to Schechtman’s contention 
that ‘mineness’ is part of the content of the memory: a sense of ownership 
is precisely what is missing from the phenomenology of his episodic recol-
lections.  Thus,  Klein  and  Nichols  (2012)  respond  to  what  they  call 
‘Schechtman’s dilemma’—that quasi-memories rich enough to reproduce a 
sense of remembering are either delusional or presuppose personal iden-
tity—by pointing out that R.B.’s ‘ownership’-less episodic memories are not 
delusions (they were factually corroborated), but nor do they involve the 
presupposition  that  R.B.  is  necessarily  the  same person  whose  episodic 
memories he seems to be experiencing—indeed, he appears to experience 
those recollections as though they were someone else’s.
But we must be careful here to distinguish between what Klein and 
Nichols call ‘the sense of personal identity’ and the presupposition of person-
al  identity.  Yes,  R.B.  lacks a sense  of  identity with the protagonist  of  his 
episodic recollections. But his case arouses interest precisely because he and 
his clinicians do presuppose that he is—as a matter of fact, not as a matter of 
phenomenology—continuous with the person who had the experiences he 
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now remembers. What is so strange about R.B.’s phenomenology is that we 
know—and  he  knows,  or  can  deduce—that  these  are,  in  fact,  his  own 
memories (even though they do not feel that way to him). R.B.’s case does 
not presuppose a sense of ‘mineness’ (that is a point against Schechtman’s 
argument)—but for it to count as a non-delusional case, it does involve the 
presupposition that R.B. the rememberer is the same person as the R.B. who 
had the experiences he now recollects (which is a point in Schechtman’s 
favour).
What  is  instructive  about  R.B.  in  discussing  the  nature  of  autobio-
graphical memory is that there seems to be a clear dissociation between 
self-knowledge (such as R.B.’s knowledge of having been at MIT, which is 
intact) and a sense of ownership of episodic recollections (the scenes at MIT 
do not seem  ‘his’). Thus, R.B. provides evidence that a ‘sense of personal 
agency/personal ownership’—second in Klein and colleagues’ (2004) list of 
capacities  subserving  autobiographical  memory—is  indeed  among  the 
normal self-representational capacities at work in personal remembering, 
though it is noteworthy that this sense becomes apparent only by its ab-
sence  or  impairment:  R.B.  experiences  his  recollections  as  odd because 6
there is something missing from them, a self-representational capacity (and 
the phenomenology it gives rise to) whose operations, in non-pathological 
circumstances, go unnoticed.
Klein  and  colleagues’  (2004)  third  prerequisite  for  autobiographical 
memory is having a sense of ‘personal temporality’. They characterize this 
as the ‘capacity to become aware of the temporal dimensions of one’s own 
experience’ (p. 466). On a quasi-Lockean view of the self, this sense of self-
over-time would assume intact autobiographical memories. But the Lock-
ean then faces a vicious circularity: that autobiographical memory is neces-
sary for a sense of self-over-time, and a sense of self-over-time necessary for 
memory to be properly autobiographical. One way of avoiding this circu-
larity would be to suggest that a sense of personal temporality is a result, 
not a prerequisite, of autobiographical memory. Klein and colleagues con-
sider this hypothesis, but note that
a review of the literature reveals that episodic memory loss is not neces-
sarily  associated  with  impairments  of  temporal  consciousness.  For  ex-
ample, patients with retrograde amnesia cannot remember their personal 
 As it also is in schizophrenia (see § 8.3.4).6
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past, but they can remember events occurring after the brain trauma that 
left them amnesic; other amnesic patients report other types of temporal 
gaps in their personal narrative. (p. 466)
Thus,  not only can a sense of personal temporality be intact  in cases of 
autobiographical memory loss, but it also seems to be precisely that sense 
of temporality that allows amnesic patients to notice their loss of personal 
memories.  A sense of personal temporality does indeed seem to operate 
independently of the contents of autobiographical memory.
4.2.4  Re-enter the episodic–semantic distinction
An illustration of the foregoing is provided by Klein’s (2013c) case of an 
amnesic patient, D.B.:
D.B. was a 79-year-old man who became profoundly amnesic as a result of 
anoxia following cardiac arrest. Both informal questioning and psycholo-
gical testing revealed that D.B. was unable to consciously recollect a single 
thing he had ever done or experienced from any period of his life. In addi-
tion  to  his  dense  retrograde  episodic  amnesia,  he  also  suffered  severe 
anterograde  episodic  memory  impairment,  rendering  him  incapable  of 
recollecting events that transpired only minutes earlier . . . (p. 797)
D.B.  thus had no accessible episodic autobiographical  memories nor the 
means of forming new ones. Yet, Klein and his colleagues found that he re-
tained semantic self-knowledge related to his personality traits:
To test D.B.’s semantic self-knowledge, we asked him on two separate oc-
casions to judge a list of personality traits for self-descriptiveness. We also 
asked D.B.’s daughter (with whom he lives) to rate D.B. on the same traits. 
Our findings revealed that D.B.’s ratings were both reliable and consistent 
with the way he is perceived by others . . . D.B. thus appeared to have ac-
curate and detailed knowledge about his personality despite the fact that 
he had no conscious access to any specific actions or experiences on which 
that knowledge was based. (ibid.)
In  addition to  this  dissociation between episodic  and semantic  autobio-
graphical memory, Klein and colleagues also found a dissociation within 
D.B.’s semantic memory, for his ability to recollect general knowledge or 
factual information relating to his own life was likewise impaired by his 
amnesia. Only ‘his knowledge of his own personality was intact’ (p. 798).
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It may be observed that ‘knowledge of personality traits’ is a tricky no-
tion, since it is questionable whether anyone really has the stable personal-
ity traits we assume ourselves and others to have (Doris, 2002). But that 
question is not at issue here. For we do think ourselves to have stable traits, 
and it is the knowledge and recollection of that self-image  that is in play 
here. Thus, hereinafter, Klein’s term ‘trait self-knowledge’ may be under-
stood as ‘knowledge of one’s trait self-image’.
Klein (2013c) observes that his patient R.B. (§ 4.2.3) likewise ‘possessed 
both accurate and reliable trait self-knowledge’ despite the impairments to 
his  episodic  memory,  and concludes  that  ‘[p]erhaps,  semantic  trait  self-
knowledge  provides  the  bedrock  from  which  a  sense  of  diachronicity 
springs’ and hence, ‘long-term memory (with the possible exception of se-
mantic trait self-knowledge), due to its potential for loss without accompa-
nying loss of sense of identity, appears unnecessary for a sense of personal 
identity across time’ (p. 799, original emphasis).
But D.B.’s  sense of  self,  taken globally,  is  nevertheless seriously im-
paired by his amnesia. Thus, Klein reports that D.B.
was greatly troubled by the absence of information that, as D.B. describes 
it, “I don’t know, but I should, shouldn’t I?” (D.B. often broke down in 
tears over his inability to recollect  knowledge of his personal past);  in-
formation, in short, that failed to inform his subjective self-awareness.  
(p. 798)
Again, there is a dissociation of self-representational capacities in evidence 
here. D.B. has a sense of temporality and intact trait self-knowledge, but 
lacks other semantic self-knowledge and episodic memories—and is deeply 
troubled by this. On the system view, there is a self operating here—D.B. is 
able to situate himself in time, retains knowledge of his trait self-image, 
and, crucially, is aware that something important is missing from his self-
representations. What is missing are the components of a Lockean or popu-
lar quasi-Lockean self: his personal memories (apart from trait self-know-
ledge). Without these, his sense of self is incomplete. It seems, then, that the 
quasi-Lockean intuition that  memories  are  important  for  a  sense  of  self 
over time is justified—but we must also note that the only way for D.B. to 
recognize their absence is for other conscious self-representational capacities 
to continue—troublingly for him—to function. Thus, the Lockean self does 
not exhaust the self.
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4.2.5  Summary: the diverse nature of autobiographical memory
As this discussion shows, autobiographical memory is a much more com-
plicated matter than it may at first seem. Episodic memories of the events 
of one’s life form an important, but not exclusive, part of autobiographical 
memory. Memory that pertains to oneself and one’s biography can also be 
semantic  self-knowledge  (in  some  cases,  perhaps  even  procedural 
memory).  Autobiographical  memory  thus  straddles  the  boundaries  of 
standard psychological classifications of memory.
But deficiencies in autobiographical  memory also reveal  unexpected 
dissociations within episodic and semantic memory. For semantic autobio-
graphical  memory,  the case of  D.B.  shows that  it  is  possible to have no 
memories of facts about oneself except knowledge of one’s character trait 
self-image. Episodic recollection, meanwhile, involves different dissociable 
self-representational capacities: self-reflection, a sense of agency and own-
ership, and a sense of temporality. As shown by R.B.’s case, the sense of 
ownership can be absent despite the availability of episodic recall (as well 
as semantic self-knowledge).
The diverse nature of  autobiographical  memory processes and their 
possible faults pose a first problem for the view that memory supports the 
self over time. On the contrary, it seems that more basic self-representation-
al processes are required to support autobiographical memory. But there is 
worse to come: there are constraints upon the availability and accessibility 
of autobiographical memory, and important questions about its reliability. I 
discuss these issues in the next two sections of this chapter.
4.3  Availability and accessibility constraints
It is a common enough observation that not all individuals have equally 
good  autobiographical  memory.  Some  of  us  have  excellent  semantic 
memory, others may have particularly rich and vivid episodic memories 
without, perhaps, being able to place them very accurately in their semantic 
context. Some people’s memory seems generally poor; some care greatly 
about this, others do not. Even barring the serious progressive memory loss 
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associated with dementias such as Alzheimer’s disease, memory tends to 
degenerate with age, though it is often the ability to form new memories 
that is most afflicted, so that age-related memory loss manifests itself most 
acutely with reference to recent events, while its sufferers seem to retain 
autobiographical memories of long past events with great clarity.
But no human being, not even one gifted with extraordinary recall for 
both facts and events, retains a complete record of his or her life in autobio-
graphical memory. Whereas the aptly named android ‘Data’ in Star Trek: 
The Next Generation is incapable of forgetting any fact or event he is ever 
exposed to, no such total recall is known outside fiction, and nor would it 
be desirable or to its bearer’s advantage. As Marya Schechtman (1996) puts 
it, were one to strive to recall ‘each and every event befalling the human 
being in full detail—such a goal would result in a Proustian paralysis in 
which the recognizable general features required for a coherent story [of 
one’s life] would be lost in the richness of information’ (p. 124).  The intel7 -
lectual paralysis of one who remembers the details of every minute of his 
life but is unable to abstract or generalize from them is nicely illustrated in 
Jorge Luis Borges’ (1942) short story ‘Funes the Memorious’.
There is, and indeed needs to be, selectivity concerning both what facts 
and events are encoded in autobiographical memory and how and when 
(and why) they are retrieved. Nor are our autobiographical memories dis-
tributed evenly across a lifetime. I shall look at these issues in turn.
4.3.1  Encoding and retrieval8
If,  as  just  suggested,  autobiographical  memory is  selective,  the question 
arises: what factors contribute to an event or fact in short-term memory be-
ing committed to long-term memory for later autobiographical recall, in-
stead of forgotten? For instance, I currently have a short-term memory of 
an amiable but trivial conversation I’ve just had with the staff at my favour-
 Schechtman’s use of ‘story’ here is not metaphorical; the remark comes from her 7
‘narrative self-constitution’ account, which I discuss in the next chapter (§ 5.3.4).
 The terms ‘encoding’ and ‘retrieval’ for the formation and recall of memories, 8
borrowed from computing language in the 1960s, reflect the then newly fashion-
able paradigm of the brain as an information-processing system (Brown & Craik, 
2000).
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ite coffee shop, which is already fading into just a recollection of the fact of 
having had a friendly exchange of words, rather than of what was said; and 
soon I’ll have forgotten both the fact and the content of that conversation 
completely. It will form no part of my long-term autobiographical memory. 
But why not? What factors would have to have been present for this epis-
ode to be stored in autobiographical memory?
Scott Brown and Fergus Craik (2000) identify a number of factors for 
‘good encoding’ (p. 96) of memories in general: how a fact or event relates 
to one’s goals and purposes; how the memory is rehearsed (‘elaborative’ 
rehearsal, involving some cognitive processing of the information, is more 
effective than mere ‘maintenance’ rehearsal; so is rehearsal distributed over 
a  longer  time-span);  the  organization  of  memories  (where  constructing 
‘meaningful relationships between items’ (p. 97) increases effectiveness of 
encoding); the distinctiveness of the episode or fact in question; and, over-
all,  how  the  encoding  of  memories  is  ‘guided  by  an  individual’s  prior 
knowledge, values, and expectations’ (p. 98). Relating these factors to my 
coffee-shop episode, we notice that some components of good encoding are 
missing. Though a friendly exchange of words with the staff may be con-
ducive to my immediate goal of obtaining coffee, that goal ceases to be once 
the coffee has been obtained. For the same reason, the memory of the epis-
ode wouldn’t usually be rehearsed (though it has now been by my writing 
about it). As for organizing my memories, the episode may serve to consol-
idate a generic semantic memory of the staff at this particular coffee shop 
being generally personable, without my recalling the specifics of today’s 
conversation—because it was not distinctive. Indeed, an episode seriously 
conflicting with my prior knowledge and expectations of the coffee shop 
would have been much more memorable.
But though this humdrum coffee-shop episode will not reside in my 
long-term episodic memory, I just suggested that it may help consolidate 
some  more  general  semantic  memory  about  the  coffee  shop.  Likewise, 
many episodes that we recall for only a short while and that fit some but 
not others of Brown and Craik’s ‘good encoding’ factors may contribute to 
autobiographical memory without ever being recalled as individual events 
in Proustian detail: our memory of certain periods in life or repeated activ-
ities is built up in this way.
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Thus, Martin Conway and David Rubin (1993) theorize that our ‘auto-
biographical knowledge base’ is structured into three layers differing in the 
level of detail of their contents. The most general layer, one’s autobiograph-
ical knowledge of ‘lifetime periods’, will include general knowledge associ-
ated with the different periods of one’s life, such as the significant others 
and overarching goals that define each lifetime period and which ‘may rep-
resent major thematic divisions of a person’s life’ (p. 105)—years at school, 
at college, time spent working at X or living with Y, and so on.
The second, somewhat more specific layer of autobiographical memory 
is  that  of  ‘general  events’—repeated  events  such  as  a  particular  work 
routine or extended events like holidays, which are organized thematically 
and chronologically and will generally be attributable to a lifetime period 
at  the  top layer.  They also  provide  context  for  event-specific  memories, 
which  mark the  third,  most  detailed  layer  of  autobiographical  memory. 
These  memories  are  episodic,  relating  to  a  particular  event,  rather  than 
thematic, and are typically recalled for a much shorter time span than gen-
eral event memories and lifetime period memories.
An  important  consequence  of  this  plausible  structuring  of  autobio-
graphical  memory  is  its  mutability—at  the  most  detailed,  event-specific 
level, episodes are typically recalled for a few hours or perhaps days, then 
may contribute to general event memories lasting some months or years, 
some of  which in turn feed into the most  general  and abstract  autobio-
graphical  knowledge  of  lifetime  periods.  Thus,  my  coffee-shop  episode 
ceases as episodic memory after few hours but contributes to the general 
event memory of repeatedly going to that coffee shop during the lifetime 
period of being a PhD student at Sheffield. Autobiographical memory, then, 
is subject to constant change: it is not merely a question of accumulating 
more and more memories over a lifetime, but of organizing and reorganiz-
ing one’s autobiographical knowledge base. In general, the less recent an 
episode, the less likely is it to be retained as episodic memory, though it 
may shape and alter general event memories.
Of course, there are some events that may be recalled episodically for a 
much longer time than our humdrum, day-to-day experiences. This is es-
pecially the case with some early-life memories (see § 4.3.3) and memories 
of significant events—one’s wedding, say, or the funeral of a close friend or 
relative,  or  any other  event  that  in  some way has  a  particular  salience. 
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Here, two factors from Brown and Craik's (2000) catalogue are decisive: the 
distinctiveness of the event in question, and the rehearsal of the memory. 
And both these factors will be reinforced by another element crucial for re-
taining episodic memories: affect. The presence of strong (positive or negat-
ive)  emotions  contributes  to  the  salience  of  our  experiences,  and  con-
sequently to the likelihood of our remembering them.  According to this 9
‘intensity hypothesis for memory’ (Hardcastle, 2008, p. 63), not only does 
the  presence  of  a  strong  affective  response  reinforce  the  memory  of  an 
event,  it also makes us more likely to retell (in Brown and Craik’s terms, 10
‘elaboratively  rehearse’)  the  episode  in  question,  thereby  once  more  re-
hearsing the affective response that accompanied the original experience, 
and so again reinforcing our memory of it (fig. 4.1).
The rehearsal of memories in this way is a process involving both the 
retrieval and subsequent re-encoding of a memory. But how does retrieval 
work in general? Clearly, we do not constantly recall everything we can re-
member (this would lead to a cognitive overload much worse still than be-
ing able to remember everything we experience). What, then, are the condi-
tions  under  which  memories  are  retrieved?  Once  again,  it  was  Tulving 
 There are exceptions. In cases of post-traumatic stress disorder, the affective sali9 -
ence of an experience can block rather than enhance memory encoding (‘mnestic 
block syndrome’, Markowitsch, 2000, p. 470), though the mechanisms of this are 
not yet fully understood, and some traumatic experiences do produce especially 
vivid episodic memories (Schooler & Eich, 2000).
 The  neural  substrate  of  such  reinforcement  is  found in  the  projections  from 10
limbic  structures  (associated  with  affect  responses)  to  the  orbitofrontal  cortex, 
which mediates input from the affect and reward systems for learning, memory, 
decision-making, and planning (Hardcastle, 2008; Kringelbach, 2005).
Figure  4.1   Hardcastle’s 




(1983) who introduced an important distinction here, between the availabil-
ity of memories (a memory trace has been encoded) and their accessibility 
(the  memory  can  actually  be  accessed/‘retrieved’).  The  accessibility  of 
memories is dependent on what cues are present at the time of retrieval. 
And what cues are effective for the retrieval of a particular memory de-
pends on ‘the extent that information in the cue was incorporated in the 
[memory] trace .   .   .  at the time of its original encoding’, in other words, 
‘successful  retrieval  depends on the similarity of  encoding and retrieval 
operations’ (Brown & Craik, 2000, p. 99; cf. Morcom, 2014).
One’s affective state is one important factor here—a memory encoded 
while one is joyful or despondent will more likely be recalled when one is 
once again in a similar affective state.  Other information encoded along 
with  memories  that  can be  used as  retrieval  cues  includes  co-occurring 
activities and/or cognitive processes—doing household chores, or listening 
to a piece of music—or environmental, especially spatial, features—I may 
be more likely to recall my coffee-shop episode when I find myself in the 
vicinity of the same coffee shop again. Besides this, ‘the depth (or type) of 
initial encoding also plays a major role’ in the retrieval of memories (Brown 
& Craik, 2000, p. 99), so for strongly encoded memories, especially those 
involving a strong affective component, a relatively weak cue will suffice 
for their retrieval.
But is ‘retrieval’ really the right word for the process of accessing our 
memories? For semantic memory, it may be: the recall of facts can plausibly 
be described as a retrieval of a memory trace. But for episodic memory, ‘at 
least some memory imagery is due to constructive processes rather than 
simple  retrieval  and  reactivation  of  memory  traces’  (Robinson,  1992, 
p. 238). Indeed, it seems that most or all episodic recollection is constructive 
or  at  least  reconstructive  (Schacter & Addis,  2007;  Klein,  2013b):  unlike a 
film, in which every detail of a scene is replayed exactly as encoded, epis-
odic  memory  works  by  reconstructing  mental  imagery  from  accessible 
memory traces and present cues. This is no mere retrieval, but a self-repres-
entational process of a more complex kind that involves a number of disso-
ciable capacities (§ 4.2.3). And if episodic recollection is reconstructive in its 
contents, that reconstruction may be more or less faithful to the original 
event that is being remembered; in some cases it may be partly or entirely 
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fictitious or false.  I  discuss reconstructive remembering,  and its  implica-
tions, in more detail below (§ 4.4). 
To sum up: autobiographical memory is selective at both the encoding 
and the retrieval stages. What facts and events are committed to memory 
depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external, the most im-
portant for encoding event memories being an occurrence’s distinctiveness 
and/or  one’s  affective  response  to  it.  Once  memories  are  encoded,  and 
therefore ‘available’ in Tulving’s sense, they are not necessarily always ac-
cessible. Our constantly updated and reorganized ‘autobiographical know-
ledge base’ is not designed for random-access searches for specific memor-
ies (as we notice in those maddening moments when we’re trying to re-
member minor autobiographical details, like the name of a former neigh-
bour whose kids were keen to partake in the harvest from our pear tree). 
Their  retrieval  depends on effective cues,  which again range from one’s 
own  present  affective  and  cognitive  states  to  external,  environmental 
factors, and may be quite unanticipated and unplanned (as when the pear-
loving  kids’  father’s  name—Tony—suddenly  pops  back  into  conscious 
awareness). Finally, the recollection of episodic memories is a constructive 
or reconstructive process rather than one of mere ‘retrieval’.
4.3.2  Types and degrees of awareness11
As discussed above (§ 4.2),  semantic and episodic memory (in Tulving’s 
revised definition) differ in the character of our awareness of each. Accord-
ing to  Tulving (1985),  awareness  of  semantic  memories,  including those 
about oneself,  is  merely noetic;  noetic consciousness need not recruit  the 
sense of ownership and agency or of personal temporality that appear to be 
subsidiary  capacities  for  autonoetic  consciousness,  which  is  exercised  in 
episodic recollection.  This poses a problem for Locke’s (1690/1706) cri12 -
terion that past actions constitute the self ‘as far as any intelligent being can 
repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at 
 I here follow Wheeler et al.’s (1997) usage of consciousness as referring a ‘general 11
capacity’ and awareness to ‘a particular manifestation or expression of this general 
capacity’ (p. 335).
 But note that patient R.B. (§ 4.2.3) does attribute ‘ownership’ to his semantic self-12
knowledge.
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first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action’ (II.xxvii.
10; emphasis added). This is only possible (if at all) in the case of autonoetic 
awareness, where a sense of ownership and agency comparable to that of 
present awareness accompanies the episodic memory. (As noted in § 4.2.2, 
the notion of autonoetic consciousness has a decidedly Lockean flavour.) 
But this would mean once more excluding semantic memories from the 
Lockean self. Given the large number of semantic memories one has about 
oneself and the events of one’s life that are not or no longer available for 
episodic  recollection,  yet  still  part  of  one’s  ‘autobiographical  knowledge 
base’ (Conway & Rubin, 1993), this seems an undesirable consequence. For 
example, I have no episodic recollection of playing on the beach at Oost-
duinkerke at the age of just under four, but the fact of having been on that 
summer holiday (corroborated by family records and photographs) does 
form part of my autobiographical knowledge base. But, because of my lack 
of episodic recall, it would not form part of my Lockean self.
Within  autonoetic  consciousness,  awareness  varies  also  by  degree. 
Most of us are familiar with having some vague memories of past events 
without  quite  being able  to  recollect  the  details  of  these  episodes.  Such 
vague memories may sometimes, if more effective cues are produced, re-
solve into sharper recollections. Or they may in time become inaccessible as 
episodic memories, their trace merely adding to the semantic memory of 
what Conway and Rubin call ‘general event’ knowledge.
These varying degrees of our awareness of past events are explicable 
by a number of factors already discussed—the strength of the original en-
coding, the presence or absence of effective cues for recall, the activity of 
Klein’s (2013b) ‘enabling’ systems for episodic recollection—and also the 
temporal distance of the event in question (cf. § 4.3.3 below). This poses an-
other problem for Locke’s ‘same consciousness’ criterion. Even supposing 
that autonoetic awareness of a past action satisfies the condition of being 
the same type of consciousness, for many instances of episodic memory, the 
same degree of awareness cannot be assumed. 
Does this matter? It could be argued that so long as an episodic recol-
lection is veridical (and this is a big if—see § 4.4), the degree of awareness 
one has of the past event is unimportant for its forming part of one’s Lock-
ean self: what matters is that one recalls oneself, the present agent, as the 
agent of the past episode. This might not satisfy Locke himself (though it is 
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somewhat unclear quite what he means by ‘same consciousness’),  but it 
would satisfy many latter-day Lockeans in that ‘psychological continuity’ 
between the past event and the present is maintained. 
However, there is another problem. For it can be argued that whatever 
the degree of autonoetic awareness one has of an episodic memory, it never 
is the same type of awareness as that which one has of a present action. 
Episodic  recollection  makes  use  of  one’s  sense  of  personal  temporality 
(Klein et al., 2004), which means that as well as being aware of the memory, 
one has a ‘feeling of pastness’ (Fernández, 2008) about it. It is precisely that 
sense of recalling an event as a past event that makes it phenomenally dif-
ferent from any present experience. As it happens, Locke (1690/1706) him-
self makes that point in his account of memory: 
the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions, which it has 
once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them 
before. (II.x.2, emphasis added)
Indeed, if we did not have a ‘feeling of pastness’ accompanying episodic 
recollection, we would be hopelessly confused between our personal past 
and present. But that means that Locke’s ‘same consciousness’ is never en-
sured.
There are other ways in which the awareness of an episodic recollec-
tion can differ from present experience. As Mohan Matthen (2010) notes, 
some of us may, in some cases, have episodic memories from an ‘observer’ 
or allocentric perspective, in which ‘you yourself are one of the things in 
the image, and you view yourself doing things in the way somebody else 
would’ (p. 12). We do not, except in pathological cases of depersonalization 
or  schizophrenia (see ch.  8),  have awareness of  the present  in this  way. 
Non-pathological  present awareness of  oneself  always has an egocentric 
perspective. 
Finally, there are episodic recollections in which one’s sense of owner-
ship—without  being  completely  lost,  as  in  the  case  of  R.B.  (§  4.2.3)—is 
weakened. A vague and diffuse childhood memory may often, even with 
intact autonoeticity, feel detached from one’s present self, almost as if it be-
longed to a different person. This benign feeling of detachment probably 
owes much to the passage of time—and it is in this context that the nature 
and structure of autobiographical memory present some more potentially 
troubling characteristics.
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4.3.3  Distribution of autobiographical memories over a lifetime
Another constraint on autobiographical memory is the uneven distribution 
of our memories over a lifetime. It has already been established that we do 
not have equal availability and accessibility of memories from all periods in 
our  life.  In  view of  Conway and Rubin’s  three-layer  model  of  autobio-
graphical memory discussed above (§ 4.3.1), one might envisage a temporal 
distribution of autobiographical knowledge in which memories of recent 
events (those that may still be episodically available) are the most numer-
ous, with the number of accessible memories then decreasing as a function 
of how much time has passed between the event being recalled and the 
moment of its recall. As we shall see shortly, there is evidence to support 
this view, but only up to a point.
For it will be recalled that there are significant events in our lives the 
memories of which are more richly (often affectively) encoded, and which 
are therefore not forgotten at the normal rate. Thus, one might visualize the 
distribution of autobiographical memories over time as a descending curve 
interrupted  at  irregular,  idiosyncratic  intervals  by  spikes  of  significant 
memories. But memory research paints a somewhat different picture.
David Rubin and colleagues (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of sev-
eral earlier, independent studies of the number of memories recalled by 50- 
and 70-year-old participants. By aggregating the data sets of these studies, 
they obtained an S-shaped curve for autobiographical memory distribution 
(fig. 4.2), which
represents the contribution of three factors: a retention function, a reminis-
cence  factor,  and a  childhood amnesia  factor.  The  general  picture  they 
present is that from adolescence into old age there is a moving 20-year 
memory window which exhibits a generic forgetting rate independent of 
the person’s current age. However, that rate cannot be extrapolated back 
to infancy. First, people aged 40 and older exhibit a reversal of the trend 
for those years corresponding to late childhood through adolescence and 
into early adulthood. Rubin et al. attribute this to a reminiscence factor. 
Second, adults of any age report disproportionately fewer memories from 
the preschool years than would be projected by a uniform forgetting rate. 
That is a manifestation of childhood amnesia.  (Robinson, 1992, p. 226)
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Thus, besides more-or-less linear ‘generic forgetting’, there are two other 
factors in play in shaping the autobiographical memory distribution curve: 
a ‘reminiscence bump’ (Conway & Rubin, 1993; Roberts & Feeney, 2009) 
between  late  childhood  and  early  adulthood,  and  so-called  ‘childhood 
amnesia’. 
The reminiscence bump coincides with a lifetime period that is gener-
ally  replete  with  ‘formative’  experiences—school,  college,  first  romantic 
relationships,  leaving  the  parental  home,  etc.  This  might  lead  to  such 
memories being selectively retrieved more frequently, i.e.  by reminiscing 
(Rubin et al., 1986). More likely, however, is that memories from this life-
time period are recalled and rehearsed not for nostalgic  reasons but for 
 
Figure 4.2   Distribution of autobiographical memories over a lifetime in 70-
year-old respondents:  aggregated data from four studies analysed by Rubin 
et al. (1986).
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their salience, ‘the central place those events have in the person’s life story 
or  self-narrative’  (Robinson,  1992,  p.  231,  citing  Fitzgerald,  1988).  Other 
proposed explanations of the bump appeal to the relative cognitive novelty 
of events in that period of one’s life, biological maturational factors, and 
cultural normative expectations or ‘life scripts’ (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002). I 
will return to this debate in the next chapter (§ 5.2.3).
Before the bump (i.e. to its right in the temporally reversed curve in 
fig. 4.2), the memory curve tails off and ends rather abruptly some time in 
the first decade of life (usually around the age of three years), reflecting the 
absence  of  any  autobiographical  memories  of  early  childhood,  a  phe-
nomenon known as childhood amnesia (Robinson, 1992; Conway & Rubin 
1993).  Here too a number of competing explanations have been attemp13 -
ted. Katherine Nelson (1993) reviews four standard theories of childhood 
amnesia  (repression,  forgetting,  no  memories,  inaccessible  memories)  in 
light  of  evidence from developmental  psychology and finds all  of  them 
either lacking in evidence or contradicted by it. She then considers the so-
cial-interaction hypothesis (Hudson, 1990; Pillemer & White, 1989), accord-
ing to  which autobiographical  memories  are  rehearsed and retrieved in 
narrative conversations with parents and other care-givers. While admit-
ting that such narrative memory talk is not universal,  and not culturally 
universal, Nelson (1993) endorses a version of this hypothesis which one 
might call social-functional: ‘the original functional significance of autobio-
graphical memory is that of sharing memory with others, a function that lan-
guage makes possible’ (p. 376, emphasis added).
But whatever the exact mechanism of childhood amnesia (and a com-
bination of cognitive, developmental, and social factors seems plausible), 
its  existence limits the availability of  autobiographical  memory to about 
age three upwards.
 Given the usual meaning of ‘amnesia’ as loss of memory, this label is somewhat 13
misleading,  because  it  implies  that  previously  formed memories  are  no  longer 
available, whereas the explanation of childhood amnesia may well be that no per-
sistent autobiographical memories are encoded in the first place. We should there-
fore, in this context, understand ‘amnesia’ simply to mean lack of memory.
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4.3.4  Availability and accessibility constraints: summary
The availability and accessibility of autobiographical memory is, first of all, 
governed by processes operating at the time of both the encoding and the 
retrieval of memories. The significance and salience of an event or fact, es-
pecially where underwritten by affective responses, enhance its committal 
to memory. But for a memory to be accessible as well as available, similarly 
salient and significant processes must be in operation for its retrieval.
Encoding and retrieval processes also determine what kind of aware-
ness  we have of  an autobiographical  memory,  whether  it  is  recalled se-
mantically, with noetic awareness, or episodically, with autonoetic aware-
ness. And in episodic recollection, the degree of vividness and detail of the 
recall will vary according to factors such as time elapsed since the memory 
was  encoded,  the  effectiveness  of  present  cues  for  the  retrieval  of  the 
memory, and again the event’s significance and affective resonance.
More globally,  the distribution of  autobiographical  memories over a 
lifetime appears to be governed by three factors. Generic forgetting means 
that the most recent period of one’s life is generally the most present in 
autobiographical memory. Reversing this general trend, there is a ‘reminis-
cence  bump’  of  memories  from  early  adulthood,  adolescence,  and  late 
childhood. And childhood amnesia means we generally hold no autobio-
graphical memories at all from the first three years of our lives.
Taken together, these constraints suggests that a Lockean self, made up 
of  those  autobiographical  events  we  can  remember  (whether  ‘with  the 
same consciousness’  as  at  the  time  of  the  event  or  with  any  degree  of 
awareness at all), is uneven in both its temporal distribution and its access-
ibility, highly variable over time, and (depending on how stringently we 
apply the ‘same consciousness’ criterion) rather patchy.
4.4  Reconstruction and reliability
At the beginning of the preceding section I noted what I took to be a com-
monly known fact, for which I then presented psychological evidence: that 
no one retains a complete record of the events of his or her life in autobio-
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graphical memory. I shall now argue that it is also highly unlikely that any-
one holds a completely accurate record of the events of his or her life.
How reliable is autobiographical memory? We can have accurate recall 
of some semantic autobiographical memories (important dates in one’s life; 
schools  and colleges  attended;  the  names  of  family,  friends,  lovers,  col-
leagues, pets; etc.). Other semantic memories may be less accurate—for in-
stance, I may not accurately recall the year or month I went on a particular 
holiday without, where available, checking my records.  And in episodic 14
recollection, probably only very recent or the most salient memories are 
recalled with anything approaching accuracy. For, in addition to the con-
straints on availability and accessibility just discussed—the complex factors 
that attend the encoding and retrieval of autobiographical memories—the 
reconstructive  nature  of  most  of  our  episodic  recollections  seriously  con-
strains their reliability. I will now discuss this important feature of episodic 
remembering, and then sketch a continuum of reliability among reconstruc-
ted episodic recollections.
4.4.1  Remembering as reconstruction
The idea that memory involves constructive or reconstructive processes is 
far from recent. Giambattista Vico (whose lifetime overlaps with those of 
both Locke and Hume) may be noted as a precursor for his observations, in 
his New Science (1744), on what he sees as the triadic nature of memory:  15
Memory thus has three different aspects: memory [memoria] when it re-
members things, imagination [fantasia] when it alters or imitates them and 
invention [ingegno] when it gives them a new turn or puts them into prop-
er arrangement and relationship. (1948 edn, p. 280)
Writing two centuries later, and on the basis of empirical research in social 
and cognitive psychology, Frederic Bartlett (1932) is widely cited as the first 
 An interesting question arising in this context is whether such external self-refer14 -
ring records amount to something like an ‘extended self’. I will address this point 
in my final chapter (§ 9.2.2).
 I owe this discovery to Neimeyer and Metzler (1994), who in turn credit M. J. 15
Mahoney.
!98
modern  psychologist  to  have  espoused  a  reconstructive  or  constructive 
theory of memory:
The first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally redu-
plicative, or reproductive. (1995 edn, p. 204)
Remembering is  not  the re-excitation of  innumerable fixed,  lifeless  and 
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction . . .  
(p. 213)
Bartlett studied mostly people’s repeated recollection of stories and images 
and found these to vary considerably over time. Such recollections share 
structural features with episodic remembering, which involves both imagery 
and a temporal sequence.
The view that episodic recollection is a reconstructive process is now 
widely accepted (e.g. Loftus, 1974; Neimeyer & Metzler, 1994; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007; Klein, 2013b). The precise mechanisms of reconstructive epis-
odic remembering are, as yet, not so clear. There seem to be several possib-
ilities concerning what and how much of our episodic recollections is re-
constructed. There may be islands of episodic memory traces which, on re-
trieval, are imaginatively enhanced, with missing imagery filled in around 
a core episode. Or perhaps all retrieval is semantic and then used as a cue 
for imaginative episodic construction.
The second possibility would be consistent with Stanley Klein’s (2013b) 
recent hypothesis that there are not, after all, discrete systems for semantic 
and episodic memory, but that it is retrieval operations—supported by the 
‘enabling systems’ of self-reflection, sense of ownership and agency, and 
sense of temporality—that lend episodic recollections their episodicity:
What makes a memory experience episodic or semantic is not the nature 
of the content, or the hypothesized system in which content resides while 
in “storage,” but rather an act of temporal (or atemporal) awareness that 
becomes associated with the content once it has been retrieved. (p. 3)
Episodic recollection is then something like, as Rob Hopkins (forthcoming) 
puts  it,  ‘imagining  the  past’.  Much  recent  cognitive  neuroscience  offers 
support for this view, having found a significant overlap in brain activity 
between episodic remembering and imagining (for a review, see Schacter et 
al., 2012). Yet the overlap is not complete. For example, some patients with 
amnesia resulting from hippocampal damage are still able to imagine fu-
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ture and fictitious experiences (Maguire et  al.,  2010;  Cooper et  al.,  2011; 
Hurley et al., 2011). This is perhaps not surprising—in the absence of (se-
mantic?) memory traces, a capacity for imagining is insufficient, on its own, 
for  imaginative recollection.  But,  conversely,  unilateral  prefrontal  lesions 
seem to result in impaired imagination but no impairment of episodic recall 
(Berryhill et al., 2010), which suggests that imagination is not always neces-
sary for episodic recollection.
A plausible position may be that we sometimes have episodic memory 
traces, which are reconstructively enriched, but at other times reconstruct 
episodic memories wholly around semantic retrieval. But in both cases, re-
constructive  processes  contribute  to  the  episodic  recollection  we experi-
ence. Given this, it is easy to see how inaccuracies will creep into our recol-
lections, as at the time of remembering we (unconsciously) fill in gaps in 
the recalled episode with more or less likely details. 
Are such recollections still genuine memories? It seems plausible that a 
popular notion of the veridicality of memories appeals to a suitable causal 
link  from  the  event  being  remembered  to  the  recollection.  Adapting 16
Grice’s (1961) causal theory of perception to memory, George Botterill sug-
gests that genuine memories ‘are states which are causally related [in the 
right way] to the incidents of which they are memories’ (Botterill & Car-
ruthers, 1999, p.  37). Thus, the gist  of an episodic memory may count as 
genuine, while some details are filled in that do not satisfy the causal re-
quirement of being traceable back to the event in question. I will call this 
largely benign filling-in ‘embellished recall’.
More serious instances of unreliable recollections are misremembered, 
confabulated or outright false ‘memories’. Thus emerges a continuum ran-
ging from largely reliable to wholly unreliable recollections, which I now 
discuss  in  order  of  decreasing  reliability.  And  it  should  be  noted  that, 
without recourse to external evidence, we have little ability to discriminate 
between reliable and unreliable recollections (Ross & Buehler, 1994).
 An experimental survey to test this presumed popular notion is in preparation. A 16
pilot  study conducted with  15  philosophy postgraduates  and final-year  under-
graduates, while involving too small and homogeneous a sample to allow general-
ization, suggests that the right kind of causal connection indeed seems crucial for a 
‘vivid image’ to be deemed an instance of ‘remembering’.
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4.4.2  Embellished recall
In ordinary episodic recollections, many details will be missing: either be-
cause they were not encoded in memory in the first place, or because they 
have since been forgotten, or because retrieval conditions are less than per-
fect. At the same time, the rememberer will have some generic knowledge 
relevant to the episode in question, as well as memories of similar episodes. 
It  is plausible,  therefore,  that when one attends closely to a partially re-
membered episode, the details missing from the memory trace are filled in 
from these other sources.
Suppose  I  try  to  recollect  a  dinner  at  a  restaurant  with  a  group of 
friends  that  took  place  some  months  ago.  I  remember  the  faces  of  my 
friends and where everyone sat in relation to each other. I remember some 
of what I ate. I seem to remember fragments of what was talked about over 
dinner,  perhaps even snatches of the conversation that were particularly 
memorable, because funny or outrageous. I do not remember exactly what 
clothes people were wearing, what the waiter looked like, what everyone 
else ate and drank, or anything about the decor of the restaurant. But as I 
try to recollect the scene, I fill in some of these gaps quite easily from other 
parts  of  my  autobiographical  knowledge  base.  Mike  doesn’t  drink  red 
wine,  so  I  ‘remember’  him  drinking  white.  Josh  usually  wears  knitted 
jumpers, so I picture him in knitwear. And from relevant generic know-
ledge, my recollection gains a white table cloth, a small, dark-haired Italian 
waiter, some gauche wall decorations, and a scene over splitting the bill in 
which those wanting to pay by cash hand over banknotes to those wanting 
to pay by card. And so forth.
Such instances of embellished recall are normally benign. Embellished 
recollections aren’t exactly false. Though they contain elements from one’s 
autobiographical knowledge base that don’t derive from the precise epis-
ode that is currently being recalled, these elements are nevertheless autobi-
ographical  and  usually  veridical  (such  as  Mike’s  preference  for  white 
wine). Other reconstructed details may be so trivial that it is of little im-
portance to the rememberer whether or not they are veridical (such as the 
colour of the table-cloth)—the original detail of the episode having been 
forgotten (or not having been encoded in the first place) precisely because it 
was of no particular importance. Embellished episodic recollection, while 
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not accurate in its details, can thus, in many cases, still be said to be genu-
ine remembering, at least in its essentials.
4.4.3  Misremembering
A more pronounced manifestation of the ‘filling-in’ that occurs in embel-
lished recall is what we ordinarily term ‘misremembering’. Suppose that, in 
recollecting the restaurant scene, I seem to remember that my friend Char-
lotte was present at the dinner, when she wasn’t. I probably have veridical 
recollections of her at dinner on other occasions; however, placing her at 
table in my recollection of this particular dinner seems a more serious de-
parture from the facts than the filling-in of the colour of the table-cloth, for 
example. On a social occasion like a dinner with friends, it is no mere trifle 
who was and who was not present. In such a case, it would be too generous 
to speak of proper remembering, since one essential feature of the recollec-
tion is clearly a misremembered one.
Yet, in ordinary circumstances (but not, for instance, the more unusual 
circumstance of giving evidence in a court of law), even such misremem-
bering is usually benign in its consequences. In particular, we tend to admit 
to having misremembered, and to correct our memories accordingly, when 
presented with evidence or testimony contradicting our recollections. Thus, 
if  everyone else present at  that  dinner assures me that Charlotte wasn’t 
present, or Charlotte herself points out that she couldn’t possibly have been 
there as she was out of town that evening, I would be happy to accept that 
my memory was unreliable on that point and conclude that my episodic 
recollection mixed up different events. Such admission of misremembering 
and revision of memory is not so likely to be forthcoming in pathological 
cases of false remembering, which I’ll consider next.
4.4.4  Confabulation
Besides the embellished recall and misremembering just described, which I 
contend happens to most of us some of the time, more serious defects of 
episodic recollection occur in certain pathologies. Patients with frontal-lobe 
damage are prone to confabulating episodic ‘memories’, with unhesitating 
confidence and often in considerable detail, most or all of which are untrue 
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(Conway & Rubin, 1993; Baddeley et al., 2009). Such confabulation is usu-
ally marked both by the patients’ clearly believing their own story (there is 
no deliberate deception) and by the fact that to those around them it is of-
ten completely obvious that the patients’ ‘memories’ cannot be true.
Consider, for example, patient RR, who had extensive bilateral damage to 
his frontal lobes following a driving accident . . . When asked about the 
accident, he happily provided a detailed account that involved his getting 
out of his car and carrying out a polite but extremely repetitive conversa-
tion with the driver of the lorry that had hit him, with each apologizing to 
the other multiple times. He had in fact been unconscious for a lengthy 
period following the accident and could almost certainly not remember it. 
He was no longer capable of driving and gave a totally implausible ac-
count of how he had subsequently driven himself to the rehabilitation cen-
ter . . . (Baddeley et al., 2009, p. 158)
The cause of this kind of spontaneous confabulation is usually neuro-
logical damage to the frontal lobes, which have been associated with execut-
ive function, our ability to control and manage cognitive processes. Badde-
ley and colleagues theorize that executive dysfunction resulting from front-
al-lobe damage leads to the patient’s having difficulties both with generat-
ing effective retrieval cues and with evaluating his own ‘memories’. This is 
how confabulation, along with the patient’s belief in the veracity of his con-
fabulated memories, comes about. (Note that, although there is still a causal 
chain  from the  event  to  its  confabulated ‘recollection’,  we obviously  no 
longer consider confabulations to be genuine memories, because the causal 
link—from accident to frontal lobe damage to confabulation—does not ob-
tain ‘in the right way’. Causal connections are necessary but not sufficient 
for genuine memories.)
Here then we have a defect of episodic autobiographical memory that 
is the result of a fairly well-understood pathological condition. Thus, one 
might think that any way one’s sense of self is adversely affected by these 
confabulations is likewise a pathological symptom. Indeed, executive dys-
function, however caused, may be associated with deficits of the self in oth-
er ways.  There are, however, cases of false memories that are not the res17 -
ult of such clearly defined neurological injuries. What I’ll discuss next are 
such false memories, particularly of one’s childhood, which often refer to 
 See §§ 7.2.3, 8.2.2, 9.2.1.17
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more prolonged events  than those  in  confabulation,  in  some cases  with 
troubling consequences.
4.4.5  False memories
I must begin this discussion with a confession. Though a tolerable sprinter 
in my school days (especially when running for a bus), I never did win the 
hundred metres against my peers. Nor do I have a detailed memory of any 
particular school sports day. The vivid episodic recollection I describe in 
§ 4.2.2 is a fabrication. Yet, in making up that story of the fictitious sprint 
victory, I readily imagined the sensory details described there. And I can 
readily do so again: I seem now to have an episodic pseudo-memory of this 
made-up event.
The apparent ease with which episodic memories can be fabricated is 
supported by evidence from psychological studies. Elizabeth Loftus (1996; 
1997)  describes  a  number  of  memory  studies  in  which  false  childhood 
memories were successfully implanted in between a fifth and a quarter of 
participants. The subjects were given vignettes of four episodes, three of 
which were about events from their own childhood (obtained from parti-
cipants’  parents),  one was fabricated by the experimenters  (participants’ 
parents having confirmed that  no such event had occurred in the parti-
cipants’ childhood). Participants were then interviewed several times about 
what they recalled of the events in question. In one such study,
subjects remembered something about 89% of the true events during the 
first  interview.  Somewhat  higher  percentages  were  remembered during 
the second (93%) and third (95%) interviews. As for the false events, . . . no 
subject  recalled these during the first  interview, but 25% did so by the 
third interview. (Loftus, 1996)
Loftus reports that some of the participants who ‘remembered’ the false 
event at interview gave considerable detail of themselves in the fabricated 
episode, suggesting that the rehearsal of a false memory creates an autono-
etic awareness like that of recalling an actual event.
The fact of actively imagining the fabricated event has a reinforcing ef-
fect on one’s confidence that the event occurred. In another study, Loftus 
and her colleagues asked participants to
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indicate the likelihood that certain events happened to them during their 
childhood. The list contains 40 events, each rated on a scale ranging from 
“definitely did not happen” to “definitely did happen.” Two weeks later 
we asked the participants to imagine that they had experienced some of 
these events.  Different  subjects  were asked to imagine different  events. 
Sometime later the participants again were asked to respond to the origin-
al list of 40 childhood events, indicating how likely it was that these events 
actually happened to them. (Loftus, 1997)
Participants who had been asked to imagine a particular event were sub-
sequently  significantly  more  confident  that  such  an  event  had occurred 
than participants who had not been asked to imagine the event. So, were I 
to  forget  having deliberately  made up the  sprint  episode to  illustrate  a 
chapter  of  my thesis,  I  might  well,  by  virtue  of  having  imagined  it  so 
vividly (and now repeatedly), come to believe that it was a true memory. In 
this imaginative rehearsal of a fabricated memory, Vico’s fantasia  and in-
gegno aspects of memory find empirical corroboration.
Should all this worry Lockeans? One might say that the examples of 
false memories given here—a fabricated memory to illustrate a doctoral 
thesis, some laboratory studies in which only up to a quarter of subjects 
were susceptible to the creation of false memories, all designed specifically 
with the aim of creating false memories—show only that false memories 
can be created in this way, in some people, under specific conditions. They 
do not suggest that this is what routinely happens in people’s lives.
But there is a back story to Loftus’s work. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases were recorded in North America of 
psychotherapy  patients  (often  diagnosed  with  ‘multiple-personality  dis-
order’ )  who  claimed  to  have,  in  therapy,  ‘recovered’  previously 18
‘repressed’  memories  of  being subject  to  satanistic  and/or  sexual  abuse 
when children. Many of these cases led to court proceedings against the 
alleged perpetrators (often the patients’ parents); in some 29 US states new 
legislation was enacted delaying statutes of limitation, making it possible to 
sue for civil damages within a given number of years of the ‘discovery’ of 
the ‘repressed memories’, no matter how long ago the alleged abuse was 
supposed to have taken place. Many of these ‘recovered’ memories were 
subsequently found to be false,  leading to hundreds more lawsuits,  this 
 See § 8.3.3 for a discussion of this disorder.18
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time against the therapists responsible for encouraging the false memories, 
and the formation of a pressure group of families affected by such cases, 
the False  Memory Syndrome Foundation (Hacking,  1995a,  ch.  8;  Loftus, 
1996).
Now, it might again be argued that, tragic though such false-memory 
cases were for those affected, they were the result of some underlying psy-
chopathology and misguided therapeutic  methods,  and that  no  adverse 
conclusions should be drawn from pathological cases about the reliability 
of episodic recollection in ‘healthy’ people. This is a dangerous argument. 
Anyone could, through no fault of his or her own, succumb to some psy-
chological disorder that encourages the formation of false memories. And 
Loftus’s studies show that it is possible to create false memories in healthy 
subjects, too. Although these were created in controlled laboratory condi-
tions, it is at least conceivable that similar circumstances occur in our or-
dinary lives. A conversation in which someone recounts experiencing a par-
ticular instance of abuse in childhood could, given appropriate motivating 
factors (envy, sympathy…), convince one of having experienced that kind 
of abuse in one’s childhood, too, even if one did not. Even if most of us do 
not have completely false memories, it would be implausible to assert that 
anyone is immune from them.
4.4.6  Reconstruction and reliability: summary
The reconstructive nature of episodic recollection and its close kinship with 
imagination call into question the reliability of such recollections. As just 
seen, there is a considerable spectrum of diminishing veridicality of autobi-
ographical memories, ranging from the wholly accurate to the wholly false. 
Some semantic memories, as well as recent and particularly salient episodic 
memories, may be entirely accurate. Most episodic memories are likely to 
become embellished in recollection with the filling-in of details from other 
sources in one’s autobiographical knowledge base. Some episodic recollec-
tions, by the same process, will be misremembered ones, but open to being 
revised when the rememberer is confronted with contradictory evidence.
More serious, but admittedly pathological, cases of false remembering 
include  the  confabulation  arising  from  frontal-lobe  damage,  and  false 
memories  allegedly  ‘recovered’  in  psychotherapy.  However,  as  Loftus’s 
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studies show, a significant minority of subjects are susceptible to the cre-
ation of false childhood memories even in the absence of an underlying 
pathological condition.
We cannot, therefore, take autobiographical memories for granted as 
fixed and unchanging or  reliable  reproductions of  past  events.  Together 
with the constraints on the availability of autobiographical memory dis-
cussed earlier, this should worry Lockeans. And reconstructive remember-
ing suggests that the order of priority of self and autobiographical memory 
in our cognitive architecture is really quite the reverse of what historical-
constructionist accounts of the self assume. These issues are the subject of 
the final section of this chapter.
4.5  Autobiographical memory and the self
Having discussed the nature and constraints of autobiographical memory, I 
must now turn to its relation with the self. There is a large psychological 
literature  exploring  various  empirical  approaches  to  this  relation  (for  a 
wide-ranging sample, see Neisser and Fivush, 1994). But my aim here is to 
adjudicate between different conceptualizations of the self. In this regard, 
there seem to be two opposite ways in which one might view the self–
memory relation,  depending on which of  the relata is  given logical  and 
empirical priority over the other. Is memory prior, and is the self a construct 
from our autobiographical  memories,  as  the Lockean-inspired historical-
constructionist tradition would have it? Or is the self prior, in that the con-
struction of autobiographical memory is an activity of the self? I will now 
examine which of these approaches better fits the evidence from psycho-
logy that I have presented here.
4.5.1  The self as a construct from autobiographical memories?
A common reading of Locke’s account of the self is that ‘the self is a logical 
construction, and is to be defined in terms of memory’ (Grice, 1941, p. 340). 
I  have  already  discussed  the  well-rehearsed  philosophical  objections  to 
Locke’s account (§ 2.3). Now, it seems, the Lockean view and its descend-
ants face serious empirical challenges as well. I noted earlier (§ 4.3.2) how 
!107
variations in awareness of our autobiographical memories and the fact that 
episodic memory has a ‘feeling of pastness’ about it make it impossible for 
there ever to be the ‘same consciousness’ of the past as of the present that 
Locke’s own account requires. So let us discard the ‘same consciousness’ 
criterion and follow Grice in taking memory—whatever the type and degree 
of awareness we may have of it—as the crucial ingredient of the self. But, 
given  the  nature  of  autobiographical  memory,  can  it  serve  as  ‘raw 
material’ (Hirst, 1994) for the construction of a self?
Raw materials for construction—if they are suitable,  and if  the con-
struction is to be stable—are not expected to change much. This is not true 
of  autobiographical  memory.  As discussed above (§  4.3.1),  our ‘autobio-
graphical knowledge base’ (Conway & Rubin, 1993) is subject to constant 
updating  and  modification.  Recent  episodic  memories  are  discarded  or 
transformed into components of ‘general event’ memories. More distant, 
half-forgotten  memories  may  suddenly  be  retrieved  with  new  urgency 
when an appropriate relevant cue is presented. Anything constructed out of 
such mutable material is likely to shape-shift accordingly. But perhaps the 
self  is  like  that,  itself  being constantly  reshaped and updated? Granted, 
even my system view (§ 1.4) supposes that the self is dynamic rather than 
static. But, if the self is constructed from autobiographical memories alone, 
the selectivity with which we encode and retrieve these makes for a very 
‘gappy’  self—a construction not  only constantly shape-shifting,  but  shot 
through with  rather  large  holes,  which over  time become larger  still  as 
‘generic forgetting’ takes its toll. Over a lifetime, the gaps in one’s memory 
probably far outnumber available memories, and not all available memor-
ies are always accessible: we end up with a very flimsy and unstable con-
struction.
Defenders  of  an  historical-constructionist  view  of  the  self  may  be 
happy to bite that bullet and accept that the self, constructed from memor-
ies, is both gappy and unstable. But there is an element in the uneven dis-
tribution of autobiographical memories over a lifetime (§ 4.3.3) that is par-
ticularly  troubling  here:  childhood amnesia.  The  simple  consequence  of 
childhood amnesia is that a self constructed from autobiographical memor-
ies begins no sooner than about the age of three. Whatever happens in the 
first  few years of our lives—and developmental psychology suggests an 
awful lot happens during that time, as various cognitive functions come 
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online, are trained, honed, and exercised—it cannot, on a view of the self as 
based on available memories,  form part  of  our selves.  The foundational 
cognitive developments of early childhood are simply excluded here. This 
is a deeply troubling implication of the view that the self is constructed 
from autobiographical memory: for it now seems that this construction—
already shape-shifting and riddled with holes—also lacks a foundation.
But  the  most  critical  argument  against  the  historical-constructionist 
position comes from the realization that autobiographical memory is itself a 
construction. As discussed in the previous section, our episodic memories 
are reconstructed rather than fixed. And the organization of our ‘autobio-
graphical  knowledge  base’  (§  4.3.1),  containing  our  semantic  self-know-
ledge as well as the elements for episodic recollection, is a constructive pro-
cess, too. Constructionism about the self here seems to face another circu-
larity objection. The construction of autobiographical memory involves, in 
Stanley Klein’s notation (Klein et al., 2004; Klein, 2013b—see §§ 4.2.3; 4.4.1), 
the capacity to self-reflect, a sense of ownership and agency, and a sense of 
temporality. These capacities sound very much like elements of a self. Thus, 
it  seems that a self  is  necessary for the construction of autobiographical 
memory—but autobiographical memory is supposedly what the self is con-
structed from.
A constructionist about the self could try to weasel out of this circular-
ity by holding that neither self nor memory is logically or empirically prior 
to the other, but that they are somehow co-constructed. Klein’s three capa-
cities may seem to be elements of a self, the reply goes, but they only appear 
as such when they are exercised in constructing autobiographical memory, 
which in turn constructs a self. I do not find this reply very convincing. 
Does the self thus construed now encompass the very tools exercised in its 
construction? This would imply placing capacities (such as are involved in 
constructing autobiographical memory) on a par with content (the self sup-
posedly constructed from autobiographical memory). But the capacities ne-
cessary for constructing memory are prior to this construction. And the pos-
ition  that  self  and  memory  are  somehow  interwoven  constructions  has 
nothing to say about the capacities required for constructing either.  It  is 
thus far more sensible to situate the self, conceptually, at the level of these 
capacities, as I will demonstrate shortly (§ 4.5.2).
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There is, however, one more problem to mention that affects the view 
that the self is, in Grice’s phrase, ‘defined in terms of memory’. A self con-
structed from memory alone is vulnerable to the concerns about the reliabil-
ity  of  our  memories  highlighted  in  the  previous  section.  We  have  en-
countered a spectrum ranging from embellished and misremembered recall 
to confabulation and false memories. In cases where someone actually has 
false memories, we would have to say that such a person’s self is defined 
partly in terms of false memories—which would be psychologically and 
philosophically problematic. Psychologically, because of the cognitive dis-
sonance  it  creates  between  what  one  ‘remembers’  and  what  really 
happened. Philosophically, because it  makes a mockery of any notion of 
self-knowledge and is thus, as Ian Hacking (1995a) puts it, ‘contrary to our 
best vision of what it is to be a human being’ (p. 267).19
But  even in cases where no false  memories  are present,  a  memory-
based self is at risk from their mere possibility. For we can rarely be sure 
which of our episodic memories might not be false, at least in part. (Thus 
Hacking’s ‘best vision’ may turn out to be an unrealistic one.) If we con-
struct a self wholly from the memories we seem to have of our past actions, 
which  may  be  embellished,  misremembered,  confabulated,  or  false,  the 
resulting self is uninsured against being contradicted by the facts.
4.5.2  The self as constructor of autobiographical memory
If  we  reject  the  view that  the  self  is  a  construct  from autobiographical 
memory, does this entail dismissing the apparent popular intuition we en-
countered in Chapter 3—that the loss of one’s memories is indicative of a 
discontinuity of  self? Not necessarily.  For such an intuition is  consistent 
with a view that preserved memory is evidence of a self, rather than con-
stitutive of it.  Hume (1739/1978) makes this point in response to Locke: 
 Personhood is not my topic, but I should add that the possibility of false memor19 -
ies seems even more troubling for Locke’s concept of a person (in its ‘forensic’ sense 
that emphasizes responsibility for one’s past actions—see § 2.4). For if one falsely 
remembered a past action one did not in fact commit, then—unless the Lockean 
account  is  augmented  by  a  requirement  for  external  evidence  that  such  ‘re-
membered’ actions are truly one’s own—that action would be appropriated into 
one’s Lockean person. But then the notion of a person as the totality of the actions 
for which one can be commended or blamed becomes absurd.
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‘memory does  not  so  much produce  as  discover  personal  identity’  (I.iv.6, 
p. 262). Then the loss of one’s memories is a symptom, not the cause, of a 
disrupted or malfunctioning self. Let us then turn the memory–self relation 
the right way up: the construction of autobiographical memory is an activ-
ity of the self, a function of our self-representational system.
On this view, the operations of autobiographical memory discussed in 
this chapter make a lot of sense. Autonoetic consciousness, Tulving’s marker 
of episodic recollection (§ 4.2.2), now appears as an instance of self-monit-
oring: the ability to process past experiences with reference to oneself and 
from an egocentric perspective, and correspondingly to simulate oneself in 
future activities. Suppose I have a rich autonoetic, first-personal recollec-
tion of delivering a mediocre (or successful) lecture. If I then catch myself, 
in my next lecture, proceeding in a manner that my recollection has marked 
as mediocre (or successful), I can adjust my style accordingly (or merrily 
carry on in that vein). A mere factual memory, detached from personal in-
volvement in a specific experience, of what is and what isn’t good lectur-
ing, would be much less effective than the autonoetic awareness of myself 
having done well or badly in the past.
The fact that dissociable processes contribute to episodic remembering 
(§ 4.2.3) is easily accommodated by the system view, since it takes the self 
to be a complex system of self-representational capacities that can fail or 
malfunction individually.  In the case of R.B.  just one such capacity—the 
sense of ownership of episodic recollections—is faulty,  while others—se-
mantic self-knowledge, a sense of temporality—are unaffected.
The selectivity of encoding and retrieval operations (§ 4.3.1) also makes 
sense if we consider them in the context of what is relevant to one’s self-in-
terest both at the time of encoding and of retrieval. The friendly manner of 
the coffee-shop staff is worth encoding in memory as it provides one with a 
reason (along with the quality of the coffee) to return there—the precise 
words exchanged, on the other hand, are irrelevant and do not get recalled. 
In remembering a dinner party qua social occasion, being able to recall who 
was present is a useful self-representational exercise of situating oneself in 
one’s social context. Recalling the colour of the table-cloth is not: that in-
formation is discarded from memory. Another way in which selective en-
coding and retrieval is adaptive is in ‘storing the exception’ to some pre-
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existing self-image (Wagenaar, 1994): an event that represents a prediction 
error is ipso facto more salient and more likely to be encoded in memory.
The view that the self qua self-monitoring system constructs autobio-
graphical memory may also help explain the two striking features of the 
distribution of autobiographical memories across a lifetime (§ 4.3.3): child-
hood amnesia and the ‘reminiscence bump’ of memories from adolescence 
and early adulthood. Concerning childhood amnesia, it is plausible to as-
sume that our self-representational capacities are not all online at birth, but 
that  the  higher-level  capacities  required  for  autobiographical  memory 
gradually develop over the first three years of a human life—hence the lack 
of autobiographical memories from those early years. As for the reminis-
cence bump: if the formation of autobiographical memories is a result of 
higher-level self-monitoring processes, it should not come as a surprise if 
that system is particularly active during adolescence, accordingly encoding 
more (or more durable) memories at that time than in later life, when self-
monitoring is a more routine business as we encounter fewer novel situ-
ations (but see § 5.2.3 for other explanations of the bump).
As to the reconstructive nature of episodic recollections (§ 4.4): the sys-
tem view has no difficulties here. Understood as our system of self-repres-
entational capacities, the self is quite obviously in the business of produ-
cing self-representations—and episodic memories are self-representations 
par excellence. Moreover, the manner in which we reconstruct autobiograph-
ical  memories  is,  quite  literally,  self-serving.  Memories  are  rearranged, 
shaped, and twisted by the self—by, as Anthony Greenwald (1980) dramat-
ically calls it, ‘the totalitarian ego’. Thus, Michael Ross (1989) found that 
our ‘implicit theories’ about ourselves determine the construction of auto-
biographical memory. Pace Wagenaar’s above-cited ‘storing the exception’ 
model, Ross’s experimental participants with a stable self-image tended, in 
their recollections, to overestimate the consistency of their attitudes. Con-
versely, the recollections of participants with a self-image emphasizing per-
sonal development were prone to overstate the changes in their attitudes 
over time. Such cognitive biases in remembering underline the priority of 
self-representational processes over autobiographical memory.
And it is here that differences between individuals are most apparent. 
For we differ not only in the experiences we have: what and how and how 
much we remember autobiographically reflects individual proclivities—as 
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Bartlett  (1932)  put  it,  the  rememberer’s  ‘appetite,  instinct,  interests,  and 
ideals’ (p. 210). Greg Neimeyer and April Metzler (1994) studied the differ-
ences in autobiographical recall between three types of personalities: ‘in-
formation-oriented  individuals’,  who  actively  explore  different  attitudes 
before committing to one, ‘normative-oriented individuals’, who are firmly 
committed to their attitudes without exploration, and ‘diffuse-oriented in-
dividuals’, who show neither commitment to nor active exploration of atti-
tudes. 
Participants were asked to recall personal memories relevant to cues of 
personality traits that were either positive or negative and either validated 
or  invalidated  participants’  (pre-trial)  ratings  of  self-descriptiveness  of 
those traits. The number of memories recalled and the latency of recall were 
measured,  as  was  an index of  ‘perceived self-change’  based on another 
(post-trial) round of ratings of self-descriptiveness of the personality traits. 
The results showed differences in all these variables between the three dif-
ferent personality types. Information-oriented subjects had the most posit-
ive  validating and the  most  negative  invalidating memories  (here  more 
than double the number of memories recalled by normative-oriented indi-
viduals). Diffuse-oriented subjects had the fewest recollections overall, but 
showed the most marked change in their self-perception after recalling in-
validating memories, while normative-oriented subjects showed the least 
change in their self-perceptions in those cases. Normative-oriented subjects 
were also ‘the most inclined . . . to generate invalidating memories when it 
benefited them and the least inclined when it threatened them’ (p. 130).
Neimeyer and Metzler’s study illustrates a number of features of auto-
biographical memory: the reconstructive nature of its recall and how a re-
memberer’s self-image can govern this reconstruction, but also how indi-
viduals  differ  in  their  cognitive  biases  and flexibility  when engaging in 
autobiographical  recollection.  A variety of  self-representational  processes 
seems  at  work  here—retrieval  and  reconstruction  of  autobiographical 
memories, and their appropriate enabling sub-processes, but also the main-
tenance or reappraisal of one’s self-image—and not all in equal measure in 
different individuals. The self is a very busy system. Autobiographical re-




Autobiographical memory is complicated. It involves several different as-
pects of memory, supported by even more dissociable self-representational 
processes.  Its  organization and the recall  of  episodic  memories  are  con-
structive or reconstructive processes. Thus, it is difficult to maintain the po-
sition that the self is a construct from autobiographical memories.
The system view provides an account of the self much better suited to 
the nature and operations of autobiographical memory. Remembering, on 
this view, is an activity of the self, recruiting diverse self-representational 
functions both when memory is encoded and, crucially, at the time of recol-
lection. The system view also avoids limiting the self to being ‘defined in 
terms of memory’, which would leave it vulnerable to the constraints of 
availability and accessibility and reliability that I have elucidated in this 
chapter.
Much more could be said about autobiographical memory. But I must 
now address a related matter that also pervades the philosophical and psy-
chological  literature  on the  self:  narrativity.  Looking again at  how some 
autobiographical memories are reinforced and consolidated, it will be ob-
served that the notion of narrative creeps up in a number of places. Hard-
castle’s intensity hypothesis of memory (fig. 4.1) makes use of the retelling 
of events to reinforce episodic memories. Some explanations of the reminis-
cence bump likewise appeal  to  narrative practices,  as  does Nelson’s  ac-
count of childhood amnesia, which suggests that the beginning of autobio-
graphical memory in childhood may co-occur with the onset of narrative 
memory talk between child and parent.
The role of narrative practices may not be limited to being an aide to 
the consolidation of autobiographical memories: a number of scholars sug-
gest that it is by means of narratives that we construct our selves. It may 
seem that narrativity offers a way out for historical-constructionist accounts 
of the self, if it can remedy the gappy and shifting nature of autobiograph-
ical memory by providing additional support to its structure, and perhaps 
a narrativist view can mitigate concerns about reliability. I will discuss nar-





Narrative practices, narrative selves?
5.1  Introduction
As hinted in the previous chapter, there are interactions between memory 
and narrative practices concerning the onset, organization, consolidation, 
and retrieval of autobiographical memories.  But narrativity is frequently 
taken to be more directly connected with the self. Narrative practices, it is 
claimed,  enable  the  emergence  of  a  self-concept  in  child  development 
(Fivush, 1994; Miller, 1994; Nelson, 2003) and allow us to structure and in-
terpret our autobiographical memories in a meaningful way (Barclay, 1994; 
Freeman, 2003). Narratives provide the vehicle by which we give reasons 
for and make sense of our actions (Velleman, 2005), or indeed produce or 
‘constitute’ the self (Dennett,  1992; Bruner, 1987; Bruner & Kalmar, 1998; 
Schechtman, 1996; 2007).
It  is  no  easy  undertaking  to  define  the  scope  of,  and  distinguish 
between, these various claims, since there is considerable overlap between 
them.  A philosophically  important  distinction to  be  made,  which I  take 
from Schechtman (2011b), is that between, on the one hand, accounts that 
link the self with various narrative capacities and practices in various ways, 
and, on the other hand, accounts that take the self to be constructed and 
structured narratively. In this context we must also ask quite what is meant 
by ‘narrative’.  I  will  discuss this  question,  distinguish between different 
views of the relation between narrative and the self, and illustrate these in 
the second half of this chapter (§ 5.3). But before doing so, I will consider 
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evidence from empirical psychology for the role of narrative practices in 
constructing autobiographical memory and how this might affect our con-
ception of the self (§ 5.2).
5.2  Narrative, memory, and self: the view from psychology
5.2.1    Narrative  practices  and  incipient  memory  construction  in  early 
childhood
In discussing the distribution of autobiographical memories across the life-
span and its absence in early childhood (§ 4.3.3), I mentioned that the onset 
of autobiographical  memory in child development has been linked with 
narrative practices. I will now review relevant research in developmental 
psychology and the conclusions that researchers have drawn from it.
Robyn Fivush (1994) reports on studies of parent–child conversations 
about the past. One such study observed parents and their 2½–3½-year-old 
children (all from a white middle-class American population) engaging in 
conversations about events they had experienced. These were initiated and 
steered by the parent. The children’s responses Fivush reproduces are most 
often repetitions of key words from parents’ questions, and brief affirmat-
ive (‘Yeah’, ‘Uh huh’), negative, or querying (‘What?’) rejoinders to these, 
but children are also reported as providing their own brief descriptions of 
what  happened during the event  under discussion.  This  occurred when 
parents  were  using  an  ‘elaborative’  conversational  style,  in  which  they 
themselves  provided  descriptive  information  about  the  event  and  kept 
adding to this in the course of the conversation, ‘thus providing distinctive 
memory cues’ (p. 143) which would lead to the child’s volunteering his or 
her own descriptive memories. A ‘repetitive’ conversational style, in which 
parents asked brief questions and then repeated these without elaborating, 
moving to a different topic if the child provided no information, was not 
successful  in  this  regard.  Fivush concludes  that  ‘elaborative  parents  are 
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teaching their  children that the past  is  interesting and important to talk 
about and share with others’ (p. 144).1
It  seems  plausible  that  such  narrative  practices  encourage  incipient 
autobiographical remembering in childhood, and the children’s ages in this 
study correlate nicely with the usual onset of autobiographical memory at 
around 3 years of age. We should not, however, jump to early conclusions 
about the direction of causality between narrative practice and incipient 
autobiographical memory, and about the role of narrative practices in ‘the 
continuously developing sense of self’ (p. 136). I will return to these points 
below (§ 5.2.4). An initially more pressing question, given Fivush’s entirely 
‘white  middle-class’  experimental  population,  is  whether  the  narrative 
practices studied are culturally universal.
Peggy  Miller’s  (1994)  work  suggests  that  practices  of  ‘personal 
storytelling’ do occur in diverse socio-cultural communities. With respect 
to child development, she classifies these narrative practices as taking place 
(1)   ‘around the child’  in adult-to-adult  conversations about the personal 
experiences of the narrating adult in the presence of children, neither ‘told 
deliberately for children, nor . . . censored on behalf of children’ (p. 167); 
(2)  ‘about the child’ in adult-to-adult conversations with the child as the 
protagonist of the event being narrated (though children begin to contrib-
ute verbally to these narrative acts by 2½ years of age); and (3) ‘with the 
child’, where children act as ‘co-narrators of their own experiences’ (p. 171) 
from about 2½ years of age. Both ‘around’ and ‘about the child’ narration is 
 The study also showed an unexpected gender differentiation: ‘Both mothers and 1
fathers  were  significantly  more  likely  to  use  an  elaborative  style  when talking 
about the past with daughters than with sons’ (Fivush, 1994, p. 143). Fivush con-
ducted a follow-up study of the use of emotion words in mother–child conversa-
tions about the past (15 boys and 15 girls aged 2½–3 years), which gave further 
support to this. While there was no significant difference between genders in the 
quantity of emotion words used overall, there were significant differences in em-
phasis, regarding both the kinds of emotions discussed (more discussion of sad-
ness with girls, more of anger with boys), the types of resolutions to emotional 
episodes discussed (with regard to anger, these tended to be conciliatory with girls, 
retaliatory with boys), and the way in which the context of the emotional experi-
ence  was  discussed (a  ‘social-relational  framework’  with  girls,  an  ‘autonomous 
[individualistic] framework’ with boys). Thus, Fivush argues, girls’ ‘remembered 
selves  will  be  rich,  detailed,  and  interpersonally  oriented’,  whereas  ‘boys’  re-
membered selves will be spare, limited in emotional tone, and autonomously ori-
ented’ (p. 154).
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reported as occurring across socio-cultural groups (including both Americ-
an  and  Taiwanese  Chinese  groups;  among  the  former,  both  low-  and 
middle-income  groups,  each  in  both  white  and  African-American  com-
munities).
Unlike those in Fivush’s studies, the narrative practices observed by 
Miller are not explicitly seen as an aid to building and recalling autobio-
graphical memories:
Events are not remembered for the sake of remembering but for the sake 
of creating tellable stories about the self. In South Baltimore, Daly Park, 
and West  Side [low-income neighbourhoods;  the latter  two in Chicago, 
respectively white and African-American], where traditions of highly per-
formed oral narrative flourish, speakers do not seem to define personal 
storytelling as a memory task. They infrequently use remember or related 
terms when telling or introducing stories and they rarely revise their ac-
counts in the interest of accuracy. To do so would destroy the integrity of 
the story as an artistic performance. (p. 175)
Rather,  the  role  of  narrative  here  seems  to  be  to  illuminate  personality 
traits,  to  organize  one’s  experiences  (one’s  ‘autobiographical  knowledge 
base’—see § 4.3.1), and to explore and define self–other relations. Memory 
reconstruction here is ‘socially distributed’ (ibid.) in vicarious story-telling, 
in placing oneself in relation to others, and in the narrative act itself, which 
is in part determined by its audience (notice Miller’s reference to an ‘artistic 
performance’).
Miller contends that children included and participating in these nar-
rative  practices  ‘experience  and  reexperience  self  in  relation  to 
other’ (p. 173). This suggests that narrative memory construction in child-
hood shapes one’s experience and, more generally, one’s self-consciousness. 
That theme is developed by Katherine Nelson (2003). According to Nelson, 
consciousness is an ‘ongoing self-organizing developing system’ with dif-
ferent ‘emergent levels’ (p. 18) of representation. In childhood, this system 
develops from early social awareness and intersubjectivity (as attested in 
joint  attention  and  protodeclarative  pointing)  in  the  first  year  of  life 
through rudimentary self-awareness  (attested by self-recognition in  mir-
rors)  by  the  end  of  the  second year  to  a  more  nuanced  self-and-other-
awareness that comes with narrative discourse and, ultimately, the emer-
gence of a ‘new level of consciousness . . . dependent upon language used 
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to exchange views of self and other, primarily through narratives but also 
through commentary on the self by others’ (p. 33).
How, then, do narrative practices affect the structure of consciousness 
in child development? Borrowing terms from Bruner (1990), Nelson (2003) 
refers to two ways of conceptualizing experience that appear to come from 
narrative practices. The first of these is a ‘landscape of action’, which we are 
to understand as ‘the sequencing of actions to make a coherent and cohes-
ive event’ (p. 25). The other is a ‘landscape of consciousness’, to be understood 
as ‘the revealing of the mental states of the actors that are associated with 
the action, including their goals, their perspectives, their beliefs, their emo-
tions,  and  so  on’  (ibid.).  Both  the  understanding  and  the  evaluation  of 
agents’  motivations—or,  as  Dan  Hutto  (2007b)  puts  it,  ‘reason-
giving’ (see § 6.4); or again our ‘theory of mind’ (see § 7.2.2)—belong to this 
second ‘landscape’.
Crucially  for  Nelson’s  argument,  a  grasp  of  the  ‘landscape  of  con-
sciousness’ occurs rather later in child development than that of the ‘land-
scape of action’. Nelson (2003) cites an example from her own research into 
infants’ ‘crib talk’: a 2½-year-old child soliloquizes about her father’s not 
being able to run in the New York marathon and having to watch it on tele-
vision instead, without however grasping the reason for this. And in the 
parent–child conversations studied by Fivush and in the social narratives 
researched by Miller, while young children provide some of the narrative 
elements of action, the evaluative elements are provided by the adults. Over-
all,  Nelson observes that in the narratives of 3- to 5-year-olds, ‘temporal 
perspective’ (an obvious crucial capacity for self-monitoring over time) as 
well as ‘the mental . . . perspective of self and of different others’ is still 
‘weak or nonexistent’ (p. 28).
Unfortunately, indeed somewhat maddeningly, this is where Nelson’s 
developmental story ends. Some time after the age of five, we are led to as-
sume, the ‘landscape of consciousness’ begins to unfold in children’s nar-
ratives,  and with it  emerges that  ‘new level  of  consciousness’  which in-
cludes self-consciousness—but Nelson does not tell us when and how.
Commenting  on  research  into  children’s  narratives,  Rebecca  Eder 
(1994) observes that there are ‘substantial developmental changes in chil-
dren’s self-concept, especially between 3 and 8 years of age and during ad-
olescence’ (p. 185). The process of developing a sense of self in childhood is 
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thus rather more drawn out than the developmental window (ages 2–5) 
studied by Fivush, Miller, and Nelson. Furthermore, the evidence from de-
velopmental psychology, while suggesting that narrative practices play a 
role in developing a sense of self, is inconclusive on whether their role is a 
necessary one. As Eder notes, narrative practices fulfil functions other than 
‘self-construction’. These include self-presentation, and in such cases the nar-
rative  is  ‘the  result  of  .   .   .  rather  than  a  mechanism  for  self-
construction’ (ibid.).
Let me turn then to narrative practices in adults, and in this context 
return to the question of how they interrelate with autobiographical recol-
lection.
5.2.2  Narrative capacities and autobiographical memory in adulthood
As discussed at length in the preceding chapter, there are numerous con-
straints on the encoding and retrieval of autobiographical memories, which 
include the significance of events. Here, then, is an obvious role for narrative 
practices: if an action or experience is significant in the context of some nar-
rative structure—it  may fit  nicely with a  particular  story we like to  tell 
ourselves and others about ourselves—such an event may be more likely to 
be consigned to memory, and, assuming the continuing relevance of its nar-
rative context, to be recalled. Given the reconstructive nature of episodic 
recall,  perhaps narrative practices shape that reconstruction. Further,  the 
narrative rehearsal of a particular episode—actively telling oneself and/or 
others about it—is likely to consolidate one’s memory of it. Finally, Conway 
and Rubin’s (1993) layered structure of  our autobiographical  knowledge 
base (lifetime periods, general events, specific events) suggests that the way 
we organize our autobiographical memories may likewise benefit from nar-
rative practices: lifetime periods and ‘general events’ are structured around 
themes, and these may well be the themes of an autobiographical narrative.
But, again, we should exercise caution about the direction of causality 
between narrative practices and memory organization. It is just as plausible 
that  the  thematic  structure  of  one’s  autobiographical  knowledge  base 
shapes the stories one tells about oneself as it is that such self narratives 
shape the organization of autobiographical memories. On the other hand, 
where the retelling of experiences aids the encoding, consolidation, or re-
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trieval  of  relevant  autobiographical  memories,  there  does  seem  to  be  a 
causal influence of such narrative practices on autobiographical memory. 
But here, too, we should pause before assigning a necessary role to narrat-
ive. 
If narrative capacities—the ability to narrate one’s memories, and/or 
the ability to reason narratively about one’s experiences—were to be neces-
sary for autobiographical memory, we should expect impairments of these 
capacities to correlate with memory loss. In a thoroughgoing review of the 
evidence  from  cognitive  psychology  and  neuropsychology  on  autobio-
graphical recollection and its disorders, David Rubin and Daniel Greenberg 
(2003) consider a number of systems that may be needed for autobiograph-
ical recollection, two of which would seem to underpin narrative capacities: 
the language system (here understood as the system for phonetics, syntax 
and semantics at and below the level of sentences), and what they call a 
‘narrative reasoning’ system, where ‘narrative reasoning’ is understood as 
‘the ability to use structure above the level of the sentence’, which is ‘used 
to describe particular incidents of goal-directed behavior’ (p. 62).
The evidence from cases of language loss (aphasia) and loss of narrat-
ive reasoning cited by Rubin and Greenberg suggests that (a) language and 
narrative reasoning are indeed separate systems: the loss of one does not 
necessarily entail the loss of the other; and (b) neither language loss nor loss 
of  narrative  reasoning  necessarily  leads  to  loss  of  autobiographical 
memory. 
Only one particularly severe kind of aphasia, known as semantic de-
mentia or progressive fluent aphasia, ‘often results in severe impairment of 
autobiographical  memory’  (p.  67),  especially  for  early  memories.  Other 
forms of aphasia, however, do not. In most cases of fluent aphasia (struggle 
to  retrieve  words)  and  conduction  aphasia  (deficit  in  ‘inner  speech’), 
‘aphasics  manage  to  produce  remarkably  well  formed  autobiographical 
memories’ (ibid.). Nor do these types of aphasia lead to a loss of narrative 
reasoning:  aphasics’  narratives  ‘reflect  their  language  impairments’  but 
‘frequently preserve discourse structure’ (p. 70). So a difficulty with produ-
cing language is dissociable from deficits of narrative reasoning. Narrative 
reasoning  is  also  spared  in  a  variety  of  other  disorders  including 
Alzheimer’s  disease  and  Korsakoff’s  syndrome,  which  involve  memory 
loss; thus, narrative reasoning ability is also dissociable from memory.
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What of a loss of narrative reasoning itself? Rubin and Greenberg ob-
serve that narrative reasoning is surprisingly difficult to disrupt and its loss 
difficult to test for. However, assuming a neural basis of narrative reason-
ing in the right hemisphere and/or the frontal lobes, some conclusions can 
be drawn from patients with neural  damage in these areas.  Right-hemi-
sphere patients present obvious symptoms of a loss of narrative reasoning: 
they have ‘difficulty comprehending speech at the discourse level’, ‘fail to 
judge the intent of nonliteral statements’, ‘have substantial difficulty inter-
preting metaphors . . . and drawing inferences from stories’, show ‘substan-
tial impairment of their ability to organize and reorganize data’ and ‘signi-
ficant  difficulty  reproducing  narratives’  (p.  72).  However,  no  deficits  in 
autobiographical memory are reported in right-hemisphere patients. If nar-
rative reasoning were necessary for autobiographical memory, there should 
be such deficits.
For frontal-lobe patients, meanwhile, there is a correlation between the 
loss of some components of narrative reasoning and impairments of auto-
biographical memory. As noted in the previous chapter, frontal-lobe dam-
age leads to confabulation (§ 4.4.4), which is marked by noticeable deficits 
in  maintaining  plausible  temporal  and  causal  sequences  in  personal 
memories and narratives. But it would be questionable and unwarranted to 
suggest that the frontal-lobe damage first produces a loss of the requisite 
narrative reasoning ability, which then, in turn, produces the faulty memor-
ies. Rather, it seems that the executive dysfunction which is the result of 
frontal-lobe injury is  responsible,  by disrupting temporal  and causal  se-
quencing,  for  the  impairment  of  both  narrative  reasoning  and  autobio-
graphical recollection. That is to say that narrative reasoning and autobio-
graphical memory here share a common substrate in the shape of executive 
function, not that one of them is a substrate of the other.
Overall, then, there are interesting interrelations between narrative ca-
pacities (as instantiated in what Rubin and Greenberg call the language sys-
tem and the narrative reasoning system) and autobiographical memory, but 
they do not support the hypothesis that narrative capacities are necessary 
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for  autobiographical  recollection.  At best,  we can say that  some  impair2 -
ments of narrative capacities correlate with certain impairments of autobio-
graphical recollection.
5.2.3  The ‘reminiscence bump’ revisited
Let us look, then, at a particular aspect of the structure of autobiographical 
memory that might be subject to shaping by narrative practices and that is 
particularly relevant for one’s sense of self over time. As I said earlier, nar-
rative practices seem a possible influence not only on the recollection of in-
dividual episodes, but also on the way we organize and structure our auto-
biographical  memories across the life-span (e.g.  into Conway & Rubin’s 
(1993) ‘general events’ and ‘lifetime periods’). Of particular interest here is 
the ‘reminiscence bump’ discussed in the previous chapter (§  4.3.3)—the 
high concentration of autobiographical memories from the period between 
late childhood and early adulthood.
In a study with over 1,200 Danish participants between the ages of 20 
and 93, Dorthe Berntsen and David Rubin (2002) set out to examine wheth-
er the distribution of memories across the life-span was affected by the emo-
tional  content of the memories. Participants were asked to state how old 
they were in their happiest, saddest, most important, and most traumatic 
memory. Further, they were asked about their most recent involuntary (un-
bidden) recollection: how old they were in the event they had recalled in-
voluntarily, and whether this was a happy or a sad event.
The distribution of responses obtained by Berntsen and Rubin shows a 
clear bump in the twenties for the reported age in participants’ happiest 
and most important memories across all age groups, but not for the saddest 
and most traumatic memories.  For involuntary memories,  most of  these 
took place in the recent past for all age groups; there is, however, a smaller 
peak in the distribution for memories from participants’ teenage years, but 
again only for happy memories. Berntsen and Rubin note:
 This in contrast to the evidence for a necessary role of what Rubin and Greenberg 2
call the ‘imagery system’ in autobiographical memory: long-term visual memory 
loss does correlate with ‘a general loss in autobiographical memory that extend[s] 
beyond visual memory to all areas of memory’ (p. 66).
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The data reflect some bias exerted by memory and not simply how events 
are distributed over life. For example, it is unlikely that around 40 % of the 
happiest events in people’s life actually take place between age 20 and 30, 
as would be the case if the memory data simply reflected a real-life distri-
bution. (p. 647)
One might quibble here that, since the study asked participants to re-
call  only the single most prominent  event for each emotional category (the 
happiest, the saddest, etc.), the distribution of responses does not in fact say 
anything  about  the  distribution  of  memories  overall:  barring  the  single 
happiest event participants were asked to recall, there could be an other-
wise even distribution of happy memories across a life-span. But even so, it 
is still noteworthy that for 40 % of participants the single happiest memory 
of their lifetime should be one from their twenties. Let us accept, then, that 
there is  something in the organization of  autobiographical  memory that 
accounts for this ‘happiness bias’ in early adulthood. But what?
Berntsen and Rubin note that various explanations of the reminiscence 
bump in general fail to predict the specific results of their study. A ‘biologic-
al/maturational’  account of the bump—suggesting (as I do in §  4.5.2) that 
‘early adulthood might be especially favoured by nature with respect to 
cognitive skills’ including memory—‘does not specify any differences re-
lated to the emotional charging of the memory material or to involuntary 
versus voluntary retrieval’ (p. 640). Similarly, cognitive accounts attributing 
the reminiscence bump to the relative novelty and distinctiveness of events 
experienced between the ages of about 15 and 25 do not predict a dissoci-
ation between happy/important and sad/traumatic memories. Cognitive 
explanations can be modified to account for Berntsen and Rubin’s results: 
happy memories are more likely to be rehearsed than sad ones, possibly as 
a result of social censure; and there is some evidence that ‘ratings of emo-
tional intensity decrease more rapidly for negative than for positive events’, 
suggesting that sad and traumatic memories are more easily forgotten, but 
then ‘it is not clear what causes memories of negative events to fade more 
quickly  than positive  memories’,  which  makes  this  suggestion  ‘a  rather 
weak explanation of the present results’ (p. 684).
As for narrative accounts of the bump, in which early adulthood is seen 
as  a  particularly  identity-forming chapter  in  the  ‘life  story’:  these  again 
predict no difference between positively and negatively valenced emotional 
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memories from that period. Again, modifications to such accounts are re-
quired to accommodate Berntsen and Rubin’s findings, such as—again—
social censure precluding the narration of sad and traumatic events, or nos-
talgia for one’s adolescence. ‘Nostalgia,’ however, Berntsen and Rubin note, 
‘is a description rather than an explanation’ (p. 649).
The  only  account  of  the  reminiscence  bump  which,  according  to 
Berntsen and Rubin, correctly predicts their findings without ad hoc modi-
fications is what they call ‘life scripts’, that is, ‘normative expectations with-
in a given culture [concerning] the patterns of individual life courses, such 
as the developmental changes that are expected to take place at various 
points in life and the different life phases that people are expected to live 
through at different ages’ (p. 640). ‘Life scripts’ are to be distinguished from 
narratives: the former are ‘generic’, ‘nonpersonal’, involve ‘cultural expect-
ations’, and are ‘public knowledge’; the latter are ‘concrete’, ‘personal’, in-
volve  autobiographical  memories,  and  are  ‘private  knowledge  that  is 
shared with very few people’ (ibid.). According to the ‘life scripts’ account, 
To the  extent  normative  life  scripts  organize  autobiographical  memory, 
memories of the happiest and most important events should form a bump, 
whereas the distribution of memories for the saddest and most traumatic 
events should be relatively flat, because they are unlikely to be part of the 
life script. This pattern should be found for both voluntary and involun-
tary memories. (p. 638)
While  this  account  does  predict  Berntsen  and  Rubin’s  results,  and 
would seem also to underlie the ‘social censure’ modification of the cognit-
ive and narrative accounts, it is not quite clear why socially mandated ‘life 
scripts’ would exclude sad and traumatic events. Indeed, one might think 
that unavoidable unhappy occurrences such as the deaths of close friends 
and family members ought to form part of a cultural life script precisely 
because they will  happen to most people at some point(s) in their lives. 
Thus, a better way of framing the ‘life scripts’ account, which is still con-
sonant with the flat distribution of sad and traumatic memories observed, 
is that ‘no specific time slot [in life] is allocated to such events’ (p. 640)—
whereas the happy and important events in a stereotyped life script (such 
as graduation, first job, marriage, parenthood) do have a relatively fixed 
time slot, which concurs with the bump in the memory distribution.
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There  remain  questions  about  the  ‘life  script’  account;  for  instance, 
what  cross-cultural  variation there might  be in  such normative expecta-
tions, and whether these are reflected in people’s autobiographical memory 
organization. But the point is that Berntsen and Rubin’s ‘life script’ account 
offers a better explanation of the ‘happy memories’ bump in their data than 
mere appeal to narrative practices. A narrative account without ‘life scripts’ 
as an auxiliary hypothesis cannot explain the happiness bias of the reminis-
cence bump.
5.2.4  The self as a product of narrative?
From the psychological evidence considered here, there emerges a patchy 
and diffuse  picture  of  the  role  of  narrative  in  the  development  and/or 
maintenance  of  a  sense  of  self,  either  by  shoring  up  autobiographical 
memory or more directly. Narrative practices may play a role in the devel-
oping sense of self in childhood, but it is far from clear whether only they 
can or do perform this role, and whether their increased sophistication in 
older  children  perhaps  reflects  other  developmental  changes.  There  are 
various interactions between narrative practices and autobiographical re-
collection, but none support the hypothesis that either language or narrat-
ive reasoning (unlike sensory imagery) is necessary for autobiographical 
memory. And a narrative account is neither the only nor the best explana-
tion for  the reminiscence bump in the temporal  distribution of  autobio-
graphical memories (and thus of the temporal structuring of one’s sense of 
self over time).
Though  the  empirical  evidence  in  psychological  studies  of  narrative 
practices is thus suggestive only of some involvement of narrative in our 
sense of self, some psychologists go further than this on theoretical grounds. 
Foremost and first among these is Jerome Bruner, who argues that the self 
is indeed a product of narrative (Bruner 1987; 1994; Bruner & Kalmar, 1998). 
Bruner’s grounding assumptions are, briefly, these. First, stories or narrat-
ives embody a ‘mode of thought’ (1987, p. 11) universal among human be-
ings that predates, in cultural evolutionary terms, what he calls ‘logical or 
inductive’ thought.  The evolutionary idea here is,  put simply, that once 3
 This is taken up by Nelson (2003) who argues that in child development, too, nar3 -
rative capacities precede ‘logic and scientific theorizing’ (p. 24).
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human beings had developed language, they first began making sense of 
the world by telling stories about it. These cultural practices are then said 
(by  followers  of  Vygotsky)  to  ‘mediate  thought’  (Bruner,  1991,  p.   3). 
Secondly, Bruner notes, ‘We seem to have no other way of describing “lived 
time” save in the form of a narrative’ (1987, p. 12).4
Taking these two assumptions together, we would seem to arrive at 
making sense of our lives through narratives, and since such narratives are 
also  a  ‘mode  of  thought’,  they  in  turn  ‘structure  perceptual 
experience’ (p. 15). But, more than that, they supposedly produce a narrat-
ively constructed self. How so? Miller (1994) refers to ‘self-construction’ in 
her account of narrative practices among her subjects in South Baltimore 
(§ 5.2.1), but, as discussed in that context, these practices seem more a case 
of self-presentation than self-construction. Bruner (1994), meanwhile, at first 
describes the self as ‘a complex mental edifice that one constructs by the 
use of a variety of mental processes’ including remembering (p.  41), but 
soon emphasizes the principal role of narrative in this constructive process 
and concludes that ‘Self is a perpetually rewritten story’ (p. 53). According 
to this view, we are asked to take the self to be (a) a construction and (b) a 
narrative construction. Even so, the resulting self is patchy—because ‘we tell 
of ourselves fitfully and patchily’ (Bruner & Kalmar, 1998, p. 323)—unless 
‘metanarrative’ construction is deployed to bring different self narratives 
together to a coherent whole, which occurs principally when outside (i.e. 
social) circumstances demand it.
The crucial features of a narratively constructed self in Bruner’s sense 
are  these.  First,  there  is  an emphasis  on agency—or its  opposite,  which 
Bruner (1994) terms ‘victimicy' (p. 41): stories have protagonists; thus, the 
narrative  self  is  that  of  an agent.  Secondly,  since  narratives  are  cultural 
practices, our ‘life stories [are] highly susceptible to cultural, interpersonal, 
and linguistic influences’ (1987, p. 14); thus a narrative self is culturally and 
socially, even dialogically, shaped. Thirdly, because no two instances of nar-
ration are quite alike, and the social and interpersonal requirements of each 
instance of self-narration admit of significant variation, the narratively con-
structed self is ‘somewhat unstable over extended time’ (Bruner & Kalmar, 
 This contention is, at best, highly debatable: not all chronological descriptions are 4
narrative  in  form.  I  discuss  Bruner’s  claim  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter 
(§ 6.1.3).
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1998, p.  308). So, for all the consistency a narrative structure supposedly 
provides to otherwise disparate rememberings, the resulting self is never 
an authoritative version, but rather, as just mentioned, ‘a perpetually re-
written story’ (Bruner, 1994, p. 53)
I will discuss the difficulties faced by Bruner’s account, together with 
those arising from other narrative accounts of the self, in the next chapter. 
But first, let me consider quite what is meant by ‘narrative’, and then intro-
duce narrative accounts of the self proffered by philosophers.
5.3  Narrative selves?
5.3.1  Defining ‘narrative’
What exactly is meant by ‘narrative’? Much of the literature on narrativity 
and the self, whether psychological or philosophical, lacks such a defini-
tion.  That may perhaps be explained by noting that everyone may be pre5 -
sumed to have a good grasp of what a story is and of what is involved in 
story-telling. It may also be due to the preponderance of appeals to nar-
rativity in a wide range of academic disciplines (see e.g. Brockmeier & Car-
baugh, 2001).
Yet,  the  different  authors  cited in  this  chapter  do use  ‘narrative’  in 
subtly different ways. Bruner (§ 5.2.4) and Dennett (§ 5.3.3) overtly take a 
narrative to be very much like a literary novel—a view that runs into diffi-
culties, which I will discuss in the next chapter (§  6.1.2). Marya Schecht-
man’s (1996; 2007) notion of narrativity (§ 5.3.4) is a looser one that allows 
narrative processes be ‘largely implicit and automatic’. But she also identi-
fies narrativity with certain mental  activities—identifying with one’s  ac-
tions, awareness of their causal relations, having affective connections with 
one’s past—that do not obviously require narrative form.
The problem with looser definitions of ‘narrative’ is that they easily 
become trivial and uninformative. As Galen Strawson (2004) puts it:
 This absence of a definition of ‘narrative’ is not limited to works concerned spe5 -
cifically with narrativity in relation to the self. Even Gregory Currie’s (2010) Narrat-
ives and Narrators: a philosophy of stories deliberately eschews defining its first titular 
term.
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Well, if someone says, as some do, that making coffee is a narrative that 
involves Narrativity, because you have to think ahead, do things in the 
right order, and so on, and that everyday life involves many such narrat-
ives, then I take it the claim is trivial. (p. 439)
On the other hand, too strict a definition of what amounts to a ‘narrative’—
that it  should have the characteristics of a literary  narrative, say—would 
exclude  the  every-day  story-telling  practices  discussed  above  (§   5.2.1). 
What is required, then, is a definition of ‘narrative’ that is neither too re-
strictive in excluding such practices, nor so loose as to become trivial.
Peter Goldie’s (2012) account of narrativity has some similarities with 
Schechtman’s, as does the notion of narrative he employs and (unlike most 
others) takes some care to define:
A narrative  or  story  is  something that  can be  told  or  narrated,  or  just 
thought through in narrative thinking. (p. 2)
The notion of  ‘narrative thinking’  widens the applicability of  ‘narrative’ 
beyond instances requiring a ‘public act of narration’ (p.  4).  This would 
seem to allow Schechtman’s ‘implicit and automatic’ narrativity. But what 
is narrative thinking? Broadly, it means thinking that is structured in a par-
ticular way that resembles (and, if need be, enables) overt narration. A nar-
rative, Goldie continues,
is more than just a bare annal or chronicle or list of a sequence of events, 
but a representation of those events which is shaped, organized, and col-
oured, presenting those events, and the people involved in them, from a 
certain  perspective  or  perspectives,  and thereby giving narrative  struc-
ture—coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import—
to what is related. (p. 2)
Narrative perspective, Goldie adds, can be internal or external, that is, from 
the point of view of a protagonist or that of a narrator or, one might add, 
following Schechtman (2011b), a critic.
As for the three elements of narrative structure: coherence, Goldie (2012) 
notes, is not achieved merely by linking events with causal explanations, 
but by selecting particular features or details in a causal history for their 
salience and interest. Meaningfulness may be obtained from both an internal 
and an external perspective; in the first case, by dwelling on a protagonist’s 
‘thoughts, feelings, and actions’ in relation to the events in the narrative; in 
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the  second case,  because  the  protagonists’  thoughts  and feelings  ‘throw 
light on why the narrative was related (or just through through) in that par-
ticular way’ (p. 17). Finally, the evaluative and emotional import of a narrative, 
which is closely linked with its meaningfulness, consist in why and in what 
way the events of a narrative matter, and what feelings the narrative may 
precipitate.
It is important to add that, on Goldie’s view, narrative structure overall 
‘is a property that can be possessed as a matter of degree: it can be present 
to a greater or a lesser extent’ (p. 13). Thus, it would seem that there may be 
degrees of coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional im-
port. One might wonder how small a degree of any of these is permitted 
before something ceases to be a narrative, but let us assume that a narrative 
requires that at least some degree of all of these is present.
Goldie’s definition seems wide enough to cover the instances of nar-
rativity  I  discuss  in  this  chapter,  yet  not  so  loose  as  to  be  open to  the 
Strawsonian charge of being trivial. Let me attempt, next, to classify the dif-
ferent ways in which narrativity may be, and has been, said to relate to the 
self.
5.3.2  Narrativity and the self: four positions
Marya Schechtman (2011b) draws a useful ‘tentative distinction’ (p.  395) 
between two broad families of views on the relation between narrativity 
and the self. The first group comprises various accounts of the self as ‘con-
stituted by narratives’ (ibid.), among whose proponents Schechtman lists 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Paul Ricœur, Jerome Bruner, and her-
self, as well as, in a somewhat different vein, Daniel Dennett. The second 
group of views ‘links selfhood to the capacity to think in narrative terms 
and to offer narrative explanations’ (p. 398). This includes Katherine Nel-
son’s account of the development of the self (§ 5.2.1). I will here try to refine 
Schechtman’s distinction by identifying two subdivisions in each of the two 
families of views.
First, then, there are what I will call narrative constructionist accounts of 
the self: these share the view that the self is, in some way, a narrative pro-
duction  or construction.  Among them we can distinguish further between 
what I will call, respectively, strong and weak narrative constructionist ac-
!130
counts. Strong narrative constructionist accounts take the self both to be a 
narrative construct  and to have a  narrative structure—in short,  on such 
views the self is some kind of a narrative. They include Bruner’s view dis-
cussed above  (§  5.2.4)  and,  I  take  it,  Schechtman’s  own (1996)  account, 
which I discuss below (§ 5.3.4). Weak narrative constructionist accounts do 
not take the self to be narrative in structure, but still hold that it is, in some 
way, a product of narrative activity. The paradigm case of such an account 
is Dennett’s (1992) view of the self as a ‘centre of narrative gravity’ (see 
§ 5.3.3). Narrative constructionist accounts of the self all accord priority to 
narrative  processes  over  the  self.  Strong narrative  constructionist  views, 
additionally, conceive of the self as narratively structured, while weak nar-
rative  constructionist  views  merely  take  it  to  be  a  product  of  narrative 
activity.
Secondly, there is a still more diffuse group of views that, in some way, 
as Schechtman puts it, ‘link’ the self to narrative capacity, without however 
taking it to be a narrative construct or product. To the contrary, on these 
views, the self can very well be conceived of as the producer of narrative 
activity. We can call these views narrative-capacity views. Here, too, a further 
sub-distinction will be useful. One position is to take narrative capacity and 
activity to be essential for a self: something is a self only if it has the capacity 
to engage in narration and/or narrative thinking and, additionally, keeps 
exercising that capacity. An example of such a view is David Velleman’s 
(2005) response to Dennett (§ 5.3.3). But then there are also simple narrative-
capacity views, which hold merely that selves can and often—but not ne-
cessarily—do engage in narrative activity. My system view of the self sits 
on this lowest rung of the narrativity ladder.6
In sum, there are, broadly, four positions regarding the relation of self 
to narrativity. Strong narrative constructionist views take the self to be nar-
ratively constructed and narrative in structure.  Weak narrative construc-
tionist views regard the self as a product of narrative activity but not itself a 
narrative. Narrative-capacity views take the self to be a producer of narrat-
ive activity, but differ on whether narrativity is an essential activity of the 
 I would like to claim Peter Goldie as a fellow occupant of this position, since his 6
own (2012) view on narrativity is that while we have a ‘narrative sense of self . . . 
the sense that one has of oneself in narrative thinking, as having a past, a present, 
and a future’ (p. 118), he insists that this sense of self is neither a narrative self—nor 
the only sense of self we have.
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self. The remainder of this chapter will be an exposition of what I take to be 
representative samples of three of these four positions: Dennett’s weak nar-
rative constructionist view and Velleman’s development of it into an essen-
tial  narrative-capacity  view (§  5.3.3),  and Schechtman’s  strong narrative 
constructionist view (§ 5.3.4). Most of the next chapter will then be devoted 
to a sustained critique of all three views.
5.3.3  The self as fiction—or narrator
Short of the strong narrative constructionist view of the self as narrative in 
structure, the prominent weak narrative constructionist view treats the self 
as  an  abstraction  from  our  narrative  practices.  This  is  Daniel  Dennett’s 
(1992) suggestion that the self is a ‘center of narrative gravity’. Analogous 
to the concept of a centre of gravity in physics, the self is a theoretical, fic-
tional abstraction—a focal point, as it were, of the every-day stories we tell 
about our lives. And, just as the centre of gravity of a physical object shifts 
when the shape of the object is interfered with, so the self qua centre of nar-
rative gravity is not fixed, but gets changed and updated over time: ‘We 
cannot undo those parts of our pasts that are determinate, but our selves 
are constantly being made more determinate as we go along in response to 
the way the world impinges on us.’ (p. 110)
Thus,  like  Bruner’s  strong  narrative  constructionist  self,  Dennett’s 
centre-of-narrative-gravity self is unstable and subject to change over time. 
But, whereas in Bruner’s account the self is  the story (or the metastory), 
here the self is something like the inferred central character of the stories 
we tell of ourselves. This may seem odd: if I tell a story about my life, why 
need I infer from my own story that someone I refer to as ‘I’ is its protagon-
ist? But this is precisely Dennett’s point. To be sure, there is already a per-
sistent  human  animal,  perhaps  even  a  persistent  experiencing  subject 
(though Dennett would doubt this, since ‘the unity of normal life is an illu-
sion’ (p. 111) given to us by our self narratives), who is telling his life story. 
But the ‘I’ or self that is the protagonist of my narrative, in so far as he has a 
rich psychological ‘inner’ life, is an abstraction from the narratives I tell. In 
telling stories about ourselves,  we create their fictional central  character, 
our self.
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The most serious question arising from Dennett’s account is this: who 
(or what) exactly is telling these stories? Even if we were to accept Den-
nett’s contention that our perceived psychological unity is itself an artefact 
of our narrative activity—that there is no ‘I’ prior to narration—we must 
still ask what processes result in the production of our narratives. What is it 
that enables a loquacious animal to spin a narrative about itself? It is plaus-
ible  to  assume that,  analogously  to  Klein’s  three  ‘enabling  systems’  for 
autobiographical memory (see § 4.2.3), something that is capable of narrat-
ing its own story with any degree of verisimilitude requires some prior self-
awareness, a sense that its experiences are its own, and an ability to place 
events in a temporal sequence. And if such self-representational capacities 
are required for us to tell our tale, it seems misguided to locate the self at 
the end of its narrative production line. I will return to this issue in the next 
chapter (§ 6.2.1).
A comparatively lesser concern about Dennett’s account is his charac-
terization of the self as a fiction. For though Dennett’s self is fictional, this 
does not mean that it is an idle concoction without any useful application. 
Hence the analogy with a centre of gravity in physics: ‘when I say it is a 
fictional object, I do not mean to disparage it; it is a wonderful fictional ob-
ject, and it has a perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober, echt phys-
ical science’ (p. 104). Likewise, the self as a centre of narrative gravity has a 
legitimate  and  useful  place  in  human  psychology—elsewhere,  Dennett 
speaks of the ‘reality’ of our fictional selves (1991/1993, p. 412), though it is 
somewhat unclear whether he simply means that they are real qua fictions, 
or something more than that.
Dissatisfied  with  this  metaphysical  nonchalance  on  Dennett’s  part, 
David Velleman (2005) develops Dennett’s account. In his view, the self is 
‘both fictive and true’  (p.  58)—‘fictive’  in the way Dennett  suggests  but 
‘real’ in the sense that ‘we really are the characters whom we invent’ (ibid.). 
This reality of the narrative self is derived, on Velleman’s account, from the 
insight that our narratives about ourselves do not merely describe or ex-
plain our behaviour, but also determine it. For instance, when we narrat-
ively state an intention that we’re about to do something, we then—other 
things being equal—act on that stated intention. More globally, we gener-
ally attempt in our behaviour to cohere with whatever autobiographical 
narrative  we tell  of  ourselves.  There  is,  in  Velleman’s  view,  a  ‘feedback 
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loop’ that ensures that our lives correspond to our life-stories both by the 
narration of our actions and by the acting out of our narratives.
This ability to turn narratively formed intentions into actions, Velleman 
insists, is what makes us ‘autonomous agents’. Perhaps so. A discussion of 
what might be meant by ‘autonomy’, and in what way Velleman’s might be 
a plausible account of it, would take me too far off course here. The em-
phasis on agency, however, is of some importance, because, as in Bruner’s 
account discussed above, and of course as in Locke’s account, it links the 
notion of self with that of action. However, unlike Locke, for whom the 
ownership of a past action is indicative of its being part of the same self, 
Velleman takes it that what makes an action mine is its being part of my 
narrative.
Thus the self,  in  Velleman’s  view,  is  not  the fictional  protagonist  of 
Dennett’s  account,  nor  ‘the  autobiographer’s  reflective  representa-
tion’ (p. 70), i.e. the autobiographical narrative, as it is in Bruner’s account. 
Rather, the self is the narrator of that narrative—and not an impartial or un-
involved narrator, but rather an ‘inner locus of agential control’ (p. 71), a 
decider and determiner of actions. It is not someone to whom things hap-
pen, but someone who makes things happen.
There is, I think, something right about this modification: it is the em-
phasis on the narrator as agent, which goes some way to alleviate the lack 
of a producer of narrative in Dennett’s account. But Velleman’s notion of 
‘agential control’ goes too far. If he held that, by way of the stories we tell, 
we take ourselves to be decisive agents seemingly in control of our actions, 
so as to make sense of what we do by means of a narrative agential inter-
pretation of diverse and often unconscious processes, that would preserve 
some of the essence of Dennett’s account and nicely tally with empirical 
psychology. But he seems to be saying rather more than this, viz. that we 
are genuinely in control of our actions by making ourselves act in accord-
ance with a pre-established narrative. And that, given what little insight we 
have into our judgements and reasons for action (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Carruthers,  2010),  seems implausible.  I’ll  return to this point in the next 
chapter (§ 6.3.1).
It is a little difficult to situate Velleman’s (2005) account on the spec-
trum of narrative views of the self I have sketched above (§ 5.3.2). Some of 
his remarks—e.g., ‘We invent ourselves’ (p. 58)—seem to position his view 
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on the narrative constructionist side of Schechtman’s distinction, among the 
views that take selves to be narrative constructions or productions. But his 
characterization of the self as narrator, the one who actively constructs his 
narratives, suggests otherwise. Indeed, Velleman explicitly disagrees with 
Dennett  in insisting that  our narrative activity requires  a  prior  capacity, 
which he calls ‘narrative intelligence’ (p. 72). I take it, then, that Velleman’s 
position is really a narrative-capacity view, rather than a narrative construc-
tionist one. As to what kind of narrative-capacity view it is, clearly Velleman 
takes narrative activity to be the essential activity of the ‘self-narrator’, for it 
is this activity that makes him an ‘autonomous agent’, which is Velleman’s 
main concern. The self, then, though not narratively constructed, is essen-
tially a narrator. And that too is a problem, as I shall explain in the next 
chapter (§ 6.3).
Meanwhile, there is still the strong narrative constructionist position to 
consider, according to which the self is not only a narrative construct, but 
also narrative in structure.
5.3.4  ‘Narrative self-constitution’
Schechtman’s (1996) ‘narrative self-constitution view’ (p. 93) combines two 
features of narrative views of the self already discussed: the idea that selves 
are ‘self-creating’ (p. 95) in some way, which is also a tenet of Dennett’s ac-
count, and the idea of the self as a narrative construct, as found in Bruner’s 
view.  Moreover,  Schechtman’s  view preserves  the  Lockean conflation of 
‘self’ with ‘person’.  According to Schechtman,7
we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a narrative self-conception 
according to which we experience and organize our lives. This self-con-
ception and its operations are largely implicit and automatic. (2007, p. 162)
With this narrative self-conception in place, ‘we experience the present in 
the context of a larger life-narrative’ (ibid.), that is, the self narrative not 
 Schechtman later (2007) resiles from the self–person conflation in response to ob7 -
jections, which I discuss in § 6.1.1. And in her latest (2014) monograph, even her 
narrative account of persons has been superseded by what she calls the ‘person life 
view’, according to which ‘persons are defined in terms of the characteristic lives 
they lead’ (p. 110). As this is a new account of persons rather than of selves, I for-
bear to discuss it here.
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only serves to organize our experiences, but also determines how we experi-
ence the present. Here, something like Bruner’s narrative ‘mode of thought’ 
seems to operate on our experiences. For instance, as a Schechtmanian self, 
I might experience the noise of strimmers and lawn-mowers in the grounds 
outside my window not merely as an occurrent impediment to concentra-
tion, but as an instance of a recurring motif in my life story wherein various 
extraneous forces (gardeners, builders, guitar-playing neighbours, children, 
dogs, magpies…) conspire to annoy me by making a racket whenever I’m 
trying to work. I will look at the possible pitfalls of such thinking in the 
next chapter (§§ 6.1.2, 6.3).
But what exactly does it mean to say that a person or self ‘constitutes’ 
herself ‘by forming a narrative self-conception’? What has been said so far 
about having a narrative self-conception is compatible with Goldie’s (2012) 
view that we engage in narrative thinking about our lives and so may have 
a narrative sense  of self (among other senses of self), without any of this 
amounting to a narrative self. Schechtman does not state in what sense she 
uses ‘constitution’ in her account,  but a common usage in the personal-
identity literature suggests that for A to ‘constitute’ B means that A and B 
are ‘made of  the same matter’  but  have different  persistence conditions 
(Olson, 2015). On this reading, a human being ‘constitutes’ a person/self, in 
Schechtman’s  account,  ‘by  forming  a  narrative  self-conception’.  Thus,  it 
would seem that once (and for as long as) one has a narrative self-concep-
tion, one is ipso facto a Schechtmanian person/self.
This might suggest that Schechtman espouses an essential narrative-ca-
pacity view, rather than being an exponent of the strong narrative construc-
tionist position. But in the original statement of her view, she also seems to 
imply that the narrative is the self. Although Schechtman (unlike Bruner) 
does not quite spell it out that way, in The Constitution of Selves (1996), in 
which ‘personal identity’ and ‘self’ are not distinguished, she states her po-
sition thus:
a person’s identity . . . is constituted by the content of her self-narrative, 
and the traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by virtue of that 
inclusion, hers. (p. 94, original emphasis)
It is difficult to understand this except as meaning that the content of the 
narrative  ‘constitutes’  the  self.  This  would  seem  to  make  Schechtman’s 
view a strong narrative constructionist account.
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How, then, do we get a narrative self-conception? The first requirement 
of narrative self-constitution indeed seems a cognitive effort akin to Bru-
ner’s narrative ‘mode of thought’: it is ‘that an individual conceive of his 
life as having the form and the logic of a story . . . where “story” is under-
stood as a conventional, linear narrative’ (p. 96). This conception of one’s 
life as having a narrative form supposedly provides both coherence and 
intelligibility to one’s experiences: experiences gain their meaning from the 
context of the life story in which they are situated. Obviously, in order to 
conceive of one’s life in this way, one must have some grasp of how ‘con-
ventional, linear narratives’ work. (By ‘linear’ I take it Schechtman means 
that the narrative does not involve forks or loops.) Schechtman does not 
discuss the acquisition of narrative capacity in development, but we must 
assume that the practices studied by both Fivush and Miller (§ 5.2.1) are 
required for anyone to develop the ability to form a narrative self-concep-
tion.
Must this narrative form necessarily be linear? Schechtman (1996) ar-
gues that it must be, since the self—in her sense of ‘characterization’, that 
is,  ‘which beliefs,  values,  desires,  and other psychological features make 
someone the person she is’ (p. 2)—must account for four features: survival, 
moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and eligibility for compensa-
tion. Only linear narratives, Schechtman contends, can satisfy these criteria. 
Indeed it seems that concern for the future and responsibility for past ac-
tions require linearity to the extent that there should be no bifurcations of 
self over time and that different events stand in a stable temporal relation 
to one another.
In seeking to give a view of the self that accounts for these four fea-
tures, Schechtman’s project is clearly situated in a Lockean tradition—but 
explicitly not in that strand of the tradition that equates Locke’s account of 
the self with the persistence of memory.  The extended consciousness that 
makes for the same self in Locke is about appropriating past actions and 
experiences,  which happens ‘if  they affect  present  consciousness,  causing 
the  person  pleasure  or  pain  in  the  present’  (p.  109,  original  emphasis). 
Memory  will  have  some  role  in  this,  of  course,  but  so  have  ‘affective 
traces’ (p. 110) even in the absence of explicit memory. Schechtman’s narrat-
ive  form  is  supposed  to  provide  the  framework  or  ‘organizing 
principle’  (p.   113)  by  which  we  make  sense  of  those  affective  traces 
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impinging on our present consciousness, giving them meaning and coher-
ence.
At  the  same  time,  the  case  for  a  linear  narrative  self  is  weakened 
somewhat by the influence of ‘affective traces’ of our past on present con-
sciousness. The recall of a strong emotion is likely to be unbidden or at least 
unreflected, and its association with affective traces of a similar quality will 
mostly be out  of  sequence.  Suppose some present  event  fills  me with a 
sense of crushing disappointment and conjures up the recollection of other 
events in my past that gave rise to a similar affective response. It is plaus-
ible to assume that these recollections will not appear in their temporal se-
quence, but impress themselves on me in a seemingly random order,  or 
perhaps in order of the magnitude of the emotion. And—assuming that my 
life  so  far  has  not  been an unadulterated series  of  crushing disappoint-
ments—they will amount only to a transient, incomplete and skewed rep-
resentation of myself. At that particular moment of my self-awareness, my 
‘disappointed  self’  is  not  a  linear  narrative,  but  a  mass  of  negatively 
valenced affective traces.
Of course, I will usually get over my disappointing episode sooner or 
later, and in doing so may well be aided by the recollection of overcoming 
those previous disappointments, setting them in their temporal context and 
in a wider perspective which also includes other, happier incidents in my 
life. This, one might say in defence of Schechtman’s view, is precisely where 
the narrative self  is  being deployed:  by inserting the present experience 
into a continuing storyline, I can make sense of present events in the light 
of what has gone before. But that would suggest that the narrative self is a 
kind of cognitive repair-kit, always a step or several behind present con-
sciousness. It does not then so much condition present experience as alter 
or  ‘remedy’  it  post  hoc.  And that  is  assuming that  the  narrative  kit-bag 
already contains the requisite tools for making sense of the present. Some 
self narratives may not, however—I discuss that possibility below (§ 6.3.2).
But let me go back a step and consider how Schechtman’s narrative self 
is configured. For we might wonder just how solid and detailed the narrat-
ive self-conception is by which we ‘constitute’ ourselves. Clearly it is not a 
fixed narrative—as long as one’s life continues, so does the narrative re-
ceive additions and amendments.  But nor is  it  a fully formed narrative. 
Narrative self-constitution,  according to Schechtman (1996),  does not  re-
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quire ‘[t]he formal construction of an autobiography’ and ‘does not have to 
be self-conscious’ (p. 105). Here, then, is a puzzle: in what sense precisely is 
Schechtman’s self-constitution narrative? The answer seems again to hark 
back to Bruner’s notion of a narrative ‘mode of thought’: we supposedly 
think or conceive of our lives as something like a story, with certain narrat-
ive features that go beyond mere diachronicity, including one’s own charac-
terization as the story’s protagonist with particular ‘traits, talents, likes, and 
dislikes’ (p. 114), the interpretation of one’s actions in terms of goals and 
reasons,  and,  presumably,  certain  overarching themes and motifs.  I  will 
consider in the next chapter whether we do in fact construe our lives in this 
way, and whether and to what extent it is fruitful to do so (§§ 6.1, 6.3).
Additionally, Schechtman’s narrative self is subject to what she calls 
the ‘articulation constraint’ (ibid.)—a person must ‘be able to articulate her 
narrative locally when appropriate’ (2007, p. 163). Thus, while the bulk of 
our life story may be ‘implicit’ and unconscious, we produce explicit ex-
cerpts from it when the social situation requires it and we actively narrate 
part of our life story. There is both a parallel with and a subtle difference 
from Bruner’s account here. Both his and Schechtman’s view involve the 
localized telling of (part of) one’s life story. But where for Bruner the self 
narrative is continuously reshaped or ‘rewritten’ by these acts of explicit 
narration, it seems that for Schechtman, such narrative acts are instances of 
an existing implicit narrative self being made explicit.
Another constraint on our narrative self that Schechtman stipulates is 
the ‘reality  constraint’:  the self  narrative must  ‘conform to what  we are 
generally accepted to know about the basic character of reality and about 
the nature of persons’ (ibid.). This sounds reasonable enough, but neverthe-
less also vague enough to admit less or more serious inaccuracies—both 
‘errors of fact’ (1996, p. 121) and ‘interpretive inaccuracies’ (p. 123)—into 
the self narrative. And factual and interpretative inaccuracies are a problem 
not only for narrative constructionist views of the self, but also for narrat-
ive-capacity views that take narrative to be an essential activity of the self, 
as I’ll discuss shortly (§ 6.3.1).
Having now presented examples of  strong and weak narrative con-
structionist views as well as an essential narrative-capacity view of the self, 
it  is  time  that  I  discussed  their  problems  and  shortcomings.  There  are 




The author, not the tale
6.1  The self is not a story
In the title of his latest piece in a series of articles against narrative accounts 
of the self, Galen Strawson (2015) insists: ‘I am not a story’. Nor is he. And 
neither am I, or you, or anyone else. Nor is anyone’s self a story. In this sec-
tion,  I  will  argue  against  strong  narrative  constructionist  accounts,  which 
hold not only that the self is narratively constructed, but also narrative in 
structure.  And  I  may  as  well  begin  with  Strawson’s  criticisms,  and 
Schechtman’s responses to them.
6.1.1  Strawson v. Schechtman
It is a feature of strong narrative constructionist accounts that constructing 
a self through narrative involves that one should experience one’s life in a 
narrative form. As Schechtman (2011b) puts it in her summary of such ac-
counts, ‘the lives of selves are narrative in structure’ (p. 395). Thus, a narrat-
ive ‘organizing principle’ (1996, p. 113) supposedly operates on the way we 
process our experiences. According to these views, we only make sense of 
this or that episode in our lives by placing and understanding it in the con-
text of a narrative structure.
Galen  Strawson  (2004;  2012;  2015)  disagrees  vehemently  with  this 
thesis:
I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have 
a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I 
also remember some of my past experiences ‘from the inside’, as philo-
sophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative 
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with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none.  
(2004, p. 433)
Strawson’s testimony poses a problem for strong narrative constructionist 
accounts. If the contention of these accounts is that in order to have a self 
over time, one must conceive of one’s life in a narrative way, the only con-
clusions available here are (i) that Strawson, given his non-narrative dis-
position, does not have such a self, (ii) that Strawson is somehow mistaken 
about his own self-conception, or (iii) that strong narrative constructionist 
accounts are mistaken in imputing a narrative self-conception to us all.
The  first  possibility  here  would  appear  to  be  contradicted  by 
Strawson’s assertion that he is well aware of having a past of which he has 
factual  and  experiential  knowledge.  Granted,  in  Strawson’s  (2009)  own 
‘revisionary’ use of the term ‘self’, which he reserves for any continuous 
period of consciousness, all this does not amount to a self. But, clearly, both 
his factual knowledge and ‘inside’ awareness of his own past are instances 
of self-representation over time. There is, on most reasonable definitions of 
‘self’, a persisting self evident here.
Second, one might think that Strawson is simply in error about his own 
self-conception—that he does have a narrative self-conception without real-
izing it. But that would be a highly dubious move to make: Schechtman’s 
(1996) account of the self requires that one should have a first-personal con-
ception of one’s life in narrative form. Thus, first-personal evidence such as 
that proffered by Strawson is perfectly relevant in this context. Indeed there 
is no other means currently available of deciding whether someone experi-
ences his life in a particular way than to solicit  first-personal testimony. 
Strawson’s is unequivocal on this point. He has ‘no sense of [his] life as a 
narrative . . . Absolutely none’. Some might still insist that Strawson is be-
ing narrative in ways he does not realize. As Valerie Hardcastle (2008) ob-
serves, ‘the very descriptions that Strawson provides of himself are strik-
ingly narrative in nature’ (p. 27). That may be so, but this only shows that 
Strawson has narrative capacities and is able to deploy them when talking 
about  himself.  Even  if  someone’s  account  of  himself  can  take  narrative 
forms locally, this does not yet mean that he conceives of his life—or his self
—as a story. One may engage in narrative practices without having a narrat-
ive self-conception.
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This leaves us with the third option, that strong narrative construction-
ist accounts overstate their case in holding that a self over time must neces-
sarily be narrative in form. Any one counterexample—such as Strawson’s—
invalidates that thesis. But notice that while Strawson is emphatic in not 
sharing the narrative self-conception that is at the core of strong narrative 
accounts of the diachronic self, he is not saying that no one has a sense of his 
or her life as a narrative. On the contrary, he is perfectly aware that some 
do. Self-experience, Strawson (2007) notes, varies between different ‘tem-
poral temperaments’ (p. 85):
To be Narrative is [N] to see or live or experience one’s life as a narrative or 
story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories. (p. 86)
Conversely,
To be non-Narrative is not to live one’s life in this way; one may simply 
lack any Narrative tendency, or [like Strawson himself] one may have a 
positively anti-Narrative tendency. (ibid.)
In addition, Strawson makes a distinction between ‘Diachronic’ and ‘Epis-
odic’ temperaments: 
If one is Diachronic [D] one naturally figures oneself, the self or person one 
now experiences oneself to be, as something that was there in the (further) 
past and will be there in the (further) future. (ibid.)
On the other hand,
the defining feature of being Episodic is that [E] one does not figure oneself, 
the self or person one now experiences oneself to be, as something that 
there was in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future . . .
(ibid.)
Crucially, while being ‘Narrative’ entails that one is also ‘Diachronic’, it is 
possible to be ‘Diachronic’ without being ‘Narrative’: experiencing oneself 
as something with a past and future does not require narrative form. Fur-
ther, being ‘Episodic’ and being ‘Diachronic’ are conceived as opposite ends 
of a spectrum, along which one’s temporal temperament need not be fixed, 
but ‘can vary considerably according to what one is thinking about’ (ibid.) 
or according to one’s age.
If these different temperaments reflect how different people experience 
themselves (perhaps at different times in their lives), it follows that a narrat-
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ive self-conception is just one of a range of possible self-conceptions. And if 
one’s temperament can vary situationally along the ‘Diachronic’–‘Episodic’ 
dimension, so it can vary between being ‘Narrative’ and being ‘non-Narrat-
ive’.  One might,  for  instance,  conceive of  particular  passages of  time in 
one’s life as having narrative coherence, while allowing that others have 
not.
Responding to Strawson’s criticism, Schechtman (2007) goes to some 
length in trying to revise her narrative self-constitution view to accommod-
ate the existence of different temporal temperaments. While accepting his 
self-characterization as an ‘Episodic’,  she observes that  Strawson admits 
that he qua  current experiencing self stands in a special relation to other 
parts of his life qua human being. These relations ‘within his human exist-
ence,’ Schechtman contends, ‘contain much of what is involved in having a 
self narrative’ (p. 168). As I’ve already noted, Strawson’s awareness of his 
past as being his is a kind of diachronicity, despite his ‘Episodic’ tempera-
ment. But while diachronicity is indeed something that’s ‘involved in hav-
ing a self narrative’, it is not sufficient for having one: diachronicity need 
not take a narrative form.
But Schechtman has a second response:
Much of Strawson’s argument against the narrative view is based on the 
fact that he does not experience his entire human life in narrative terms—
that there are different selves within his human existence. (ibid.)
This, Schechtman argues, does not invalidate the narrative self-constitution 
view, for her view distinguishes between the human being (and its persist-
ence conditions)  and the narratively constituted self  or  person.  Schecht-
man’s view can thus accommodate several selves per human life ‘if each 
self is constituted by a narrative internal to it’ (ibid.).
Schechtman admits that her two responses ‘are in some tension with 
one another’ (ibid.)—one claims to detect the rudiments of narrativity in 
Strawson’s diachronic awareness of his whole life, while the other admits 
of multiple narrative selves in a lifetime. She proposes to resolve this ten-
sion by introducing a new self–person distinction, whereby the self is ‘the 
subject of experience, the “I”’, and a person is ‘the bearer of certain complex 
social  capacities  that  carry  important  practical  implications’,  ‘a  moral 
agent’, ‘a reasoning creature’, ‘a creature capable of a range of complex [so-
cial] relationships’ (p. 169). Pace Locke and Schechtman’s own earlier (1996) 
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account, the persistence conditions of persons and selves may thus differ 
(as I argued in § 2.4.1).
Now, Schechtman (2007) suggests that the narrative self-constitution 
view contains accounts of the narrative construction of both  persons and 
selves as understood here. Her ‘narrative account of persons (PN)’ is that
to constitute oneself as a person, one must recognize oneself as continuing, 
see past actions and experiences as having implications for one's current 
rights and responsibilities, and recognize a future that will be impacted by 
the past and present. One need not deeply identify with past or future ac-
tions and experiences, care about them, or take an interest in them, but one 
does need to recognize them as relevant to one's options in certain funda-
mental ways. (p. 170)
This account, Schechtman notes, is compatible with Strawson’s self-experi-
ence  as  an  ‘Episodic’  (indeed  it  seems  tailor-made  to  accommodate 
Strawson’s episodicity). She does however anticipate his objection that any 
sense in which narrativity is compatible with his notion of episodicity is 
trivial, like (using Strawson’s example quoted in § 5.3.1) the ‘narrative’ of 
how to make coffee. Schechtman replies that a person-constituting narrat-
ive is relevantly different from a coffee-making narrative, in that ‘it is an 
explanatory account of how actions and events lead to other[s]’ (p. 172). 
But here too Strawson (2012) has a rejoinder: ‘causal explanation, psycholo-
gically significant causal  explanation,  isn’t  always narrative’  (pp.  82–83). 
Thus, even if one were fully to accept PN as an account of what constitutes 
a person, it does not necessarily amount to a narrative account. We can re-
cognize the relevance of past actions and experiences to our rights and re-
sponsibilities etc. without spinning them into a narrative, even if we verbal-
ize their relations. The conjunction ‘because’ does not make a story.
As to Schechtman’s (2007) revised ‘narrative account of selves (SN)’, it 
is this:
For an action or experience to belong to myself I do need to identify with it 
or care about or take an interest in it. Temporally remote actions and ex-
periences that are appropriated into one’s self narrative must . . . condition 
the  quality  of  present  experience  in  the  strongest  sense,  unifying  con-
sciousness over time through affective connections and identification. . . . 
In this sense of narrative, actions and experiences from which I am alien-
ated, or in which I have none of the interest that I have in my current life, 
are not part of my narrative. (p. 171)
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Here too it seems that the conditions Schechtman lays down for past ac-
tions and experiences to be incorporated into one’s present self do not ne-
cessarily require a narrative. Identifying with a past experience, appropriat-
ing a past action as one’s own, caring about and having ‘affective connec-
tions’ with one’s past may require some cognitive processing, but this does 
not need to take the form of a narrative.
Indeed it  remains a puzzle just  in what sense Schechtman’s revised 
view is a ‘narrative’ account. Is it still a narrative constructionist account in 
either the weak or strong sense, one which requires that the self be narrat-
ively constructed? If so, it cannot serve as a response to Strawson’s non-nar-
rative temperament. Or are non-narrative cognitive processes that satisfy 
the conditions of PN and SN equally acceptable for the ‘constitution’ of a 
person or a self? In that case, it would seem odd to insist on the label ‘nar-
rative’—unless its purpose were merely to indicate that we sometimes make 
use  of  narrative  practices  in  our  self-conception.  This  would  place 
Schechtman’s revised account among the simple narrative-capacity views.
Such a  view could  tally  with  the  temporal  temperaments  Strawson 
posits, for just as Schechtman’s responses do not quite establish that nar-
rativity is necessary for a self if other cognitive means are available to meet 
her conditions, so Strawson’s anti-narrative stance does not establish that 
no one does or can resort to narrative self-conceptions. Different temporal 
temperaments may simply mean that different individuals have different 
self-conceptions over time.
It  seems,  however,  that  such a  position is  weaker  than Schechtman 
would allow. In describing her remaining disagreements with Strawson, 
Schechtman (2007) insists that ‘affective concern’ for one’s past can only be 
accomplished by including one’s past in a self narrative (p. 177). I will re-
turn to the question of affective concern shortly (§ 6.1.3); for now, I take it 
that Schechtman’s revised view, while no longer obviously a strong narrat-
ive constructionist  account, at least accords an essential role to narrativity. 
Thus, she seems to have retreated to an essential narrative-capacity view. The 
difficulties facing such views will be discussed in § 6.3.
Meanwhile, strong narrative constructionist accounts face some further 
difficulties and objections.
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6.1.2  What’s the story?
If the self is a story, what sort of story is it? Just how literally—and literar-
ily—are we to take strong narrative constructionist accounts?
Jerome Bruner, for one, unabashedly draws parallels between the life 
stories of his subjects and literary forms and characters. In his (1987) study 
of the life narratives of four members of a Brooklyn family, the adult son’s 
story is likened to a Bildungsroman: ‘Carl is a young Werther.’ (p. 29) For his 
sister, meanwhile, ‘the tale is more like the young Stephen Hero in the dis-
carded early version of Portrait’ (ibid.). Bruner’s subjects, I take it, do not 
themselves  resort  to  these  literary  comparisons  in  narrating  their  lives; 
rather, it is Bruner who in evaluating their tales for an academic audience 
finds it useful to do so. But he would be unlikely to do so in the context of 
introducing and defending the notion of ‘life as narrative’ if he did not see 
relevant  similarities  between the  life  stories  of  ordinary  people  and the 
novels of Goethe and Joyce. Dennett (1992) too likens our self narratives to 
literary creations when he claims that ‘we are all virtuoso novelists’ (p. 114).
This, Peter Lamarque (2007) argues, is a grievous mistake. Literature is 
a form of art, an artifice, operating on particular and distinctive principles. 
Thus, contrary to what Bruner might think when reading a novel, ‘the role 
of fictional characters in literature does not closely mirror the role of real 
people living real lives’ (p. 118). Conversely, the application of literary fig-
ures to real-life narratives has a ‘distorting and pernicious effect on the self-
understanding that such narratives are supposed to yield’ (p. 119).
Lamarque shows the distinctness of  literary from real-life narratives 
with reference to five principles. The first of these concerns the nature of 
literary characters as opposed to actual people: ‘In literary works character 
identity is indissolubly linked to character description.’ (p. 120) That is to 
say, the identity of a literary character is entirely dependent on the narrat-
ive and determined by how the character is described. A real person’s iden-
tity is not, in Lamarque’s view, derived from description, but ‘constrained 
by factors independent of narrative’ (p. 130), to wit, the facts of a person’s 
life. Nor is the identity of a real person accessed in a manner comparable to 
the ‘external perspective’ a novel or its reader has on the characters.
Secondly:  ‘In  literary  works  not  only  are  characters  and  incidents 
presented  to  us  but  attention  is  conventionally  drawn to  the  modes  of 
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presentation themselves.’ (p. 122) A rather wonderful example of this oc-
curs in Nabokov’s (1957) first description of Professor Pnin: 
Ideally bald, sun-tanned, and clean-shaven, he began rather impressively 
with that great brown dome of his, tortoise-shell glasses (masking an in-
fantile absence of eyebrows), apish upper lip, thick neck, and strong-man 
torso in a tightish tweed coat, but ended, somewhat disappointingly, in a 
pair of spindly legs (now flannelled and crossed) and frail-looking, almost 
feminine feet. (1960 edn, p. 7) 
Such a description does not merely introduce the character but invites the 
reader to make a first evaluation of Pnin that isn’t given by the contents of 
the description but in its slightly oddly chosen, comically juxtaposed epi-
thets (foreshadowing the character’s somewhat erratic command of Eng-
lish)  and the gentle  mockery of  its  style.  Lamarque (2007)  calls  this  the 
‘Opacity  Principle’:  ‘Rather  than  being  merely  transparent  vehicles  for 
prompting imaginings the descriptions provide a more opaque kind of per-
spective for observing and making sense of a fictional world.’ (p. 122) In 
real-life narratives, however, one normally aims for transparency; in such 
contexts the opacity that marks literary discourse ‘is a weakness . . . and 
merely clouds personal characterisation’ (p. 130).
Lamarque’s third and fourth principles of literary narratives are the 
‘Principle of Functionality’—‘It is always reasonable to ask of any detail in 
a  literary  work  what  literary  or  aesthetic  function  that  detail  is 
performing’ (p. 123)—and the ‘Teleological Principle’: ‘In literary works the 
explanation of why an episode occurs as it does and where it does often 
centres  on the  contribution the  episode  makes  to  the  completed artistic 
structure.’ (p. 126) Details matter in real-life narratives, too, but in different 
ways from literary narratives: they are selected for relevance rather than cre-
ated  for artistic effect; what matters is not their symbolic significance but 
their pertinence and accuracy. Ascribing symbolic functionality to details in 
real  life  is,  according  to  Lamarque,  ‘misplaced’,  ‘a  kind  of 
mysticism’ (p. 131)—as is resorting to teleological explanations in real-life 
narratives, where ‘[e]xplanations for non-fictional events must stay in the 
realm of causes and reasons’ (ibid.).
Finally, literary narratives invite thematic interpretation; their ‘signific-
ance and unity’ (p. 128) frequently appeal to some overarching theme. And 
while thematic coherence may sometimes occur in real-life narratives too, it 
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does so contingently. We may of course choose to recount a selection of our 
experiences under some thematic heading or other, as I did earlier in my 
example of being disturbed by outside noise (§ 5.3.4); but even if, in telling 
the tale of motorized gardening implements, screaming schoolchildren, and 
guitar-playing neighbours preventing me from working, I were to conclude 
it with a wry and weary ‘It’s the story of my life’, I would (I hope) be far 
from  assuming  or  asserting  that  my  occasional  exasperation  over  ex-
traneous noise was anywhere close to being the whole story of my whole 
life.
We might now think that, while Lamarque may be right to point out 
the distinctness of literary narrative from everyday storytelling, their dif-
ferences present no objection to strong narrative constructionist accounts of 
selfhood unless these explicitly appeal to literature as a model for self nar-
ratives. Schechtman (2007), for instance, makes clear that her narrative self-
constitution view does not state that the self narrative is like a literary nar-
rative;  for  instance,  it  does  not  require  a  ‘unifying  theme  and 
direction’ (p. 160) as found in Lamarque’s fifth principle of literary narrat-
ives. Thus, Lamarque’s argument may serve against Bruner’s willingness to 
compare his subjects’ life stories to novels, and against Dennett’s assertion 
that ‘we are all virtuoso novelists’ (when one listens to the everyday tales 
one might hear in an English public house, it  quickly becomes apparent 
that most of us are nothing of the sort; and there are probably no Goethes, 
Joyces,  and Nabokovs among Miller’s storytelling subjects in South Bal-
timore either)—but it need not invalidate a narratively constructed self on 
Schechtman’s (original) view.
Yet, the central contention of Schechtman’s account—that the self is, in 
her  words,  ‘constituted’  by  narrative—does  echo  Lamarque’s  literary 
‘Character Identity’ principle:  in literature, a character is determined en-
tirely by the narrative description given of him or her. If we—as selves or 
persons—are likewise ‘constituted’ by narrative, in what way do we differ 
from literary characters? Schechtman (2011b) replies that as characters of 
our self narratives, and unlike literary figures, ‘we are constrained by the 
facts  about  the  social  and  natural  world  in  which  we  find 
ourselves’  (p.  413).  While  this  acknowledges  Lamarque’s  point  that  the 
characters of real-life stories are determined by ‘factors independent of nar-
rative’,  consistency with facts is not as straightforward a requirement of 
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everyday narratives as it may seem. I discuss the difficulties of factual ac-
curacy in self narratives below (§ 6.3.1).
Schechtman’s reply to Lamarque goes on: we are not merely the charac-
ters, but also the authors and indeed critics of our self-stories.1
[W]e must think of ourselves as authors of our lives insofar as we must 
make decisions and these must involve reasons and purposes. (pp. 413–4)
This assumption of an authorial role resembles Velleman’s view of the self 
as  narrator,  as  the  ‘locus  of  agential  control’—though,  unlike  Velleman, 
Schechtman is commendably cautious about how much control we really 
have as authors of our life stories. Her point seems a more modest one: that 
as narratively constituted selves we do not just sit and wait to see how the 
story develops, but try to shape it as best we may, given the constraints im-
posed by the world around us and the limits of our psychological abilities.
This  is  complemented by  our  role  as  critics  of  our  own narratives, 
which we assume when we engage in self-reflection. However, Schechtman 
stresses that the triad of our roles as critic, author, and character of our self 
narratives isn’t neatly separable into its constituents; rather, the three func-
tions interact in constructing the narrative self: 
Life is different from literature because we write it as we live it and engage 
in criticism as we go along rather than after  the fact,  and because this 
forces us to take on different roles and perspectives. The creative act in 
narrative self-constitution is thus neither to produce a tidy and meaning-
ful story out of whole cloth nor to take accidents and contingencies and 
arbitrarily interpret them as meaningful. It is rather to carve out a mean-
ingful life trajectory by appreciating the contingencies, considering how to 
respond to them meaningfully, and directing life so much as possible in 
the direction of that meaning.  (p. 414)
In this passage, Schechtman stresses the differences of real-life narratives 
from literature in respect of Lamarque’s third, fourth, and fifth principles 
(the functionality of details, teleology, and themes), as well as her crucial 
point that unlike literary characters, their creators, and their critics, we are 
 Schechtman, ever a moving target, here seems to espouse something like a weak 1
narrative constructionist view: while an essential narrative-capacity view would 
cover the ‘author’ and ‘critic’ roles, for the self to be a ‘character’ it has to be a nar-
rative construct (without being the story, as the strong narrative constructionist pos-
ition would have it).
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deemed to fulfil all these functions simultaneously with respect to our nar-
ratively constructed self.
But it is striking that, even in delineating self narratives from literary 
narrative,  Schechtman still  has  recourse  to  the  terminology of  literature 
studies when she asserts that we are ‘characters’, ‘authors’, and ‘critics’ of 
our self stories. We may grant that this usage is somewhat metaphorical—
though  it  exemplifies  the  difficulties  involved  in  referring  to  narratives 
without resorting to comparisons with literature.
Let us accept, then, that real-life narratives do not (and should not) re-
semble literary narratives. Even so, the claim of strong narrative construc-
tionists that the self is story-like in structure, even in a loose way, has wor-
rying implications concerning what it permits to be part of one’s self.
6.1.3  Narrative structure is not necessary
If a self is structured like a story, this may seem to remedy two of the short-
comings of the view I criticized in ch. 4—that the self is constructed from 
autobiographical memory. Recall that a self thus constructed was found to 
be very ‘gappy’ and, additionally, totally to exclude one’s early years, the 
period of childhood amnesia (§ 4.5.1). A narratively constructed self could 
be said to have the advantage on both these points. 
First, as to the problem of the very large gaps that affect our autobio-
graphical memory even in non-pathological circumstances, a story-like self, 
it  would seem, can compensate for these.  It  does not actually fill  in the 
gaps.  But it  provides narrative coherence across  the gaps.  If  the isolated 
events  and  experiences  we  recall  in  autobiographical  remembering  are 
connected by some narrative arc, the gaps do not matter so much—what 
matters, on a narrative constructionist view, is that our islands of autobio-
graphical memory can be part of a coherent narrative. I will later note that 
even autobiographical narratives can be seriously discontinuous (§ 6.3.2), 
but let us grant, for the moment, that a narratively constructed self has less 
of a problem with ‘gappiness’ than a self constructed purely from memory. 
Narrativity, we might say, papers over the cracks of our autobiographical 
knowledge base.
Secondly, it seems that a story-like self also does not suffer from child-
hood amnesia in the way a memory-based self does: narrativity can com-
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pensate here, too. Now, the onset of full narrative capacities, as seen in the 
previous chapter (§ 5.2.1), occurs even later in child development (after five 
years of age) than that of autobiographical memory (at about age three). 
But this does not mean that a self narrative is restricted to lifetime periods 
in which one was oneself able to narrate. For example, I know—and could 
include in an autobiographical narrative—that I  was born on a showery 
and stormy day. There is no way I could possibly remember this fact (if it is 
a fact)—but I can remember being told about it by my mother. Thus, par-
ental tales of a child’s early years can become included in the offspring’s 
own self narrative. Indeed it is very likely that some of our earliest ‘memor-
ies’ are reconstructed from parental narratives, rather than from our own 
memory traces laid down at the time of the events in question. The begin-
ning of life therefore poses no problem for narrative accounts; rather, they 
are at an advantage over pure memory accounts in being able to incorpor-
ate our early years.
If I am happy to grant these advantages that a narratively constructed 
self has over a self constructed from memory, it is because these advantages 
are rather insignificant in comparison to what a story-like self leaves out. 
Such a self, too, has serious limitations, which I will now discuss. Strong 
narrative constructionist accounts of the self, let us recall, hold that the self 
is both narratively constructed and also narratively structured. Let me now 
deal with these characteristics in turn.
Concerning  narrative  construction:  as  Dan  Zahavi  (2007)  points  out, 
there is a more primitive level of selfhood, which he calls the ‘experiential 
self’ (p. 185), and which precedes, and thus does not require, any narrative 
capacities. This bare self-consciousness, the experience of being someone 
distinct from one’s environment, is Damasio’s (1999; 2010) ‘core self’ that is 
a necessary substructure for the temporally extended consciousness of an 
‘autobiographical self’. It is at the level of the core self that a present exper-
ience already has the quality of ‘mineness’, an implicit sense 
that the objects I now perceive are being apprehended from my perspect-
ive and that the thoughts formed in my mind are mine and not anyone 
else’s. (Zahavi, 2007, p. 185)
The experiential core self is an integral part of the structure of phenomenal 
consciousness and must be regarded as a pre-linguistic presupposition for 
any narrative practice. (p. 191)
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Narrative constructionists  might rejoin that  the experiential  self  and 
the sense of ‘mineness’ it imparts on one’s experiences are subsumed into 
the narrative self by narrative thinking and narrative structure. They might 
grant these pre-narrative, primitive aspects of self-experience in the ‘spe-
cious present’ (James, 1890), but insist that we still  require narrativity to 
construct a diachronic self from what would otherwise be disjointed, episod-
ic experiences.
But, again, narrativity is not required for temporal consciousness. Our 
‘sense of personal temporality’ identified by Klein and colleagues (2004) is 
more basic even than the contents of autobiographical memory, from which 
it is dissociable (see § 4.2.3). If a sense of temporality persists in the event of 
memory loss, it seems unlikely that narrative capacities could be required 
for it. The apperception of causal relations, too, does not require narrativity, 
as both Strawson (2012) and Goldie (2012) point out.
What, then, are we to make of Bruner’s (1987) assertion, quoted earlier, 
that ‘[w]e seem to have no other way of describing “lived time” save in the 
form of a narrative' (p.  12)? It depends on what Bruner means by ‘lived 
time’. Taking the expression literally, Bruner seems wrong: it is perfectly 
possible to describe lived time non-narratively, drawing on one’s temporal 
consciousness,  placing events in their sequential order—as Goldie (2012) 
reminds us, a narrative ‘is more than just a bare annal or chronicle or list of 
a sequence of events’ (p. 6)—and even identifying their causal relations. But 
this is not, apparently, what Bruner (1987) means:
there are . . . other temporal forms that can be imposed on the experience 
of time, but none of them succeeds in capturing the sense of lived time: not 
clock or calendrical time forms, not serial or cyclical orders, not any of 
these. . . . Even if we set down annales in the bare form of events, they will 
be seen to be events chosen with a view to their place in an implicit narrat-
ive.  (p. 12, original emphasis)2
So Bruner’s sense of ‘lived time’ involves an ‘implicit  narrative’—which 
begs the question. If other forms of temporal experience are available, as he 
admits, why should these not suffice for having an autobiographical self? 
What is it that narrative structure supposedly adds to our sense of self over 
time?
 Bruner credits Paul Ricœur (1983–5) with this view.2
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Let me turn, then, to narrative structure, the second characteristic of a 
self according to strong narrative constructionist accounts. Goldie’s (2012) 
three  features  of  narrative  structure  (which,  we  should  recall,  ‘can  be 
present to a greater or a lesser extent’) are ‘coherence, meaningfulness, and 
evaluative and emotional import’ (p.  2). Coherence here, as noted above 
(§ 5.3.1), is not merely temporal or causal coherence, but a thicker notion of 
events hanging together in a salient and interesting way—which, I take it, 
is what gives ‘meaningfulness’ to the narrative. But is this kind of coher-
ence and meaning required for a diachronic self? In my discussion of bio-
graphical discontinuities and ‘turning points’ (§ 6.3.2) I will note that while 
we may acknowledge the practice reported by Bruner of constructing turn-
ing-point stories about important changes in one’s life, it is also possible to 
accept discontinuities in our lives without a narrative arc. Sometimes, and 
for some, a more or less sequential ordering of events or lifetime periods is 
all the coherence that is required for a sense of self over time.
As mentioned earlier, Schechtman’s (2007) revised narrative self-consti-
tution view allows for  narrative  selves  (unlike  persons)  to  be  of  limited 
temporal duration relative to a person’s life. Narrative coherence then op-
erates within each self, but not across successive selves. But she also be-
lieves that ‘there are advantages to making one’s self narrative coincide as 
far as possible with one’s person-narrative’ (p. 176), that is by having just 
one (narrative) self for a lifetime, instead of several discrete ones. This is 
because, she suggests, merely acknowledging one’s past as part of one’s 
personal history, rather than including it in one’s self narrative, ‘seems a 
recipe for alienation’ (p. 177) because of its lack of affective concern.
I have three observations on this. First, it isn’t clear how or why affect-
ive concern requires narrativity (more on this shortly). Secondly, Schecht-
man has a point in saying that one self per life is enough to be getting on 
with: for reasons of cognitive economy, certainly; but, more important, be-
cause conceptually it makes little sense to impute more than one self to any 
one  human  being  (§  1.7).  But—thirdly—wishing  to  impose  a  narrative 
structure  on  the  self  can  have  tremendous  disadvantages  too.  To  seek 
meaning and (narrative)  coherence across  one’s  life-span—linking all  its 
general events and lifetime periods—may, besides requiring a colossal ex-
pense  of  cognitive  energy,  be  a  recipe  for  depression and despondency, 
when no such overarching meaning or coherence can be found, or for self-
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deception, when narrative themes and meaningfulness are imposed on a 
recalcitrant reality (see § 6.3.2).
Let  me move on to Goldie’s  last  element of  narrative structure,  the 
evaluative and emotional  import  of  what is  being related or narratively 
‘thought through’. In literary narrative, the evaluative import of an episode 
is often conveyed opaquely (in Lamarque’s terminology) by the portrayal 
of a scene or its characters in a manner that is geared towards evoking cer-
tain emotional responses. In what Goldie calls ‘narrative thinking’, different 
devices are deployed in creating evaluative context,  such as a particular 
mood being associated with a particular event.  Nevertheless,  as pointed 
out in my discussion of Schechtman’s replies to Strawson (§ 6.1.1), evaluat-
ive thinking about one’s past is perfectly possible in other, non-narrative 
ways. I may, for example, recall some juvenile transgression of mine: I ac-
cept responsibility for what I did then, I now consider it a foolish act, I am 
faintly amused (or disgusted) by it. There’s the self-identification, there’s 
the evaluation, there’s the emotional response. No narrative devices are re-
quired.
There’s no denying that the emotional import of episodes in one’s life 
is indeed something that lends itself to narrative treatment. However, the 
presence of certain emotions during certain events and the affective connec-
tions one has to episodes in one’s past are not narrative artefacts. Emotion, 
on empirically plausible theories,  precedes any cognitive appraisal of it, 3
including narrative thinking. While narrative thinking can of course pro-
cess,  evoke,  and evaluate  emotions,  it  is  very  far  from being  their  root 
cause. Thus, as far as the self is shaped by affective concern, such concern is 
antecedent to any narrative gloss we may put on it.
In  sum,  then,  strong  narrative  constructionist  accounts  of  the  self 
(though in adding narrative cohesion they may perhaps represent a slight 
improvement over purely memory-based constructionist accounts) overstate 
their case in several ways. First, they ignore or sideline the pre-narrative 
elements involved in the self: primitive self-consciousness and its attendant 
‘mineness’, temporal consciousness, and, as just discussed, affect and emo-
tion. Second, they are overambitious in requiring our sense of self over time 
to have narrative coherence and meaning when sequential coherence may 
 Such as Paul Ekman’s (1992) account of basic emotions; or Jesse Prinz’s (2004) 3
somatic theory of emotions, and Barlassina and Newen’s (2014) correction of it.
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be all  that is  required. Third,  they are unduly prescriptive in ruling out 
non-narrative means of self-identification and evaluation.
We should, therefore, reject the strong  narrative constructionist claim 
that selves are narrative in structure. The self is not a story. But some of the 
criticisms just discussed affect weak as well as strong narrative construction-
ist accounts: even if we dismiss the requirement for selves to have a story-
like structure, the first and third points just mentioned affect any account of 
the self as the product of narrativity, whatever its resulting structure may 
be. Emotion, temporal awareness, self-identification over time, and evalu-
ation of one’s past may be aided by, but do not require, narrative capacities. 
Indeed, as I shall now argue, the very idea that narrative processes precede 
the self is misguided, back-to-front, upside-down.
6.2  Author, author!
6.2.1  The authorship problem
I come now to what I take to be the most crucial objection to narrative con-
structionism about the self. All narrative constructionist accounts of the self 
are faced with what I will call the authorship problem: if the self is construc-
ted through narrative, or a ‘centre of narrative gravity’, or in some other 
way a product of narrative activity, who or what then produces the narrat-
ive? Who is the author of the tale? It cannot be the self, for the self is only 
produced through narrative processes, a narrative construct or fiction. But 
narratives have authors. Taking heed of Lamarque’s warnings about con-
fusing  real-life  story-telling  with  literary  narration,  when I  say  ‘author’ 
here I do not mean anything like a literary author. I do not even mean that 
the authorship of our real-life tales need involve a conscious or deliberate 
intention to concoct a story. What I do mean is that there has to be some 
originating process or processes for a narrative to emerge. And whatever 
produces  the narrative—its ‘author’ in a relatively weak sense—is not the 
same thing as something produced by the narrative. This being so, I will in 
this section make the case that it is in the author, not in a product of the 
narrative, that we should conceptually situate the self.
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But let me pause briefly to consider a possible, indeed likely, reply to 
the authorship problem. I can imagine a chorus of narrative construction-
ists intoning, ‘We never said there wasn’t an author! The self is the author, 
too!’ Wait—the self is the producer as well as the product of its narratives? 
Indeed, one of the various permutations of Schechtman’s view discussed in 
the preceding section had the self as the character, author, and critic of our 
narratives,  all  at  once.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  psychiatrist  James  Phillips 
(2003) maintains: ‘The whole notion of a narrative self is that the self is in-
dissolubly narrator and narrative.’ (p. 316) On this view, we appear to be 
dealing with something that creates itself. This is clearly circular, perhaps 
viciously so—I’m inclined to think it is, but I won’t insist upon the point, as 
many see nothing metaphysically amiss with a self-creating entity:  thus, 
Dennett (1984) speaks of ‘self-made selves’, and Schechtman (1996) cites ‘a 
number of sources both philosophical and psychological which argue . . . 
that persons are self-creating’ (p. 93). But even granting the possibility of 
such self-creation, I submit that anyone who claims that the self is ‘indis-
solubly’ both author and narrative has not been looking hard enough. That 
claim is simply wrong. For we can distinguish the author from his/her/its 
narrative  productions.  A  good  illustration  of  this,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
provided by Dennett himself.
In  his  characterization  of  the  self  as  a  ‘center  of  narrative  gravity’, 
Dennett  (1992)  invites  us  to  consider  a  thought  experiment  involving  a 
novel-writing machine,  which creates a fictional character called Gilbert, 
who is  the  first-person narrator  of  the  novel  the  machine  is  producing. 
Dennett goes on:
So far we’ve imagined the novel, The Life and Times of Gilbert, clanking out 
of a computer that is just a box, sitting in the corner of some lab. But now I 
want to change the story a little bit and suppose that the computer has . . . 
wheels. It has a television eye, and it moves around in the world. It also 
begins its tale with “Call me Gilbert,” and tells a novel, but now . . . we 
discover that there’s a truth-preserving interpretation of that text in the 
real world. The adventures of Gilbert, the fictional character, now bear a 
striking and presumably non-coincidental relationship to the adventures 
of this robot rolling around in the world. If you hit the robot with a base-
ball bat, very shortly thereafter the story of Gilbert includes his being hit 
with a baseball bat by somebody who looks like you. . . . At this point we 
will be unable to ignore the fact that the fictional career of the fictional 
Gilbert bears an interesting resemblance to the “career” of this mere robot 
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moving through the world. We can still maintain that the robot’s brain, the 
robot’s computer, really knows nothing about the world; it’s not a self. It’s 
just a clanky computer. It doesn’t know what it’s doing. It doesn’t even 
know that it’s creating a fictional character. (The same is just as true of 
your brain; it doesn’t know what it’s doing either.) (p. 108)
Notice how Dennett distinguishes between ‘Gilbert, the fictional character’ 
and ‘this robot rolling around the world’—its author. But then, Dennett’s 
argument is that, in all the ways that are relevant to having a self, we are 
just like that robot: our brains spin a story about our experiences, centred 
on a character we call ‘I’, and this fictional character is the self.
Let me unpack just what is involved in the doings of this novel-writing 
robot.  The crucial move in the scenario occurs where Dennett ‘twiddle[s] 4
the knobs on this thought experiment’ (ibid.) and gives a previously sta-
tionary machine mobility and camera vision. Now, to roll around the world 
without bumping into the furniture or toppling down the stairs, this robot 
presumably has a system that integrates the input from its camera with the 
circuits that control the movements of its wheels—a robot’s version of sen-
sorimotor integration. To register being hit by a baseball bat, it must have 
the robotic equivalent of nociceptors. This does not entail that the robot feels 
pain when hit (though its narrative may put it that way, perhaps: ‘“Ouch,” I 
thought, “that hurt!”’). But it needs sensors to record the impact, and—cru-
cially—pathways for that information to reach its central processing unit, 
so as to be available to its narrative output. Its camera input must likewise 
be connected to its novel-writing processor, or it could not write a truth-
preserving story of what the robot comes across in the world.
Curiously, Dennett suggests that ‘[w]e can still  maintain that the ro-
bot’s brain, the robot’s computer, really knows nothing about the world’. I 
do not wish to digress into an epistemological discursion on the nature of 
knowledge here, but then there is no need for that: if we take Dennett’s 
own (1981) ‘intentional stance’  with respect to his novel-writing robot—
which allows us to attribute beliefs and desires to a system if that strategy 
successfully  predicts  its  behaviour—the robot’s  computer  jolly  well  does 
 In so doing, I am merely ‘following directions’ (Dennett, 1991/1993, pp. 398–401)4
—that is, making transparent the implications of a thought experiment as it is de-
scribed, rather than yielding to thought-experimenter demand by latching on to 
the first intuition that presents itself.
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know about the world, in the sense of processing information about the world. 
More important, it processes—and integrates—information about the robot’s 
interactions with the world. And so the robot registers that it is being hit by 
a baseball bat. Aided by its camera, it can move around and locate itself in 
its environment—for example, it notices it is trapped in a closet. Nocicep-
tion, sensorimotor integration, spatial orientation—or their robotic equival-
ents—are all basic self-representational capacities (as discussed in § 1.4). And 
the various bits of information provided by its different self-representation-
al capacities must be integrated in the robot’s computer, for they all form 
part of its story of Gilbert the roving robot. But it is the actual robot (or its 
computer), which has the capacities just described, that is the author of that 
story.
But wait. It may be said at this point that I haven’t quite established 
that the author and the character of its narrative are distinct. Surely, the ro-
bot novelist and the character Gilbert in its autobiographical narrative are 
the same? Well, they are in so far as this robot is writing its own story. But 
they are not ‘indissolubly’ or indistinguishably the same. They don’t share 
all of the same properties. The systems that feed into the authorial process 
are features of the robot rolling around the world, not of the character. (The 
character Gilbert presumably does not talk in terms of his nociceptors and 
sensorimotor integration.) And the robot, if it is any good at novel-writing, 
could be telling a different story from its own. In the first version of Den-
nett’s thought experiment, where the novel-writing machine is stationary 
and has no camera, we are not asked to imagine that it produces The Life 
and Times of Gilbert with a box in the corner of a lab that experiences noth-
ing for its protagonist. We are simply asked to imagine a machine capable 
of writing a novel with a fictional first-personal narrator called Gilbert. 
To make a little clearer how the actual robot and its character Gilbert 
are distinguishable, let me, too, ‘twiddle the knobs on this thought experi-
ment’—and take narrative  capacity out of the equation. Let us imagine a 
like robot on wheels with a camera eye, pottering about the lab, that is not 
also a novel-writing machine, but is otherwise endowed with all the same 
systems and capacities as the novel-writing version. This non-narrative ro-
bot—let’s call it iBot 2.0—can still register the impact of being hit with a 
baseball bat and connect this occurrence with its camera image of someone 
wielding the bat. It can still integrate its camera input with the motoric op-
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eration of its wheels. It can still exercise these self-representational capacit-
ies in moving about and orientating itself in its environment. With the ex-
ception of narrative capacity, iBot 2.0 has all the same systems and capacit-
ies as the novel-writing robot in Dennett’s scenario. Obviously, since it can’t 
write, it is not an author—but in all other respects it is a perfect replica of 
the author robot.
Dennett, I take it, would object here and insist that iBot 2.0 cannot have 
the same integrative capacities as his novel-writing robot precisely because 
it cannot narrate. The level of integration of different self-representational 
inputs displayed by the original robot happens only, Dennett would con-
tend, because a narrative is being spun. (That, after all, is the gist of his posi-
tion: that there is no single unified ‘I’ unless and until a story is being told 
about such a character.)
I am not so sure. To be clear: I do not suggest that either the novelist 
robot or iBot 2.0 has a self. But each of them probably has a self-model (Met-
zinger, 2007) or the robotic equivalent of a proto-self (Damasio, 1999; 2010), 
that is, a dynamic (non-conscious) representation of itself which integrates 
the available distinct self-representational inputs from its robotic equival-
ents of vision, motor control, nociception, and so on. Why would iBot 2.0 
have  such  integration?  Because  that  is  what  allows  it  to  move  about 
without falling down the stairs, to register that it is locked in a cupboard, or
—as  the  case  may  be—to  notice  thought-experimenting  philosophers 
thwacking it with a baseball bat.  If Dennett’s novel-writing robot has these 5
capacities, so has iBot 2.0. Narrative capacity is an optional extra.
This, of course, is an illustration of the point I already made in my first 
discussion of Dennett’s view (§ 5.3.3)—that it is implausible to credit nar-
rativity with the functional integration of what are (certainly in biological 
organisms like ourselves, but it seems also in well-designed mobile robots) 
basic self-representational capacities. Language—a prerequisite for narrat-
ive capacity—is a very recent development on an evolutionary scale (as 
Dennett well knows). The integration of different self-representational ca-
pacities, however, is not. It is indeed essential for an organism’s survival 
that it should be able to integrate input from different sensory modalities 
and to evaluate dangers and obstacles, as well as advantages and oppor-
tunities, that the world presents to it, with reference to how they affect its 
 As a new Pet Shop Boys song has it: ‘Sad robot world.’ (Tennant & Lowe, 2016)5
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own well-being and progress.  Thus,  when we,  now equipped with lan-
guage and the ability to narrate, tell a story of the things that happen to us 
in the world, this narrative capacity taps into a deeper, already well-estab-
lished system of self-representational capacities.
Returning, then, to the question of distinguishing the author of a self 
narrative from the protagonist of its/her/his tale—there really is no ques-
tion here. Author and protagonist clearly are distinct. In the first presenta-
tion of Dennett’s thought experiment, we have an immobile, unwheeled, 
uneyed novel-writing machine, the author, producing a story about ‘Gil-
bert’, the protagonist and I-narrator who, however, is nothing like a com-
puter  in  the  corner  of  a  lab,  but  just  a  fictional  character.  In  Dennett’s 
second presentation, the character ‘Gilbert’ seems to live all the exploits of 
its author—now a novel-writing robot on wheels and with a camera. Den-
nett’s point is that ‘Gilbert’ is still a fictional character, despite reflecting the 
experiences of the novel-writing robot. Very well. But the robot that integ-
rates its various inputs into the narrative is not a fictional character. It is the 
author of the tale. Finally, iBot 2.0 is just like that robotic author, except that 
it doesn’t write—but it still has the integrative capacities that, in the previ-
ous case, subserved the robot’s narration.
Two points to note emerge from this discussion. First, there is an au-
thor–character  distinction which does apply in self  narratives:  Dennett’s 
novelist robot is a fairly sophisticated machine that adds the ability to nar-
rate to its other capacities, while ‘Gilbert’ is the character of its narrative. 
Secondly, while The Life and Times of Gilbert is that robot’s autobiographical 
narrative, this does not entail the conclusion Dennett wants us to accept—
that, in the analogous case where we construct our life narrative in a similar 
vein,  it  is  the  product  of  the  narrative,  rather  than its  author,  which  we 
should consider ‘the self’. For, as the example of iBot 2.0 illustrates, the rel-
evant self-representational capacities that enable something to integratively 
process its own experiences are prior to narrative capacity. So, narrativity is 
incidental, but the integration of self-representational functions is not. We 
should, therefore, situate the self in the system that narrates its own story, 
rather than in its narrative productions.
I will shortly offer another argument in support of this. Before that, I’ll 
attempt to explain why the contrary view is so widespread.
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6.2.2  A diagnosis and a refutation6
Narrative views currently seem to dominate the literature on ‘the self’, in 
psychology and psychiatry  as  well  as  in  philosophy (where  their  expo-
nents, besides those discussed here, include MacIntyre, Taylor, and Camp-
bell; and, in another tradition, Heidegger, Sartre, and Ricœur ). Not all of 7
them are narrative constructionist views, but, as we have seen, such views 
are  espoused  by  Bruner,  Schechtman  (at  least  originally),  and  Dennett, 
among others. If, as I have just suggested, there are good reasons to take 
the self to be the author, rather than the product, of our narratives, then 
why does the notion that we, as selves, are narrative constructs or products 
seem so pertinaciously attractive to so many thinkers? Put another (if less 
charitable)  way,  how can  otherwise  highly  competent  philosophers  and 
psychologists make such an elementary mistake as to confuse the author of 
some narrative with a narrative construction?
To begin our diagnosis,  let’s  admit that  the narrative strategy starts 
from a fairly uncontroversial insight: many or most of us (perhaps even Ga-
len  Strawson)  habitually  tell  stories  about  ourselves.  We  do  so  among 
friends and family, but also among strangers: on first dates, at job inter-
views, over drinks and dinner at academic gatherings. ‘What’s your story?’ 
is a conversation opener, but more than that, it is an invitation to reveal 
something of oneself (to the extent appropriate in a given social context, of 
course). As discussed in the previous chapter (§ 5.2), many of our social in-
teractions  involve  some exchange of  autobiographical  narratives  (Miller, 
1994), and the development of autobiographical memory in childhood be-
nefits from narrative practices and encouragement (Fivush, 1994; Nelson, 
2003; Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Let us accept, then, that modern humans, by 
and large, are story-tellers.
But how do we get from this insight into our narrative nature to the 
view that the self is narratively constructed? Merely to say that we are, in 
some sense, ‘essentially’ narrative creatures is not enough: that would give 
us what I’ve called an essential narrative-capacity view,  but not a narrative 
 I thank George Botterill for his helpful suggestions here.6
 Strawson, 2004; Schechtman, 2011b.7
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constructionist one. Why, in addition, would anyone locate the self in our 
narrative productions?
One may, perhaps,  suppose that there is  something of an empiricist 
hangover at work here. This is a somewhat tentative diagnosis, but it goes 
something like this. According to the Empiricists, we could only ever have 
a concept—an ‘idea’, in Hume’s (1739) terms—of something if there was a 
corresponding object of sensory experience—in Hume’s terms, an ‘impres-
sion’. Now, the self is not an immediate object of experience (hence Hume’s 
failure to find one amid his perceptions). So one might be led to think that 
the concept of a self, which does not correspond to any object of direct ex-
perience, must somehow denote a construction, or abstraction, from things 
that are direct objects of our experience: our self narratives. The self, thus 
construed, is not unlike the visual field: we don’t see a visual field, only its 
contents; the notion of a visual field is an abstraction from the totality of 
whatever we can see. But of course, while talk of visual fields is useful in 
the right context, it does not do any explanatory work about vision—which 
also  involves  the  eye  (which  we  also  don’t  see:  cf.  Wittgenstein,  1922, 
§ 5.663), the optic tract, the visual cortical areas.
So, narrative constructionism seems to end up with something like the 
inversion of the classic ‘homunculus’ fallacy. This fallacy is to attempt to 
explain some capacity by postulating a second-order entity that has that 
same capacity. Take again the example of vision. I can see, but (let us sup-
pose) I know nothing about the processes that enable this capacity; I just 
think it’s something in my brain. So I posit a little man, a homunculus, with 
big eyes, sitting somewhere in my brain, who does the seeing for me. (And 
more homunculi for the other sensory modalities, for motor control, for de-
cision-making, etc.) Now it is clear that this strategy hasn’t explained any-
thing about vision—it has merely displaced the problem: how is it that my 
visual  homunculus  can see?  Unless  we begin  explaining vision by  pro-
cesses other than ‘seeing’, an infinite regress of homunculi beckons.
Now, confusing the self with its narrative productions is structurally 
rather similar to this fallacy. We have ample experience of our remember-
ing, reminiscing, narrative thinking, telling stories of ourselves. We do not
—as just mentioned—have direct experience of a self. So, we might say, the 
self just is something produced by (or ‘constituted by’) our memories and 
narratives. For it is when I catch myself remembering my past or telling 
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tales about my life that I seem closest to being aware of my self. But now we 
run into the authorship problem, because I haven’t accounted for who  is 
remembering or telling tales. Obviously, it is I who recollects and narrates. 
But I am supposed to be a product of my recollections and narratives. So we 
end up either with the circularity of self-creating selves or, worse, some-
thing like the homuncular regress: my telling a story about myself is a nar-
rative product telling a narrative about a narrative product telling a narrat-
ive… Either way, and worse still, I have not, on this account, said anything 
at all about the processes underlying narrating or remembering (just as my 
seeing homunculus says nothing about the processes underlying vision).
Thus, in order to explain what the self is, we have to put things in the 
right order. In the same way as the self is the constructor, rather than the 
construct, of autobiographical memory, so it is the constructor, and not the 
construct, of its life narratives. (And of course such a self can be both re-
memberer and narrator. It does not have to be exclusively one or the other.) 
I have already presented an empirical argument for the priority of self-rep-
resentational  capacities  over  both  remembering  (§   4.5)  and  narrating 
(§  6.2.1),  from which arises  the conceptual  recommendation that  it  is  in 
these prior capacities that we should situate the self, rather than in their 
productions,  our  autobiographical  memories  and  self  narratives.  Philo-
sophers with a less empirical temperament than mine might wish for some-
thing stronger. Here, then, is an attempt at a metaphysical argument that the 
self is not a narrative production.
This argument adapts Saul Kripke’s modal argument against descriptiv-
ism about names. Kripke (1972/1981) famously argues that names are not 
definite descriptions, but ‘rigid designators’ (p.  48), because of how they 
behave in  modal  contexts.  What  a  name designates  does  not  change in 
counterfactual statements, whereas the referents of definite descriptions do. 
For example: Hume is the author of A Treatise of Human Nature. Now, ‘the 
author of the Treatise’ is a definite description which happens to designate 
Hume. But the Treatise might have been written by someone else, in which 
case the definite description ‘the author of the Treatise’ would designate that 
author, and not Hume. But ‘Hume’, as a name, always designates Hume: 
Hume  might  not  have  written  the  Treatise—he  might  have  written  Les 
Sincères  instead—but ‘Hume’ would still  designate Hume (as would, in 8
 A comedy by Marivaux, premiered in 1739, then quickly forgotten (Greene, 1965).8
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this particular counterfactual case, the definite description ‘the author of 
Les Sincères’).
Something analogous seems to apply to selves and narratives. We can 
place the self in modal contexts without changing its referent, i.e. what is 
designated by the first-person singular pronoun. As Goldie (2012) notes, we 
can and routinely do put ourselves in counterfactual scenarios in every-day 
‘narrative thinking’, such as, in his example, ‘If only I hadn’t dawdled, I 
wouldn’t have missed the train’ (p. 15).  Similarly, I might (in a fairly close 9
possible  world)  have decided to pursue postgraduate studies in classics 
instead of philosophy. That putative, counterfactual classics postgraduate 
would then have been me—or, if you like, he would have had my self. 
Narratives,  however,  do not  behave in  that  way in  modal  contexts. 
Keeping with the example of my choice of postgraduate course, the factual 
(mini-)narrative here is: ‘Seven years ago, Philipp went to Sheffield to do an 
MA in philosophy’. Now, in the counterfactual case, we end up with a dif-
ferent narrative, e.g. ‘Seven years ago, Philipp went to Manchester to do an 
MA in  classics’.  Like  definite  descriptions,  narratives  are  not  constant 
across possible worlds—whereas the referent of ‘I’ or ‘the self’ is. And so, 
just as names cannot be definite descriptions, selves cannot be narratives.
Narrative constructionists could not disagree with my second premiss 
here: that narratives are not constant across different modal contexts. But 
they would dispute the first: that selves are. The whole point of their ac-
count, they’d say, is that the self is a narrative production, so a counterfac-
tual scenario would naturally result in a different self—‘constituted’ by a dif-
ferent  life  story,  or  a  ‘centre  of  narrative  gravity’  located  elsewhere,  or 
whatever. Now I agree that, had I gone to Manchester to study classics, my 
life would, from that point onwards, have been different. I would have had 
different teachers, different friends, different books on my shelves. I might 
even, in some loose and metaphorical sense, have become a different per-
son—one who talks freely of (or in!) the aorist optative and the genitive ab-
solute, rather than of counterfactuals and possible worlds. But that person 
 Whether we always should do so is a different matter: see § 6.3.2.9
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would have been me, that life would have been my life, the life of the same 
self that, in the actual world, didn’t go on to study classics.10
At this point, the narrative constructionists and I could well be said to 
be at cross-purposes: we appear to mean something different by ‘the self’. 
Indeed we do. But what I mean by ‘the self’ here is simply—me. In this ar-
gument, ‘the self’ has the referent of the first-person singular pronoun, that 
is, the ordinary meaning of ‘self’. If we are asked to abandon this and adopt 
a  different  meaning  of  ‘self’,  an  historical-constructionist  conception 
whereby the self is a narrative construct and has a temporal dimension, the 
onus is on the constructionists to make the case for that. And this, as I think 
I have demonstrated in the above discussion of narrative structure (§ 6.1) 
and of Dennett’s narrative robots (§ 6.2.1), they have failed to do. 
The self, in the ordinary sense, behaves like a Kripkean ‘rigid designat-
or’ and so cannot be a narrative. It may have a tremendous narrative capa-
city (which, as seen here, is indeed useful in counterfactual thinking), but 
that does not make it a narrative construct. In our narrations, the self is the 
author, not the tale.
6.3  Are we essentially narrators?
We can now dismiss  narrative constructionism  about  the self,  both in its 
strong and its weak variant: the self is not narrative in structure or a narrat-
ive product. But we might still think that our narrative capacity is in some 
way essential to who we are. This is the third of the four positions I distin-
guished in the previous chapter (§ 5.3.2): the essential narrative-capacity view. 
 Indeed, when we engage in counterfactual narrative thinking about ourselves, it 10
is usually because such thinking is informative about us as we actually are. Take 
Goldie’s example: ‘If  only I  hadn’t dawdled, I  wouldn’t have missed the train.’ 
Having had this thought, one may well conclude that, next time, it may prove use-
ful either not to dawdle, or to get up early enough to allow time for dawdling.
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David Velleman’s account of the self as narrator  (§  5.3.3) emphasizes 
the authorial role of the self in our narrative activities.  As I have just ar11 -
gued that the self is the author of our every-day stories, I obviously do not 
disagree with that. But Velleman (2005) also holds that our narrative activit-
ies give us ‘agential control’ over our doings: ‘[my] inner narrator is a locus 
of control that unifies [me] as an agent by making decisions on the basis of 
reasons’ (p. 71). In this way, ‘the process of self-narration shapes our day-
to-day lives’ (p. 73). 
There are three claims here that need to be addressed. One is that it is 
only by narrating that we become unified agents with reasons for action—
which suggests that, if we want to be the sort of being who acts for reasons, 
narrative capacity, and its deployment, are essential. Though I cannot ven-
ture to give a full account of agency here, there may be something to be said 
for the view that narrative practices help us understand ourselves and each 
other in terms of agents acting for reasons (see § 6.4). But we should separ-
ate accounting for agency in this sense from giving an account of the self. 
Recalling Galen Strawson’s point that we are not all equally narrative in 
temperament (§ 6.1.1) and my earlier observation that many of our higher-
level  self-representational  activities,  including ‘affective  concern’,  do not 
require a narrative structure (§ 6.1.3), it would seem reckless to make nar-
rative agency an essential  component of  the self.  Furthermore,  it  would 
mean depriving of a self anyone with limited or no narrative capacity, des-
pite their other self-representational capacities—in particular, people with 
autism spectrum conditions (which I discuss in the next chapter).
Velleman’s second claim is that self narratives give us ‘agential control’. 
In § 6.3.1, I will argue that such control is largely illusory, and point out that 
there are dangers inherent in an over-reliance on our self narratives. Velle-
man’s third claim is that our lives are ‘shaped’ by our self narratives, which 
echoes Schechtman’s (1996) claim that ‘the lives of persons are narrative in 
form’ (p. 93). In § 6.3.2, I will argue that, taken as a descriptive claim, this 
 In literature, there is, of course, an important distinction between the narrator of a 11
story, who is internal to the narrative and part of its artifice, and its author, who is 
not. But in the present context, that distinction is not relevant. It has already been 
observed that literary narratives differ from real-life stories in their level of artifici-
ality (§ 6.1.2). And I have for present purposes defined author rather weakly as a 
producer of narratives (§ 6.2.1). Similarly, I will now take narrator to mean simply 
someone who narrates.
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may be true of some people, but not others. And, taken as a prescriptive 
claim, I will note that it is dangerous.12
6.3.1  Ignorance, inaccuracy, and interpretation
Some mention has already been made of the phenomenon of confabulation 
associated with frontal-lobe damage, where the loss of executive function 
leads patients to tell completely fabricated stories and alleged ‘memories’ 
of themselves (§§ 4.4.4, 5.2.2). A similar phenomenon occurs in commissur-
otomy (‘split-brain’) patients in specific experimental conditions. Commis-
surotomy is the resection of the corpus callosum, the main nerve bundle 
linking the left and right hemispheres of the brain, performed as a (now 
outdated) treatment for severe epilepsy. Michael Gazzaniga (1995) reports 
on an experiment where instructions were delivered to split-brain patients 
in such a way that they would be perceived and processed only by their 
right cerebral hemisphere (e.g. the written instruction ‘Walk!’ being flashed 
up in the patient’s left visual field, the left visual field being processed by 
the  right  cerebral  hemisphere).  The  participants  then followed these  in-
structions, but when asked about the reasons for their behaviour, their re-
sponses—generated in  the  left  cerebral  hemisphere,  where  the  language 
areas  are  situated—made  no  reference  to  the  experimental  instructions, 
since these data had not crossed hemispheres; the reasons participants gave 
were confabulated (e.g. ‘I needed to stretch my legs’).13
From this work with split-brain patients, Gazzaniga (2000) hypothes-
izes that the left cerebral hemisphere has an ‘interpreter’ mechanism that 
integrates monitoring our responses with available information about in-
puts the brain has received and processed. The ‘interpreter’ (which is based 
in  cortical  areas  associated  with  language  production)  then  produces  a 
reason-giving narrative when prompted. But it does so even when no data 
 Strictly, my case here is against the descriptive essential narrative-capacity claim. 12
But the two claims are often interwoven in narrative accounts of the self; as Galen 
Strawson (2004) notes, the ‘dominant view in the academy today’ is that ‘all nor-
mal non-pathological human beings are naturally Narrative and also that Narrativ-
ity is crucial to a good life’ (p. 429). Thus, a few words on the dangers of the pre-
scriptive claim also seem appropriate.
 I discuss split-brain cases in more detail in § 8.3.1.13
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are available about the actual reasons for a certain behaviour, as in the case 
of the split-brain patients’ confabulations (whose left cerebral hemisphere 
receives no input from the right hemisphere). This raises an interesting and 
somewhat unsettling hypothesis: if the ‘interpreter’ merrily spins a plaus-
ible  (but  false)  explanatory  tale  in  the  absence  of  any  explanatory  data 
available to it in such circumstances, might it not do the same even in a 
healthy brain? Could our narrative outpourings, whether oral or in ‘inner 
speech’, all be confabulations?
There is a considerable amount of empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that we do not ordinarily have access to the cognitive processes 
that inform our decisions and behaviour and that, consequently, any verbal 
reports we give of our reasons cannot be based on what actual cognitive 
processes  prompted  the  judgement  or  action.  Instead,  as  Nisbett  and 
Wilson (1977)  suggest  in their  seminal  paper ‘Telling more than we can 
know’, our verbal reports ‘are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or 
judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible 
cause of a given response’ (p. 231). Absent any conscious awareness of a 
specific stimulus, the need to stretch one’s legs is a perfectly plausible reas-
on for unexpectedly getting up from one’s seat and walking about, even if, 
as in the split-brain example, there is a different but unobserved (by the left 
cerebral hemisphere) stimulus that prompts this response. Thus, what we 
take to be reports on our judgements and decisions are post hoc interpreta-
tions (Carruthers, 2010). 
John Doris (2002) has argued that the plausible causes we cite as reas-
ons for our behaviour, particularly when they refer to our presumed char-
acter traits, frequently fail to account for situational factors that may have 
primed our behaviour on a given occasion. A person’s helpfulness towards 
another may owe more to a minor piece of good fortune just encountered, 
the fine weather, or a good lunch, than to a generally benevolent personal-
ity. However, it is possible to overstate the influence of situational factors, 
particularly if they result from specially concocted experimental designs or 
extraordinary  circumstances  (Scaife,  2011).  And,  as  Nisbett  and  Wilson 
(1977) themselves make clear, there are cases where our verbal reports do 
pick out the relevant stimuli that prompt our responses: ‘reports will be ac-
curate when influential stimuli are (a) available and (b) plausible causes of 
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the response, and when (c) few or no plausible but noninfluential factors 
are available’ (p. 253).
What are the implications of this for the self-narrator? For one thing, it 
seems that the reasons we give for action in our self narratives are only 
sometimes accurate reflections of the causes of our behaviour, often merely 
plausible interpretations of it, and, at worst, confabulations. But, according 
to Velleman (2005), ‘[t]he self-narrating agent is a bit like an improvisation-
al actor, enacting a role that he invents as he goes’ (p. 71). So, not only are 
we supposed to be narrating our reasons for past actions, but also narrat-
ively formulating reasons for future behaviour, which we then proceed to 
enact. But, as John Bickle (2003) notes:
The measurable brain activity [in left-hemisphere language areas] hypo-
thesized . . . as . . . expressing our (narrative) selves does not exert signific-
ant control over neural regions that subserve cognition and behavior . . .   
(p. 196)
And,
given the limited access enjoyed by the language regions to neural net-
works that subserve specific cognitive and behavioral tasks, these narrat-
ives are actually outright fabrications, as is the self-in-control they create 
and express. (p. 201)
With respect to Velleman’s notion of the narrative self as a ‘locus of 
control’, Bickle’s point is well made. So is the observation that, whatever 
narratives we spin, they are made without introspective knowledge of the 
cognitive processes that really subserve our behaviour and decisions. The 
problem, however, is not, as Bickle suggests, that all our verbal reports, all 
our self narratives, are ‘outright fabrications’, but that—lacking introspect-
ive access to relevant cognitive processes—we cannot know  which of our 
narrative reports are accurate and which are not. Self narratives may give 
us the illusion of being in control of our reasons and actions, but they are 
not what produces our behaviour, nor do they necessarily reflect its causes.
Some narrativists might be happy to bite that bullet. They might point 
out that most ordinary self narratives contain enough plausible and accur-
ate  components  to  be  a  legitimate  expression  of  the  self,  whereas,  as 
Schechtman (1996) suggests, completely delusional self narratives can be 
rejected outright, and partial delusions will result in defective narratives to 
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the extent of the delusion. While this seems fair, it flags up the need for ex-
ternal, non-narrative correctives. For if one is delusional, one cannot oneself 
judge one’s delusional self narrative to be flawed. That correction needs to 
come from outside the person concerned, and from outside her narrative.
More trivial errors of fact in self narratives are more easily corrected. 
As Schechtman puts it,  they differ from delusional errors in ‘the typical 
willingness of people to revise their narratives when presented with evid-
ence of  these  small  errors’  (p.  123).  This  mirrors  somewhat  what  I  said 
about ‘benign’ misrememberings and embellished memories (§§  4.4.2–3). 
But again we should note that the corrective provided here is external (and, 
for all we know, may itself be misremembered). 
Thus, self narratives need to be open to external corrections. And what 
if no such correctives are forthcoming? Self narratives might be said to have 
this  advantage  over  autobiographical  memory  on  its  own:  they  can  ac-
commodate a modest number of factual inaccuracies so long as the general 
thrust of the narrative is not violently at odds with the facts. On the other 
hand, there is also a danger inherent in narrative more serious than that of 
occasional false memories: while one false recollection does not invalidate 
all memories, a self narrative built around a single false memory—like the 
alleged ‘recovered memories’ of child abuse discussed earlier (§ 4.4.5)—will 
thereby be wholly false, because its very foundation is an untruth. The only 
corrective mechanism available in such circumstances is to scrap the whole 
narrative and start anew.
It seems dangerous, therefore, to place too much emphasis on one’s 
own narrative productions. Notwithstanding this danger, narrativists tend 
to show a certain disregard for factual accuracy:
To some degree, and for the sake of creating a coherency to life, it is nor-
mal to confabulate and to enhance one's story. As Ricœur [1990] points 
out, narrative identity ‘must be seen as an unstable mixture of fabulation 
and actual experience’. Self-deception is not unusual; false memories are 
frequent. (Gallagher, 2007, p. 211)
Narrative coherence, it would seem, is taken to be more important than fac-
tual accuracy. Mark Freeman (2003) makes a similar point when he con-
trasts ‘narrative truth’ (a term he borrows from Spence) with historical truth. 
The only way to make sense of this, without stretching one’s logical under-
standing too far by stipulating a multitude of truths, is to note again the 
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interpretative nature of self narratives. The criterion for ‘narrative truth’ then 
seems to be whether the self narrative provides a useful and meaningful 
interpretation of the events of one’s life.
But what is useful and meaningful here? In Schechtman’s (1996) view, 
considerable  leeway is  allowed in  what  interpretative  stance  one  might 
take in constructing one’s self narratives:
The depressed person, the suspicious person, the optimistic person, the 
angry person might tell quite different narratives of the same events, but 
they are all comprehensible and in most cases it seems misguided to argue 
about which is the most accurate. (p. 128)
I’m not  sure  about  that.  Placing a  particular  narrative  interpretation on 
one’s life may sometimes be helpful and motivating. Some kind of story to 
the effect that ‘it wasn’t meant to be’ may perhaps help one overcome the 
disappointment of a failed relationship, for example. But in other cases—
particularly that of ‘the depressed person’—an overindulgence in narrative 
interpretation seems a recipe for misery. Self narratives of a particular kind 
can be extremely noxious. I will return to this danger presently, as I now 
discuss whether we do (and should) shape our lives narratively.
6.3.2  Discontinuities, ‘turning points’, and noxious narratives
Defenders of narrative accounts of the self often refer to the coherence a self 
narrative provides to what may otherwise seem disparate and discontinu-
ous experiences in one’s life. Up to a point, this may be a useful cognitive 
strategy and serve to organize one’s autobiographical knowledge base into 
‘general events’ and ‘lifetime periods’, as Conway and Rubin (1993) sug-
gest  (see  §  4.3.1).  But  there  are  discontinuities  in  most  lives  that  aren’t 
smoothly papered over by a continuous narrative. People change careers 
and social circles, move to different cities and countries, end old and form 
new personal relationships, take up new habits and hobbies and abandon 
old ones; sometimes all of these at once. The reasons for such discontinuit-
ies are frequently complex. Changes in professional and personal circum-
stances  may depend on chance  and on the  other  people  involved.  And 
whatever ‘life-changing’ decisions one may attribute to oneself in such con-
texts must be taken with a pinch of salt, given the lack of introspective ac-
cess we have to our judgements and decisions.
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Thus, it seems reasonable simply to accept discontinuities in our lives 
for what they are. That would be the strategy adopted by someone with an 
‘Episodic’, non-narrative temperament like Galen Strawson—but it can also 
be accommodated by Schechtman’s (2007) revised view, in which even a 
narrative self need not span a whole life. But it seems that some do sense an 
urge  to  explicate  autobiographical  discontinuities  in  narrative  tropes,  in 
what Bruner (1994) calls ‘these idiosyncratic turning points that people so 
persistently report’:
They are vividly particular, even though they carry some affective or mor-
al message with them. Take some instances. The football coach tells the 
high-school kid to ‘get’ the opposing end, get him out of the game. The kid 
turns in his uniform the next day, revolted by ‘winner’ morality. He gives 
up  the  adolescent  ideal  of  being  an  athlete,  and  becomes  a  ‘brain’ 
instead . . . and is now an academic.  . . . In another turning point, a wo14 -
man tells of living with an alcoholic for eight years. He comes home at all 
hours, threatening to beat her and sometimes carrying out the threat—but 
‘once too often: I remember that night; that was enough.’ She leaves him.  
Note first  that  these turning points,  though they may be linked to 
things happening ‘outside’, are finally attributed to a happening ‘inside’—
a new belief, new courage, moral disgust, ‘having had enough’. They are 
thickly agentive. Secondly, they ride into the story on a wave of episodic 
memory retrieval, rich in detail and color. . . .  
. . . They are prototype narrative episodes whose construction results 
in increasing the realism and drama of the Self. In that sense, the narrative 
construction, whenever it actually happened, is as important as what is 
reported to have actually happened in the turning point episode. Turning 
points, in a word, construct emblems of narrative clarity in the teller’s his-
tory of  Self.  Narrative,  we know, imposes a particular  structure on the 
‘reality’ that it depicts. . . . (pp. 49–50)
Bruner’s last remark is telling: these turning-point stories are not factual 
recollections,  nor  is  that  their  function.  The  high-school  football  player 
must have had some aptitude for ‘brain’ work as well as (if not more than) 
 In his subsequent discussion of this case, Bruner again evokes the literary form of 14
the Bildungsroman  (p.  51).  And though Bruner’s  Goethean comparisons may be 
overstretched, his repeated recourse to the Bildungsroman  form when discussing 
the life narratives of young American males suggests that they do have certain 
thematic features in common, rooted not in their individual lives, but in a shared 
‘cultural consciousness’ (Nelson, 2003, p. 24)—which in these cases perhaps owes 
more to Hollywood coming-of-age movies than to Sturm und Drang.
!172
for athletic activities before he handed in his kit. The turning-point story is 
a post hoc creation, an interpretation, indeed an ‘idealization’ (p. 51).
While  the turning-point  episodes Bruner cites  are perhaps useful  to 
their tellers in making sense of their lives, they are also a fine illustration of 
how the  reconstruction of  autobiographical  memories  is  affected by the 
tales we tell of ourselves. Does the woman leaving her alcoholic and abus-
ive partner really ‘remember that night’, or is her episodic memory of ‘that 
night’ an amalgamation of many distinct episodes leading up to her leaving 
him? We cannot know. What seems to matter here is how she remembers 
(tells) it. But, as Bruner admits, the narrative construction of a single turn-
ing-point episode is a dramatic idealization. The problem, however, is that 
there is no objective criterion for deciding when such idealization becomes 
self-deception.
Narrativists might argue that some amount of self-deception is a risk 
we must take in exchange for the coherence and ‘meaning’ a narrative self 
provides. That is to assume that changes and discontinuities in our lives 
necessitate  the  deployment  of  narrative  tropes  for  us  to  make  sense  of 
them. But it is far from obvious that the only way to incorporate discon-
tinuities—including significant, career-changing events—in one’s sense of 
self over time is to paint over them with dramatic gloss.
For instance, I am occasionally (if mercifully rarely) asked what made 
me begin studying philosophy at the age of thirty, after spending the previ-
ous decade drifting from one kind of occupation, city, and country to an-
other. Questioners perhaps expect some sort of turning-point story of the 
kind Bruner describes. But I have none. Though in retrospect my academic 
studies may with some justification be described as ‘life-changing’, I have 
no particular vivid episodic memory to mark their onset, no dramatic in-
cident, and certainly no ‘affective or moral message’. I can give a prosaic 
description of my circumstances at the time, theorize about what factors 
may have contributed to the change, and, if pressed, tell some kind of story 
about them—but I have no ready-made narrative up my sleeve, nor do I 
see why I should have one. At the same time, I happily accept both what 
happened before and after the change as parts of my biography: for all its 
narrative discontinuities, it is the life of a continuing self.
Recalling Strawson’s notion of different ‘temporal temperaments’, we 
may perhaps say that narrativity about the self may be helpful or natural 
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for some, impossible or unnecessary for others. But I must go a little further 
and note that, for some and in some circumstances, self-narration can also 
be outright harmful. There are, I suggest, both forward-looking and back-
ward-looking noxious self narratives (which may co-occur). They involve an 
increasing divergence of one’s narratively constructed ‘reality’ from actual 
reality, either when the events of one’s life fail to accord with a prepared 
(forward-looking) autobiographical  narrative that is  too limited in scope 
and thus under-equipped to deal with unexpected actualities, or when a 
(backward-looking) self narrative constructs one’s past in a way that im-
poses unrealistic limits on present and future.
As an example of a forward-looking noxious narrative, let us assume 
that Bruner’s high-school footballer does not have an epiphanic moment on 
the playing-field. Instead, he sticks to his idea of an athletic career. He con-
structs a self narrative in which he becomes first a college footballer, then a 
professional league footballer. He neglects his academic study in pursuit of 
making that story come true. Almost inevitably (I’m assuming that the stat-
istical likelihood of an American youth becoming a professional American 
footballer is about as low as that of a European youth becoming a profes-
sional association footballer), he fails to get admitted to his chosen prestigi-
ous college, bides his time playing for a minor college, fails to get a degree, 
and ends up neither a professional footballer nor in any academic career 
that might have been open to him had he not followed his idealized self 
narrative. 
Narrativists will be quick to point out that such cases, where they oc-
cur, are not paradigmatic of normal self-narration, in which the self narrat-
ive is revised in the light of the events of one’s life. The point is, however, 
that it isn’t obvious at what stage one should reasonably correct or abandon 
a forward-looking self story. Should the young man revise his narrative as 
soon as he gets rejected by his chosen college, or should he carry on ‘believ-
ing in himself’ (that is, in his preferred narrative version of himself), letting 
up other opportunities, and, if so, for how long? Disappointment ensues 
either way: by having to give up a beautiful story before giving it every 
chance to be played out, or by finding it more and more at odds with actu-
ality.
The corollary to this scenario is a particular type of backward-looking 
self narrative that has the effect of unrealistically limiting one’s prospects 
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for the future. This is the narrative rumination that often occurs in clinical 
depression. Take the (fictitious) case of Bernard, a man in his mid-forties, 
highly intelligent and articulate, well-educated, well-read and well-quali-
fied. He is also chronically depressed, alcohol-dependent, and unemployed 
(these last three characteristics forming a causal chain, in the order named, 
but then looping back to the start). Bernard has a well-rehearsed, indeed 
over-rehearsed,  self  narrative  involving  a  number  of  negative  turning 
points going back nearly three decades, each of which ‘explains’ a particu-
lar disappointment, a particular instance when things went wrong for him, 
and each of which is in turn narratively construed as the inevitable con-
sequence of the preceding one. 
Strikingly, all  these incidents,  which Bernard recounts in ruminating 
detail,  involve the agency of  others  (his  parents,  for  instance)  that  is  in 
some way blamed for the infelicitous outcome. Exemplifying what Bruner 
(1994) calls ‘victimicy’, it is never Bernard’s own agency that is invoked. 
This denial of agential selfhood in the past also affects Bernard’s sense of 
agency in the present: any course of action that might be taken to alter his 
situation can be  ruled too difficult  or  impossible  because of  things  that 
happened in the past, which happened because of what happened in the 
further past,  and so on. If  only such-and-such had been different in the 
past, the present too would be different, and Bernard would be better off. 
But such-and-such would only have been different if previous matters too 
had been different, which they weren’t… Being clinically depressed, Bern-
ard cannot rid himself of this noxious narrative. He cannot, for example, 
just start a new story. And in his persistent narrative, the only way to a bet-
ter future is to change his past, which of course he cannot. Goldie’s (2012) 
counterfactual ‘narrative thinking about one’s past’—while sometimes use-
ful, in small doses—here leads to a cycle of narrative misery.
As Bernard’s noxious self narrative clearly correlates with depressive 
illness, narrativists here have recourse to what one might call the ‘patho-
logy defence’:  pathological  cases do not  invalidate healthy cases;  rather, 
their abnormalities illustrate the features of a normal narrative self. Bern-
ard’s example, they might say, shows that a sense of agency is required for 
a healthy narrative self; the dysfunctional narrative is a symptom of a de-
fective self. They might also suggest how to repair it: the therapy required 
would involve changing Bernard’s self narrative. Perhaps so, but then it 
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isn’t clear which way the aetiology goes. If depression is the cause of the 
defective self narrative, then correcting the narrative may not get rid of the 
depression (or may not even be possible). Or if narrative therapy can help 
overcome or contain the depression, we must wonder whether having a 
defective self narrative is responsible for the depression in the first place, or 
at least for its persistence. And then it is the narrative that is doing unne-
cessary harm.
Thus, my point about noxious narratives, forward- or backward-look-
ing, is not that the existence of harmful self narratives disproves the possib-
ility of helpful self narratives. It is rather that, in such circumstances, not 
having a self narrative of any kind would be preferable to having a noxious 
one. Of course, it may be that holders of noxious self narratives have no 
choice about how narratively inclined they are, if Strawson is right about 
our different temporal temperaments. Yet, if  our temporal temperaments 
are subject to change, it would also be wrong to hold up narrativity as the 
gold standard in what a self should be.
In sum, we need not necessarily appeal to narrativity when it comes to 
making  sense  of  our  lives.  Discontinuities  in  biographies  are  common; 
change, even drastic change, is a part of a human life. One needn’t always 
have  a  story  to  make  sense  of  it.  Thus,  descriptively  speaking,  narrative 
activity is not essential for a sense of self over time. It would be wrong to 
insist that all  selves are essentially narrative. And, as noxious narratives 
show, the wrong kind of autobiographical narrative can be seriously self-
limiting. So neither should we endorse the prescriptive claim that our lives 
should be given narrative form.
6.4  A role for narrative practices
I have argued, in the first two sections of this chapter, against narrative con-
structionism about the self and, in the preceding section, against the view 
that narration is an essential activity of the self. Of the four positions one 
could take regarding the relation between narrative and the self, that leaves 
only the fourth: the simple narrative-capacity view—the view that selves can 
and often (but not necessarily) do engage in narrative activity. This is my 
view. For it seems that we are something of a story-telling species, and be-
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sides telling stories about ourselves to others, many of us engage in what 
Goldie calls ‘narrative thinking’ about ourselves from time to time (though, 
in the light of my discussion of noxious narratives, we would do well not to 
overdo this). So let me outline, briefly, the (non-exclusive) role of narrative 
practices in our self-representations.
First, narrative practices can play a role in forming and reconstructing 
autobiographical memory. The conversational narrative practices reported 
by Fivush with which I began the previous chapter are an example of this, 
suggesting (along with Miller’s research) that the onset of autobiographical 
memory is helped along by the onset of rudimentary narrative capacities. 
But there is also a role for narrativity in rehearsing and reconstructing epis-
odic memories in adult life. The narrative ‘thinking through’ of an import-
ant episode is the kind of elaborative rehearsal that, according to Brown 
and Craik (2000), helps consolidate episodic memories (see § 4.3.1). Narrat-
ive practices also help both with the construction of our autobiographical 
knowledge base with its ‘general events’ (Conway & Rubin, 1993) and with 
the reconstructive remembering of these general events (Goldie, 2012). A 
narrative context will shape how an episodic recollection is reconstructed. 
We should note, however, that far from increasing the reliability of memor-
ies, their narrative reconstruction will obey the dictates of a particular so-
cial  context  or  cultural  trope,  as  in the turning-point  stories Bruner dis-
cusses. Here the function of narrative practice is indeed the construction of 
meaning that narrativists like to emphasize—with all the dangers of inter-
pretative largesse that entails.
Besides aiding autobiographical memory, narrative practices contribute 
to self-representation in other ways. Dan Hutto’s (2007b) ‘narrative practice 
hypothesis’ suggests that children learn how to use and apply the concepts 
and  tenets  of  folk  psychology—desires  and  beliefs,  and  the  way  they 
provide us with socially acceptable reasons for action—through narrative 
practices:  our  every-day story-telling,  which involves  giving reasons for 
actions,  has  the  function  of  explaining  our  responses  to  others  and  to 
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ourselves alike.  I said earlier that the conjunction ‘because’ does not make 15
a narrative (§ 6.1.1). Nor does it: but the explanatory force of our ‘becauses’ 
is increased when they are embedded in a narrative that pads out the ex-
planation of an individual action with additional information concerning 
its agent’s background and/or her circumstances. Where that agent is the 
self,  these  narratives  thus  contribute  to  one’s  self-representation  as  an 
agent.  And, as Valerie Hardcastle (2008) puts it, our self narratives ‘tie us 16
to  our  social  communities’  (p.  48).  Miller’s  (1994)  studies  of  every-day 
story-telling illustrate this nicely.
A more controversial assessment of the role of narrativity is the theory 
put forward by Nelson (2003) discussed above (§ 5.2.1) that the emergence 
of narrative capacities around age five provides us with the ‘level of con-
sciousness’ required for a full sense of self. Responding to Zahavi’s (2007) 
point  on  the  priority  of  non-narrative  self-awareness  over  narrativity 
(§  6.1.3),  Schechtman  (2011b)  cites  Nelson’s  theory,  suggesting  that  our 
(post-narrative)  self-consciousness  differs  qualitatively  from  ‘brute  first-
personal awareness’ (p. 410). But if it does, it isn’t clear whether this richer 
kind  of  self-consciousness  is  caused  by  developing  narrative  capacities, 
merely correlates  with their emergence, or is in turn causing  the develop-
ment of narrative capacity. On this point, Hardcastle (2008) suggests that, 
contrary  to  the  ‘dominant  research  paradigm in  developmental  psycho-
logy’,  it  isn’t  narrativity  that  enables  self-consciousness  in  the  relevant 
sense; rather, ‘the drive for selfhood pushes us along in our linguistic, cog-
nitive,  and  mnemonic  development  instead  of  the  other  way 
around’ (p. 52). I am not quite sure what she means by ‘the drive for self-
hood’, but if her point is that a social demand for overt self-representation 
encourages the development of children’s mnemonic and narrative capacit-
ies—that does seem a hypothesis worthy of investigation by developmental 
psychologists.
 Hutto also argues—more controversially—that it is through narrative practice 15
that children acquire folk psychological categories, rather than by the activation of a 
theory-of-mind (ToM) module around the age of four. I do not think that the stim-
uli provided by narrative practices are sufficient to support that conclusion, but the 
point is not germane to my current concerns. (I’ll discuss ToM in relation to autism 
in ch. 7.)
 This seems to be the motivation for Velleman’s account.16
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Overall, then, narrative practices do play a role in our higher-level self-
representations, both in consolidating and reconstructing autobiographical 
memories, and more overtly in fostering reason-giving discourse that con-
tributes  to  the way we construe ourselves as  agents  in a  social  context. 
However, it is also worth repeating that, in childhood or in adulthood, we 
do not all engage in narrative practices to the same extent, nor deploy them 
evenly throughout life. Selves can be more or less narrative between indi-
viduals and over time within individuals.  Self-representation is far from 
exclusively narrative.
To illustrate this, the next chapter will examine the self in autism spec-
trum conditions, which are often marked by a lack of narrative capacity, as 






There are several connected reasons why autism is relevant to accounts—
and particularly this account—of the self. The first of these is the peculiar 
self-absorbedness  of  autistic  individuals—a  corollary  of  their  social  and 
communicative impairments.  The earliest  clinical  descriptions of  autistic 
children by Leo Kanner (1943) make frequent reference to the child’s being 
‘self-sufficient’,  ‘self-satisfied’,  or  ‘retire[d]  within  herself’.  Kanner  re1 -
peatedly  refers  to  autistic  children’s  ‘aloneness’  as  a  defining feature  of 
their condition; several of his case studies explicitly mention the difficulties 
experienced by parents and clinical examiners in attracting the children’s 
attention. But their relative lack of interest in other people is often accom-
panied by an unusual interest in inanimate objects. Thus, there emerges a 
picture of individuals whose self–other and self–world relations are con-
figured in a significantly different way from those of non-autistic (‘neuro-
typical’ ) individuals.2
Secondly,  while  autistics  seem  excessively  self-centred  and  self-ab-
sorbed, this does not entail an over-active self—indeed, autistic individuals 
seem  to  lack  some  typical  higher-level  self-representational  capacities. 
These include the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself. As will be dis-
cussed  below  (§  7.2.2),  the—to  date—clinically  and  diagnostically  most 
successful neurocognitive theory of the symptoms of autism is that autistics 
lack a theory of mind and thus the ability to ‘mentalize’, i.e. ascribe mental 
 The coinage ‘autism’—from αὐτός  ‘self-,  oneself’—obviously derives from this 1
characteristic trait of autistics.
 The term recommended by people with autism to describe those without autism, 2
avoiding the potentially offensive ‘normal’ (National Autistic Society, 2015).
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states to others—resulting in the detached and aloof attitude to others that 
is characteristic of autism. Frith and Happé (1999) have argued that such 
lack of mentalizing ability regarding others would entail a concomitant in-
ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and, consequently, a qualitatively 
quite different form of self-awareness. This, however, does not entail that 
the autistic person does not have a self (§ 7.3.1). 
The past two decades of clinical research on autism have produced a 
large body of neurophysiological data on brain processes involved in men-
talizing and self-awareness.  It  seems fair  to  say that,  absent  the  clinical 
needs of autistic patients (and their families), far fewer neuroimaging stud-
ies would have been conducted from which we can learn about the func-
tioning of both autistic and non-autistic brains and about how brain func-
tion correlates with social interaction.
Thirdly, the self-representational capacities of remembering and narrat-
ing about the self discussed in the preceding chapters show marked peculi-
arities in autistic individuals (§§ 7.3.2, 7.3.3). Narrative capacity may be en-
tirely absent, as may self-referencing episodic memory. According to histor-
ical-constructionist accounts of the self, this would disqualify many indi-
viduals with autism spectrum conditions from having a self at all. On my 
system view, however, no such drastic consequence follows from the lack 
or impairment of these specific higher-level self-representational capacities. 
Other self-representational processes are intact in autistic individuals, and 
their mnemonic and narrative idiosyncrasies may be characterized as an 
‘alternative cognitive style’ (Happé, 1991, p. 212).
Overall,  for the Jamesian project of giving an account of the self  by 
‘[g]etting  clear  about  the  empirical  relations  between  one’s  experience, 
one’s brain, and one’s social relations’ (Barresi & Martin, 2011, p. 49), aut-
ism provides a valuable case study, precisely because the brains and social 
relations of autistics (and presumably their experience of themselves and 
the world) are so unusual. But before discussing autistic selves (§  7.3),  I 
need to give a brief account of the characteristics of autism spectrum condi-
tions and the theories  that  have been put  forward for  their  explanation 
(§ 7.2).
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7.2  Characteristics and theories of autism
7.2.1  Clinical characteristics of autism
Autism  is  a  neurodevelopmental  disorder  characterized  by  specific 
‘impairments  in  socialization,  communication,  and  imagination’  (Frith, 
2001a). Though its precise aetiology is still unknown, a ‘genetic basis . . . is 
strongly indicated from twin and family studies’ (ibid.).  The characteristic 3
signs and symptoms of autism, generally grouped into a ‘triad’ of impair-
ments, usually become apparent between the ages of eighteen months and 
three years. They are:
1. Abnormalities of social development. Autistics fail to engage in normal so-
cial interaction, appearing aloof and self-absorbed. A clinical marker of 
this characteristic is their failure to monitor another’s gaze and to en-
gage in shared-attention behaviour.
2. Abnormalities  in  communication,  both  verbal  and  non-verbal.  Autistic 
children show difficulties and significant delays in acquiring and com-
prehending speech. An early, non-verbal sign of communication deficit 
is their failure to engage in protodeclarative pointing (i.e. pointing with 
the intent to draw someone’s attention to something). Echolalia is also 
observed. Where language skills approaching a normal level of compet-
ence are developed, lexical and pragmatic abnormalities persist, includ-
ing difficulties with the use of personal pronouns, as well as an overly 
literal understanding of others’ utterances.
3. A restricted repertoire of activities and interests and a deficit of imagination. 
These non-social characteristics of autism manifest themselves in stereo-
typed and repetitive behaviour—a ‘desire for .   .   .  sameness’  (Kanner 
1943, p. 249) in one’s activities. Failure to engage in spontaneous pre-
tend play is an early clinical marker of the imagination deficit in autistic 
individuals. 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995, ch. 5; Bauman, 1999; Botterill & Carruthers, 1999, ch. 4; 
Frith, 2001a; World Health Organization, 1992/2016, F84.0).
 Thus, the description of autism as developmental refers to how the disorder mani3 -
fests itself (i.e. in unusual psychosocial development) rather than to its being caused 
by developmental factors—though environmental factors can modify behaviour in 
autistic children (Frith, 2001a).
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While  this  triad  of  social,  communicative,  and imaginative  impair4 -
ments  forms  a  consistent  and  diagnostically  useful  identifier  of  autism, 
there is considerable variation in the severity of these deficits. For this reas-
on, autism is now regarded as a spectrum  of more or less severe impair-
ments in these three categories—a spectrum, moreover, that is continuous 
with the ‘normal’ population (Wing, 1996; Baron-Cohen, 1999). Thus, the 
distinction between ‘autistic’ and ‘non-autistic’, while a useful shorthand 
for clinical purposes, is no longer thought to trace a sharp dividing line 
between cognitively typical and atypical individuals. Nor is it always ap-
propriate to label the presence of autistic characteristics as a disorder; hence, 
the term ‘autism spectrum disorders’  is  giving way to the more neutral 
‘autism spectrum conditions’ (e.g., Barnes & Baron-Cohen, 2012).
Of particular interest on the autistic spectrum are the milder forms of 
autism known as Asperger syndrome and ‘high-functioning autism’.  Asper5 -
ger cases are distinguished by normal or above-average intelligence (com-
pared with below-average intelligence in other autism cases: Bauman, 1999; 
Frith, 2001a) and, by current diagnostic criteria, undelayed language devel-
opment (Hill & Frith, 2003). Though socially awkward and prone to enga-
ging in solitary and repetitive activities (thus satisfying characteristics (1) 
and (3)  above),  they often display unusual  cognitive  abilities,  including 
above-average linguistic aptitude (though their speech tends to be uncon-
versational, stilted, and/or socially inappropriate, thus satisfying the gen-
eral characteristic (2) of abnormal communication) (Wing, 1996, pp. 20, 40). 
Such individuals can provide an insight into the autistic mind that, because 
of  communicative  impairments,  cannot  be  obtained from more  severely 
 The latest version of the American Psychiatric Association’s (2013) Diagnostic and 4
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) reduces this common diagnostic triad 
into a  dyad,  merging social  and communicative impairments into one criterion 
(Hassall, 2016).
 ‘Some confusion exists between the labels Asperger syndrome and high-function5 -
ing autism’ (Hill & Frith, 2003, p. 281). Asperger syndrome has been dropped en-
tirely as a diagnostic category in the DSM-5 (Hassall, 2016), while the WHO’s In-
ternational  Statistical  Classification of  Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) 
marks it as a ‘disorder of uncertain nosological validity’ (World Health Organiza-
tion, 1992/2016, F84.5).
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autistic cases. Evidence from Asperger cases relating to the self is discussed 
in § 7.3 below.
 Whereas the ultimate causes of autism are still uncertain, there are now 
several  neurocognitive  theories  available  to  account  for  the  signs  and 
symptoms of autism. The most diagnostically successful such account is 
that autistics lack a theory of mind. I outline this theory in § 7.2.2 and discuss 
its implications for an account of the self in § 7.3.1. Beyond this, the non-
social characteristics of autism are theorized to derive from weak central co-
herence and/or executive dysfunction in the brains of autistics. I discuss these 
theories in § 7.2.3 and the potential implications of weak central coherence 
for the self in § 7.3.2. It may be that weak central coherence and executive 
dysfunction  are  not  so  much  rival  theories  to  theory-of-mind  deficit  as 
complements that attempt to explain those features of autism that the ab-
sence of a theory of mind cannot account for: a ‘restricted repertoire of be-
haviours, rigidity and perseveration’ (Hill & Frith, 2003, p. 284). If the the-
ories are complementary, this raises the interesting question whether aut-
ism is, in fact, a unified condition. I cannot go into this here. But I can, at 
least, discuss the prominent theories put forward to account for the differ-
ent symptoms of autism, and how each might affect the self.
7.2.2  Theory-of-mind deficit
In the psychology literature, theory of mind (hereinafter ToM) refers to the 
ability to ‘mind-read’ or ‘mentalize’, that is, to ascribe mental states such as 
beliefs  to  other  people  on  the  basis  of  their  observable  behaviour.  This 
mind-reading ability allows us to engage in and navigate the complex so-
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cial interactions, ‘both co-operative and competitive’, that are characteristic 
of our species (Botterill & Carruthers, 1999, p. 77).  6
The theory that the social impairments of autism could be explained by 
autistic  individuals’  lack  of  a  ToM was  first  proposed by  Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, and Frith (1985). The experimental paradigm they used to support 
this theory—the ‘Sally–Anne’ false-belief task—has since become a stand-
ard diagnostic test for autism in children:
There were two doll protagonists, Sally and Anne. . . . Sally first placed a 
marble into her basket. Then she left the scene, and the marble was trans-
ferred by Anne and hidden in her box. Then, when Sally returned, the ex-
perimenter asked the critical Belief Question: “Where will Sally look for 
her marble?“. If the children point to the previous location of the marble, 
then they pass the Belief Question by appreciating the doll’s now false be-
lief. If however, they point to the marble’s current location, then they fail 
the question by not taking into account the doll’s belief. (p. 41)
The correct ascription of a false belief to the doll protagonist is taken as evid-
ence of a functioning ToM; failure to ascribe a false belief to Sally is indicat-
ive of ToM deficit. Neurotypical children generally pass the false-belief task 
by about three or four years of age; the vast majority of autistic children 
with matched mental ages do not. A corollary of this inability to ascribe 
false beliefs and thus recognize deception is their inability to use pretence 
and deception themselves (Baron-Cohen 1995, ch. 5; Botterill & Carruthers 
1999, ch. 4). Other mind-reading tasks have been developed for older chil-
dren (faux-pas  recognition: Baron-Cohen et al.,  1999) and adults (reading 
 There are two main rival theories of the cognitive mechanism underlying ToM: 6
theory-theory and simulation theory. The former is the view that our mind-reading 
ability derives from a core of  theoretical  knowledge that  is  implicitly deployed 
when we ascribe mental states to each other (and ourselves) as causal explanations 
of our actions. The latter theory holds that we do not draw on theoretical know-
ledge (however implicit) when we mind-read, but rather simulate others’ cognitive 
situation in our own minds and so come to ascribe the appropriate mental states to 
them (Botterill & Carruthers, 1999, ch. 4). The debate between these rival theories is 
not critical to this discussion, nor does autism help settle it. The ability of some 
high-functioning autistic individuals, such as Temple Grandin (Sacks, 1995), to re-
sort to an acquired, explicit ToM substitute (see § 7.3.1) suggests that at least some of 
our ToM capacities do resemble a theoretical body of knowledge, since it can be 
replicated by active conscious theorizing. But the remaining social awkwardness of 
such  individuals  suggests  that  theoretical  knowledge  of  a  repertoire  of  mental 
states is still not the whole story of our ‘mentalizing’ capacity.
!185
mental states from the eyes of people in photographs: Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997;  2001).  In  these  tasks,  too,  mind-reading  ability  is  consistently  im-
paired in autistic subjects relative to controls.
Baron-Cohen (1995) hypothesizes that one of the mechanisms underly-
ing ToM is a shared-attention mechanism (SAM), which allows us both to 
monitor and to direct others’ attention. A functioning SAM is evidenced by 
behaviour  such as  following another’s  gaze,  and pointing and showing 
gestures. Such shared-attention behaviour is also markedly absent in most 
autistic children and allows an even earlier diagnosis than false-belief tasks, 
at about eighteen months of age.
Further support of the ToM deficit theory of autism comes from autistic 
individuals’ characteristic communicative impairments. These include both 
pragmatic  and lexical-semantic  aspects  of  language  use  (Tager-Flusberg, 
2000). Pragmatic communication impairments include an overly literal use 
and  understanding  of  language  and  a  lack  of  conversational  relevance, 
which suggest a failure to understand that ‘communication is about . . . in-
tended rather than literal meaning’ (p. 126), where understanding intended 
meaning requires the ascription of intentions to others and therefore a func-
tioning  mind-reading  ability.  Narrative  discourse  is  impoverished,  with 
little appeal to mental states as motivators of action. Lexical deficits in cog-
nition  verbs  (‘think’,  ‘know’)  correlate  with  poor  performance  at  mind-
reading tasks. 
Significantly, where autistic children do pass ToM tasks, this requires a 
higher level of lexical ability than in neurotypical children, suggesting that 
the acquisition of language, if it occurs, can to some extent be used to over-
come (or  mask)  ToM deficits.  However,  shared-attention  deficits  in  turn 
make it difficult for autistic children to acquire language. Though the causal 
links between shared attention, ToM, and language acquisition are likely to 
be complex (Happé, 1995; Lorusso et al., 2007), there are strong correlations 
between impairments in all three domains.
7.2.3  Weak central coherence and executive dysfunction
While ToM deficit provides a neurocognitive theory of the social and com-
municative  impairments  of  autistics,  including  impaired  imagination  in 
social situations, it does not explain the third characteristic of autism: ste-
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reotyped and repetitive behaviour and a restricted repertoire of interests 
and activities, which seem indicative of a more general lack of imagination. 
Two further cognitive abnormalities have been suggested as explanations 
of the non-social impairments of autistics: weak central coherence and execut-
ive dysfunction.
The notion of central coherence is simply that normal cognitive func-
tioning involves ‘the tendency to draw together diverse information to con-
struct higher-level meaning in context . . . For example, the gist of a story is 
easily recalled, while the actual surface form is quickly lost’ (Frith & Hap-
pé, 1994, p.  121). Autistics, meanwhile, have a ‘tendency to focus on the 
local, rather than global aspects of an object of interest’ (Hill & Frith, 2003, 
p. 284), often showing a greater ability in processing and retaining details 
than non-autistic individuals, as exemplified by autistic ‘savants’ like the 
scientist Temple Grandin and the artist Stephen Wiltshire (Sacks, 1995). But 
they show a concomitant weakness in cognitive tasks that require assem-
bling disparate but related pieces of information into a meaningful whole.
Such weak central coherence  has been hypothesized to be the result of 
‘poor connectivity between more basic perceptual processes and top-down 
modulating processes, perhaps owing to a failure of [neural] pruning’ (Hill 
& Frith, 2003, p. 284). This lack of normal neural pruning during develop-
ment may account for the fact that ‘the autistic brain . . . is on average lar-
ger and heavier than the normal brain’ (pp.  282–3). More recently, weak 
central coherence has been associated with disrupted neural connectivity 
and the balance of inhibitory and excitatory processes (Zikopoulos & Bar-
bas,  2013).  However,  research in this area is  still  somewhat inconclusive 
and,  as  yet,  lacks  ‘well-specified mechanistic  models  of  altered  cerebral 
communication’ in autism spectrum conditions (Vasa et al., in press).
Autistics’ lack of imagination, undue perseveration, and predilection 
for  repetitive  activities  also  suggest  impairments  in  ‘planning  working 
memory,  impulse  control,  .   .   .  and  the  initiation  and  monitoring  of 
action’ (Hill & Frith, 2003, p. 285). These executive capacities correlate with 
frontal-lobe activity, whose impairment is thus known as executive dysfunc-
tion.  The main problem with advancing executive dysfunction as an ex-
planation of specifically autistic traits is that it is neither an exclusive nor an 
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inclusive marker of autism, since it is a feature of psychopathologies other 
than autism  and may not be present in all autistic cases (p. 286).7
7.2.4  A ‘Wittgensteinian’ critique of neurocognitive theories
In a recent essay, Peter Hobson (2009) advances the view that current psy-
chological theories of autism, by focusing on neurocognitive abnormalities 
of the individual brain, ignore the central role of abnormal ‘relations with 
people and things’ (p. 254) in the presentation of autism. Citing Wittgen-
stein’s (1980) extant notes on the philosophy of psychology, Hobson sug-
gests that the key to understanding autism lies in its sufferers’ inability to 
join in with shared ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 226e/238e).
It  may  seem  odd  that  a  clinical  neuroscientist  should  appeal  to 
Wittgenstein in his theorizing about autism. In the context of a study of the 
self, however, Hobson’s choice is less surprising, since Wittgenstein may be 
regarded as something of a (perhaps unwitting) godfather to social theories 
of the self (see e.g. Bakhurst, 1995). At any rate, he may be credited with the 
view that our folk-psychological concepts gain their meaning only in our 
shared use of these concepts.8
In contrast to this ‘social’ view of folk psychology, Hobson (2009) de-
tects a ‘strong individualistic bias’ in contemporary psychological theories 
of autism (p.  254).  This requires some elucidation. Presumably, by ‘indi-
vidualistic’ Hobson means that neurocognitive theories of autism assume 
that abnormalities in autistic individuals’ neurocognitive functioning will 
explain their abnormalities of social behaviour. In that sense, these theories 
are indeed individualistic. But this does not imply that they do not account 
for ‘the nature and developmental implications of the children’s relations 
with  people  and  things’  (ibid.).  To  the  contrary,  that  is  precisely  what 
neurocognitive theories of autism are meant to account for. Explaining the 
signs and symptoms of autism in terms of ToM deficit is a way of account-
ing for the neurocognitive substrate (or lack thereof) that underlies our abil-
ity (or lack thereof) to engage in the shared folk-psychological discourse 
that shapes our relations with, and understanding of, other people. The so-
 Cf. my discussion of impaired executive function in frontal-lobe amnesia, § 8.2.2.7
 For a more recent exposition of this view, see Kusch (1997).8
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cial instantiation of that discourse and understanding is not thereby called 
into question. But it is at the level of the individual brain that we must look 
for the underlying capacity to partake in that discourse.
But Hobson goes further. He suggests that the direction of theorizing 
employed here (individual  ability/disability  accounts  for  normal/abnor-
mal  social  engagement)  may  be  misguided.  He  muses  ‘whether  much 
communicative, linguistic, and cognitive dysfunction in autism could prove 
to be the result, and not the cause, of the children’s social-affective/rela-
tional  impairments’  (p.  255).  Of course,  it  is  entirely possible that  social 
impairments feed back into cognitive dysfunction (difficulties in language 
acquisition as a result of impaired shared attention (§ 7.2.2) being a case in 
point). But what causes the social impairments in the first place? Given that 
any kind of behaviour requires an appropriate neurocognitive infrastruc-
ture that enables such behaviour, it seems reasonable to suggest that it is 
the absence or impairment of this neurocognitive infrastructure that causes 
the absence or impairment of the correlated behaviour, and not vice versa.
Another criticism for which Hobson recruits Wittgenstein’s reflections 
on psychology is directed specifically at the ToM deficit theory. He quotes 
Wittgenstein (1980) on our ability to perceive others’ mental states without 
conscious inference:
‘We see emotion.’—As opposed to what?—We do not see facial contortions 
and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a 
face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give 
any other description of the features. (§ 570)
Thus, Hobson argues, ‘we do not need to “theorize” about the nature of 
people’s . . . feelings, intentions and the like’ (p. 246).
Of course, Wittgenstein and Hobson are quite right that our ability to 
detect others’ mental states does not, as a rule, involve explicit theorizing or 
conscious inferring.  But to take our ‘direct perception’ of mental states as 9
evidence against ToM is to ignore that our perceptions are themselves the-
ory-laden. Thus, if we ‘see emotion’ we do so because the seeing is already 
modulated by an active ToM (Lavelle, 2012).
 The likely exception being Asperger syndrome cases, who may employ an ac9 -
quired and conscious ToM substitute to perform the same tasks (Frith & Happé 
1999)—but do so precisely because they do not have access to a normal, implicit 
ToM (see § 7.3.1).
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It may be that the term ‘theory of mind’ is, as Hobson suggests, some-
what misleading in that it might be seen to imply that a functioning ToM 
involves  explicit,  quasi-scientific  theorizing.  But  that  is  not  how ToM is 
generally understood nor the best account of how it works, which is rather 
that ToM is an innate system of implicit theorizing ability (Botterill & Car-
ruthers, 1999, ch. 4). This account of ToM is consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
observations. The fact that we do not make conscious inferences about oth-
ers’ mental states but seem to perceive them directly is no argument against 
ToM operating at the subpersonal level and shaping our perceptions.
Overall, then, Hobson’s ‘Wittgensteinian’ criticisms of neurocognitive 
theories of autism do not seem very compelling. We cannot explain the de-
fect in terms of its symptoms. Hobson is right, however, to remind us that 
impaired social relations are a defining feature of autism. And in discussing 
the implications of autism, it may be useful to refer to a shared ‘form of life’ 
that is partly, perhaps largely, absent from the lives of autistics. I will return 
to this theme in discussing the ‘social self’ of autistic individuals (§ 7.3.4).
7.3  The self in autism
Having looked at the specific defects present in autism spectrum condi-
tions, we can now ask how each of them affects the self. If, as I suggest, the 
self is a complex and dynamic system comprising different self-representa-
tional capacities (§ 1.4), we should expect the peculiarities of autistic selves 
to be fairly specific. Thus, I will now examine in turn the consequences for 
the self that may arise from ToM deficit, weak central coherence, autistics’ 
memory organization, and social impairments. As will become apparent, 
the deficits discussed sometimes seem to pull in different directions when it 
comes to assessing how functional an autistic self might be, and caution is 
advised against generalizing over all conditions and individuals on the aut-
istic spectrum.
7.3.1  Consequences of theory-of-mind deficit
How does ToM deficit affect the self? If, as I propose, the self is a system for 
self-monitoring, this would usually involve monitoring one’s own mental 
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states.  Uta  Frith  and Francesca  Happé (1999)  hypothesize  that  autistics’ 
lack of a theory of other minds may imply a lack of a theory of their own 
minds. That is to say, if an individual’s ToM mechanism is deficient, she can 
no more ascribe mental states such as beliefs to herself than she can ascribe 
them to others.
Support  for  this  hypothesis  comes from experimental  work using a 
variant of the false-belief test, in which autistic children’s inability to at-
tribute false beliefs to others correlates with their inability retrospectively to 
attribute  false  beliefs  to  themselves  (‘Smarties’  task,  Hogrefe  et  al.,  1986; 
Gopnik & Astington, 1988). It also fits Alan Leslie’s (1987) theory that our 
representations of states of the world are kept cognitively separate from 
our metarepresentations of mental states (ToM), a theory supported by the 
ability of autistic children to reason about cause-and-effect relations (states 
of  the  world)  in  stories,  without  being  able  to  comprehend  motivations 
(mental states) of characters in those stories (Happé et al., 1996).
Frith and Happé (1999) hypothesize further that if  ToM impairment 
implies impaired mentalizing ability with respect to oneself, it should lead 
to an impaired or unusual form of self-awareness in autistic individuals. For, 
without ToM, their self-awareness cannot include metarepresentations of 
their mental states. To support this second part of their hypothesis, Frith 
and Happé point to individuals with Asperger syndrome, who unlike other 
autistics often pass ToM tasks, but do so because they have an explicitly 
learned (rather than implicit and intuitive) ToM ability. This ToM substitute 
does not, however, appear to produce the self-ascription of mental states.
Thus, Hurlburt, Happé, and Frith (1994) found that self-reported self-
awareness in Asperger cases differed from that of neurotypical subjects by 
being mostly visual, concrete, and devoid of descriptions of ‘other forms of 
inner experience’. This Frith and Happé (1999) take to suggest that their 
Asperger subjects’ ‘unusual’ ToM ability—a learned substitute for a nor-
mally  intuitive  process—produces  qualitatively  ‘unusual’  self-awareness, 
in which the ToM substitute is not activated, because it is deemed necessary 
only for understanding or describing others.
This is not to say that these individuals lack mental states, but that in an 
important sense they are unable to reflect on their mental states. Simply 
put,  they lack the cognitive  machinery to  represent  their  thoughts  and 
feelings as thoughts and feelings. (p. 7)
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‘Representing one’s thoughts and feelings as  thoughts and feelings’ may 
seem a cumbersome description of what neurotypical individuals automat-
ically and intuitively do as part of their normal self-monitoring. How, one 
might ask, could we not? But that is the point: the self-experience of autistic 
individuals,  while it  presumably does involve the experience  of cognitive 
and affective states, does not include their categorization along the familiar 
mental-state  terms  which  to  those  gifted  with  ToM  seems  natural  and 
automatic. Frith and Happé’s formulation attempts to capture quite how 
different the ‘inner life’ of an autistic individual without ToM is from that 
of neurotypical individuals.
But their failure to categorize or metarepresent their mental states in 
ToM terms does  not  mean that  autistic  individuals  are  unaware  of  their 
thoughts and feelings. And indeed it seems that such awareness does not 
require ToM. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003) theorize that, as well 
as—and prior to—ToM, we have a ‘distinct mechanism that is specialized 
for detecting one’s own mental states’ (p. 163), which they call the ‘Monit-
oring Mechanism’ (MM). Evidence from developmental psychology sup-
ports the hypothesis that the MM is online in child development some time 
before ToM: three-year-olds perform better in detecting pretence, false be-
liefs, and knowledge in themselves than in others, and they also do better 
in difficult perspective-taking tasks when they involve shifting their own 
perspective as opposed to taking another’s perspective. This suggests a clear 
dissociation between self-monitoring (via MM) and ToM capacity.
Further, Nichols and Stich note that two of the subjects in Hurlburt et 
al.’s (1994) study of self-reported self-awareness in Asperger cases do, in 
fact, use some mental-state vocabulary with reference to themselves. Over-
all, then, while
the inner lives of autistic individuals differ radically from the inner lives of 
most of us . . . people with autism and Asperger’s syndrome do have ac-
cess to their own inner lives. They are aware of,  report,  and remember 
their own beliefs and desires as well as their occurrent thoughts and emo-
tions. (Nichols & Stich, 2003, p. 185)
Nichols and Stich do not suggest that, in neurotypical individuals, ToM 
plays no role at all in the self-monitoring of mental states. Once the ToM 
capacity is  online,  it  can of  course be deployed in  addition to  MM. This 
raises the question to what extent neurotypical self-monitoring involves the 
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ToM capacity. Kai Vogeley and colleagues (2001) conducted a neuroimaging 
study to investigate whether ToM and self share the same neural mechan-
isms. Participants were presented with a number of stories involving either 
taking only someone else’s perspective (‘TOM’), taking only one’s own per-
spective (‘SELF’), or taking both perspectives.  The neural mechanisms in10 -
volved in taking these perspectives were studied using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Both TOM and SELF factors correlated with in-
creased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex.  The TOM factor, but not 11
the SELF factor, also correlated with increased cortical activity at the left 
temporal pole.  The SELF factor, but not the TOM factor, also correlated 12
with  increased  cortical  activity  at  the  right  temporoparietal  junction.  13
TOM–SELF interaction was observed in activity in the right prefrontal cor-
tex. In sum, the imaging results showed both an overlap and a dissociation 
between the neural correlates of the TOM and SELF conditions. (See fig. 7.1 
for an illustration of these brain areas.)
These results suggest two things. First, the exercise of ToM and self-
monitoring capacities seems to be linked by a common neural substrate.  14
Given that, in the context of the experiment, participants were asked to en-
gage in similar activities taking their own perspective and that of others, 
 The study also included two control conditions: a collection of unlinked sen10 -
tences (to serve as a baseline) and stories without a ‘TOM’ or ‘SELF’ component 
(‘physical stories’).
 Anterior cingulate activation is consistent with other neuroimaging results find11 -
ing ToM to correlate with activity in the adjoining medial prefrontal cortex includ-
ing the anterior paracingulate cortex (Frith & Frith 1999; Frith 2001b; Gallagher & 
Frith 2003). It is also consistent with Damasio’s (1999, ch. 8) identification of the 
cingulate cortex as a correlate of the core self.
 This is consistent with other neuroimaging results finding ToM to correlate with 12
left temporopolar (periamygdaloid) cortex activation (Frith, 2001b). 
 The right temporoparietal junction is, however, identified as involved in the ToM 13
network by other studies (Frith, 2001b). 
 It might be argued that ToM and self could still be separate systems whose shar14 -
ing of neural correlates is entirely coincidental. However, Vogeley and colleagues’ 
results  showed  no  activation  of  anterior  cingulate  cortex  in  the  control  tasks, 
whereas it was consistently active in both TOM and SELF tasks. The linking of the 
systems for both provides an explanation for this activity, while the hypothesis of 
coincidence would itself require further explanation.
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this seems unsurprising. More generally, however, it is also not surprising 
that similar neurocognitive mechanisms should be deployed when we en-
gage in self-monitoring and when we take another person’s perspective, if 
both activities involve the ascription of mental states to oneself or another. 
So far as the self qua self-monitoring system involves observing one’s men-
tal life, one would expect it to be linked to our ToM capacity.
Secondly, however, Vogeley and colleagues’ results also showed a dif-
ferential activation of brain areas between the two conditions. Thus, even in 
the limited context of this experiment, with its similar tasks in both condi-
tions,  taking a self-perspective involves a neural architecture that differs 
from that involved in taking the perspective of others. Again more gener-
ally, this suggests that the system or systems involved in self-monitoring do 
not merely involve the application of socially useful capacities (like ToM) to 
oneself, but have their own neural channels. Vogeley and colleagues’ sub-
jects did not include individuals with autism, but the partial dissociation of 
TOM and SELF correlates in their findings suggests that there is a neural 
basis for self-monitoring without theory of mind, and thus, a neural basis 
for autistic selves, however different their operations may be from neuro-
typical ones.
Thus, it would be misguided to suggest that there is no self when there 
is no ToM capacity, which is but one higher-level self-representational capa-
city (albeit a socially  important one). Contrariwise, if self-monitoring sys-
Figure  7.1   Brain  areas  associated  with  TOM and SELF  factors  in  Vogeley 
et al.'s (2001) study. 
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tems are dissociable from ToM, that is an argument against any account of 
the self that requires ToM—as would narrative constructionist and essential 
narrative-capacity views, since the ‘reason-giving’ character of self narrat-
ives would seem to require ToM capacity.  Narrative capacity is also im-
paired in other ways in autism, as I’ll now discuss.
7.3.2  Consequences of weak central coherence for narrative capacity
As weak central coherence is characterized as a deficit in ‘pulling informa-
tion together for higher-level meaning’ (Hill & Frith, 2003, p. 284), some of 
its most obvious consequences are seen in peculiarities concerning narrat-
ive  abilities  of  autistic  individuals.  Thus,  autistic  children attempting to 
narrate a scene with puppets that has been played before them resort to 
‘bizarre/inappropriate utterances’,  showing ‘a kind of failure to compre-
hend the story presented or, in some cases, even to comprehend what a 
story is:  some of the narratives produced by the autism group certainly 
suggest a poor awareness of the puppets as characters rather than simply 
objects’ (Loveland et al., 1990, p. 19). In autistic adults, another peculiarity 
in story-telling is that they ‘are biased toward providing local  over global 
details about each element [of a story], regardless of whether the element 
involved mental content’ (Barnes & Baron-Cohen, 2012, p. 1557). Thus, in-
dependently of ToM deficit, there are deficits in narrative comprehension 
and production concerning the nature and function of stories. A narrative is 
not understood or presented as a coherent whole involving the meaningful 
doings of characters; rather, specific details are picked out that may have no 
strong bearing on the storyline, but are dwelt on at the expense of the ‘big 
picture’ of the narrative as a whole.
What, then, are the consequences of this for the self? For defenders of 
narrative constructionist views (§ 5.3.2), autistic individuals with these defi-
ciencies in narrative understanding and construction could not have a self, 
in the sense of a narrative construct, at all.  Nor could autism be accom-
modated by essential narrative-capacity views, for even autistic individuals 
with verbal  abilities  may (i)  struggle  to  construct  a  self  narrative at  all, 
and/or (ii) fail to understand the point of doing so, or, if a self narrative of 
some kind is constructed, (iii) produce narratives lacking in some or all of 
the features that we would normally expect of meaningful personal stories. 
!195
I  have,  of  course,  already rejected both these  views (§§  6.2,  6.3),  so  we 
should not take the absence or peculiarity of narrative capacity to entail a 
lack of self—just the lack of a particular type  of self-representation. And 
where autistic individuals do  engage in autobiographical  narrating,  their 
way of narratively self-representing is idiosyncratic.
Francesca Happé’s (1991) analysis of the autobiographical writings of 
three adults with Asperger syndrome shows them to be examples of case 
(iii)  above.  Though the subjects  are verbally highly able and clearly see 
some point in writing their life stories, the results diverge from other auto-
biographical writings in a number of ways. Besides evidence of ‘social na-
ivety’ (a consequence of ToM deficit), their writings often do not follow or-
dinary  standards  of  communicative  relevance,  displaying,  on  the  one 15
hand, frequent apparently unmotivated changes of topic and, on the other 
hand, a tendency to perseverate. Happé notes that ‘it is hard to find any-
thing formally wrong [with these writings], rather the reader is left with an 
overall impression of oddness’ (p. 229). Crucially, one of the writers, Barry, 
‘does  not  recognise  what  knowledge  is  shared  and  what  is 
personal’ (p. 214). It may seem, then, that the autobiographical writings of 
autistic individuals fail to adhere to certain basic narrative and communic-
ative rules, such as maintaining relevance and a sense of what can reason-
ably be expected of one’s audience.
But here perhaps the fault, if fault there is, lies not with the autistic 
writers, but with the expectations of a neurotypical reader of their writings:
For example, it may be that the difficulty the reader has in following these 
writers’ subject changes is in part due to the different availability of vari-
ous contexts to the autistic and the normal person. Communication may 
break down with each party getting hold of the wrong end of the stick if 
the autistic speaker is intending his utterance to be processed in a context 
that the normal hearer does not have easily accessible at the time. (p. 229)
If,  then,  autistic  self  narratives  leave an ‘overall  impression of  oddness’ 
with a neurotypical reader, that impression is likely to go both ways. Hap-
pé says of Temple Grandin, another of the autistic writers she studied, that 
she ‘seems to see autism not so much as a handicap but as an alternative 
cognitive style’ (p. 212). If that is so, autistic self-monitoring, and the auto-
 Cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986.15
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biographical narratives this may give rise to, will  necessarily reflect that 
alternative cognitive style.
While the ‘cognitive style’ of neurotypical individuals, for reasons of 
cognitive  economy,  tends  towards  generalization,  focussing  on  salient 
points and discarding unnecessary details, there may, in autistic individu-
als, well be a ‘tolerable cost to processing unrelated and irrelevant informa-
tion’. And whereas we generally process information by reference to a giv-
en context, which in communication is a shared context, for autistic indi-
viduals, ‘the most accessible context  is idiosyncratic’ (p.  237). This is also 
reflected in the organization of memory, and it is the peculiarities of autistic 
memory to which I now turn.
7.3.3  Memory: abilities and differences
Some autistic  individuals  have exceptional  mnemonic abilities,  often for 
numbers and dates (e.g. Scheerer et al., 1945) and/or for visual detail, as in 
the case of the autistic artist Stephen Wiltshire (Sacks, 1995). These ‘savant’ 
abilities are striking not only in their rapidity and accuracy of recall, but 
also in their isolation from other cognitive processes: they seem to bear no 
relation to how developed or underdeveloped the individual’s  cognitive 
functions are generally; they are usually limited to a specific domain (like 
numbers or images) and do not transpose to other cognitive domains; they 
are unbidden and untrained and do not increase with practice or decrease 
for lack of it.
One area of memory, however, that is generally not marked by excep-
tional recall in autism is autobiographical memory. Quite the reverse: recent 
studies  note  deficits  in  autobiographical  memory  in  both  children  and 
adults with both ‘classic’ autism and Asperger syndrome. Bruck and col-
leagues (2007) studied autobiographical memory recall in autistic children 
and found them to have poorer recall than controls both of staged events 
and of  past  personal  events,  particularly  early-life  memories.  Studies  of 
adults  with  Asperger  syndrome by  Goddard and colleagues  (2007)  and 
Tanweer and colleagues (2010) both showed fewer specific memories being 
recalled by the Asperger groups than the control groups. Adler and col-
leagues (2010) found autobiographical memory impairment in individuals 
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with  Asperger  syndrome and  high-functioning  autism to  correlate  with 
ToM impairment.
But, given the complexity of autobiographical remembering discussed 
in ch.  4, it  would be wrong to suggest that autobiographical memory is 
poorer in autistic individuals across the board. Rather, it may be that stud-
ies merely testing quality of event recall and number of events recalled ob-
scure a more nuanced picture of autobiographical memory abilities in aut-
istic individuals, namely a differential ability with respect to semantic and 
episodic memory (§ 4.2.1). For instance, Klein and colleagues (1999) report 
on the case of R.J., ‘a high-functioning autistic individual [who] was found 
to have accurate knowledge of his traits, despite severely limited access to 
the personal experiences on which that knowledge was based’ (p. 413). A 
study by Bowler and colleagues (2000) comparing word recognition per-
formance between Asperger syndrome and neurotypical adults found no 
overall difference in performance, but Asperger subjects were more likely 
to  respond  that  they  ‘knew’  rather  than  ‘remembered’  the  memorized 
words, which Bowler and colleagues take to indicate a moderate impair-
ment  in  episodic  but  not  semantic  memory.  Crane  and Goddard (2008) 
studied autobiographical memory in autistic adults and also found a disso-
ciation between personal episodic memory, which showed deficits in the 
autistic group, and personal semantic memory, which did not. 
These results suggest an impaired ability in autism to recall oneself as a 
protagonist in a past event, as opposed to unimpaired recall of merely fac-
tual information. The study by Tanweer and colleagues (2010) is even more 
suggestive in this respect. One of its aims was specifically to test whether 
autobiographical memory in Asperger cases was processed as self-referen-
tial.  Here again,  besides recalling fewer specific memories,  the Asperger 
group more often classed autobiographical memories as ‘known’ (noetic) 
than  as  ‘remembered’  (autonoetic).  Thus,  whereas  factual  recall  was 
present, recall of the involvement of self in the process of acquiring that 
knowledge was missing.
And yet it may be misleading to use the label ‘episodic memory’ for 
what is impaired in autistic recall, because episodicity is precisely not the 
problem. Many high-functioning autistics have an exceptional capacity for 
recalling events in their episodic detail. As Oliver Sacks (1995) reports on 
Temple Grandin, the autistic animal scientist:
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I was struck both by the vividness of the re-experience, the memory, for 
her—it seemed to play itself in her mind with extraordinary detail—and 
by its unwavering quality. It was as if the original scene, its perception 
(with all its attendant feelings), was reproduced, replayed, with virtually 
no modification. This quality of memory .   .   .  seemed to me both prodi-
gious and pathological—prodigious in its  detail  and pathological  in its 
fixity, more akin to a computer record than to anything else. Such compu-
tational analogies, indeed, are frequently brought up by Temple herself: 
‘My mind is like a CD-ROM in a computer—like a quick-access videotape. 
But once I get there, I have to play that whole part.’ She could not just fo-
cus,  for instance,  on the cradling of an animal .   .   .;  she had to play, in 
memory, the entire scene . . . (pp. 268–9)
While episodic memory is normally a reconstruction (§ 4.4), this does not 
seem the case here. Rather, Grandin’s episodic recollection seems a faithful 
replay of the past event in her consciousness.  In a sense, we might say 16
that Grandin is a perfect Lockean; she really is a being that can ‘repeat the 
idea  of  any  past  action  with  the  same  consciousness  it  had  of  it  at 
first’ (Locke, 1690, II.xxxvii.10).
But Sacks notes that this unusual, ‘prodigious’ actualization of Lockean 
recall also strikes him as ‘pathological in its fixity’.  It may be, then, that 
normal reconstructive episodic remembering, while lacking the videograph-
ic faithfulness of Grandin’s recall, provides us with a more useful tool for 
locating self in time. A fixed unchanging episodic memory does not, after 
all, take account of the passage of time. Self-representation over time is a 
dynamic process: perhaps it is precisely the reconstructive elements of per-
sonal  remembering,  the  reshaping of  our  memories  in  the  light  of  sub-
sequent experience and of present context, that provide us with a sense of 
self over time, as opposed to the mere impersonal knowing that some event 
(however detailed its recollection) occurred in the past.
In sum, memory in autism shows normal or exceptional ability in cer-
tain areas, but impairments of autobiographical episodic memory, shown 
either by a lack of self-reference in remembering or by the abnormal ‘fixity’ 
of  episodic  retrieval.  Thus,  of  the  three  ‘enabling systems’  identified by 
 Grandin (2009) herself likens her mind to a ‘search engine, set to locate photos. 16
All my thoughts are in photo-realistic pictures’ (p. 1437). Sacks’ description of her 
again recalls Borges’ (1942) description of the fictional Ireneo Funes, who is said to 
remember everything in intricate detail,  while, like many autistic individuals (if 
not Grandin), he is unable to form abstractions and generalizations. 
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Klein  and  colleagues  (2004)—self-reflection,  agency/ownership,  and  a 
‘sense of personal temporality’ (see § 4.2.3)—the first and third may be im-
paired or lacking in autistic individuals. We should note, however, that dif-
ferent individuals with autism may have very different memory abilities 
and deficits. For instance, Grandin’s unusual episodic recall seems a corol-
lary of her excellent capacity for mental visual simulation. Other people 
with autism lack this,  and consequently do not  have such videographic 
episodic  memory,  but  may  be  able  to  compensate  with  their  semantic 
memory abilities. There is, then, no paradigm case of autistic memory, but a 
variety of different abilities which may be more or less useful in supporting 
autobiographical memory.
7.3.4  Social aspects
An individual’s self is also, in part, shaped by his social interactions.  It is 17
in this area that the most obvious deficits of the autistic self appear, given 
the autistic characteristics of social and communicative impairments. These 
impairments can be categorized as either affecting primary or secondary in-
tersubjectivity,  where  primary intersubjectivity  concerns  person-to-person 
relations  and  secondary  intersubjectivity  person–person–world  relations 
(Hobson, 2011).
Primary intersubjectivity in autistic individuals is characterized by a 
relative lack of engagement with other people, as reported by parents of 
autistic children (Wimpory et al., 2000) and shown in experimental studies. 
These reveal a reduced propensity to offer spontaneous or prompted greet-
ings to strangers (Hobson & Lee, 1998) and difficulties with engaging in 
conversation (Capps et al., 1998). There are also significant differences in 
affective engagement and the ‘smoothness’ of the interaction (García-Pérez 
et al., 2007), reaffirming the stereotype of the autistic individual as socially 
 I will return to this point in discussing dementia (§ 8.2.3).17
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detached and awkward.  It must be noted, however, that since these indic18 -
ators reflect group differences, they do not predict that any one autistic in-
dividual will perform worse at social-engagement tasks than any one non-
autistic control. Autistics’ difficulties in primary intersubjectivity, while a 
general characteristic of the condition, remain a matter of degree.19
Autistic impairments of secondary intersubjectivity—i.e. relations not 
just with another person but with another person’s own relation to a shared 
world—are more marked. Autistic individuals show a significant lack of 
engagement and emotional connectedness with others’ experience of the 
world. Thus, while they readily imitate others’ goal-directed (intentional) 
actions  (Charman  &  Baron-Cohen,  1994),  they  do  not  imitate  others’ 
emotional  and  expressive  attitudes  while  performing  those  actions 
(DeMyer et al., 1972; Hobson & Lee, 1999; Rogers et al., 2003) and show less 
shared  attention  behaviour  during  imitation  tasks  (Hobson  &  Hobson, 
2007).
Autistics also show a disjunction between self-centred emotions which, 
contrary to a popular conception, are unimpaired in autism (though rarely 
directed at other people), and other-centred emotions, which are impaired 
in autism (Hobson, 2011). For instance, pride is expressed by autistic chil-
dren only as pleasure at their own accomplishment, not as anticipation of 
praise from another person (Kasari et al.,  1993). In another experimental 
setup, autistic subjects showed a marked absence of ‘anticipatory concern’ 
for others’ hurt feelings (Hobson et al., 2009). Thus, the anticipation of the 
emotional responses of others, and correlated own emotions (anticipatory 
pride or pity), seem impaired.
 Specific difficulties with verbal communication appear to straddle the division 18
between primary and secondary intersubjectivity. An interesting but inconclusive 
case is the misuse/reversal of first- and second-person personal pronouns (Kanner, 
1943; Charney, 1981). A study by Lee, Hobson, and Chiat (1994) found that compre-
hension of these pronouns was virtually unimpaired in the autistic test group, but 
that their use by autistic subjects was less frequent relative to controls in a visual-
perspective task. This relative reluctance by autistics to employ first- and second-
person pronouns may be connected to a deficient ‘grasp of reciprocal roles in dia-
logue’ (Hobson, 1990, p. 172) (primary intersubjectivity) and, more generally, diffi-
culties in perspective-taking (Hobson & Lee, 1999) (secondary intersubjectivity).
 This applies particularly to cases of high-functioning autism and Asperger syn19 -
drome, where acquired compensation mechanisms may exist for primary intersub-
jective relations (§ 7.3.1).
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These deficits in anticipating and mirroring others’ emotions suggest a 
general lack of ability in autistics for taking the perspective of others. In an il-
luminating discussion of perspective-taking in Asperger syndrome, Frith 
and de Vignemont (2005) note that in normal intersubjectivity, we adopt 
both egocentric and allocentric stances towards others. From an egocentric 
stance, one represents others in relation to oneself. Adopting an allocentric 
stance, others are represented as independent of oneself. While, in non-aut-
istic individuals, these allocentric and egocentric stances interact and feed 
off each other, Frith and de Vignemont hypothesize that they are disconnec-
ted and ‘polarized’ in Asperger cases: social relations are processed from an 
extreme egocentric  stance that  is  never transposed to another’s  point  of 
view. Where an allocentric stance is adopted, it is ‘highly abstract’ and rep-
resents social relations from neither party’s point of view.
In a similar vein, Hobson theorizes that full self-awareness of a kind 
that is lacking in most autistic individuals involves ‘identifying with the 
attitudes of other people’ (2011, p. 582; cf. Hobson et al., 2006, pp. vii, 126). 
This choice of phrase recalls G. H. Mead’s (1925; 1934) social behaviourist 
account of selfhood, in which taking the attitudes of others is a necessary 
condition  for  developing  a  self.  Hobson’s  interpretation  is  not  that  far-
reaching, however: he does not hold that the self is entirely constituted in 
one’s social relations. But he notes that the development of the self usually 
includes the development of the ability to identify with others’ attitudes. 
Absent this ability, one is led to conclude, the autistic self remains some-
how incomplete.
However,  the  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  intersub-
jectivity shows that the social self is not monolithic but itself divides into 
different  components.  Autistic  impairments  in  primary  intersubjectivity 
concern the manner and intensity of social relations more than the fact of 
such relations, suggesting that we are dealing with an impoverished or dif-
ferently configured—rather than absent—social self in autism. It is in sec-
ondary intersubjectivity that the social self in autism is most obviously im-
poverished, in that autistic individuals simply cannot, as it were, put them-
selves in another person’s shoes: their representation of another’s perspect-
ive, where it exists, remains abstract and impersonal. It may be, then, that 
what autistic individuals lack is a sense of being one among other like indi-
viduals. It is difficult to quantify how that lack of a comparative standard 
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affects an autistic individual’s sense of ‘being someone’ overall.  We may 
perhaps guess that it could be a sense of being someone who is very much 
alone in the world.
And yet, Hobson’s above-cited injunction that we should understand 
autism as an inability to join in a shared ‘form of life’ (§ 7.2.4) falls short of 
recognizing  that  people  with  autism may be  able  to  develop  their  own 
forms of existence, in particular in their social relations with other autistic 
individuals.  Thus,  Oliver  Sacks (1995)  reports  on the B.  family—parents 
and an older son with Asperger’s syndrome, and a younger son with clas-
sical autism—who are able to share with each other the experience of being 
surrounded by a profoundly baffling social world:
Indeed, in some autistic people this sense of radical and ineradicable dif-
ferentness is so profound as to lead them to regard themselves, half jok-
ingly, almost as members of another species (‘They beamed us down on 
the transporter together,’ as the B.s liked to say), and to feel that autism, 
while it may be seen as a medical condition, and pathologized as a syn-
drome, must also be seen as a whole mode of being, a deeply different 
mode or identity, one that needs to be conscious (and proud) of itself.
(p. 264)
The B. family not only have a ‘form of life’, but a shared one. Within their 
family, they are selves among like selves. It is at least questionable, then, 
whether we should regard their differences from neurotypicals as patholo-
gical.
7.3.5  The self in autism: conclusion
I have here given an overview of how the characteristics of autism spec-
trum conditions may affect different cognitive processes that contribute to 
the self. As a result of ToM deficit, there may be no fluent and automatic 
self-ascription  of  mental  states  in  mental-state  terms—but  there  is  still 
awareness  of  one’s  cognitive and affective states.  Weak central  coherence 
and different memory organization pose difficulties for narrative produc-
tion and the ‘autonoetic’ awareness of episodic autobiographical memories. 
And the social impairments of autistic individuals will result in an unusual 
and impoverished social self.
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It  must  not,  however,  be  assumed  that  all  these  impairments  are 
present  in  all  individuals  with  autism  spectrum  conditions,  or  where 
present,  always to the same degree.  Autism spectrum conditions are di-
verse,  ranging  from  high-functioning  autistic  individuals  like  Temple 
Grandin  through  cases  of  cognitively  underdeveloped  individuals  with 
isolated  savant  abilities  to  individuals  with  classical  autism,  often  non-
verbal, who may be profoundly disabled.  Even among autistic individu20 -
als with similar degrees of cognitive idiosyncrasies, considerable variations 
exist  in  what  cognitive  capacities  are  particularly  developed  or  under-
developed—just as such variations exist between neurotypical individuals. 
There is,  therefore,  no one paradigmatic  ‘autistic  self’.  There are,  rather, 
various self-representational capacities that may be impaired—or operate 
differently—in autism.
In the next chapter, I will look at other defects and disorders and their 
relation to memory, narrative capacity, and the self.





Other defects and disorders
8.1  Introduction
My target in much of this thesis has been historical-constructionist theories 
of the self, which attempt to define the self in terms of either autobiograph-
ical memory (ch. 4) or narrative (chs. 5 & 6). Against these, I have argued in 
favour of a view of the self as a complex, dynamic self-representational sys-
tem. By way of illustrating my case for the system view, after autism spec-
trum conditions in the previous chapter, I will now discuss a number of 
psychopathologies  that  affect  memory  and/or  self.  This  discussion  will 
demonstrate the advantages of the system view over historical-construc-
tionist accounts of the self.
Against the Lockean intuition that a loss of memory causes a loss of 
self,  clinical  case  studies  of  memory deficiencies  suggest  that  some ele-
ments of self persist despite the loss or impairment of explicit memory. Dif-
ferent memory impairments correlate with impairments of different self-
representational  capacities.  Explicit  autobiographical  recollection  is  only 
one such capacity, perhaps not the most important one (§ 8.2).
Other ‘self disorders’—split brains, bipolar disorder, multiple personal-
ity disorder, schizophrenia—also show disruptions of different self-monit-
oring processes. Tempting though it may be to speak of such conditions as 
resulting in multiple or dissolving selves, the self-representational capacit-
ies disturbed in each are distinct and quite specific, while other parts of the 
self continue to function. Moreover, these disturbances of the self are not 
caused by defective narrativity: narrativity may be unimpaired, or if it is 
impaired, this is a consequence of the disorder (§ 8.3).
I’ll conclude by showing how the system view can account for these 
different  psychopathologies  as  partial  disturbances  of  the  self,  while  ac-
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knowledging their specificity and the unimpaired operations of other func-
tions of the self (§ 8.4).
8.2  Memory defects
As noted in Chapter 4, autobiographical memory is complex and varied. 
Besides episodic  recollections of the events of our lives, we have semantic 
autobiographical knowledge, both of the facts relating to our biographies, 
and of our (self-image of) personality traits (§ 4.2.5). We have, in addition, a 
capacity for recognizing  ourselves in mirrors and images. Self-recognition 
and the various kinds of autobiographical remembering are all self-repres-
entational processes—activities of the self as system.
If one were deprived of these capacities, would one thereby lose one’s 
self? There appears to be a widespread quasi-Lockean intuition that auto-
biographical memories are necessary for the self to persist (ch. 3). Yet, that 
intuition is triggered by thought experiments or experimental philosophy 
vignettes in which the usual persistence of memories (and self) is contras-
ted with a complete (and usually sudden) loss of memories (and sometimes 
all other psychological states).
It  would now be useful  if  there were empirical  studies of  complete 
memory loss to corroborate or disconfirm the supposition that such a con-
dition should result in a loss of self. But, as we shall see, memory loss in 
amnesias and dementias is never quite complete. While many amnesias are 
sudden  in  onset,  their  effect  is  mostly  on  a  circumscribed  aspect  of 
memory; dementias are more global in their effects, but progress gradually, 
and may spare isolated self-representational  mnemonic  capacities.  I  will 
shortly look at examples of amnesias (§ 8.2.2) and dementia (§ 8.2.3) and 
their implications for patients’ selves. But first, let me discuss an intriguing 
case of complete lack of episodic memory.
8.2.1  ‘Severely deficient autobiographical memory’
In April 2016, Wired magazine ran a story about Susie McKinnon, who has 
no episodic recall at all, and never has had that capacity (Hayasaki, 2016). 
McKinnon leads an otherwise unremarkable life: she is happily married, 
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has a steady job, enjoys holiday cruises, and sings in a choir. She has per-
fectly normal semantic self-knowledge: she knows who she is, her personal-
ity traits are no less stable than those of others, she has factual knowledge 
of things she has done in the past—but ‘none of it bears a vivid, first-person 
stamp’. She also cannot date even recent holidays more accurately than to 
within a decade. Having first been made aware of her deficiency as a teen-
ager, she has not found it a serious impediment in her personal or profes-
sional life. Indeed, she seems to have no desire to compensate for the lack 
of episodic memory with photography or by having a ‘timeline’ on social 
media websites: ‘the life-logging impulse is lost on McKinnon’. She seems 
to lack what Klein et al. (2004) call a ‘sense of personal temporality’. More 
precisely, what is missing appears to be the constructive capacity that un-
derwrites episodic recollection (§ 4.4.1): just as she has no episodic memory, 
McKinnon also does not engage in episodic thinking about the future, or 
any  kind  of  imagining:  ‘She  does  not  daydream.  Her  mind  does  not 
wander’ (Hayasaki, 2016). And thus, while she enjoys reading novels and 
watching films and television serials, she has no narrative capacity of her 
own. She also cannot recall the narratives of books or films she has read or 
seen.
McKinnon is one of only three reported cases so far with what has been 
labelled ‘severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM)’ (Palombo et 
al.,  2015).  None  of  these  cases  had  any  ‘history  of  birth  complications, 
seizures, stroke, traumatic brain injury or neurological disease . . ., nor was 
there evidence of psychological trauma’, and, ‘at the time of testing, there 
was no evidence of depression or other psychopathology’ (p. 107). All three 
showed reduced activity in midline brain regions in fMRI scans during a 
personal recall task, notably in the left medial prefrontal cortex, ‘associated 
with  the  mental  projection of  the  self  through time’,  and the  right  pre-
cuneus, ‘associated with visual memory’ (p. 111). Additionally, in structural 
MRI, they all showed a significant asymmetry of the hippocampus, with 
the right hippocampus, which has been associated with visuospatial pro-
cessing, being 6–9 % smaller in volume than that of controls (pp. 109, 112, 
115). The SDAM cases also performed significantly worse than controls on 
a visual memory task. All this suggests that normal episodic recall makes 
strong  use  of  visual  memory  circuits.  The  absence  of  episodic  memory 
combined with poor visual memory in SDAM thus seems the opposite of 
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the strongly visual  cognitive style and highly detailed episodic recall  of 
Temple Grandin discussed in the previous chapter (§ 7.3.3).
What, then, of Susie McKinnon’s self? There is no chance that McKin-
non could ever satisfy the criterion of a Lockean self: the re-living of past 
events in autonoetic consciousness. Neo-Lockeans, meanwhile, would dia-
gnose a severe lack of ‘psychological connectedness’ over time, as well as 
seriously impaired ‘psychological continuity’. As she has no narrative ca-
pacity, narrative constructionists and defenders of essential narrative-capa-
city views would also have to exclude her from having a self. But while the 
constructive  capacity  for  episodic  recollection  and  narration  is  absent, 
McKinnon’s semantic autobiographical knowledge and her self-awareness 
in the present are functioning. Thus, her case illustrates perfectly how mis-
guided the historical-constructionist project is in defining the self in terms 
of episodic memory and/or self narratives.
McKinnon’s  inability  to  form episodic  memories  is  not  an acquired 
condition; it is not a case of a previously available capacity being lost. In 
this respect, and in others, SDAM differs from cases of amnesia, to which I 
now turn.
8.2.2  Amnesias
The term ‘amnesia’ covers any loss of memory of any severity and dura-
tion.  Amnesia  usually  correlates  with  brain  lesions  resulting  from head 
trauma,  stroke,  tumours,  infectious disease,  or  toxins.  As the aetiologies 
vary,  so do the affected brain areas;  and with them vary the aspects  of 
memory  that  are  lost  or  impaired.  More  important,  the  presentation  of 
memory loss varies in scope and severity, as well as in its temporal direc-
tion: retrograde amnesias are characterized by a loss of memory of events 
before the onset of the condition, while anterograde amnesias are marked 
by an inability to form new memories post-onset. Retrograde and antero-
grade amnesia can also co-occur.
Alan Baddeley and Barbara Wilson (1986) tested the autobiographical 
memory recall of patients with different forms of anterograde amnesia and 
found ‘qualitative differences . . . that were not predictable on the basis of 
the  more  traditional  memory  tests’  (p.  229).  These  differences  were  ob-
served across the dimensions of fluency, episodicity, richness of detail, and 
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reliability.  Overall,  Baddeley  and  Wilson  record  four  ‘patterns  of 
deficit’ (p. 234): first, relatively unremarkably, a number of patients showed 
normal recall of autobiographical memory for events before the onset of 
their anterograde amnesia. A second group of patients were afflicted with 
what  Baddeley  and Wilson  call  ‘clouding’  of  autobiographical  memory: 
they were able ‘to recall events in some detail on one occasion but not sub-
sequently’ (p. 235). These patients showed confusion but did not confabu-
late. Finally, four patients with frontal-lobe damage exhibited two further 
patterns of impairment present to differing degrees in different patients: 
non-fluency  of  recollection,  and  confabulation.  While  confabulation  is 
common in frontal-lobe patients (see § 4.4.4) it is not present in all of them; 
nor are non-fluency and confusion present in equal measure in all cases of 
frontal-lobe damage.
Baddeley (1982) distinguishes between processes of retrieval and of re-
collection of autobiographical memories, where recollection is a second-or-
der ‘active process of setting up prospective retrieval cues, evaluating the 
outcome, and systematically working toward a representation of a past ex-
perience that we find acceptable’ (p. 712). In most amnesics, it is the retrieval 
mechanism that is impaired, making recollection impossible: this is the case 
with Baddeley & Wilson’s (1986) first group of patients, where the onset of 
anterograde amnesia marks the point beyond which no memories are re-
trievable. In contrast, in the frontal-lobe cases, the issues with fluency and 
confabulation suggest that some disorganized retrieval occurs, but that recol-
lection  (in Baddeley’s sense) is disrupted, affecting ‘the capacity both for 
directing  memory  retrieval  and  for  evaluating  output’  (p.   249).  This 
impairment  of  executive  control  over  memory retrieval  and assessing the 
veracity of reported memories is consistent with other features of frontal-
lobe defects that show lack of executive control, such as distractibility and 
difficulties initiating and interrupting behaviour.  In frontal-lobe patients, 
then,  such disruption of  self  as  may be  inferred from the disruption of 
autobiographical recollection is a defect of executive control, rather than a 
defect of memory itself. As Baddeley and Wilson observe,
This leads to the general question of how normal subjects verify their 
memories. The fact that we make mistakes indicates that this process is 
far from perfect, but the fact that most of our mistakes are plausible 
ones  suggests  that  we  do  cross-check  the  results  of  our  retrieval 
processes. (p. 249)
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This is another point in favour of the priority of the self qua self-monit-
oring system over autobiographical memory. Executive control clearly is a 
self-monitoring process, and an important one at that: the prefrontal cortex 
is the closest thing to a ‘central processing unit’ for higher-level cognition 
that we have in our brains. Defects in decision-making, in planning and 
monitoring complex goal-directed behaviour, as well as in monitoring our 
memory reconstructions, are all associated with prefrontal lesions (Dama-
sio, 1994).  And it is a defect in this higher-level self-monitoring which here 1
leads  to  confabulation  and  defective  memory—rather  than  defective 
memories leading to a defective self.
William Hirst’s (1994) review paper ‘The remembered self in amnesics’ 
supports the view that the self depends on a number of processes whose 
disruptions  are  dissociable  and  not  uniform.  Experimental  studies  with 
anterograde amnesics show that although there is generally a failure to re-
trieve memories of post-onset events, memories are nevertheless being en-
coded and can sometimes be accessed when given the right cue, though 
without temporal and other contextual information. Recognition is some-
what preserved in amnesics (amnesics perform worse than control subjects 
but better than chance in recognition trials), as are skill learning and prim-
ing (amnesics perform as well as controls in implicit, but not explicit, word 
completion  tasks).  Additionally,  amnesics  retain  ‘islands  of  preserved 
memory’  (p.   264)  such  as  family  events  (perhaps  for  their  emotional 
valence or because of frequent rehearsal of these memories—cf. § 4.3.1).
Hirst also notes that the implicit memories of amnesics are still operat-
ive  in  governing  behaviour.  For  instance,  Hirst  mentions  the  case  of  a 
former executive with both retrograde and anterograde amnesia, who has 
no explicit recollection of his former occupation but whose demeanour re-
mains that of one with the role and position he occupied. Thus the self, 
Hirst suggests,  is  apparent not only in individuals’  explicit  memories of 
their lives, but also ‘in the amnesics’ behaviour, and in their physical envir-
onment’ (p. 272):
Our patients had a sense of their place spatially, temporally, socially, 
professionally, and emotionally. Moreover, they could talk about what 
they liked to do . . . and they planned their lives around these activit-
ies. (p. 271)
 I’ll return to executive control in my concluding chapter (§ 9.2.1).1
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Hirst also emphasizes the role played by others—by the social context—in 
supporting his amnesic patients’ selves. He suggests that their impairment 
of memory functions is to some extent compensated for by a process we 
may call cognitive outsourcing: memories are ‘externalized, collectivized, and 
eventually  internalized’  (p.  273),  if  only  implicitly.  (Such  cognitive  out-
sourcing also occurs for individuals with dementia—see § 8.2.3 below.)
The complexity of the effects of amnesia on the self  is  further illus-
trated by two cases from Oliver Sacks’s (1986) clinical memoirs. Both are of 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, a disorder in chronic alcoholics char-
acterized by anterograde amnesia, confabulation, and disorientation (Suth-
erland, 1995). One case, Mr Thompson, had profound anterograde amnesia, 
with recall of new experiences limited to less than a minute, for which he 
compensated with continuous confabulation, a ‘narrational frenzy’ (Sacks, 
1986, p. 106) in which he mistook Sacks variously for old friends or cus-
tomers of his former delicatessen, recruiting elements of pre-amnesia auto-
biographical knowledge apparently at random. He was able to recognize 
his brother but treated him with indifference, as he did the characters of his 
confabulations. Overall, Sacks describes him as seeming ill at ease and be-
wildered, except when alone in the garden: ‘one never feels, or rarely feels, 
that there is a person remaining’ (p. 110, original emphasis). Here then, we 
might say, is a case of a seriously impaired self. But what Mr Thompson 
lacks is not simply autobiographical memory—for his pre-onset memories 
are available and drawn on in his confabulations—nor narrative capacity—
which if anything is present to excess. Rather, because of the anterograde 
amnesia there is a lack of temporal positioning and of the ability to integrate 
available memories coherently.
Sacks’s other Korsakoff’s patient, Jimmie G., presented somewhat dif-
ferently. He did not confabulate, but in addition to the typical anterograde 
amnesia also had retrograde amnesia eclipsing about 25 years before the 
onset of his disorder. Of his life before that period, he had intact and de-
tailed autobiographical memories, on which he was able to draw in conver-
sation.  He had intact  spatial  recognition,  was able to recognize his  own 
handwriting,  and  learned  to  recognize  the  nursing  staff  around  him 
(though misidentifying them with people he had known in his pre-amnesia 
days). But as a result of his amnesia, like Mr Thompson, he was ‘isolated in 
a single moment of being’ (p. 28), without temporal positioning and having 
!211
no access to (by the time he became Sacks’s patient) three decades of auto-
biographical memory. The question then, as Sacks himself puts it, is ‘what 
sort of a self can be preserved in a man who has lost the greater part of his 
memory and, with this, his past, and his moorings in time?’ (p. 22)
Sacks’s own tentative first answer to this is that his patient had become 
a ‘“Humean” being’ (p. 28), one whose self truly is ‘nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions’ (Hume, 1739/1978, I.iv.6). But this ‘dia-
gnosis’ seems to hold only for the patient’s explicit cognitive functions. There 
are implicit cognitive abilities—such as recognition—that are unaffected by 
his amnesia. And there are affective states and traits which may well mark 
one as a particular individual. Sacks (1986) quotes from his correspondence 
with  Alexander  Luria,  who  reminds  him:  ‘a  man  does  not  consist  of 
memory alone. He has feeling, will, sensibilities, moral being’ (p. 32). Sacks 
also reports witnessing Jimmie attending divine service with ‘an intensity 
and steadiness of attention and concentration that I had never seen before 
in him or conceived him capable of’ (p. 36). Further, Sacks’s initial descrip-
tion  of  his  patient  abounds  with  predicates  of  persistent  (and pleasant) 
character  traits—Jimmie  G.  is  ‘charming’,  ‘cheerful,  friendly,  and 
warm’ (p. 22), ‘genial’ (p. 23).
Like the other cases of amnesia discussed, the case of Jimmie G. sug-
gests that the characteristics that make one who one is are not exhausted by 
the availability of explicit autobiographical memories. There is no denying 
that a large part of Jimmie G.’s autobiographical knowledge has been lost. 
But equally it is obvious from Sacks’s clinical portrait that some elements of 
his patient’s self—his native intelligence, his character traits, and what we 
may call his affective self—persist.
8.2.3  Dementia
Dementia is defined, generally, as ‘an acquired and irreversible deteriora-
tion  of  intellectual  function’  (Marcovitch,  2010,  p.  179).  Thus,  dementia 
does not merely affect memory, but (as the term’s etymology implies) ‘men-
tal’ capacities generally. This might suggest that as well as those components 
of self linked to autobiographical memory, other elements of self—such as 
those apparently spared in localized amnesias—should deteriorate in cases 
of  dementia.  Once  again,  however,  the  clinical  literature  paints  a  more 
!212
complex picture. I will here first consider a couple of case studies suggest-
ing  that  some  self-related  memory  functions  persist  even  in  advanced 
stages of dementia. Then I will discuss, more broadly, how the effects of 
dementia on the self may be characterized.
As discussed earlier (§ 4.2.4), knowledge of one’s character traits ap-
pears to be dissociable from other semantic personal memory.  As Klein, 
Cosmides, and Costabile (2003) note, such trait self-knowledge is ‘surpris-
ingly  resilient  in  the  face  of  brain  damage  and  developmental 
disorders’  (p.  158).  Is  it  resilient in the face of dementia? Klein and col-
leagues examined this in the case of patient K.R., a 76-year-old college-edu-
cated woman with severe Alzheimer’s dementia, who suffered from disori-
entation, had difficulties finding words and naming objects (i.e. seriously 
impaired semantic memory), had severe anterograde amnesia, and retained 
only a very sketchy knowledge of her personal past before the onset of her 
dementia. But when tested on questions about her own personality traits, 
she produced reliably consistent answers between a first test and a re-test. 
Though her answers did not agree with her daughter’s and her carer’s as-
sessment of her current personality, they did agree with her daughter’s rat-
ings of K.R.’s pre-onset personality. Further, K.R.’s ratings of her daughter’s 
personality ‘correlated strongly with her daughter’s self-ratings’ (p.  161). 
On the other hand, her ratings of the carer’s personality traits were not reli-
able compared with the carer’s own self-ratings and those by age-matched 
healthy control subjects. Thus it appears that K.R. retained pre-dementia 
trait  self-knowledge,  which  had,  however,  not  been  updated  with  the 
changes in her personality that had occurred since the onset of her demen-
tia. Analogously, she retained pre-dementia knowledge of others’ personal-
ity traits  (daughter)  but  had not  formed an accurate trait  knowledge of 
post-onset acquaintances (carer). K.R.’s trait knowledge of self and others 
was thus, as it were, archived at the time of the onset of dementia and re-
mained accessible thereafter, even as other personal memories before and 
after onset became inaccessible.
Hehman, German, and Klein (2005) observed a similar effect with re-
spect to self-recognition  in another dementia patient,  P.H.,  an 83-year-old 
woman in  the  late  stages  of  Alzheimer’s  disease  (which  had  been  dia-
gnosed about seven years previously). P.H. was presented with 14 photo-
graphs of herself (two each from seven decades of her life, all presented in 
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monochrome  and  with  context  removed)  on  two  occasions  and  asked 
whether she recognized the person in the picture. With images from her 
twenties and thirties, she recognized herself in 7 of 8 presentations. For the 
remaining decades, she only recognized herself, and with uncertainty, in 2 
of 20 image presentations, and mistook a further two photos for one or oth-
er  of  her  sisters.  Hehman and colleagues conclude that,  like K.R.’s  trait 
knowledge  in  the  other  case  study,  ‘P.H.’s  self-recognition  is  frozen  in 
time’ (p. 121). But, unlike in P.H.’s case, the ‘freezing point’ of K.R.’s self-
recognition appears much earlier than the onset of her dementia—it was in 
the oldest photographs that she most assuredly recognized herself, while 
there was not much difference between her responses to images from her 
forties and her eighties.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that aspects of self-knowledge 
(i.e., personality traits, facial appearance) that have been documented in 
clinical descriptions as degraded as a result of Alzheimer’s disease, might 
degrade  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  vestiges  of  earlier  representational 
states. This idea is consistent with the proposal that Alzheimer’s disease 
might carry with it impairment in routines that update various databases of 
self-related knowledge. (p. 122, emphasis added)
Thus, in Hehman and colleagues’ analysis, while there is degradation of 
self-knowledge in Alzheimer’s dementia concurrent with the loss of gener-
al semantic memory, some premorbid self-knowledge persists, but is no longer 
updated. In this respect, the presentation of Alzheimer’s disease resembles 
the cases of anterograde amnesia discussed earlier.
While the cases of P.H. and K.R. suggest that memory and self-know-
ledge rely  on dissociable  components  that  do not  deteriorate  equally  in 
dementia, the preserved elements of self-knowledge are nonetheless lim-
ited in comparison with the overall degradation of cognitive function ob-
served, involving the progressive loss of memory, of the ability to commu-
nicate, and eventually of recognition, along with secondary effects such as 
changes in personality, confusion and disorientation. The experience of the 
outward effects of this cognitive deterioration by others, particularly close 
family and friends of those with dementia, has led to a popular conception 
of dementia as a progressive ‘loss of self’ (Aquilina & Hughes, 2006). And if 
the self is a system that recruits various cognitive capacities, a general pro-
gressive deterioration in cognitive function may well be expected to affect 
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most or all of them sooner or later, even if, as suggested by the studies of 
K.R. and P.H., this occurs at different rates for different components of the 
self.
But there are two qualifications still to be made here. One is that the 
‘loss of self’ observed by others is informed by the overt behaviour of de-
mentia sufferers, which is affected by their ‘declining ability to communic-
ate’ (Small et al., 1998)—leaving the possibility that a patient’s inability to 
communicate may mask his or her remaining cognitive capacities. The oth-
er qualification is that a dementia sufferer’s self may be affected by care 
practices, specifically by his or her being ‘positioned’ (Sabat, 2006) as noth-
ing but a helpless patient whose every behaviour is interpreted as being a 
result of the disease.
On the first of these points, a number of studies conducted since the 
1990s show that though communication is impaired in dementia sufferers, 
what utterances they do make contain indicators of a functioning sense of 
self even in the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Along with ‘lucid peri-
ods .   .   .  when the patient was the subject of individual attention, or .   .   . 
triggered by strong emotions  in  the  context  of,  for  example,  music  and 
prayer’ (Aquilina & Hughes, 2006, p. 145), these indicators include the use 
of  first-person pronouns and proper nouns,  and patients’  self-referential 
statements  ‘about  themselves,  their  needs,  and concerns’  (Tappen et  al., 
1999,  p.  123).  Where  such  a  sense  of  self  can  no  longer  be  expressed 
verbally, it may still be apparent in patients’ interactions with care staff: 
For the [care home] residents who did not use first person pronouns, self 
was, nevertheless, indexed in other ways. These residents were frequently 
involved in conflicts in which they defended their rights as an individual. 
In these conflicts, their awareness of and resistance to the violation of their 
desires by others was a clear expression of an intact self.  
(Small et al., 1998, p. 309)
As Steven Sabat (2005) puts it, a person with dementia thus remains a ‘se-
miotic  subject’,  that  is,  ‘a  person  whose  behaviour  is  driven  by 
meaning’ (p. 1030), one who has desires, acts with intention, interprets and 
evaluates and responds to events, situations, and others’ actions. Conflicts 
arise because the person with dementia is unable to articulate his or her 
desires and intentions. Aquilina and Hughes (2006) take this as indicating 
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that ‘there is an inner self, which cannot communicate with the carer’, mak-
ing dementia sufferers in effect ‘mental prisoners’ (p. 145). 
But there is a caveat to this. If emotions, lexical and behavioural self-
reference, and intentional agency are indices of a persisting self, its capacity 
for  self-representation  over  time  is  nonetheless  impaired  by  the  loss  of 
memory. For instance, Small et al. (1998) record a conversation between a 
member of care staff and a care home resident in which the carer makes 
reference to the resident’s former occupation as a carpenter—‘you made 
buildings’—whereupon  the  resident  seems  astonished  and  utters 
‘really?’ (p. 300)—suggesting that his sense of self no longer, at that point, 
involved any such autobiographical content.
This is not to say, however, that references to a dementia sufferer’s past 
occupations cannot be useful. And that brings me to my second qualifica-
tion of the progressive loss of self in dementia stipulated earlier. Some ele-
ments of our self-representational activity emerge from our social interac-
tions and how one is ‘positioned’ in interactions with others, that is, what 
social roles are ascribed to one by others and, interactively, by oneself. I will 
refer  to  these  aspects  of  self-representation  collectively  as  the  social  self. 
(Other terms in the literature include Rom Harré’s (1991) self2, defined as 
‘the selves that are publicly presented in the episodes of interpersonal in-
teraction in the everyday world, the coherent clusters of traits we some-
times  call  “personae”’  (Sabat  &  Harré,  1992,  p.  445),  and  Aquilina  & 2
Hughes’ (2006) ‘outer self’ (in contrast to their aforementioned ‘inner self’), 
‘the public observable aspects of self, which depend on psycho-social struc-
tures including social relations, culture, and language’ (p. 150).)
The social  self  depends on social  interactions and these,  largely,  de-
pend on interpersonal communication. Where one party’s communicative 
abilities are impaired, as in the case of people with dementia, the onus of 
supporting  their  social  selves  shifts  to  those  around  them—family  and 
friends, carers, and clinical staff. This is the common theme that emerges 
from studies by Sabat and Harré (1992), Small and colleagues (1998), and 
Tappen  and  colleagues  (1999).  In  clinical  and  residential-care  settings, 
people with dementia are generally treated as entirely dependent, and all 
 In Sabat's (2005) revised notation, which also distinguishes between ‘the self of 2
personal identity’ and ‘the self of mental and physical attributes’, this social self 
becomes ‘self3’.
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their behaviours are interpreted as resulting from their disease. Sabat (2006) 
refers to this practice as ‘malignant positioning’ (p. 289) (where ‘malignant’ 
means  ‘harmful’  rather  than ‘with  malicious  intent’);  dementia  sufferers 
‘can then come to see themselves in progressively more defective terms and 
lose a sense of self-worth’ (p. 290). Besides this ethical implication, position-
ing the dementia sufferer as an entirely dependent patient forecloses the 
preservation of his or her social self.
As Small and colleagues (1998) point out, different care practices may 
produce different results:
Caregivers can help preserve the personae of residents by cooperating in 
the co-construction of the residents’ preferred personae. This will require 
taking a personal interest in the residents’ background . . . One might ar-
gue that  there  is  little  reason for  staff  to  talk  with nonverbal  residents 
about their (residents’ or staff’s) personal lives since it would be a one-
way conversation. This perspective, however, fails to take into account the 
retained receptive abilities  of  many nonverbal  demented residents.  The 
fact that residents may not respond verbally does not mean that they do 
not understand. (pp. 312–3)
It is also possible for a still verbal dementia sufferer actively to solicit oth-
ers’ co-operation in supporting his social self. A rather touching example of 
this is provided by Sabat and Harré (1992). One of their subjects, J.B., a re-
tired academic, still able to communicate but often finding it difficult to put 
into words what he was trying to say, evidently took his involvement in 
Sabat’s research as continuous and of a kind with his own previous scientif-
ic career. It became apparent that he wished to obtain some ‘tangible’ recog-
nition of his contribution. Sabat’s response to this is worth quoting at some 
length  as  it  illustrates  what  is  meant  by  positioning  a  person  with 
Alzheimer’s dementia as other than just a patient, and thereby supporting 
his social self:
Once the nature of J.B.’s wish to link this last spurt of academic effort with 
the final stage of his moral career became clear it was arranged for him to 
have a letter of commendation from the Dean of the College of Arts and 
Sciences. In that letter, J.B. was commended for giving of himself unstint-
ingly to help with the investigation of the abilities that remain intact in 
spite of A.D. [Alzheimer’s disease] . . . Upon receiving the letter, his wife 
made copies and he, then, brought a copy to the day care centre where it 
was read aloud to the entire group of participants. In addition, when his 
adult children visited, he showed them the letter with great pride, for it 
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signalled that he was, indeed, doing something important. Thus, . . . the 
academic self2 was jointly constructed once again. By virtue of the social 
force of the letter of commendation J.B. was positioned, not as a helpless 
and confused A.D. sufferer, but as one who had a contribution to make to 
science even in the throes of A.D. (p. 455)
Of course,  different dementia sufferers will  have different ‘preferred 
personae’, and, depending on individual circumstances and the progress of 
the disease, not all will respond in like manner to attempts by carers at re-
connecting them with their occupational past (cf. the example of the car-
penter in Small et al. (1998) cited earlier). In some cases, treating patients’ 
present needs without regard to their past can be advantageous as well as 
problematic;  and  sometimes  the  preservation  of  a  patient’s  personhood 
may occur only by proxy, through a spouse or close family member (Op-
penheimer, 2006)—another example of the cognitive outsourcing described 
earlier (§ 8.2.2). But the point is that such social interactions as are possible 
in the various stages of dementia still shape and shore up a sufferer’s social 
self. What form these interactions take makes a crucial difference—whether 
the  person  with  dementia  is  positioned  as  merely  a  patient,  or  as  a 
person (Sabat, 2006). The right kind of engagement with dementia sufferers 
may well amount to a ‘workout’ for their selves.
8.2.4  Memory defects and self: conclusions
Though the complete and immediate erasure of memory and other psycho-
logical states that is the staple of thought experiments on the persistence or 
otherwise of self is not encountered in actual clinical cases, the quasi-Lock-
ean  intuition  was  that  any  noticeable  loss  of  autobiographical  memory 
should entail a proportionate loss of self. But the loss or inaccessibility of 
explicit autobiographical memory in amnesias and dementia, or the lack of 
episodic memory in SDAM, are not the causes  of a defective self. Rather, 
they are symptoms of the deterioration or absence of a particular self-repres-
entational capacity.
Moreover,  memory  is  not  monolithic.  There  are,  rather,  areas  of 
memory that are preserved in these conditions: recognition including self-
recognition, procedural memory, trait self-knowledge, and other ‘implicit’ 
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memories.  Furthermore, there are other domains of the self, such as char3 -
acter traits, decision-making and a sense of agency, and affective disposi-
tions, that are not neatly classifiable as memory-related and that seem per-
sistent even in severe memory disorders. In sum, then, the pathologies of 
memory once again suggest that it is the self that makes its memories, and 
not memory that makes a self.
8.3  Divisions, dissociations, dissolutions
While the previous section concerned the question whether disorders of 
memory entail a disturbance of the self, I now turn to some psychopatholo-
gies in which, conversely, a disturbance of self seems to form an inherent 
part  of  the  presentation  and  diagnosis  of  the  disorder.  There  are  two 
caveats to this discussion. Firstly, ‘disorders of self’ denotes a very hetero-
geneous group of psychopathologies that vary according to their presenta-
tion, their severity, and their aetiology (where known). What they relev-
antly have in common is that their sufferers experience some form of disturb-
ance of self; but their discussion under this heading should not be taken to 
imply a biomedical taxonomy.
Second, since the criterion ‘disorder of self’ allows a great many vari-
ations in its precise instantiation, there is, consequently, a large number of 
psychopathologies that meet this criterion. They include severe depression, 
bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder (and other so-called per-
sonality disorders),  post-traumatic  stress  disorder,  depersonalization and 
derealization, various kinds of dissociative disorders (including dissociat-
ive  identity/multiple  personality  disorder),  and  schizophrenia.  For  eco-
nomies of space and argument, I cannot here discuss all these disorders. I 
will therefore limit my discussion to three of them, which have sometimes 
been characterized as cases of division, dissociation, and dissolution of the 
self:
• Bipolar  disorder,  which is  characterized by the abrupt alternation of 
two distinct and opposite mood states;
 Long-term musical memory is particularly resilient in dementia (Jacobsen et al., 3
2015).
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• Multiple  personality/dissociative  identity  disorder,  which  has  informed 
and inspired a number of philosophical discussions on the self; and
• Schizophrenia,  which  may  appear  to  involve  a  dysfunctional  self–
world boundary.
But before that, let me discuss a surgically acquired condition that has for 
some time been something of a philosophers’ favourite: split brains.
8.3.1  Split brains
I have already mentioned commissurotomy cases, whose ‘split-brain’ con-
dition results from the resection of the corpus callosum, the main commis-
sure linking the cerebral hemispheres (§§ 1.7, 6.3.1). Such patients exhibit 
laterally disconnected sensory and motor systems in experimental condi-
tions:
What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the 
right hand, can be reported verbally. What is flashed to the left half field or 
felt by the left hand cannot be reported, though if the word ‘hat’ is flashed 
on the left, the left hand will retrieve a hat from a group of concealed ob-
jects if the person is told to pick out what he has seen. At the same time he 
will insist verbally that he saw nothing. (Nagel, 1971, p. 400)
The reason why only perceptions in the right visual field or with the right 
hand can be reported verbally is that linguistic capacities are processes en-
tirely  in  the  left  cerebral  hemisphere,  which  also—contralaterally—pro-
cesses sensory input and motor output to and from the right-hand side of 
the body. Lacking input from the right hemisphere and therefore the left-
hand side sensory organs, the speech centres are unable to process that in-
formation, though other responses (the left hand picking up a hat) indicate 
that  such  information  is  nevertheless  processed  cognitively  in  the  right 
hemisphere.
Studies of split-brain patients have two main implications. One is that 
the sensorimotor system of  each cerebral  hemisphere,  and some higher-
level  cognitive functions (like language,  in the left  hemisphere),  operate 
independently of the other hemisphere. The other is that while the cerebral 
hemispheres are symmetrical anatomically and with respect to sensorimo-
tor function, they are not, in humans, functionally symmetrical. Certain cog-
nitive functions are strongly lateralized:  language and speech,  hypothesis 
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formation, and pattern recognition are left-hemisphere functions, while the 
right hemisphere is specialized for face recognition, perceptual distinctions 
and grouping, and focusing attention (Gazzaniga, 2000).
Now, it might be suggested that split-brain patients therefore end up 
with, literally, two brains: a left brain that controls the sensorimotor sys-
tems for the right-hand side of the body, along with the cognitive capacities 
of the left cerebral hemisphere; and a right brain controlling the left-hand-
side sensorimotor processes and the cognitive operations of the right hemi-
sphere. But, although somatosensory functions are largely lateralized, split-
brain  patients  can  still  execute  co-ordinated  movements  bilaterally,  e.g. 
walking, or waving both their arms synchronously (Gazzaniga, 2000). Nor 
is sensory input processed wholly contralaterally—some visual information 
reaches the ipsilateral visual cortex. Thus, isolating the left and right visual 
fields  in  experimental  conditions  in  such  a  way  that  only  one  cerebral 
hemisphere receives input requires a rather complicated experimental set-
up designed expressly for that purpose—a situation no split-brain subject is 
likely to encounter in ordinary circumstances. Thus, even in the split-brain 
condition it would be wrong to assert that the patient’s brain had been en-
tirely bisected.
Notwithstanding this, Roland Puccetti (1973) suggested not only that 
split-brain patients have two ‘minds’ and are therefore two persons, but that, 
given the cognitive specializations of the cerebral hemispheres revealed by 
split-brain cases but present in all humans, we are all ‘compounds of two 
persons’ (p. 353). He cites cases of individuals living with only one cerebral 
hemisphere (congenitally or postoperatively) as evidence that each hemi-
sphere, in normal cases, already amounts to a full person’s brain.
But the lateralization of brain function in humans means that our spe-
cies,  uniquely,  does  not  duplicate  all  brain  functions  across  both  hemi-
spheres (Gazzaniga, 2000). Therefore, a single hemisphere is precisely not 
fully equipped to discharge the functions of a whole brain. While indeed it 
is possible to live with only one cerebral hemisphere, patients in that condi-
tion are  somewhat  disabled.  And where  one hemisphere,  post-injury or 
post-hemispherectomy, is able to take over some functions of the other, it 
can do so thanks to the remarkable neuroplasticity of our brains, which is 
then activated to make up for an acquired loss of function—and not be-
cause that hemisphere exercised the missing functionality all along.
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Most crucially, such disconnection between cognitive processes in op-
posite cerebral hemispheres as is exhibited by split-brain patients is pre-
cisely what one would expect from their condition. It is because they lack 
the communication lines of the corpus callosum that some of their cognit-
ive processes are not integrated in the normal way. But in non-split-brains 
the  corpus  callosum  ensures  that  cognitive  integration  between  hemi-
spheres;  there is  no disconnection between the ‘left  brain’ and the ‘right 
brain’. Of course, such integration, even in healthy brains, is deployed as 
needed. As Thomas Nagel (1971) remarks, ‘our own unity may be nothing 
absolute, but merely another case of integration, more or less effective, in 
the control system of a complex organism’ (p. 410). 
It is ‘another case of integration’ because there are also intrahemispheric 
processes of integration at work, for instance integrating input from differ-
ent sensory modes in the cortical association areas (Romero, 2006, pp. 114–
116). And many other processes of integration are required for higher-level 
cognitive  functions,  if  cognition  is  modular  (Fodor,  1983).  Thus,  it  may 
seem arbitrary to single out the corpus callosum as the defining integrative 
pathway: ‘why then should we not regard each hemisphere as inhabited by 
several  cooperating  minds  with  specialized  capacities?  Where  is  one  to 
stop?’ (Nagel, 1971, p. 413). Indeed: once we begin considering cognitive 
processes, or modules, in isolation, we might think there are an indefinite 
number  of  ‘minds’  collaborating  in  one  brain—echoing  Hume’s 
(1739/1978) ‘republic or commonwealth’ analogy (p.  261).  But there is  a 
good case for stopping at one, for, as Nagel suggests in the remark quoted 
earlier, it is in the running of one organism that cognitive integration and, 
crucially, self-representation are of service.
And that is as true of split brains as it is of brains with an intact com-
missure. For, as Gazzaniga (2000) observes, even in split-brain cases there 
does not seem to be an overall bisection of self-awareness:
The most powerful impression one has when observing patients who have 
had their  hemispheres  divided is  how unaffected they appear  to  be in 
their general cognitive awareness, affect and sense of self. (p. 1309)
Nevertheless,  the general  cognitive awareness and sense of  self  of  split-
brain patients can be faulty, because part of their self-monitoring system is 
of  course  interrupted by the  severed corpus  callosum.  Thus,  as  already 
noted, patients cannot verbally report—verbal reporting being a left-hemi-
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sphere process—on stimuli received only by the right cerebral hemisphere. 
Interestingly, they seem blithely unaware of this lack of input from the right 
hemisphere. As mentioned earlier (§ 6.3.1), when, in experimental settings, 
patients receive flashed instructions to the left visual field only (processed 
by the right  hemisphere)  and perform actions  accordingly and are  then 
asked for  an explanation  of  their  behaviour  (processed by the  left  hemi-
sphere), they confabulate: they give plausible, but palpably false accounts 
of their actions.
Gazzaniga  (2000)  attributes  this  confabulation  to  a  left-hemisphere 
mechanism he calls ‘the interpreter’ (p.  1316),  which constructs explana-
tions and hypotheses of behaviour and perceptual information: 
The interpreter weaves together an interpretative story. Often enough, the 
story is actually correct, and the judgments and decisions attributed to the 
self are accurate. But sometimes the data are misleading or (as in the case 
of split-brain patients) absent altogether, and confabulation results.  
(Carruthers, 2010, p. 84)
According to Gazzaniga (2000), the interpreter may also be responsible for 
the ‘feeling in all of us that we are integrated and unified’ (p. 1316), includ-
ing split-brain patients, who ‘do not have any sense of the dual conscious-
ness implied by the notion of having two brains’ (p. 1319).
The interpreter is the glue that keeps our story unified and creates and 
creates our sense of being a coherent, rational agent. . . . These narratives 
of our past behaviour seep into our awareness and give us an autobio-
graphy. (p. 1320)
For a defender of historical-constructionist account of the self, the in-
terpreter would be something like the originator of the self qua narrative 
construct. On the system view, too, the interpreter clearly has an important 
role in sustaining one’s sense of self. However, we shouldn’t jump to the 
conclusion  of  identifying  the  interpreter  with  the  self.  For,  in  order  to 
provide a veridical integrative function of cognitive self-awareness, it re-
quires input from other self-representational processes all over the brain—
half of which are what is missing in split-brain patients. So the interpreter 
is  a  component  of  our  complex  self-monitoring  system—an  important 
component in that  it  provides integration of  information and acts  as an 
output mechanism. But it neither is the self nor produces it. It is part of it.
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As for split-brain patients, they clearly do not have two selves under 
either view of the self discussed here. For an historical-constructionist ac-
count, only the products of the interpreter would count as the self, and the 
interpreter simply ignores the processes of the right hemisphere. On my 
system view, the self of a split-brain patient is defective to the extent that 
self-representational information from the right hemisphere cannot be in-
tegrated in the left-hemisphere interpreter’s productions, but, as the right 
hemisphere does not have an equivalent interpreter capacity, nor can there 
be systemic integration of this information within the right hemisphere to 
combine into a second, independent self-monitoring system. Thus, rather 
than producing two selves, the split-brain condition results in one self that 
is deficient to the extent that there is no interhemispheric integration of self-
representational processes.
While  the  split-brain  condition  results  from  a  clear  division  of  the 
brain, other conditions in which one might be tempted to diagnose a di-
vided self are less clear cut (to coin a phrase). They include multiple per-
sonality disorder and bipolar disorder, which I discuss next.
8.3.2  Bipolar disorder
Sufferers  of  bipolar  disorder  (more  precisely  bipolar  affective  disorder, 
sometimes also called bipolar manic–depressive disorder) oscillate between 
two extremes of mood: one being mania—‘[p]athological over-excitement, 
often involving extreme agitation, excessive optimism, restlessness, flights 
of  idea,  and incoherent  speech’—or  hypomania—‘in  which  the  person  is 
“mildly” manic; . . . too optimistic, too exuberant, too talkative, and too act-
ive’ (Sutherland, 1995, pp. 261 & 212), and the other being depression. While 
‘mixed states’ with both manic and depressive symptoms do occur (Ander-
son et  al.,  2012),  the usual  presentation of  the disorder is  of  alternating 
manic/hypomanic  and  depressive  phases,  of  varying  duration  (though 
usually of at least several days). The distinguishing characteristic of bipolar 
disorder  is  the  spontaneous  switching  between  these  mood  states,  and 
while the precise neurobiological mechanisms of these mood switches are 
as yet poorly understood (Salvadore et al.,  2010),  their consequences are 
stark. A bipolar patient will alternate between a state of elevated mood and 
self-esteem,  heightened  activity,  and  excessive  pleasure-seeking  (with 
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sometimes adverse social and financial consequences), and a state of de-
pressed mood and dejection, with a lack of interest in activity, fatigue, and 
feelings of worthlessness (Anderson et al., 2012).
What, then, are the consequences of bipolar disorder for the self? In my 
above discussion of amnesias, I noted that in the absence of explicit person-
al memories, a person’s affective dispositions and character traits can re-
main. Let us call these dispositions and traits an individual’s affective self. 
Then, it seems, a bipolar patient’s affective self is fractured between the two 
poles of the disorder. And this fracturing obtains despite any psychological 
continuity that otherwise exists between a bipolar patient’s depressive and 
manic/hypomanic phases. For although, when in a depressive phase, the 
patient may well remember being euphoric in the past and perhaps wish to 
regain that mood, this makes no difference to the now prevailing depress-
ive mood. Indeed, given the reconstructive nature of episodic  recollection 
(§ 4.4), it may well be impossible for a currently depressed bipolar patient 
to reconstruct accurately an episode from a preceding manic/hypomanic 
phase (and vice versa), for he now has no access to the affect states that ac-
companied the episode. He may of course remember that  he was happy 
and euphoric. But the overpowering depressive mood of his current state 
will preclude his (as it were) ‘reliving’ the moment being remembered in 
the affective state he was in at the time.
Bipolar disorder, then, involves a fractured and discontinuous affective 
self while psychological continuity (in Shoemaker’s sense) is intact. Now, it 
may seem very tempting to think of a bipolar patient as having two selves, 
particularly for the people around him or her, who cannot fail to notice the 
abrupt changes in personality that occur when a bipolar patient switches 
from one extreme mood to the other. For instance, Lloyd Wells (2003) de-
scribes the case of Dr Jones, a university professor with rapid-cycling bipolar 
disorder. One day he was depressive, pessimistic, fatigued; he found work 
difficult and social activities meaningless. The next day he rose early and 
began  working  immediately,  was  euphoric,  hyperactive,  a  helpful  col-
league, and a great socializer until late at night.
The cycle then repeated itself, every 2 days, over 8 months. Professor Jones 
hated his dysphoric days and loved his energetic days. . . . His wife felt 
differently about them. “He’s not my husband,” she said. “I like him fine, 
but he’s a different person. He’s so down every other day, but he’s worse, 
for  me,  on  the  ‘good’  days.  He’s  up  at  four  in  the  morning,  banging 
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around in the kitchen and making a  lot  of  noise.  He was always very 
thoughtful and quiet when he got up before me in the past. And he’s—he 
doesn’t listen, and he tells jokes he would never have told before. He em-
barrasses me, a little, although everybody seems to think he’s wonderful.” 
(p. 298)
Dr Jones initially refused medication, as he was ‘reluctant to give up on his 
good days’. Eventually, when, on his hypomanic days, ‘he began to drink 
excessively at social events . . . he bought a summer house on a whim, and 
he nearly invested a lot of money in a scheme that would have had dis-
astrous consequences’ (ibid.), he consented to treatment with lithium, used 
as a mood-stabilizing drug.
Almost  immediately  after  therapeutic  blood  levels  of  lithium  were  at-
tained,  Professor  Jones  returned  to  his  moderately  morose,  still  highly 
achieving old self, which he thought was quite different from either of the 
cyclic states. He missed his high self very much, but thought that he was 
better off without it. He told me, “For the first time I understood Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde.” His wife said, “I have my husband back.” (ibid.)
What is striking about this case is not merely the unusually rapid al-
ternation between the depressed and the hypomanic mood states, but also 
the stark secondary effects of the mood switches on both Jones’s profes-
sional and his social  and marital  life.  So did bipolar Dr Jones have two 
selves? 
Tempting though this way of putting things may have seemed to both 
the patient and his wife, such talk can only be metaphorical. Granted, the 
fracturing of  his  affective  self  was  significant  enough for  both him and 
those around him to conclude that he embodied, if not strictly two persons, 
then two very distinct personalities (or three if  we include his pre-onset 
and post-treatment ‘moderately morose old self’ ). However, Jones suffered 4
no amnesia between alternating mood states, and was well aware of his 
sudden shifts of mood: there was a continuing self—disturbed and disrup-
ted though it was in its affective states. That is not to say that Jones’s self 
was not impaired by his bipolar disorder. But it was not split in two.
Further, few cases of bipolar disorder exhibit as rapid shifts between 
extremes of  mood as  Dr  Jones's,  and manic  and depressive  episodes  of 
 It is also remarkable how quickly mood-stabilizing medication appears to have 4
put an end to his bipolarity (cf. § 8.3.5).
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longer duration may alternate with more ‘neutral’ mood states, too. While 
in such cases bipolar patients’ affective selves are disrupted and discontinu-
ous when their mood state enters a new (hypomanic or depressive or ‘neut-
ral’)  episode,  there  is  nonetheless  a  persisting  self  that  experiences  these 
mood changes, even if the presentation of a bipolar self to others may seem 
like two or three distinct personalities.
The supposed presence of two or more conflicting personalities in one 
individual is even more marked in cases of multiple personality or dissoci-
ative identity disorder, which I consider next.
8.3.3  Multiple personality/dissociative identity disorder
Multiple personality or dissociative identity disorder (MPD/DID)  involves 5
the apparent alternating presence, in one individual, of a number of differ-
ent ‘personalities’ or ‘identities’. These alternative personalities, or ‘alters’, 
exhibit various ‘cognitive, sensory, and physiological differences’ (Braude, 
1995, p. 48), the last including differing facial expressions and postures, in 
some cases even the presence or absence of allergic reactions. Alters are of-
ten  characterized  by  particular  traits  or  personality  types—‘persecutor’, 
‘helper’, ‘recorder or memory’ (p. 40); frequently they involve at least one 
child alter, and in about one in two cases, a personality of the opposite sex. 
The number of alters an individual may have varies between about half a 
dozen and two dozen (Braude, 1995; Hacking, 1995a) but in some cases has 
 The naming of the disorder is of some interest. The American Psychiatric Associ5 -
ation’s  Diagnostic  and Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  substituted the term 
‘dissociative  identity  disorder’  for  ‘multiple  personality  disorder’  in  its  fourth 
edition (DSM-IV)  in 1994 (Hacking, 1995b).  While reasons for this change were 
mostly ‘clinical and pragmatic rather than philosophical’  (Braude, 1995, p.  249), 
they reflect a change in therapeutic approach (Hacking, 1995a, p. 54) laying more 
emphasis on a patient’s singleness (however dissociated) than on the presentation 
of multiplicity. What the exact psychiatric distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘per-
sonality’ might be is rather more murky, and the current (DSM-5) edition’s dia-
gnostic criteria for ‘dissociative identity disorder’ continue to refer to ‘distinct per-
sonality states’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.  292).  Meanwhile, the 
WHO’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 
retains ‘multiple personality’ in its current version (ICD-10), as a subcategory of 
‘other dissociative [conversion] disorders’ (World Health Organization, 1992/2016, 
F44.8). I will here acknowledge the currency of both labels by using the somewhat 
ungainly shorthand ‘MPD/DID’.
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been numbered in the hundreds, though ‘[m]any of these are perhaps bet-
ter described as personality fragments’  (Braude,  1995,  p.  41,  original  em-
phasis).
The onset of MPD/DID can usually be traced to childhood with the 
‘initial split’ occurring ‘between the ages of four and six’ (p. 48). And psy-
chological  trauma or  abuse in  childhood seems to  be  one of  ‘two main 
causal determinants’ of the condition, the other being ‘a capacity for pro-
found  dissociation’  or  ‘self-hypnotizability’,  which  provides  a  coping 
mechanism for  the psychological  trauma suffered:  ‘through dissociation, 
the  subject  is  able  to  avoid  experiencing  or  dealing  with  an  intolerable 
episode by turning it over to an alternate personality (or alter) who under-
goes those experiences in his place’ (p. 37).  The dissociation may then be6 -
come habitual: once successfully deployed as a coping strategy, the mech-
anism may be deployed again and again, thus leading to a proliferation of 
alters.
Switching  between  alters  can  take  ‘one  or  two  seconds  to  several 
minutes,  and it  can be voluntary or involuntary’  (p.  41).  The process of 
switching is characterized in the literature as one alter gaining ‘executive 
control’ over the patient’s behaviour or body (p.  42). But what exactly is 
meant by one particular personality being ‘in control’ of the patient? Short 
of  resorting  to  mediaeval  notions  of  possession  or  dualistic  theories  of 
mind, it can only mean that the patient then exhibits the traits and charac-
teristics, psychological and physiological, that are attributed to that particu-
lar alter.  Rather than speaking of another alter gaining control  of  the pa-
tient’s behaviour, it is perhaps better to describe the process as a reconfigura-
tion of executive control, such that a different set of traits and characteristics 
is brought to the fore.
The occurrence of voluntary personality-switching supports this point, 
for it raises the question whose volition it is that brings about the switch. Is 
it that of the alter that is about to be displaced by another? This may seem 
plausible in cases where the displacing personality is of the ‘helper’ type, 
 As some MPD/DID patients tend to reveal their ‘multiplicity’ under hypnosis, it 6
has been suggested that the condition as a whole is iatrogenic, i.e. brought about 
by therapeutic intervention. But other MPD/DID cases have presented in the ab-
sence of hypnosis and therapeutic encouragement (Braude, 1995, p. 62). Neverthe-
less,  a  therapist’s  expectations  and  classifications  may  affect  and  change  the 
presentation of the disorder (Hacking, 1995a, p. 21).
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but hardly likely if the newly installed alter is of the ‘persecutor’ type. Nor 
does it sound altogether plausible in such a case that the ‘persecutor’ per-
sonality actively takes over executive control, for in order to do so it would 
already have to have some executive control—but we’re told that the pro-
cess of switching is precisely about a change in executive control. Voluntary 
switching between alters thus cannot readily be explained by means of the 
terminology of alters ‘gaining executive control’. Rather, it suggests some 
underlying unified executive control.
This  brings  me to  the  crucial  question:  Does  an MPD/DID sufferer 
have multiple selves? The first point to note here is that dissociation of per-
sonality need not per se entail a plurality of selves. Many of us dissociate 
some aspects of our personalities in certain circumstances: one might sup-
press some undesirable character traits in a professional context and others 
on a social occasion. These are instances of what Erving Goffman (1959) 
calls the ‘presentation of self’, and they depend on social circumstances. In 
MPD/DID, too, it is often the social and professional context that prompts 
a switch from one alter to another:
The more functional multiples often distribute activities between alters in 
creative ways, or at least in ways that do not command attention. For ex-
ample, a college student might divide course work among personalities 
with the appropriate abilities (e.g.,  the alter good at math will  take the 
statistics course). (Braude, 1995, p. 45)
It  may  seem,  then,  that  the  switching  of  personalities  in  MPD/DID  is 
merely a particularly striking example of an individual’s adopting different 
‘masks’ (Goffman, 1959) for different purposes.
But the dissociation in MPD/DID goes somewhat deeper, in that dif-
ferent alters frequently do not share the same (explicit) memories. Indeed, 
the whole point of adopting different personalities for coping with traumat-
ic  experiences  is  precisely  that  one  alter  need  not  share  the  disturbing 
memories  of  another.  On a quasi-Lockean account  of  selves,  this  would 
suggest a plurality of selves, each defined by the particular strands of per-
sonal memory it retains. This, however, would imply multiplicity of selves 
in other individuals who have temporarily forgotten an autobiographical 
episode. I have of course rejected the memory-based account of the self, but 
some of the reasons for doing so might still support a plurality of selves in 
MPD/DID. For instance, I mentioned the retention of character traits as in-
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dicative of a continuing self in amnesia and dementia. But character traits 
are precisely what is dissociated between the different alters of an MPD/
DID patient. However, as Stephen Braude (1995) points out, such dissoci-
ation  is  not  complete.  Alters  overlap  in  their  implicit  and  procedural 
memories, such as linguistic and other motor skills, and in some of their 
cognitive capacities, too:
Generally speaking, then, what distinguishes one alter from another, and 
what gets dissociated in cases of MPD, is not a trait shared with no other 
alter  or  split-off  completely  from  the  rest  of  the  multiple’s  activities. 
Rather, it is a distinctive combination of traits, any one of which might be 
shared with other alters. (p. 106, original emphasis)
All this suggests some underlying unity in the MPD/DID sufferer, a 
stock of common capacities to which different alters have selective access. 
Are these shared capacities sufficient for a single self? There remains the 
defining feature of MPD/DID: a ‘marked discontinuity in sense of self and 
sense of agency’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 292). This, it 
seems, is no mere presentational exercise, but rather a case of experiencing 
oneself as someone else whenever one’s executive control functions are con-
figured for a different alter. Here it might seem as if narrative accounts of 
the self are, after all, suited to explaining this phenomenon.
In particular, Dennett’s (1992) view of the self as a ‘center of narrative 
gravity’ (see § 5.3.3) readily accommodates multiple personalities as mul-
tiple selves.  When an MPD/DID patient switches to a different alter,  her 
narrative centre of gravity shifts, as it were, to a different protagonist. For 
this fictive account of the self,  therefore, MPD/DID apparently poses no 
problem. For what I have called strong narrative constructionist accounts, 
the picture is slightly different: if the self is ‘constituted’ by a narrative, and 
if,  in the case of an MPD/DID patient,  each alter has its own narrative, 
there would indeed seem to be multiple selves—but all of them defective 
and incomplete, because each alter’s self narrative would only cover the 
periods when it was ‘in control’ of the patient’s behaviour. 
But there remains the authorship problem (§ 6.2), which concerns both 
Dennett’s  account  and  strong  narrative  constructionism:  who,  in  fact,  is 
spinning the narrative? For narrative constructionists, the question is, pre-
sumably,  empty:  according to these accounts,  there is  no ‘who’ that  can 
have authored the narrative until  some initially  disorganized strands of 
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narrative activity produce either a fictive protagonist or a coherent story 
that qualifies as a ‘self’. No prior single self seems required. But consider 
this cri de cœur  of an MPD/DID sufferer, Mary, reported by Lloyd Wells 
(2003):  ‘“It is really hell to wake up every morning and hate the person 
who’s there, who is not me.”’ (p. 301) Who in this case is ‘me’; who is doing 
the hating? Narrative constructionists might respond that it is simply an-
other centre of narrative gravity or rudimentary self narrative. But there is 
another and, given the apparent strong affect reported in this testimony, 
more plausible option, namely, an underlying self.7
Stephen Braude (1995, ch. 7) proffers a number of good reasons for hy-
pothesizing an underlying self in cases of MPD/DID. First, as already men-
tioned,  the  alters  of  MPD/DID patients  overlap to  some extent  in  their 
traits and capacities. Secondly, he suggests that an underlying ‘synthesizing 
self’ (p. 167) is required to maintain the dissociation of personalities. This 
may seem counterintuitive. Braude does not dwell on this point, but what I 
take him to mean is this: a single monitoring system is required to keep track 
(consciously or unconsciously) of the roles of the multiple alters deployed 
in MPD/DID (e.g. Daniel is the ‘helper’ personality, Jerry the ‘persecutor’, 
John the ‘memory’, Carl drives the car, David is the one with artistic sensib-
ilities, Stephen is good at maths, etc.). Thirdly, Braude makes the important 
point that MPD/DID patients frequently report conflicts between their al-
ters. For this to occur, the alter currently online must have awareness of the 
alters that are currently offline,  which again suggests that some (uncon-
scious) integration between alters is required.
Considering the onset and aetiology of MPD/DID, Braude observes, 
fourthly, that the initial dissociation in childhood presupposes prior unity 
of self, and fifth, that dissociation as a coping strategy for dealing with un-
bearable psychological trauma ‘seem[s] to make sense only with respect to 
a single agent’ (p. 175), one who both experienced the trauma and deploys 
 Another theoretical possibility might be that MPD/DID sufferers have a ‘primary’ 7
personality which would be the one that, in this case, hates the personality that is 
currently online. But, as Braude (1995, § 2.5) notes, the recent MPD/DID literature 
makes little reference to ‘primary’ personalities, and nor is it clear whether such a 
personality would be understood as historically or functionally primary. Either way, 
for such a primary personality to be able to hate others it would have to be online 
persistently, along with whatever alter  is currently online—thus, the notion of a 
primary personality would collapse into that of an underlying persistent self.
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personality dissociation in order to cope with it. The self-monitoring sys-
tem ‘decides’, as it were, that the trauma is too much to deal with, and in-
stitutes a compartmentalization—a dissociation—that segregates one’s in-
tolerable memories of, say, childhood abuse, from one’s day-to-day cognit-
ive operations. Further, ‘[i]t appears . . . as if alter-formation is intelligently 
guided, at least in the early stages before it becomes habitual’ (p. 177). This 
observation is akin to the authorship problem with narrativity—here, the 
question is who  is doing the alter-forming, and the acceptable answer is, 
once more, a persistent self. (As more splits occur habitually and success-
ively over prolonged periods, it is not sufficient for there to be a single self 
only before the initial split.)
How, then,  is  the presence—indeed the necessity—of an underlying 
self to be reconciled with the experience of MPD/DID sufferers of them-
selves  as  different  personalities?  Braude  suggests  that  the  alters  of  an 
MPD/DID patient are distinct ‘apperceptive centers’ (p. 78), meaning that 
when acting as a particular alter, the patient does not believe or experience 
the psychological states of her other alters to be her own. This accounts for 
the  distinctness,  in  the  MPD/DID sufferer’s  experience,  of  her  different 
personalities. What accounts for the unity required by the above considera-
tions is, in Braude’s view, a ‘synthesizing self’, by which he means essen-
tially Kant’s (1787) ‘transcendental I’, which though ‘a precondition for the 
functional distinctness of alters’, is not itself an object of experience but a 
formal property of it, whereas ‘on a level of experience much closer to the 
surface of awareness, alters are distinct’ (Braude, 1995, p. 188).
Unhelpful  though Braude’s  Kantian approach and terminology may 
be, what I take to be the gist of his ideas fits very well with my system 
view.  For  all  the  dissociation  between  alters  in  MPD/DID,  a  persistent 
single self-monitoring system is required to account for (1) the overlap of 
capacities shared between alters, (2) the consistent tracking of different per-
sonalities, (3) conflicts between alters, (4) the initially undissociated self, (5) 
the efficacy of dissociation as a coping mechanism, and (6) the creation of 
new alters. The nature of the dissociation in MPD/DID, then, is not a frag-
mentation of this self-monitoring system as such, but rather its churning 
out,  simultaneously  or  alternately,  distinct  partial  self-monitoring  ‘read-
outs’ that correspond to the different personalities MPD/DID sufferers ex-
perience themselves as having or being.
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But these ‘personalities’ are fundamentally incomplete, because none 
has all the capacities required to account for all the patient’s doings. They 
are, as the narrativists would have it, distinct ‘self narratives’—which may 
have deleterious implications for the ability of an MPD/DID patient to act 
as a unified agent in her social context.  They are not,  however, distinct 8
selves qua distinct authors: the same (faulty) self-monitoring system is the 
source of them all.
8.3.4  Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia  is  not,  as  its  name implies  and as  is  often  popularly  as-
sumed,  a  ‘split-mind’  condition.  Rather,  it  is  characterized by hallucina-
tions, delusions, ‘thought disorder’ (‘patterns of reasoning which appear to 
us to be odd, circuitous, or nonsensical’), along with flattened affect, alogia 
(‘reduced fluency of thought’) and avolition (‘difficulty initiating things by 
one’s own will power’) (Nettle, 2006, pp. 90–91). It is with the symptoms of 
delusion and hallucination that schizophrenia comes within the purview of 
a study of the self: schizophrenics typically suffer from auditory verbal hallu-
cinations (AVH), i.e. the experience of ‘hearing voices’, and thought insertion, 
where a patient experiences a thought as not being his or her own, some-
times as being that of a quite specific other person.
Assuming that the thoughts schizophrenics experience as voices or in-
serted thoughts are, in fact, their own, but are not experienced as such, one 
obvious characterization of what has gone wrong here is that it is a failure 
to distinguish between oneself and the external world, a dissolution of the 
self–world boundary. This view, which is attributed to Freud (Hoerl, 2001), 
seems initially plausible. But a functioning self–world boundary is one of 
the  most  fundamental  of  our  cognitive  capacities  (Dennett,  1991,  ch.  7; 
Churchland,  2002a,  ch.  3;  Metzinger,  2004),  without  which  an  organism 
would not be capable of survival. One might of course suggest that the dis-
solution  of  that  boundary  is  partial  in  schizophrenia—leaving intact  the 
ability to distinguish one’s body from the environment, say, but impairing 
the patient’s ability to distinguish his own conscious cognitive operations 
from the outside world. 
 For a treatment of the ethical implications of dissociation, see Radden (1996).8
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But that suggestion still does not quite capture the phenomenology of 
AVH and thought insertion.  In a study of AVH by McCarthy-Jones and 9
colleagues (2014),  more subjects reported the ‘location’ of their voices as 
‘inside the head’ than ‘outside the head’. As to thought insertion, that phe-
nomenon does not involve the simulacrum of an auditory perception, but 
the patient’s impression that ‘thoughts which are not his own are intruding 
into his mind’ (Wing et al., 1974, p. 160, emphasis added). For both AVH 
and thought insertion, the essential feature of the experience seems not to 
be that the schizophrenia patient confuses the external world with the ‘in-
ner world’ of his own mind, as the Freudian theory of self–world boundary 
dissolution would have it. Rather, both kinds of phenomena are or can be 
experienced as occurring within oneself, without however being one’s own, 
having been put there by some outside agency.
The  breakdown,  then,  is  not  in  the  schizophrenic’s  self–world 
boundary,  but  rather  in  his  ‘subjective  unity’  (Bayne,  2013)  or,  more 
precisely, his sense of agency (Stephens & Graham, 2000). On this view, as 
Christoph Hoerl (2001) characterizes it, schizophrenics suffering from AVH 
or inserted thoughts ‘lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence 
of  certain  thoughts’  (p.  189).  Put  another  way,  the  defect  concerns  not 
‘where the thought occurs’ (p. 191) but rather ‘who is . . . the author of that 
thought’  (p.   192,  emphasis  added).  It  is,  then,  a  failure  of  the  self-
monitoring system at  the stage where the system would normally keep 
track  of  what  are  one’s  own  cognitive  processes.  An  AVH  or  inserted 
thought is correctly monitored as occurring to a schizophrenia sufferer, but 
fails to be registered as his own thought (cf. Frith, 1992).
The effect of these phenomena on schizophrenia patients’ sense of self 
is  stark.  Wells  (2003)  reports  on  a  young  woman  with  schizophrenia, 
Joanne, who described her situation thus:
“I know I’m still myself, but it doesn’t feel that way. Where I was is filled 
with noise and voices, and there’s—it’s a small area, the brain, but there’s 
a huge emptiness there that I used to fill.” (p. 299)
 Perhaps surprisingly, qualitative studies of the phenomenology of hallucinations 9
in schizophrenia are quite a recent development in psychiatric research. A com-
mendable multidisciplinary research project in this area, ‘Hearing the Voice’, is cur-
rently  underway  at  Durham  University  (Woods  et   al.,  2014;  <http://hear-
ingthevoice.org>).
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Despite her epistemic self-awareness still functioning (‘I know I’m still my-
self’), this patient finds her phenomenal sense of self seriously impaired (‘it 
doesn’t feel  that way’).  This is consonant with how Louis Sass and Josef 
Parnas (2001) characterize the phenomenology of schizophrenia: a ‘dimin-
ishment in the sense of existing as a subject of experience’ (p. 352) and a 
‘lack of continuity in the sense of self and a sense of alienation from one’s 
own body, face,  and thoughts’  (p.  353).  As the normal processes of self-
monitoring in the present are malfunctioning, it becomes impossible for the 
patient to sustain a coherent sense of self over time.
What  exactly  is  going wrong when a  schizophrenia  sufferer  experi-
ences his own thoughts as inserted or voiced by someone else? A plausible 
explanation  first  put  forward  by  Irwin  Feinberg  (1978)  is  that  the  phe-
nomenon results from a faulty or absent efference copy (also known as ‘corol-
lary discharge’) of the ‘motor mechanisms of thought’ (p. 639). When the 
brain initiates a motor action, along with the efferent neural signal for mak-
ing a movement, it also generates a copy of the efferent signal which ‘loops 
back to the sensory systems identifying you as the source of the . . . move-
ment’ (Churchland, 2013, p. 210). Efference copy is thus a very useful self-
monitoring device for keeping a record of one’s motor signals (and, incid-
entally, the reason why one cannot tickle oneself).
Feinberg’s suggestion is that efference copy also accompanies thought. 
For verbal thought, that is plausible, since in ‘inner’ or ‘covert speech’ the 
motor areas responsible for language production are active. Thus, as Pat 
Churchland describes it:
When you merely think, “I need to buy milk,’ . . . a movement-planning 
signal informs the sensory brain about the source of the covert speech—
me. Except sometimes the mechanism is bungled . . . So sometimes a per-
son may think, “I need to buy milk,” but because there is no efference copy 
signal or none with the right timing, he may fail to realize that his thought 
is actually his thought. (ibid., original emphasis)
There is  evidence that  efference copy is  indeed dysfunctional  in  schizo-
phrenics, whether or not they experience AVH (Ford & Mathalon, 2005).
Another potentially promising approach to explaining the anomalies of 
self-monitoring in schizophrenia may be found in recent research on the 
brain’s default-mode network (DMN). The DMN is characterized by activ-
ity in the cortical midline regions that is hypothesized to be the brain’s ‘de-
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fault mode’ or ‘baseline activity’. This activity is ‘suspended during specific 
goal-directed behaviors’ (Raichle et al., 2001, p. 676) but ‘engaged when in-
dividuals are left to think to themselves undisturbed’ (Buckner et al., 2008, 
p. 1). A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of self-specific activity sug-
gests  that  DMN  activity  is  indeed  related  to  self-monitoring  (Qin  & 
Northoff, 2011).
Recent studies suggest that the DMN is both hyperactive and hyper-
connected in schizophrenia patients and fails to deactivate, as it normally 
would,  when they are engaged in a task (Whitfield-Gabrieli  et  al.,  2009; 
Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008). This is consistent with the hyperreflexivity—
excessive  self-focused  attention—that  is  a  feature  of  schizophrenia  (and 
other mental disorders) (Pérez-Álvarez, 2008). But how would a hyperact-
ive and hyperconnected DMN be linked with the disturbed self-monitoring 
that is evident in schizophrenics’ hallucinations? Buckner and colleagues 
(2008) note that ‘there appears to be dynamic competition between the de-
fault network and brain systems supporting focused external attention’, an 
interaction which is normally subject to a control mechanism. They suggest: 
‘The complex symptoms of schizophrenia could arise from a disruption in 
this  control  system resulting in an overactive (or inappropriately active) 
default network’ (p. 27). Qin and Northoff (2011) suggest that ‘our sense of 
self may result from a specific kind of interaction between resting-state [i.e. 
DMN] and stimulus-induced activity’ (p.  1221, emphasis added).  It  may 
thus be a defect in the normal control of this interaction that accounts for 
both the hyperactive DMN and the erroneous readings of the self-monitor-
ing system in schizophrenia.
Whether AVH and thought insertion are explained by defective effer-
ence copy or by an abnormal DMN, or both (a hyperactive DMN could in 
some way be linked to the dysfunction of efference copy), in any case the 
disturbed self of schizophrenics seems to result from the malfunction of a 
rather basic self-monitoring mechanism in the brain.
8.3.5  Self disorders and narrativity 
Let me conclude this  section with some remarks on how these self  dis-
orders fit or do not fit with the narrative accounts I discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
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For what I have termed simple narrative-capacity views, according to 
which the self may engage in narrative thinking and narrative practices to a 
greater or lesser extent, the self disorders discussed here pose no difficulty. 
A person with MPD/DID will have a number of different, incomplete, dis-
continuous, though somewhat overlapping, self narratives. The ‘protagon-
ist’ of each narrative will be the alter or personality from whose perspective 
the narrative is told, the narrative being illustrative of that alter’s particular 
personality traits.
For a bipolar person, self narratives may similarly seem somewhat dis-
continuous in that they will be coloured by the patient’s current mood state
—(hypo)manic, neutral, or depressed. For instance, in the depressed mood 
state, the self narrative is unlikely to contain any positive planning for the 
future and likely to edit out any personal memories of a positive valence, 
dwelling instead on memories of disappointments and failure. Meanwhile, 
in a hypomanic state, the self narrative likely includes exaggerated plans 
and schemes and a similarly exaggerated emphasis  on past  accomplish-
ments. It’s important to note, however, that the discontinuities of a bipolar 
self narrative are discontinuities in the selection of life events dictated by 
the current mood; they are not complete temporal breaks as might be found 
in MPD/DID self narratives. For, as mentioned above, the psychological 
continuity  of  a  bipolar  patient  is  maintained  despite  the  shifting  mood 
states, so his self narratives, however varied in mood, retain the same prot-
agonist, who undergoes those mood alterations.
In considering self narratives in schizophrenia, it is worth recalling a 
point from Rubin and Greenberg’s (2003) review of studies of memory dis-
orders cited earlier (§ 5.2.2), to wit, that our capacity for ‘narrative reason-
ing’ (where present in the first place) is very difficult to disrupt even in 
severe psychopathologies. Thus, even as severe a disruption of self-monit-
oring as that encountered in schizophrenia need not affect patients’ ability 
to think narratively. Statements by schizophrenia patients such as that by 
Wells’s (2003) patient Joanne quoted above seem to bear this out. Her al-
most  poetic  description  of  her  predicament—‘there’s  a  huge  emptiness 
there that I used to fill’—exemplifies the patient’s ability to think narrat-
ively and historically precisely in describing the condition that has so seri-
ously impaired her self.
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Indeed, of the disorders considered here, schizophrenia is the one that 
most obviously contradicts narrative constructionist accounts of the self. For 
it  is  primarily  in  the  phenomenology  of  schizophrenic  symptoms—AVH, 
thought insertion, Joanne’s ‘huge emptiness’—that the disturbance of self is 
manifest, which does not require any narrative thinking or overt narration 
to take place. And if, as seems likely, schizophrenia is a neurological dis-
order, its deleterious effects on self-monitoring are rooted in deep-seated 
neurological defects (such as the lack of efference copy and/or defect in 
DMN control referred to above), not in defective narrativity. 
MPD/DID might, superficially, seem a condition more supportive of 
narrative constructionist  accounts:  multiple  self  narratives  with multiple 
protagonists, indeed multiple ‘internal’ narrators,  might suggest a multi10 -
plicity of narratively constructed selves. But although ‘[t]he narrative unity 
falls apart entirely’ (Hardcastle & Flanagan, 1999, p. 652) in cases of MPD/
DID, that does not mean that the author is disunited, even if the narratives’ 
protagonists and internal narrators are.  For,  as pointed out earlier,  some 
continuous self-monitoring system is required to keep track of the multiple 
personalities of  the MPD/DID patient.  Perhaps this  business of  keeping 
track is not unlike the task of a novelist keeping track of the different per-
sonalities, styles of speech, and biographies of the various characters in a 
novel: but the novelist is a single author. The disrupted, discontinuous self 
narratives of an MPD/DID patient are indeed indicative of a defective self, 
but they are not evidence of a multiplicity of selves.
In bipolar disorder, it is even less obvious how narrativity is supposed 
to account for the self, since what disruption of self there is in this disorder 
is clearly attributable to shifts in mood, which must have a neurochemical 
cause—otherwise  the  administration  of  mood-stabilizing  medication 
would not,  as  in  Dr  Jones’s  case,  have  such rapid  beneficial  effects.  As 
Melvin Woody (2003) puts it in discussing Dr Jones, the patient with rapid-
cycling bipolar disorder mentioned above: 
Surely, it is not for lack of a narrative that his sense of self becomes fragile 
and the continuity of his identity becomes tenuous, but because the qual-
ity of his experiences changes so drastically from day to day. (p. 334)
 That is, here: a narrator internal to the narrative, as opposed to the author of the 10
narrative.
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Again it is the phenomenology of the individual that characterizes the con-
dition, not the shape, presence or absence of a self narrative.
This is not to say that narrative practices and thinking do not play a 
role in psychiatric patients’ being able to make sense of their conditions. A 
patient may well have an ‘illness narrative’ (Phillips, 2003) that both charts 
her experience of psychopathology and ‘contributes to the experience of 
symptoms’ (p. 320). But this is an example of a self engaging in narrative 
thinking. It is not a case of narrative self-construction as suggested by nar-
rative constructionist accounts, for the illness narrative does not exhaust 
the self, nor is the self wholly defined by the illness: ‘A disease is something 
that one has, not that one is.’ (Ghaemi, 2013, p. 67)
In sum, while narrativity has a role to play in describing and respond-
ing to pathologies of the self,  it  does not explain  them. Their causes run 
deeper, to affective, pre-reflective, neurological disturbances, all of which 
are prior to any reflective narrative thinking. Defects of narrativity, where 
they occur, are a symptom of such underlying disorders.
8.4  Defects and disorders of self and memory as specific 
system malfunctions
In describing the various defects and disorders we have encountered in this 
and the previous chapter,  it  is  easy to slip into metaphorical  talk about 
selves: the autistic child who is ‘self-absorbed’, the person with SDAM hav-
ing ‘no self’, the dementia sufferer ‘losing his self’, the bipolar patient hav-
ing  ‘two  selves’,  the  MPD/DID  case  with  ‘multiple  selves’,  the  schizo-
phrenic experiencing a ‘dissolution of the self’… But such talk, while it may 
perhaps  occasionally  be  socially  useful,  is  unhelpful  scientifically  and 
philosophically  (and,  I  submit,  ultimately  unhelpful  for  the  sufferers  of 
these conditions and those around them), because it does nothing to ex-
plain or manage the defects and disorders discussed. For the ‘selves’ that 
are supposedly impaired, absent, lost, multiplied, or dissolved are all dif-
ferent. 
On my system view of the self, we can make sense of these conditions 
by noting how each involves a failure or malfunction of a distinct self-rep-
resentational capacity, which explains in what way an affected person’s self 
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is affected. In autism spectrum conditions, a number of self-representation-
al processes seem to operate differently from those in neurotypicals, affect-
ing memory operations and self-monitoring of one’s cognitive and affective 
states. In SDAM, there is an absence of self-representation through ‘mental 
time travel’, both backwards and forwards, possibly linked to a defect in 
constructive visual memory and simulation. In frontal-lobe amnesia, self-
representation is disrupted at the point of recollecting  and cross-checking 
autobiographical memories because the self-monitoring process of execut-
ive control is  faulty.  In other amnesias,  different neurological  aetiologies 
produce different impairments affecting the encoding and retrieval of auto-
biographical memory. In dementia, there is progressive deterioration of all 
cognitive functions including higher-level self-representational capacities, 
but its progress and effect varies greatly between different capacities, like 
explicit  autobiographical  remembering,  self-recognition,  trait  self-know-
ledge, and other implicit memories. In split  brains there is a straightfor-
ward  surgically  acquired  disruption  of  interhemispheric  communication 
affecting any self-representational process that normally makes use of the 
corpus callosum. Bipolar disorder seems to result from faulty subpersonal 
self-monitoring at the neurochemical level,  mood-altering neurotransmit-
ters being abnormally released or withheld. MPD/DID, meanwhile, seems 
to be a state of altered self-representation (including a disrupted sense of 
agency and overt self-presentation) at the personal level, induced by psy-
chological trauma. And schizophrenia involves the breakdown of the pro-
cesses normally subserving the self-ascription of one’s own cognitive pro-
cesses.
There are many more conditions resulting from abnormal or defective 
self-representational processes that I could have discussed at some length: 
anosognosia (an organism’s failure to self-monitor illness or injury, result-
ing in patients’ insisting that they are well when they are not), phantom 
limbs in amputees and the converse case of alien-limb syndrome (a severe 
defect in proprioception resulting in the belief that one of one’s limbs is not 
one’s own), out-of-body experiences, and, most strangely perhaps, Cotard 
delusion (whose sufferers believe that they are dead). But I think my point 
is clear: while each of these defects and disorders affects the self, and some 
aspect of the sense of self, of its sufferers, each is traceable to a different mal-
functioning self-representational process or capacity. The diversity of these 
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conditions supports my view that the self is a complex system comprising a 
whole range of processes and capacities, each of which can malfunction. 
But a malfunctioning system is still that same system. And so, though bits 
of it may go awry, there still is a self.
It remains for me to try and explicate quite what we should take that 
system to be. After a brief summing up, that is what I shall do in the con-





9.1  Review: the system view and its advantages
In the face of the wide variety of conceptions of the self in the philosophical 
and psychological literature, my recommendation in this thesis has been 
that we should conceive of the self as a complex self-monitoring system 
deploying our higher-level self-representational capacities (ch. 1). The first 
advantage of this system view is that it puts the self on an objective empir-
ical grounding. Rather than seeking the self by introspecting—the method 
by which Hume (1739) failed to find it—the system view situates the self in 
nature.  Basic  self-representational  processes  in  nervous  systems  are  im-
portant  evolved  capacities  of  complex  organisms.  And  they  provide  a 
‘neural platform’ (Churchland, 2002b) for our higher-level self-monitoring 
processes, such as action planning, impulse control, and autobiographical 
memory.1
The  self,  understood  as  the  functional  system responsible  for  these 
processes, has the persistence conditions of the living brain in which it is 
realized. It does not bifurcate or multiply or get replaced during its owner’s 
lifetime. That is the second advantage of the system view, which distin-
guishes  it  from  the  views  of  Locke  (1690/1706)  and  the  neo-Lockeans 
(ch. 2). These views mistake the self for (some of) its productions, such as 
autobiographical memories, allowing all manner of theoretical but other-
worldly scenarios  like  fissured,  fused,  and disembodied selves.  Further-
more, the Lockeans conflate the self with the attributes of personhood—
which are a separate philosophical problem. Nevertheless, a quasi-Lockean 
 As Pat Churchland has pointed out to me, the human self thus exploits capacities 1
we share with many other animals (see § 9.3).
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view of the self as defined by the retention of personal memories seems to 
have some intuitive popular appeal (ch. 3).
It has been worthwhile, therefore, to look more closely into the nature 
of  autobiographical  memory (ch.  4).  Here  it  soon became apparent  that 
what we call  autobiographical memory is,  again, a diverse and complex 
matter, involving both semantic and episodic memory and requiring differ-
ent ‘enabling systems’ (Klein et al., 2004) for its operations. In particular, 
the reconstructive nature of episodic recollection means that it is misguided 
to  assume  the  self  to  be  constructed  from  autobiographical  memories. 
Rather, it is the self that constructs autobiographical recollections.
Narrative  practices,  whether  in  overt  narration  or  ‘narrative 
thinking’  (Goldie,  2012),  help  rehearse  and consolidate  autobiographical 
memory (ch. 5). But this by no means entails that we construct our selves 
through narrative practices.  Narrative structure is not necessary for self-
representation, and our higher-level self-representations are far from being 
exclusively narrative (ch. 6). It is misguided, therefore, to take narrative ca-
pacity to be essential for a self. Further, narrative constructionist accounts of 
the self face the problem of authorship: who or what is telling the tale? As it 
happens,  the  integration  of  our  self-representational  processes  precedes 
narrative ability. Our self-monitoring system is the ‘author’ of our self nar-
ratives—rather than our narratives being the origin of the self.
The third advantage of the system view, then, is that it puts things in 
the right order, empirically and logically. The self is not constructed from 
autobiographical memories or narratives, as claimed by what I have called 
historical-constructionist (Lockean and narrativist) views. Rather, the self is 
the system that, among other things, constructs autobiographical memories 
and narratives: these temporal constructions are just the consciously avail-
able products of a complex self-monitoring system that is constantly run-
ning in the background of our cognitive activities. By constructing memor-
ies  and  narratives  we  situate  ourselves  in  time.  But  self-monitoring  in-
volves more than conscious remembering and narrating: monitoring one’s 
affective  and cognitive  states,  planning  behaviour,  controlling  one’s  im-
pulses, and so on (see § 9.2.1 below).
Finally, the system view does a better job than its rivals in accounting 
for deficiencies and disorders of the self.  In autism spectrum conditions, 
some self-monitoring capacities are weakened or absent (central coherence; 
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theory of mind), but this does not mean that autistic individuals do not 
have other self-monitoring capacities (such as monitoring their own cognit-
ive and affective states or, in some cases, exceptional episodic recollection) 
(ch. 7). Their selves may be configured differently from neurotypical selves, 
but they are still self-monitoring systems. Other defects and disorders of 
the self-monitoring system, as found in memory deficiencies and personal-
ity disorders, are usually circumscribed to a particular self-representational 
capacity and do not (with the possible exception of late-stage dementia) 
affect other or indeed all self-representational functions (ch. 8). In a com-
plex system like the self, many different processes can go wrong. Such sys-
tem malfunctions are usually specific rather than global.
In sum, the system view (1) naturalizes the self, (2) avoids bizarre bi-
furcations and multiplications of selves and does not conflate the self with 
the qualities of personhood, (3) does not confuse the self with its produc-
tions, in the form of autobiographical memories and self narratives, and (4) 
accounts for deficiencies and disorders of the self as specific malfunctions 
in the self-monitoring system. But what exactly, it may now be asked, is 
that system? That is the topic I’ll now address.
9.2  The self: the brain, the whole brain, and nothing but 
the brain?
‘It is a category mistake to start looking around for the self in the brain,’ 
says Daniel Dennett (1992, p. 109). If by that he means we should not look 
for the self in one specific area of the brain, that is surely right—if some-
what trivial. Though some brain functions can be localized neuroanatomic-
ally in a fairly precise manner (language production, for instance), the mul-
tiplicity of its components makes it very unlikely that this could be true of 
something as complex as the self-monitoring system. 
But if Dennett means that looking around in the brain yields no an-
swers at all with regard to the self (which in the context of his narrative 
constructionist account of the self seems his likely meaning), that is surely 
wrong. Clearly, the self-representational capacities that I have characterized 
as making up the self system are capacities of our brains. The processes ex-
ploited by the self-monitoring system are brain  processes. So—in a loose 
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and somewhat metaphorical sense—we might say that the self is the brain. 
But—less loosely—is it  the whole  brain and nothing but  the brain? These 
questions concern whether we can distinguish between core and peripheral 
processes  of  self-representation  within  the  brain,  and  whether  it  might 
make sense to speak of an ‘extended self’ beyond the brain. I will now out-
line some of the correlates of self-representation in the brain and sketch an-
swers to those questions.
9.2.1  Where and how does the brain make a self?
Although the self  is  not going to be associated with activity in a single 
brain area, there are a number of brain regions whose activity correlates 
fairly reliably with self-representational processing. They include the thal-
amus, the insulae, and cortical midline regions such as the medial prefront-
al cortex, the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, and the precuneus; 
further, in self–non-self distinction tasks, the temporoparietal junction and 
temporal pole (illustrated in fig. 7.1) (Damasio, 1999; Legrand & Ruby, 2009; 
Christoff et al.,  2011).  The anterior and posterior cingulate, the temporo-
parietal junctions, and the insula have also been associated with the de-
fault-mode network (Qin & Northoff,  2011; see §  8.3.4 above).  However, 
these brain areas are not exclusively  involved in self-representational pro-
cessing  but  are  also  active  in  other  tasks,  such as  inferential  reasoning. 
Thus, as Kalina Christoff and colleagues (2011) note, ‘describing these re-
gions (singly or collectively) as self-specific could be unwarranted’ (p. 104).
This note of caution echoes a comprehensive review by Seth Gillihan 
and Martha Farah (2005) of some three dozen studies of the neural correl-
ates of various self-representational capacities. They note that the brain re-
gions involved in different kinds of self-related processing are highly di-
verse, and that ‘there is generally little clustering even with specific aspects 
of the self’ (p. 94). A striking example of this is provided by their review of 
a dozen studies of  self-face recognition,  which used a variety of  experi-
mental designs and subjects and, between them, associated the sole task of 
recognizing images of one’s own face with activity in a vast array of brain 
areas (fig. 9.1). If just one type of self-representational activity yields such a 
diversity of neural correlates—none of which seems to be uniquely special-
ized  for that particular self-representational capacity—it seems likely that 
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much of the brain (subcortical as well as cortical areas, plus the cerebellum) 
is involved, at different times, in some kind of self-representation or other. 
The self, then, is not a neuroanatomically circumscribed system. Where the 
neural correlates of self-representational processes are concerned, it seems 
that the self might really need the whole brain.
Let us then take one step back from neuroanatomy and regard the self, 
once more, as a complex functional system. At the beginning of this thesis, I 
suggested that we should understand the self as the system of potentially 
conscious higher-level self-representational capacities (§  1.4). As we have 
seen, these are quite diverse. Klein (2010) lists as components of the self our 
capacities for various semantic and episodic kinds of autobiographical self-
knowledge, the sense of agency and ownership, the ability to self-reflect, 
the sense of personal continuity over time, and self-recognition. To these 
we must add monitoring and self-ascription of our affective, propriocept-
ive, and cognitive states, executive control of our behaviour and cognitive 
functions,  evaluative  and  output  functions  like  Gazzaniga’s  interpreter 
mechanism (§ 8.3.1), and probably others. Are any of these capacities and 
processes more central or essential than others? And is there, perhaps, a 
 
Figure 9.1  Brain areas associated with self-face recognition in studies reviewed 
by Gillihan & Farah (2005).
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hierarchy of self-representational processes, such that some processes in-
tegrate and bundle others?
As  for  a  central  or  essential  self-representational  process,  Antonio 
Damasio’s (1999; 2010) core self looks a credible candidate. This is a transi-
ent but already conscious self-representation of the organism in its interac-
tions with its environment at any given time. It is, in other words, a process 
resulting  in  what  one  might  call  ‘bare’  or  ‘raw’  self-awareness  in  the 
present. (Crucially, this ‘core consciousness’ is not impaired in conditions 
like Alzheimer’s dementia or schizophrenia.) The core self does not in itself 
involve any continuing self-monitoring. But it is plausible that this capacity 
subserves any higher-level self-monitoring processes, in that self-awareness 
at any given moment seems a necessary condition for self-awareness over 
the time it takes, for instance, to plan and execute complex behaviour while 
monitoring one’s affective and cognitive states.
And it is in executive control—strongly associated with the frontal lobes 
of the brain—that we find an integration of different self-representational 
capacities.  Decision-making, the planning and execution of goal-directed 
behaviour,  and controlling our impulses require input from a variety of 
self-monitoring functions:  monitoring and, if  necessary,  controlling one’s 
affective  states  (where  they might  interfere  with a  goal-directed action), 
keeping track of one’s cognitive states (so as not to lose sight of one’s goal), 
monitoring other body states—hunger, thirst, fatigue, injury—that bear on 
the success of one’s actions, remembering past actions that are relevant to 
the present goal, and so forth. Executive control, then, seems a strong can-
didate for a self-monitoring process that integrates subsidiary self-repres-
entational capacities. One could not, for instance, be a person in Frankfurt’s 
sense (see §  2.4.1)  without executive control.  People with damaged pre-
frontal cortices, like the unfortunate Phineas Gage whose frontal lobes were 
transpierced by a tamping iron, show erratic and goalless behaviour and 
are unable to control their impulses in the pursuit of any targeted action 
(Damasio,  1994).  They become akratic,  as  philosophers like to put  it,  or 
‘scatter-brained’, as the popular idiom has it. Loss of executive control, as 
incurred in frontal-lobe lesions, is a serious loss of an important integrative 
self-monitoring function.
That said, we should not identify the integration of the self-monitoring 
system with executive control alone. People lacking executive control do 
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not usually lack self-awareness or their sense of self, which already integ-
rates various somatic, affective, mnemonic and other cognitive self-repres-
entations. Nor do we lose our sense of self when we are not currently en-
gaged in goal-directed behaviour. Thus, executive control is not the only 
process  that  integrates  other  self-representational  processes.  What  other 
such processes does the brain deploy?
A promising proposal for the integration of self-representational func-
tions in self-awareness is Thomas Metzinger’s (2003) ‘self-model theory of 
subjectivity’.  The  core  of  this  theory  is  the  phenomenal  self-model  (PSM), 
which integrates the consciously accessible self-representational processes 
instantiated in the brain, from oneʼs body image through affective states to 
whatever cognitive processing is currently being consciously experienced. 
The PSM is phenomenal in that its contents are available consciously. It is a 
dynamic model, as its contents are continuously changing. (It is also, by de-
fault,  transparent:  its  contents  do not  include the information that  it  is  a 
model.) Metzinger suggests that the PSM, integrated with a similar trans-
parent  dynamic  phenomenal  model  of  an  organism’s  relations  with  the 
world, is what gives us not only our sense of self, but our subjective first-
person perspective on the world.  Metzinger’s PSM is, as yet, a ‘hypothet2 -
ical notion’ (p. 299), but it is a plausible account of why we seem to have 
global self-awareness and a sense of self that integrates our multiple distin-
guishable self-representational processes. More empirical work is needed to 
test his hypothesis (see § 9.3 below). But if our brains do produce a PSM, 
that conscious global self-representation accounts for our sense of being a 
distinct individual in the world, our sense of self.  It  would be the most 
fundamental integrative production of the self-monitoring system.
9.2.2  Embodied, extended, and experiential selves
The self, as the brain-based self-representational system of a living organ-
ism, is obviously embodied. Except in the imagination of certain philosoph-
ers, active brains do not dwell in vats, but in living organisms. Many of our 
self-representational capacities serve to monitor various states of the body, 
 Metzinger goes further, claiming that his theory naturalizes not only subjectivity, 2
but also intentionality. Tantalizing though it is, I cannot go into this second claim 
here.
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from homeostatic regulation and sensorimotor integration to higher-level 
conscious representations of the organism in its environment. It is for these 
bodily purposes that self-representational capacities have evolved. There is 
thus no need of a prolonged argument in support of the view that the self is 
embodied. As Quassim Cassam (2011) notes, ‘the fantasy of a disembodied 
self is just that: a fantasy’ (p. 154). But, more than that, it is by its embodi-
ment in a persisting organism that the self, too, persists over time (Fuchs, 
2016). 
But then, should we not say that the self is the whole organism, instead 
of identifying it with the self-representational system in its brain?  After all, 3
our self-representations, though generated by the brain, are instances of the 
organism representing itself and not of the brain representing itself. Indeed, 
as I  have just said,  the evolutionary function of the self-representational 
system is to monitor the whole organism. However, there are conditions in 
which the persistence of a living organism and the persistence of a self in 
terms of potentially conscious higher-order self-representation come apart. 
An organism in a persistent vegetative state lacks self-awareness and high-
er-order self-monitoring. It retains only basic self-representational capacit-
ies—homeostatic functions—in the brainstem. It has, in Damasio’s (1999) 
terms, a ‘proto-self’, but it no longer has a self: for it can no longer, as Locke 
(1690/1706) put it, ‘consider itself as itself’ (II.xvii.9). Now it is true that the 
thing that I consider myself extends to the whole organism that I am. But 
my ability to do so is dependent on the functioning of higher-order self-
representations generated by my brain. It seems more fruitful, therefore, to 
think of the self as the system that gives me the capacity to perceive myself 
as a distinct individual than to take it  to be the whole organism, which 
might after all come to lack that capacity—while otherwise remaining the 
same organism. Nor would it make much sense to identify ‘the self’ with 
the referent of each and every ordinary use of ‘me’ or ‘myself’, which often 
is not the whole  organism, as when someone, having cut a finger, says ‘I 
hurt myself’—and sometimes may not be the organism at all, if I were to 
say, for instance, ‘I put a lot of myself into this thesis’.
Does the self, then, perhaps extend beyond the organism? In their ‘ex-
tended mind’ thesis, Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) suggest that 
cognition  extends  beyond  ‘the  boundaries  of  skin  and  skull’  (p.  7),  in-
 I thank Albert Newen for this challenge.3
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volving external cognitive aids such as, in their example, a notebook used 
as an aide-mémoire by a dementia sufferer, Otto. I cannot evaluate the exten-
ded mind thesis per se here. But Clark and Chalmers suggest further that 
such an extended mind implies an extended self: 
Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of con-
sciousness; my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep 
sense part of who I am. If so, then these boundaries may also fall beyond 
the skin. The information in Otto’s notebook, for example, is a central part 
of his identity as a cognitive agent. What this comes to is that Otto himself 
is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism 
and external resources. (p. 18)
Now it might at first seem plausible that the self, as a self-representational 
system, can stretch beyond the organism to any external representations of 
oneself, like photographs, diaries, and other cognitive aids like Otto’s note-
book. But, as Eric Olson (2011) points out, such an extended self would be a 
rather strange kind of entity: thinking beings, on this view, would not be 
biological organisms, but ‘bundles of mental states and processes’ (p. 495). 
For a naturalistic account of the self, that does not seem acceptable. Nor 
does the extended mind thesis entail an extended self, for even if one’s cog-
nitive processes transcend the boundaries of the organism, it does not fol-
low that the cognizing subject does, too: ‘Otto’s memories may or may not 
extend into the notebook he keeps in a drawer. But either way, Otto himself 
is right here.’ (ibid.) So, though we use external cognitive aids that may 
serve to shore up our sense of self over time, such items aren’t part of the 
self.  They are used  by  the self.  The self-representational processing  that is 
triggered or aided by external items still happens in the brain. The self here 
is the actor, not the prop.
The final challenge to identifying the self with the brain’s self-repres-
entational capacities that I wish to consider is of a more methodological 
bent. For it might be said that a naturalistic account of the self such as the 
one I have proposed here leaves out the experiential aspect of the self. Thus, 
Stanley Klein (2012b) suggests a distinction between what he calls  (in a 
somewhat non-standard way) the ‘epistemological self’ and the ‘ontologic-
al self’. The first is ‘a collection of diverse neural components that provide 
us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc.’ (p. 474). 
This  sounds very much like the self-monitoring system I  have sketched 
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here. It is, in Klein’s words, ‘the self of science’ (p. 508). The other, ‘the self 
of experience’ (ibid.), is our ‘subjective, unified awareness, a point of view 
in the first person’ (p. 474). The two selves, or aspects of the self, are further 
distinguished in that the ‘self of science’ is an object, and the ‘self of experi-
ence’ a subject. The suggestion is that the methods of science have no trac-
tion on the latter: in Klein’s view, ‘it is important not to . . . reduce the con-
scious self to the self of empirical exploration’ (p. 508).
I find this distinction, and the implied irreducibility of the subjective 
‘self of experience’ to the objective ‘self of science’, deeply misguided. For 
the whole point  of  the scientific project  of  identifying and studying the 
complex self-representational processes in the brain which ‘provide us with 
our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc.’ is to give an ac-
count  of  how  we  come  to  experience  ourselves  as  unified  subjects  of 
awareness. The self of experience is not a different thing from the self of 
science. They are, as Thomas Fuchs (2016) puts it, ‘two aspects of one and 
the same life process’. Our having ‘a point of view in the first person’ is 
precisely what, for example, Metzinger’s neuroscientifically informed self-
model theory is designed to explain: one’s first-person perspective on the 
world is a result of the integration of self-representational processes in the 
brain. Scientific exploration does not take away the experiential qualities—
the ‘what it is like’—of our subjective awareness. On the contrary: it adds to 
our understanding of  how we experience ourselves  in  the world in  the 
ways that we do. Thus, erecting conceptual barriers between selves of sci-
ence and of experience is not helpful.
There is much more work to be done in investigating self-representa-
tion in the brain, and I will outline some directions for future research in 
the next, final section of this thesis. Before doing so, let me briefly summar-
ize the points I have made in this section. First—pace Dennett—we should 
look around for the self in the brain, though we should not expect to find it 
in a particular brain region or a circumscribed neural network. The neural 
correlates  of  self-monitoring  are  widely  distributed  across  the  brain. 
Secondly, it  is not very promising to look around for the self outside  the 
brain, still less outside the organism: while the objects of neural self-repres-
entational activity are wherever the nervous system reaches, and whereas 
we make use of external cognitive aids in our higher-level self-representa-
tions, the processing and integration of these representations are done by 
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the brain. Finally, there is no unbridgeable metaphysical or epistemological 
gap between the self we experience ‘from the inside’ and the self we invest-
igate scientifically by means of, say, an MRI scanner. They are the same self. 
Let us then see what else we may learn about it empirically.
9.3  An interdisciplinary research programme
Research into selves as self-representational systems and their components 
already straddles many disciplines. Philosophy has a role here in offering 
conceptual clarifications (as I hope I have done in this thesis) and, experi-
mentally, in studying popular intuitions about the self. Disciplines conduct-
ing empirical self-related research include psychology, psychiatry, cognitive 
neuroscience, evolutionary biology and different branches of zoology, and 
the already interdisciplinary research areas of artificial intelligence and ro-
botics. I here outline some self-related topics of research that are currently 
being investigated or should receive researchers’ attention in the near fu-
ture.
Does the magpie making a racket outside my window have a self? It 
seems that she may, at least, have the capacity to recognize herself in a mir-
ror (Prior et al., 2008). Evidence of mirror self-recognition has been noted in 
a variety of species, including chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970), bottlenose dol-
phins (Reiss & Marino, 2001), and, most recently, giant manta rays (Ari & 
D’Agostino,  2016).  Meanwhile,  it  has  been  suggested  that  my magpie’s 
corvid cousins  may engage in  a  form of  mental  time travel  (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998), as may rats (Roberts & Feeney, 2009). There are live dis-
putes over whether all cases of contingency checking in a mirror amount to 
genuine self-recognition (Gallup et al.,  2011) and in what ways rats’ and 
corvids’  mnemonic  capacities  really  resemble  human mental  time travel 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 2010). But such disputes are evidence that 
there is a flourishing research programme underway concerning self-rep-
resentational capacities in non-human animals, from which we may in time 
draw  conclusions  about  how  our  own  self-representational  system  has 
evolved, and why there seems to be convergent evolution of these capacit-
ies in quite distantly related species: there clearly appear to be adaptive ad-
vantages to an organism’s having complex self-representational capacities. 
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We should not assume that we humans are the only animals around that 
have such higher-level capacities.
For our own species, there is much research to be done in seeking to 
identify the neural correlates of higher-level self-representations, such as 
Metzinger’s (2003) phenomenal self-model. As mentioned earlier (§ 9.2.1), 
these correlates are likely to be distributed across different brain regions, so 
the focus will have to be less on picking out specific neuroanatomical loca-
tions than on the processes that activate particular networks and combina-
tions of brain areas. Open questions here concern the precise role the de-
fault-mode network (§ 8.3.4) plays in self-related processing, what its activ-
ation and deactivation mechanisms are,  and what  other  functions  these 
might serve. A related topic of interest is Damasio’s (1999; 2010) suggestion 
that the emergence of a core self and that of consciousness are inextricably 
linked. Since basic self-representational processes (homeostasis, sensorimo-
tor integration) happen non-consciously, it seems clear that self-representa-
tion per se  precedes consciousness, and it  is therefore unlikely that there 
could be consciousness without its involving any form of self-representa-
tion. It is less clear whether consciousness is a by-product of the integration 
or  recursion  of  self-representational  processes  or  a  different  process  en-
tirely. The balance of the neural evidence so far suggests the former (with 
‘core consciousness’ and the core self sharing a neural substrate), but more 
empirical  work  on  the  boundaries  of  consciousness  (in  the  sleep–wake 
cycle,  or  in  psychopathologies  involving  unusual  disturbances  of  con-
sciousness) will be useful here.4
Metzinger’s  self-model  theory is  an account of  our first-person per-
spective on the world, an attempt to explain subjectivity by showing how 
the brain models the relations between the self and objects in its environ-
ment. On this point, Dorothée Legrand and Perrine Ruby (2009) suggest 
that our best chance of finding neural mechanisms that are truly self-specif-
ic (rather than shared with other neurocognitive functions) will consist pre-
cisely in studying the neural processing of self–object relations. They hypo-
thesize that the first-person perspective arises from the sensorimotor integ-
ration of efference copy of the brain’s motor commands (see § 8.3.4) with 
sensory re-afference, that is, the perceived feedback on the effects of our 
 It  may also help put to rest  the ‘new mysterianism’ about consciousness pro4 -
pounded by the likes of Thomas Nagel (1974) and David Chalmers (1995).
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motor actions in the world. This is an ongoing research project worthy of 
detailed investigation—particularly of how, where, and how soon efference 
copy and re-afference signals are integrated. On a related note, one may 
wonder whether  and how self-representations and the representation of 
self–world interactions fit with the recent model of the brain as a predictive 
processing engine, defended notably by Andy Clark (2013). Here, Anil Seth 
(2013) suggests that the self, as an embodied mechanism, does indeed op-
erate as an inferential, predictive system. This too is very much a project for 
future research, including the role of particular neural populations, neuro-
transmitters,  and higher-level  cognitive  processes  in  the error  correction 
mechanisms posited by the predictive-processing thesis.
What we can learn about self-representation and the representation of 
self–object relations in the brain has applications in robotics. The issue here 
is  not to build self-aware  robots (though it  is  an intriguing philosophical 
question what level of sophistication and integration of robotic self-repres-
entational capacities may be said to constitute self-awareness ). Rather, cur5 -
rent robotics research is concerned with endowing robots with a predictive 
self-model and a brain-like sensorimotor control architecture that will allow 
them to adapt to and interact with different environments and to plan and 
guide their activities (Schilling & Cruse, 2012; Prescott et al., 2014). Robots 
with these capacities will be useful—and needed—in areas as diverse as 
therapeutic settings and personal care, infrastructure repairs, and planetary 
exploration.
Returning to the human self, there are many open questions concern-
ing its subsidiary processes of memory that I have discussed in this thesis. 
Just  how  much  autobiographical  remembering  is  reconstructive?  Is 
‘severely deficient autobiographical memory’ (§ 8.2.1) a freak condition or 
one end of a spectrum ranging from a complete absence of episodic recol-
lection to the videographic memories of autistic Temple Grandin (§ 7.3.3)? 
More basically, how does memory retrieval actually work in neural terms? 
We have a fair amount of knowledge of the neural correlates of encoding 
memory (most  prominently,  the  hippocampus and adjoining cortical  re-
gions), but so far very little is known about the neural basis of retrieving 
memories. It seems reasonable to expect that some more of our pretheoret-
 A charming exploration of this question and its ethical implications can be found 5
in the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode ‘The Quality of Life’ (Frakes, 1992).
!254
ical assumptions about remembering will be challenged as cognitive neuro-
science makes progress on these questions. And, concerning those prethe-
oretical assumptions, I plan to conduct an experimental philosophy study 
of whether there is a popular causal conception of remembering, according 
to which we assume memories to be causally linked, in the ‘right’ way, to 
the events of which they are memories (§ 4.4.1).
Finally, there are open questions for the psychiatry of the self, particu-
larly  with  respect  to  autism  spectrum  conditions  and  schizophrenia. 
Though the diagnostic criteria of autism in behavioural experiments con-
tinue to evolve, we still do not know quite how the neural architecture of 
people with autism differs from that of neurotypicals, or indeed whether 
there is a single neurological cause of the symptoms of autism. Another ur-
gent question is what precisely has gone wrong, and from what causes, 
with self-representational processing in schizophrenia. An account of the 
neural causes of the breakdown of the self in schizophrenia could point the 
way towards preventing or curing this distressing condition. Above all, we 
should hope that a conceptualization of the self as a complex system with 
many different components may forestall the all-too-easy but, to those con-
cerned, detrimental assumption that people with autism spectrum condi-
tions, with schizophrenia, or with dementia have no self. Their self-monit-
oring  system may be  differently  configured (in  autism)  or  defective  (in 
schizophrenia and dementia)—but it is not absent.
The self—its evolution, its functioning in the brain, its links with con-
sciousness, its malfunctions in psychiatric disorders, its possible replication 
in robots—promises to be the subject of a diverse interdisciplinary research 
programme for some time yet. I like to think that David Hume, were he 
alive today, would be fascinated by this—and eager to join in.
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